Φιλοσοφια
Volume 26, 2: 2025

PHILOSOPHY, SOPHISTRY, AND THE TREACHERY OF AN *ETHICS*-LESS SOCIETY

Blaise D. Ringor
University of Santo Tomas

This essay examines the implications of the proposed removal of Ethics from the Philippine tertiary curriculum, situating the issue within the broader decline of moral and philosophical education in contemporary universities. Drawing from classical sources—particularly the educational philosophies of Plato and Aristotle—it recovers the notion of paideia (παιδεία), the formation of the soul, as the essential aim of higher learning. The argument proceeds by analyzing key elements of the classical tradition, including Plato's concept of periagōgē (περιαγωγή), or the soul's turning toward the good, and Aristotle's account of phronēsis (φρόνησις), or practical wisdom formed through habituation. Using a method of close philosophical retrieval, the essay critically evaluates the ontological consequences of reducing truth to information and formation to technical function. It assesses policy initiatives, such as those advanced by the Philippine Department of Education, through the lens of the classical notion of education and ethics as well as Christian metaphysics. The findings indicate that such educational reforms signal administrative shifts and the loss of a shared vision of the good. In conclusion, the paper argues that true education must be reoriented toward the intrinsic worth of the human person, capable of recognizing and loving what is true. Rather than a nostalgic appeal, this is presented as an invitation to recover philosophy as the governing principle of education.

Keywords: classical tradition, ethics, formation, paideia, philosophy of education

INTRODUCTION

In a disquieting turn of events, the Department of Education (DepEd) has proposed the removal of three general education courses—Art Appreciation, Contemporary World, and Ethics—from the tertiary level curriculum. These courses will be integrated into the senior high school program, and their elimination from higher education aims to prevent redundancy and reduce the general education load by 24 units, equivalent to one semester. The revised senior high school curriculum, set for

phased implementation in the 2025–2026 academic year, will include five core subjects in Grade 11, with Grade 12 dedicated to electives aligned with students' chosen academic or technical-vocational tracks (Panti 2025, n.p.). The proposal is couched in rhetoric of efficiency and streamlining, but its more profound implication is an assault on what classical philosophy deemed the soul of education.[1] It is as if the very concept of *paideía* (παιδεία, *paideía*, "education" or cultural formation) is being hollowed out. The Greeks understood education not as the mere transfer of technical know-how but as the tending of the psychē (ψυχή, *psychē*, "soul") toward the good. To remove the ethical core of higher learning is to enact a kind of spiritual amputation—a bureaucratic abolition of the soul under the guise of academic reform. In this climate, we do well to recall Socrates, who paid with his life for insisting that the soul's virtue matters more than worldly success. Socrates was accused of "corrupting the youth" of Athens, but as Romano Guardini (1948) observes, the trial of Socrates in 399 B.C. dramatized a tragic conflict between two conceptions of the good: one mythically founded and pragmatic, manifested in a stable structure of social life and in sharing of common beliefs and values, and the other, the good of the individual (Socrates) ethically superior… and rationally justified (Guardini 1948, 15-44).[2] This clash between a complacent *civic utilitarianism* and the higher demands of ethical truth is not merely ancient history; it is manifest anew in the contemporary push to *subordinate moral education* to expedient concerns. The death of Socrates, Guardini suggests, revealed the Athenians' inability to tolerate a teacher who prioritized the interior life of conscience over the external conventions of the *polis*. Today, in a newly "pragmatic"[3] bid to shorten degree programs and churn out "productive" graduates, we witness a similarly telling intolerance for the claims of ethics and philosophy. The Philippine university (Panti 2025, n.p.)[4] , increasingly shaped by technocratic imperatives, begins to resemble the posture of the Athenian magistrates who, as Plato recounts, rejected the examined life and suppressed moral cultivation. This tendency reflects a departure from paideia (παιδεία; institutio; formative education) as the ordered shaping of the soul toward the agathon (ἀγαθόν; bonum; the good).

Such institutional transformation is not hypothetical but concretely manifested in current policy proposals. In May 2025, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), guided by technocratic principles of efficiency and standardization, proposed the elimination of Ethics and two other core humanities subjects from the college curriculum (Panti 2025, n.p.). The justification? To "streamline redundancy" and reduce the time-to-degree, as though education were a manufacturing pipeline. But what is being streamlined is not inefficiency—it is conscience, contemplation, and the cultivation of judgment. When Ethics is treated as dispensable, the state does not simply reform policy; it declares the irrelevance of the soul's formation. This is not educational reform. It is a systematic diminishment of humanistic education. And it is measurable: while business and engineering programs swell with government incentives, philosophy enrollments languish at just over 1% of total tertiary students nationwide (Philippine Statistics Authority 2023, Table 10.17).[5] The numbers do not lie. We are not forming persons; we are assembling laborers. The proposal to remove Ethics[6] betrays the same impatience with which a utilitarian city-state once met the gadfly of Athens. It signals a willingness to sacrifice the *aretḗ* (ἀρετή, *aretḗ*, "virtue"

or excellence) of the soul on the altar of some presumed greater efficiency. It is, in essence, an officially sanctioned invitation to *sophistry*.

While much has been written about curricular shifts and educational decline, few treatments confront the philosophical—and particularly metaphysical—foundations of these phenomena. This article seeks to fill that lacuna by engaging the crisis not through policy analysis alone, but through classical philosophical anthropology, reasserting the forgotten telos of liberal education as the soul's alignment with the Good.

The method employed here is fundamentally classical: it employs Plato's dialectical understanding of education as paideia (παιδεία) and periagoge (περιαγωγή)—the soul's formation and turning toward the Good—together with Aristotle's analysis of phronesis (φρόνησις) as practical wisdom, implicitly grounded in Thomistic participation in the Good. This classical approach is particularly suited to our inquiry because it alone preserves the integral connection between education and human flourishing (eudaimonia) that contemporary technocratic frameworks have severed. While modern educational theories often reduce learning to skill acquisition or knowledge transfer, the classical tradition uniquely articulates education as soul-formation (paideia)—a process of periagoge (περιαγωγή), the soul's turning toward reality and truth. This "turning around" of the whole person from shadows to light, from opinion to knowledge, from appearances to being itself, is precisely what ethics education facilitates—and what its removal endangers. The inquiry proceeds dialectically through three movements: retrieval of classical sources, critical engagement with contemporary educational discourse, and critical application to the Philippine policy context. This approach allows for both philosophical depth and contemporary relevance, avoiding the twin errors of antiquarian nostalgia and unreflective progressivism. Moreover, the Philippines' own educational heritage, rooted in Catholic intellectual tradition, has historically drawn from this Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis, making this framework culturally resonant as well as philosophically rigorous. Contemporary philosophers and educational thinkers are enlisted to fortify this classical framework in examining the attempt to eliminate Ethics from the university curriculum as a fundamental philosophical incoherence.

The ἀγαθόν (agathon, *bonum*, "the Good") is taken as both final cause and formal measure of education because only a teleological framework can adequately critique the instrumentalization of learning. Without reference to objective ends—without understanding education as periagoge toward the Good—we lack grounds to distinguish authentic education from mere training. The critique unfolds through the dialectical juxtaposition of true and false educational forms, following the ἔλεγχος (elenchus, "refutation" or "cross-examination") of Socratic argumentation and Aristotelian causal analysis, but in the service of metaphysical illumination rather than epistemic skepticism.

PHILOSOPHY OR SOPHISTRY?

Plato famously drew a sharp contrast between the true philosopher and the sophist.[7] The philosopher devotes himself or herself to truth and the cultivation of the soul's virtues; the sophist forgoes truth for the sake of appearance, persuasion, or profit. In Plato's analysis, Sophistry is a kind of intellectual charlatanry—an education in

slick argument devoid of genuine commitment to the good. In the *Republic*, Socrates warns that when those unfit by character or motive pretend to educate, they only succeed in producing a facade of wisdom. "When persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them," Socrates cautions, the result will be nothing but "sophisms captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom (Plato 1991, 495a-b)."[8] This devastating critique of inauthentic teaching rings ominously true today. To eliminate Ethics in favor of ostensibly more "practical" subjects is to risk replacing genuine moral insight with a mere simulation of learning—brightly packaged "skills" training that ignores the formation of character. Proponents of the proposed reform argue from premises of expediency. They contend that tertiary education must become more streamlined, avoiding redundancy with subjects taught in senior high school, and aligned to economic demands. CHED officials and curriculum designers claim that the removal of Ethics will make way for "more employable" graduates, while saving costs for both institutions and students (Panti 2025, n.p.). These arguments reflect a view of education as a functional mechanism for labor preparation. Yet it is precisely this reduction of formation to function, and of human to instrument, that the philosophical tradition warns against. Such an approach to education, guided by the demand for immediate utility, would confirm Plato's darkest insights about the corruptibility of pedagogy. In fact, Plato has Socrates suggest that the greatest corrupting influence upon the youth is not the individual Sophist-for-hire, but the society itself when it prizes the wrong ideals. "Isn't it rather the very men who say this who are the biggest sophists?" Socrates asks. Do not the masses "who educate most perfectly and who turn out young and old, men and women, just the way they want them to be? (Plato 1991, 492a)"[9] Here, Plato turns our attention to the subtle sophistry of public opinion—how an entire culture can warp the minds of its citizens by esteeming what is base and scorning what is truly noble. A society that heaps honor upon technical proficiency while deriding moral wisdom will inevitably produce a generation in its own image. The removal of Ethics as a core subject broadcasts a message about what the polity values: it says that training compliant workers is essential, while training virtuous citizens is a dispensable luxury. The state thereby becomes, in effect, the Sophist-in-Chief, "educating" the populace by its policy priorities, molding the young to "just the way they want them to be (Plato 1991, 492ff)"[10] — one now bereft of the language of right and wrong.

Against this bleak prospect, we recall that for Plato and his heirs, the true aim of education was nothing less than the *soul's orientation to reality*. The philosopher-educator does not merely impart information; he or she turns the student's gaze toward the Good itself. In a famous passage, Plato likened education to the art of spiritual midwifery, a guiding of the soul out of the cave of ignorance into the light of truth. The ultimate τέλος (*télos*; "end" or purpose) of learning is to enable the soul to see what is true, good, and beautiful—and thereby to become good itself. No part of this process was "useless" or extraneous; still less was it an obstacle to prosperity or progress. On the contrary, Plato insists that a wise person will devote himself above all to those studies that nurture virtue. Such a person will… prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others, because "the just man has revealed himself to us as good and wise, and the unjust man unlearned and bad (Plato 1991, 350c)." The

soul's health was the standard by which to judge any curriculum. If an educational scheme failed to minister to the soul's development in virtue—if it neglected the cultivation of moral judgment alongside intellectual skill—then it could not be regarded as complete education in the Platonic sense. Since for Plato, authentic education (παιδεία; paideia; *institutio*; formation) is measured by the harmony of the soul with the good (ἀγαθόν; agathon; *bonum*). Thus, a system of education fostering skill (τέχνη; technē, *ars*; technique) but neglecting virtue (ἀρετή; aretē, *virtus*) is incomplete and ultimately misdirected, failing to fulfill its essential role. Such a system of education risks producing graduates who possess technical competence without the ethical framework to guide their application, potentially leading to the misuse of knowledge for unjust ends. Plato's concern was not that all students would become corrupt, but that education divorced from virtue leaves them vulnerable to moral error and provides no internal compass for distinguishing right from wrong use of their abilities.

For Plato, ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē, *scientia*; "knowledge") severed from ethical understanding was not wisdom but a kind of sickness. To deprive students of moral formation is to leave them with a one-sided, stunted development: a lopsided training of the intellect or will that neglects the harmony of the whole person. It is, to use the Platonic analogy, like strengthening one limb while letting the soul languish in atrophy. The inevitable result is imbalance and disorder—*a soul out of tune with the good, and thus a life out of joint*.

For Aristotle, such a disfigured conception of education would signify a mutilation of its very form. He distinguishes between τέχνη (technē, *ars*)—the skill of making—and φρόνησις (*prudential;* prudence)—the virtue of acting rightly in relation to the good. *Phronēsis* is not mere cleverness; it is moral intelligence rooted in the end of human flourishing. Without it, the intellect becomes cunning, the will unmoored, and power indistinguishable from injustice. True education must cultivate this capacity for right judgment in concrete circumstances, for it alone orders practical reason to the soul's highest purposes.[11] Thus, Aristotle contends clearly that "[p]ractical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.5, 1140b5)."[12] What is lost in the removal of ethical formation is not auxiliary content, but the very faculty by which the human person apprehends the good. And *the good*—as the classical tradition testifies—is not a functional utility or a market preference. It is the ontological end (*telos*) that perfects being itself.[13]

A society emphasizing technical ability (technē, τέχνη; ars; technique) without cultivating practical wisdom (phronēsis, φρόνησις; prudentia) invites imbalance. The classical tradition demands their integration so that competence always serves moral ends oriented to the good (agathon, ἀγαθόν; bonum). A society that cultivates both technical competence and justice achieves the ideal; yet if circumstances demand emphasis on one dimension, Plato would contend that moral education deserves precedence. Technical skills can be acquired later in specialized training, but the capacity for moral judgment—once neglected in formative years—proves far more difficult to develop. This is not to advocate for technical incompetence, but rather to recognize that a youth who develops sound moral judgment alongside modest technical abilities contributes more to society's genuine flourishing than one who

masters technical skills without any framework for their ethical application. Plato would remind us that justice is nothing other than the health of the soul, and injustice its disease. If so, what can one say about a policy that intentionally excises the very medicine—ethical reflection meant to prevent the disease? It amounts to declaring that we are content for our graduates to be clever and diseased, rather than slightly less intelligent[15] but healthy in heart and mind. The ancient philosophers, who understood the soul's well-being as the foundation of any good society, would recoil at such folly. They would see in it not progress, but the regression of a civilization into a truncated education that advances technical proficiency (τέχνη) at the expense of moral excellence (ἀρετή ἠθική), inverting the classical hierarchy that subordinated skill to wisdom (σοφία, sophia; *sapientia*).

LIBERAL EDUCATION AND THE MEANING OF *UNIVERSITY*

Josef Pieper warned explicitly against this inversion of progress, where education's contemplative foundation is undermined by demands for productivity, causing formative education to be supplanted by measurable output. In Pieper's analysis, modern societies have become so fixated on material productivity and utility that they risk destroying the capacity for higher contemplation and virtue. He spoke of the rise of a total "world of work" in which human beings are valued only as cogs in an economic machine. In such a world, education itself is reduced to a conveyor belt for producing functionaries; any element of learning that does not obviously serve the immediate economic order is disparaged or discarded. Pieper explicitly noted that "in a consistently planned 'worker' State there is no room for philosophy" and that if all knowledge is harnessed to utilitarian ends, "there can be no such thing as university (academic) education in the full sense of the word."[16] This is a remarkable statement from a man writing in the aftermath of World War II. Yet, it reads today like a prophecy of our educational policy debates. Pieper saw with clarity that true philosophy (and by extension any genuine liberal education) cannot survive in an atmosphere of relentless pragmatism. Philosophy, by its nature, "cannot serve other ends than its own or it ceases to be philosophy (Pieper 1999, 23)"[17]— it seeks truth for its own sake, not for ulterior gain. Likewise, moral education seeks the good for its own sake, not as a means to higher employment statistics or national competitiveness. Suppose a university system views the pursuit of wisdom and virtue as an expendable ornament, something to be trimmed away in lean times. In that case, that system has already renounced the idea of a university in the classical sense. The word *universitas* in Latin denotes a whole or entirety; it implies a community of scholars and students devoted to the integral formation of the human being and the unified pursuit of truth. To slice out ethics, to dismiss the quest for how one ought to live, is to shatter that wholeness. It produces, as Pieper would say, an institution in name only—an *universitas* without its animating soul. Pieper's contemporary, the German Catholic thinker Dietrich von Hildebrand, was equally alarmed by the encroachment of relativistic and utilitarian ideologies into education and the Church. Writing about the crises of his era, Hildebrand decried the mentality that elevates shifting "worldly" values above enduring truth. In his book *Trojan Horse in the City of God*, he describes

how abandoning objective truth in favor of fashionable trends endangers the foundations of moral and spiritual life. Central to Hildebrand's criticism is the role of **pragmatism** in this decline. Modern people often imagine themselves to be progressing beyond the old truths, when in fact they are merely discarding them. As Hildebrand (1967) puts it, "[i]n this dethronement of truth by the ambiguous notion of aliveness, the influence of pragmatism is manifest. Questions of truth and value are considered obsolete, abstract, and without interest. The only relevant question seems to be whether something is alive, dynamic, or operative (82-83)."[18] In this assessment, Hildebrand sounds a warning uncannily applicable to the present moment. The push to eliminate ethics is touted as a practical reform, justified in terms of credit units, labor markets, and the streamlining of redundancies between secondary and tertiary education. But this ostensibly pragmatic move stands revealed, under Hildebrand's analysis, as part of a larger "supplanting" of truth by the spirit of our age—an age that measures value in crude utilitarian terms. The very question "What is it good for?" has narrowed to mean "How does it serve the economy or the state's goals?" In this mindset, the intrinsic good of a youth coming to discern right from wrong is invisible; it is not so much debated as dismissed as irrelevant. Hildebrand understood this as a subjective distortion: what is "practical" for an apparatus of power or profit is not the same as what is truly good for a person or a community. Indeed, an undue emphasis on the "practical" can be outright destructive if it leads us to neglect the cultivation of conscience and character. He reminds us, in effect, that a society which "progresses" beyond objective moral truths does not really progress at all—it only succeeds in making Truth harder to discern, leaving a vacuum soon filled by the prevailing winds of desire and opinion. Under such conditions, education easily degenerates into sophistry: teaching the youth not what is true or good, but what is expedient to get ahead in the existing order of things. It trains them to become "useful" according to the reckoning of an amoral system, rather than to become fully realized human beings capable of independent thought and upright action.

This degeneration is precisely what Martha Nussbaum cautions against in her contemporary defense of humanistic education. Nussbaum, in *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*, observes that many nations "thirsty for national profit" are "heedlessly discarding skills that are needed to keep democracies alive (Nussbaum 2010, 2)."[19] When educational systems fixate on STEM[20] fields or vocational training to the exclusion of the humanities and ethics, they may produce efficient workers, but they imperil the cultivation of citizens. The ultimate outcome, Nussbaum warns, is that nations will begin "producing generations of useful machines, rather than complete citizens who can think for themselves (Nussbaum 2010, 2)." This stark image—young people rendered as useful automatons—exposes the fundamental incompatibility between purely instrumental education and the formation of persons capable of democratic citizenship and moral agency. A democracy relies on its citizens' capacities to deliberate, empathize, and judge rightly about the common good. These capacities do not emerge spontaneously from technical instruction; they are the fruit of ethical reflection, historical understanding, aesthetic cultivation, and yes, the seemingly "impractical" ability to imagine the world from another's point of view. In short, they come from the humanities. Nussbaum's scholarship reinforces a point that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle knew well: that a society which neglects the formation

of character and critical thinking in its young is courting disaster. A public deprived of ethical education and informed of the truth about history risks diminished capacity to evaluate political rhetoric critically; workers trained exclusively in technical procedures may find themselves ill-equipped to question morally dubious directives. As Nussbaum succinctly puts it, "Knowledge is no guarantee of good behavior, but ignorance is a virtual guarantee of bad behavior (Nussbaum 2010, 81)."[21] Stripping ethics out of the curriculum virtually guarantees that the next generation of leaders and voters will be less equipped to behave well, less likely to recognize injustice, to curb their own greed or hubris, to stand up for principles over interest. They may become superbly efficient engineers or managers, but as citizens and humans, they risk being morally adrift. In the Filipino context, one must ask: What is the end game of an educational vision that sidelines Ethics? Is it presumed that moral formation will somehow take place in a vacuum, or in the private sphere, while public education concerns itself only with technical competencies? This would be a naïve presumption. Without its formal place in the curriculum, moral education becomes contingent rather than constitutive of learning. This structural absence risks producing a peculiar form of progress: material advancement accompanied by ethical uncertainty. One is reminded of the haunting question posed in the Gospel: *quid prodest?*—what does it profit a person to gain the world and lose his soul?[22] The question applies as well to societies and their educational policies.

The risk inherent in such curricular restructuring is that efficiency gains may coincide with diminished opportunities for moral formation—potentially creating what could be understood as a Faustian exchange: immediate practical benefits at the possible expense of deeper human development. To accept this de-souling of education is to embrace what Heidegger would call a kind of *Ge-stell*, an enframing, where human beings are treated as mere resources to be optimized. Martin Heidegger, writing after the devastation of the Second World War, reflected deeply on the spiritual crisis of the modern West. In his *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger noted that "Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world."[23] By "homelessness," he did not mean the literal absence of shelter, but an extreme condition of alienation: the modern human has lost his or her spiritual home, lost sight of any transcendent orientation, and thus wanders unmoored in a wasteland of his or her own making. This homelessness is evident in our educational system. When this system focus on time-efficiency at the cost of overriding the prerequisites of moral and spiritual formation, it deprives students of an intellectual home—a dwelling place of the mind where the highest questions can be asked and where one's conscience can anchor itself in reason. Without this, students may drift into what Guardini elsewhere called the "interior impoverishment" of modern life, where the soul's hunger for meaning is left unfed. An education without ethics is literally without *ethos*—without that dwelling place or habitat in which human freedom can learn to find its proper bearings. It leaves young people technically adept but spiritually adrift, proficient in means but uncertain about ends. The danger of this is not merely personal; it is civilizational. A society of such "useful machines" may function with clockwork efficiency, but it will be prone to the worst atrocities, for nothing inside it any longer militates against treating humans as expendable means.

CONCLUSION

Dietrich von Hildebrand discerned in the crises of the 1960s that a false conception of renewal was infiltrating even the Church—a Trojan horse bearing an ethos of relativism and worldly activism that would distort true reform into destruction. Analogously, the rhetoric of "educational reform" today can hide an insidious Trojan horse: under the pretext of modernization, it smuggles in an ethos that regards youthful souls as mere clay to be molded for the economy, rather than persons to be awakened to truth. Hildebrand's counsel, following Augustine, was to resist such Trojan horses with the "lion's soul" of courage, to "kill the error, love the one who errs (Hildebrand, 64)."[24] Here, loving those who err means understanding the legitimate concerns that lead to such proposals (the desire to improve efficiency or avoid redundancy), but firmly correcting the error of thinking that ethics is a dispensable frill. It means exposing the sophistry of the sophists—those contemporary officials who, whether knowingly or not, play the role of Protagoras, selling a curriculum of *chrēsimótης* (χρησιμότης, *chrēsimótēs*, "usefulness") in place of one of wisdom. The ancient Sophists claimed to teach success; today's technocrats teach "employability." The Sophists neglected virtue; the technocrats sideline ethics. In both cases, what is lost is the soul's wholeness and the city's charter of justice.

Ultimately, removing Ethics from the university is not a neutral administrative decision. It is a profoundly ethical decision in itself—one that implicitly answers the very question it refuses to let students ask: "How should we live?" The answer it gives by omission is chilling in its silence: live without asking why, live without an examined purpose, live as efficient producers and compliant consumers. Such an answer amounts to what Socrates would deem a life not worth living, for he insisted that "it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day and those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for man, you will believe me even less."[25] Though this specific quotation is Socratic and not from our modern authors, its spirit echoes through Guardini, Pieper, Nussbaum, and Heidegger alike. Each in his or her own way urges that human life desperately needs meaning, reflection, and orientation toward the good. A university that abdicates the teaching of Ethics abdicates its responsibility to nurture that which makes us human. When education addresses only technical competence while neglecting moral formation, it produces an analogous incompleteness in its graduates—functional capability without the wisdom to direct it. So too, a society may achieve a particular kind of material order and yet be, in Guardini's words, 'emptying-out of immediate existence,' having lost the inner cohesion given by shared moral truth.[26]

We must therefore call this proposal what it is: a *state-sanctioned sophistry*. It is a policy-level endorsement of the idea that expediency trumps truth. It tells the young, by example, that the philosophical quest can be discarded whenever it inconveniences the program of economic optimization. This is a deeply cynical lesson, and a dangerous one. It breeds a habit of intellectual dishonesty in the polity, whispering that everything noble is impractical and everything impractical (like moral

integrity) is negligible. Over time, such an attitude hollows out democratic life. A healthy democracy relies not only on informed voters but on virtuous citizens—men and women capable of discerning justice and moved by more than narrow self-interest. Ethics education, far from being an abstract indulgence, has direct practical consequences for the quality of civic freedom. As Nussbaum notes, even the economic sphere ultimately suffers when humanistic values are lost: innovation stalls without imagination, and corruption abounds where critical dissent is discouraged. The removal of Ethics thus even fails on its own "pragmatic" terms, undercutting the formation of trustworthy leaders and creative thinkers.

Marking the cadence of this argument, one might detect a certain gravitas and urgency. This style is deliberate, for the matter is grave and time is short. In tones reminiscent of an earlier era's clarity, we recall Romano Guardini's meditation on Socrates' death as the fragmentation of a city's moral consciousness, and we cannot avoid drawing a parallel to our present plight. We speak with Pieper's insistence that joy in truth is the heart of culture, with Nussbaum's passionate defense of the humanities as democracy's lifeblood, with Hildebrand's zealous cry to unmask error, and with Heidegger's prophetic whisper about a world growing homeless. There is a unity to their testimony. All these voices urge that education is not fundamentally about producing ἐργάται (*ergataí;* "workers") for the economy, but about forming persons for a life of meaning and responsibility. To abolish the soul from the university is to produce graduates splendidly equipped to build a new world, yet who carry within themselves the seeds of that world's undoing. It is to raise up a generation that might "gain the whole world" in knowledge, and yet lose the very Self that knows and loves.

In light of these reflections, the ethical imperative is clear. The proposal to remove Ethics, though motivated by understandable concerns about redundancy and efficiency, must be discussed immediately with constructive dialogue and solidarity in mind, because removing it without consultation and proper discussion risks confusing the instrumental aspects of education with its fundamental aims. In any case, the proposal to drop Ethics, *if it is insisted on*, must be rejected as a false step, a confusion of the means of education with its end. The true *end* of education, as all great philosophical and religious traditions affirm, is the flourishing of the human person in accordance with truth. Let the Filipino university be a place where that truth is sought, where **σοφία** (sophía, "wisdom") is honored above mere technē, and where the soul is not starved but nurtured. Anything less would be unworthy of our heritage and fatal to our future. While this analysis has necessarily been critical, the path forward requires constructive engagement: defending ethics education through patient dialogue with policymakers, offering both philosophical arguments and practical alternatives that honor legitimate concerns about efficiency while preserving moral formation. In doing so, we heed the call of Socrates, the model for this non-violent resistance,[27] resounding across millennia: to care for our souls and the souls of our youth more than for wealth or reputation or the favor of the crowd. If we succeed in this, we will have done more than save a course on paper—we will have kept alight the flame of philosophy against the winds of sophistry, for the good of our children and the good of our democracy. In that perseverance, there remains hope that the university will not end up in spiritual ruin, but find renewal as a true home of wisdom, a guardian of the Republic's soul.

NOTES

1. The term *education* stems from the Latin *educere*—*e-* (out) and *ducere* (to lead)—signifying not the passive transference of information, but the active drawing forth of the soul into the order of what is. In the classical tradition, this presumes that reality is not a construct but a gift, and that the human being, endowed with *logos*, is capax veritatis—capable of truth. Education, therefore, is neither a charade of neutrality nor the ideological reeducation camps of modern bureaucracies, but the soul's alignment with being. Robert Spaemann, standing squarely within this tradition, declares that "education is an introduction to reality," and that "reality reveals itself only to love." Robert Spaemann, *Education as an Introduction to Reality*, *Humanum Review*, trans. D.C. and Jeanne Schindler, originally in *Scheidewege* 17 (1987–88), reprinted in *Grenzen. Zur ethischen Dimension des Handelns* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002).

This is no sentimental platitude. Love, in this context, is a disposition of reverent receptivity—an acknowledgment that meaning is not invented but received. It is only through this love that the veil of seeming is lifted and the world discloses itself in its moral and ontological depth.

Education so conceived requires formation in the one who educates. Spaemann insists, "One must be able to live in order to be able to teach how to live." Ibid.

The teacher's task is not merely to inform, but to embody—to incarnate the very orientation to reality he wishes to communicate. He introduces the student to the structure of existence, not as theory but as lived truth. Where education is reduced to utility, it becomes a parody of itself; it condemns the student to intellectual solipsism under the guise of liberation. Where it evades the question of truth, it ceases to be formative and becomes deformative.

This vision echoes the Platonic understanding of *paideia*, in which education is the soul's *periagōgē* (περιάγωγή), a turning toward the form of the Good. Plato, *Republic* 518c. It aligns with the Aristotelian and Thomistic conviction that truth is *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, and that education is a cooperation with divine providence, drawing the intellect toward its *telos*. What masquerades today as education is often a quiet anesthesia, dulling the soul to reality's call and replacing wonder with compliance. Spaemann's rebuke stands: education that is not a pathway to truth is not education at all—it is the polite form of forgetting.

2. Cf. Romano Guardini, *The Death of Socrates: An Interpretation of the Platonic Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo*, trans. Basil Wrighton (Sheed & Ward, 1948), 15-44. Guardini interprets Socrates' death as the culmination of a metaphysical fracture between the soul's moral autonomy and the city's utilitarian demands. It marks the originary moment in Western education where truth becomes more binding than civic consensus, initiating a lineage that Pieper and Nussbaum inherit in their defense of moral formation against institutional expediency.

3. Beneath these pragmatic reforms lies a deeper metaphysical deformation: the reconstitution of the university under the regime of neoliberal governance. In this model, the university is no longer a place for the pursuit of truth or the contemplation

of *verum, bonum et pulchrum*, but an instrument for credentialing and market insertion. Truth becomes secondary to operational effectiveness; value is measured not in formative depth but in economic return. This logic masquerades as "practicality," but it is in fact a quiet capitulation to what Paulo Freire identified as the "banking model" of education—where students are treated not as persons to be formed, but as repositories to be filled with information deemed useful by institutional technocrats. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (Bloomsbury Academic, 2000), 72. Freire's "banking model" refers to an educational paradigm in which students are passive recipients of information, "deposited" into by the teacher, rather than active participants in the co-construction of meaning. Freire critiques this as inherently dehumanizing and politically coercive, arguing that it treats human consciousness as inert and education as a transaction, not a liberation. Contemporary neoliberal education mirrors this model by prioritizing technical acquisition and performance metrics over dialogical engagement, ethical formation, and the unfolding of the student's interiority.

The result, as Bill Readings argues, is the transformation of the university into a deracinated bureaucracy, committed not to culture or wisdom but to the management of excellence, a term so emptied of content that it becomes a cipher for whatever advances administrative efficiency. Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins* (Harvard University Press, 1997), 22–23. Readings contends that as the university is uncoupled from the classical ideal of Bildung and the national project of cultural identity, it no longer knows what it stands for. In the void left by this absence, the university adopts "excellence" as its nominal goal—a hollow, procedural value that legitimizes administrative control while evacuating substantive educational content. The university survives, but as a technocratic apparatus—preserved institutionally, but metaphysically evacuated.

4. The concept of the *universitas* has never simply denoted an institutional building or even a curricular structure, but originally referred to the *universitas magistrorum et scholarium*—a communion of teachers and learners formed in the pursuit of *sapientia* (wisdom). John Henry Newman defined the university not by its facilities or social prestige, but by its capacity to form a "habit of mind… which lasts through life," cultivating judgment, integration, and contemplation through the unity of knowledge. A true university, he argued, "educates the intellect to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth, and to grasp it" John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University*, ed. James Tolhurst (Cluny Media, 2016), 84, 100.

Jean-Luc Marion, developing this classical and Catholic tradition, insists that the university must preserve *universality*, in the original sense of *universitas rerum*—a gathering of the whole in service of the whole person. For Marion, the university uniquely enables the student to experience the *limits of knowledge* and thereby orient himself within the horizon of truth, rather than mere technique. See Jean-Luc Marion, "The Universality of the University," *Communio* 40, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 65–75. In historical context, as Norman Cantor documents, the medieval university emerged not from bureaucratic planning or economic necessity, but from the monastic and scholastic conviction that truth is a unity and that learning, rightly pursued, orders the soul to God and the world. Cf. Norman Cantor, *The Civilization of the Middle Ages*

(Harper Perennial, 2015), section on the rise of cathedral schools and Parisian scholasticism.

5. Data drawn from Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), *2023 Annual Enrollment Report: Higher Education*, Table 10.17 Higher Education Enrollment by Discipline Group: AY 2011-2012 to 2020-2021 Note: Humanities programs, including Philosophy, registered only 42,663 in 2020-2021 out of approximately 3.4 million total college enrollees.

6. Ethics, in the classical tradition, is the science of human flourishing: the rational pursuit of man's proper ends (*telē*, τέλη) through the cultivation of virtue. Plato conceives ethics not as the memorization of rules, but as the soul's ordered ascent toward *to agathon* (τὸ ἀγαθόν, the Good)—the transcendent principle of intelligibility and moral gravity. *Republic* 509b.

In Aristotle, ethics is defined by the formation of *phronēsis* (φρόνησις), or practical wisdom, the virtue by which reason deliberates rightly about how one ought to live. "The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue," he writes, "in a complete life." Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I.7, 1098a15–18.

Thomas Aquinas extends this tradition by anchoring ethics in the teleology of rational nature. "Man acts for an end," he teaches, "and this is proper to a rational nature," since only the rational being knows its end and chooses the means toward it. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I–II, q. 1, a. 1. Teaching, then, is not the neutral transmission of content but the moral formation of a soul capable of loving the true end of its being. Margarita Mooney Suarez echoes this metaphysical anthropology in her call to restore the classroom as a sanctuary of presence, where time is given for careful attention, silence, and receptivity to the riches of tradition. See. Margarita Mooney Suarez, *The Love of Learning: Seven Dialogues on the Liberal Arts* (Cluny Media, 2021), 96. Thus, to remove ethics from education is to abandon this formative horizon; it is not curricular reform, but the disfigurement of the human image.

7. In the classical tradition, the *sophist* (σοφιστής) is not merely an errant teacher, but a metaphysical impostor: one who fabricates the appearance of wisdom without its substance. Plato's *Gorgias* classifies sophistry among the "knacks" (*tribai*) that simulate true arts—particularly ethical formation—not to heal the soul, but to gratify the passions. The sophist "panders to the masses," persuading not by leading toward truth (*alētheia*) but by manipulating opinion (*doxa*) for gain. cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 464b–465d, 521d–522e. In the *Republic*, Socrates warns that the city itself may become the "greatest sophist" when it fashions citizens to reflect its own corrupted values. Plato, *Republic* 492b–494a. The sophist thrives when the *polis* forsakes truth as the aim of education. In *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger portrays sophistry as a deceitful art of *eidōla*—mere appearances mimicking reality. Plato, *Sophist* 231b–e, 233c–d. Sophistry thus represents not ignorance but counterfeit: the conscious substitution of semblance for substance, persuasion for truth, and expediency for the good.

This critique finds renewed expression in D. C. Schindler's metaphysical analysis. For him, the sophist trades on the appearance of meaning without any responsibility to reality, a tendency institutionalized in modern technocratic rationalism, where the university risks becoming a machine for the circulation of symbols. Under the reign of utility, truth is no longer pursued but replaced—by rhetoric, policy, and marketable simulacra. In the sophistic tradition, to paraphrase

what Schindler observed, the world is rendered malleable to human invention, and words are deployed strategically, not reverently. Cf. D. C. Schindler, "Why Socrates Didn't Charge: Plato And The Metaphysics Of Money," *Communio: International Catholic Review* 36, (2009): 394–426. The university, then, in this sense, becomes not the guardian of wisdom, but the factory of fluent relativism.

8. Plato, *Republic*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 495a–b. In denouncing the sophist as a "shadow-painter," Plato distinguishes between semblance and substance—between *doxa* (δόξα; opinion) and *epistēmē* (ἐπιστήμη; true knowledge). The *sophist* replaces dialectic with persuasion, paralleling Heidegger's concern that modernity privileges utility over the unconcealment of being (*aletheia*).

9. Socrates observes that democratic education, in surrendering to the multitude, relinquishes *logos* (λόγος; reason) to *epithumia* (ἐπιθυμία; appetite), thus disfiguring the soul. Hildebrand's critique of value-neutral pedagogy mirrors this diagnosis, identifying the refusal to guide as itself a moral failure.

10. Plato's city-soul analogy rests on the notion that justice consists in internal order: *logos* ruling over *thumos* and *epithumia*. Education must therefore harmonize, not merely inform. Augustine's doctrine of *ordo amoris* extends this, arguing that virtue is rightly ordered love—a principle reiterated by Pieper's account of festivity as affirmation of order.

11. Aristotle defines *phronēsis* (φρόνησις) as the capacity "of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for oneself—not in some particular respect…but about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general" (*Nicomachean Ethics* VI.5, 1140a24–28). Unlike *technē*, which pertains to the production of external effects, *phronēsis* concerns the formation of moral character. It is the habitual discernment of what is right, in light of the end for which human life is ordered: *eudaimonia*, flourishing. Its neglect is not a pedagogical omission, but an anthropological disfigurement.

12. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.5, 1140b5.

13. Plato identifies the good (τἀγαθόν) as "the cause of knowledge and truth," and as "being the cause of them, in the intelligible realm, and of their being, but not itself being, but something still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power" (cf. *Republic*, 509b). This principle, which governs the upward ascent of the soul, is the ultimate criterion of education. Aquinas, drawing from Dionysius, affirms that *bonum est diffusivum sui*—the good is self-diffusive by nature (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 6, a. 1). Education rightly ordered is thus a participation in this metaphysical fecundity: not transmission of information, but the soul's formation through the radiance of what is worthy of love.

14. In any case, this affirmation does not entail the rejection of knowledge or technical excellence as such, but rather subordinates them to the higher end of moral formation. For without orientation toward the good, even the most refined capacities risk becoming instruments of ruin.

15. Aristotle notes that "[t]he sphere of intelligence is the same as that of wisdom, having to do with matters of action. For the intelligent man is doubtless so called from his capacity for deliberation, and in that he judges and sees a thing rightly." Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* I.34.1197b10. Thus, the intelligent person is not

measured by the number of honors alone or the highest grades that this person received, but rather it is *also* seen in *practical things* such as ethics.

16. Josef Pieper, "Chapter II" in *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, trans. Alexander Dru (Ignatius Press, 2015), EPUB. Pieper argues that leisure (*scholē*) is the foundation of culture and thus of genuine education. When education is reduced to economic function, it loses its formative power, as Heidegger's critique of *Ge-stell* (enframing) likewise confirms: the student becomes a resource rather than a soul.

17. Josef Pieper, *In Tune with the World*, trans. Alexander Dru (St. Augustine's Press, 1999), 23. For Pieper, joy signifies metaphysical consent—a jubilant reception of being. This mirrors the Socratic disposition at death, described by Guardini as a serene submission to truth, and anticipates Heidegger's *Gelassenheit* (releasement) as a letting-be of what is.

18. Hildebrand warns that pseudo-reform disguises relativism as progress. The result is not liberation, but dissolution: institutions lose their capacity to form because they fear to assert truth. Plato's critique of the sophist as a corrupter of civic and moral order thus finds direct resonance.

19. Nussbaum frames the humanities as the guardians of democratic soulcraft. Her appeal to Socratic *elenchus* (ἔλεγχος; critical examination) underscores that ethical education is not optional but constitutive of civic rationality, linking moral autonomy to political legitimacy.

20. The obsession with STEM to the neglect of the humanities is not a mark of progress but of disfigurement. Paulo Freire describes the dominant educational model as a "banking concept," in which students are treated as passive depositories and the teacher as depositor, reducing education to the mere transference of information rather than the awakening of consciousness and conscience. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 30th Anniversary ed., trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, intro. Donaldo Macedo (Bloomsbury Academic, 2000), 72.

Bill Readings laments the university's transformation into a hollow institution organized around the empty ideal of "excellence," having "no longer a substantive mission," evacuated of intrinsic ends. Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins* (Harvard University Press, 1997), 87. Martha Nussbaum offers a diagnosis no less severe, warning that the erosion of humanities education threatens to produce "useful machines rather than complete citizens," cutting students off from the formation of judgment, empathy, and civic virtue. Martha C. Nussbaum, *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (Princeton University Press, 2010, 21). Josef Pieper, writing at mid-century, foresaw that a society absorbed by relentless utility would lose the very capacity for culture itself: "The vacancy left by absence of worship is filled by mere killing of time and by boredom; absence of leisure, by the same token, is filled by the grimness of work, a world made ready for work, and the world's subjection to the exigencies of work. But the notion of man as a worker has invaded and reshaped the very consciousness of modern man." Josef Pieper, "Chapter III" in *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, trans. Alexander Dru (Ignatius Press, 2015) EPUB. This is the peril of a civilizational shift from contemplation to consumption: the soul no longer formed by truth, but by performance. The elevation of technocratic skill over wisdom represents not an advance but a regression—a forgetting of what education is for.

21. Nussbaum asserts that the removal of ethics leads to affective atrophy—citizens incapable of perceiving injustice or resisting tyranny. This complements Guardini's analysis of Socratic death as resistance to institutional coercion, and Heidegger's critique of calculative thinking that flattens all values into equivalence.

22. Cf. Mark 8:36.

23. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on 'Humanism'," in *Pathmarks*, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 258. Heidegger indicts modern education for *Seinsvergessenheit* (forgetfulness of Being), where ethics is decoupled from ontology. Moral action becomes managerial rather than existential, paralleling Pieper's charge that the soul is no longer taught to behold the real. Furthermore, Heidegger's concept of *Ge-stell* (enframing) names the technological essence of modernity: beings are treated only as standing-reserve. Applied to education, this renders the student not as a person but as potential output—a mechanization of formation that Nussbaum calls a threat to democratic freedom. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on 'Humanism'," in *Pathmarks*, 276.

24. In Augustine's words, "*interficere errorem, diligere errantem."* Hildebrand laments that relativism masquerades as openness, abolishing the very possibility of formation. The institutional renunciation of objective norms leaves only sophistry: the triumph of form over substance, persuasion over truth. In this, Plato's warning against the sophist becomes tragically prophetic.

25. Plato, Apology 38a. Emphasis added.

26. Guardini, like Nussbaum, emphasizes *elenchus* as the essence of Socratic pedagogy: education as spiritual confrontation. This method awakens the soul to its own moral responsibility, anticipating both Pieper's claim that philosophy begins in wonder and Hildebrand's view that truth requires personal assent, not mere cognition. cf. Romano Guardini, *The Death of Socrates*, 54-80.

27. Socrates stands as the inaugural figure of principled defiance, and it is nothing less than a betrayal of philosophy to interpret his death as passive compliance. The modern appetite for political efficiency, for compromise and utility, renders such a death unintelligible. Yet it is precisely the refusal to conform, the refusal to cooperate with what is unjust merely because it is lawful, that makes Socrates the exemplar of non-violent resistance. His "meekness" is not weakness; it is spiritual militancy. His refusal to flee, to flatter, to retaliate, is the gesture of one who sees further than the city, and judges its laws by a standard they did not create. Plato's *Apology* leaves no room for liberal sentimentalism. Socrates does not plead for tolerance. He indicts his accusers. "I shall obey the god rather than you," he declares before the court. See Plato, *Apology* 29d. This is not the language of surrender, but of divine defiance. He resists—not with the clenched fist, but with the unbending will. He chooses death, not because he welcomes it, but because he will not corrupt himself to live. To propose exile or silence would be to acknowledge the court's authority over truth. Socrates refuses.

Romano Guardini rightly locates the drama of Socrates' death in this conflict between interior command and exterior coercion. Especially highlighting that Socrates did not die for a cause or a teaching, but because he would not abandon his love for the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, that which had become his own through his service for Justice. Guardini, thus contends, "To overcome death is to discover in it a meaning which inserts it into the significant whole of life. This meaning lies for the

Platonic Socrates in the mind's relation to the true and good, in the relation of the conscience to that which ought to be. In spite of the last sentences of the dialogue, the victory has not a Dionysiac character. That would be the case if death were understood as the ebbing of life's wave, followed by a new surge from the great stream ; or as the culmination of life, in which the whole, shattering the individual form, breaks triumphantly through. Rather, death is overcome by the spiritually awakening man's becoming aware of an absolute which stands on the other side of life's stream and its rhythms, of birth as of death :by his becoming aware of the Just, the True, the Holy or Good." Romano Guardini, *The Death of Socrates*, trans. Robert A. Krieg (Guardini Press, 2007), 90. This is what the state could neither understand nor tolerate: a man who obeys something prior to the state, who owes allegiance not to Athens but to the divine λόγος (logos, ratio, word). Socrates' daimonion, his inner warning voice, is not psychological embellishment—it is the presence of an order no polis can summon or suppress.

In the *Crito*, the argument is explicit and unforgiving. One must not return wrong for wrong. "One must never do wrong" (Plato, *Crito* 49b–c). Even when wronged by a corrupt court, even when the city condemns its wisest citizen, the philosopher must not retaliate. He must obey the good, not the expedient. Here is the scandal: Socrates' non-violence is not weakness, not compromise, but the total rejection of the city's terms. He resists by standing still. Socrates thus shames every age that submits to injustice in the name of pragmatism. He speaks against the modern tendency to equate resistance with violence, to mistake calm for concession. His death unmasks this lie. It teaches that the just man does not escape, does not negotiate, does not accommodate falsehood. He simply refuses. This refusal, this incorruptible silence before the apparatus of power, is the very form of resistance. And it is absolute.

REFERENCES

Aristotle. *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Princeton University Press, 1984.

Cantor, Norman F. *The Civilization of the Middle Ages*. Harper Perennial, 2015.

Freire, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. 30th Anniversary ed. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. Bloomsbury Academic, 2000.

Guardini, Romano. *The Death of Socrates: An Interpretation of the Platonic Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo*. Translated by Basil Wrighton. Sheed & Ward, 1948.

Heidegger, Martin."Letter on 'Humanism'." In *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill. Translated by Frank A. Capuzzi, 239–276. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Hildebrand, Dietrich von. *Trojan Horse in the City of God: The Catholic Crisis Explained*. Franciscan Herald Press, 1967.

Marion, Jean-Luc. "The Universality of the University." *Communio: International Catholic Review* 40, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 65–75.

Newman, John Henry. *The Idea of a University*, edited by James Tolhurst. Cluny Media, 2016.

Nussbaum, Martha C. *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*. Princeton University Press, 2010.

Panti, Llanesca T. "DepEd Eyes Removal of 3 General Education Subjects from College Curriculum." *GMA News Online*, May 28, 2025.https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/947610/ched-eyes-removal-of-3-general-education-subjects-from-college-curriculum/story/.

Pieper, Josef. *In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity*. Translated by Alexander Dru. St. Augustine's Press, 1999.

Pieper, Josef. *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*. Translated by Alexander Dru. Pantheon Books, 1952.

Philippine Statistics Authority. *2023 Annual Enrollment Report: Higher Education*. Quezon City: PSA, 2024. Accessed June 21, 2025. https://psa.gov.ph.

Plato. *Republic*. Translated by Allan Bloom. Basic Books, 1991.

Plato. *Complete Works*. Edited by John M. Cooper. Hackett Publishing, 1997.

Readings, Bill. *The University in Ruins*. Harvard University Press, 1997.

Schindler, D. C. "Why Socrates Didn't Charge: Plato And The Metaphysics Of Money," *Communio: International Catholic Review* 36 (2009): 394–426.

Spaemann, Robert. *Grenzen: Zur ethischen Dimension des Handelns*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002. Originally published in *Scheidewege* 17 (1987–88). English translation: "Education as an Introduction to Reality," translated by D.C. and Jeanne Schindler, *Humanum Review*.