

NIETZSCHE'S CRITICAL APPROACH TO MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALITY

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The emergence of modernity as a dominant worldview was fundamentally rooted in practical application. This emphasis on rationality led to its elevation as the primary epistemological and organizational framework underpinning human societies across diverse domains, including politics, ethics, and cosmology. Modern philosophy, aligned with this intellectual shift, adopted rationality as its core foundation, systematically marginalizing or excluding manifestations of the irrational from its discourse. The importance of the research lies in the fact that the Nietzschean project of critiquing modernity cannot be complete without returning to the critique of modern philosophical rationality. Thus, Nietzsche contends that a genealogical critique of modern philosophical rationality must go beyond surface analysis to uncover its origins, expose its illusions, and strip away its disguises. In his view, this rationality is deeply flawed, clinging to an instinct of weakness—incapable of creating new meaning or values—and remaining entangled with religious beliefs, metaphysical constructs, and entrenched dogmas. For Nietzsche, modern rationality is not a sign of progress, but a reactive force rooted in a decayed moral and ontological foundation. As such, he calls for a radical rethinking and rewriting of the history of modern philosophy.

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INTRODUCTION: ON TECHNOLOGY, LOVE, AND FREEDOM

Degeneration, as a general phenomenon encompassing modern humanity, can be observed at the core of all elements of modernity. We mean by modernity here a value whose meaning derives from itself. Consequently, modernity itself becomes an evaluation, a justification, and a validation against something else, but without losing one's awareness of being a historical entity. As Gianni Vattimo has shown, modernity

is that stage in which the accident of “being modern has become a value; moreover, it has become the fundamental value to which all other values refer” (Vattimo 1987,105). In this sense, modernity is not merely a historical epoch, but rather a value and a criterion for thought and action. Based on the concept of the mind, through which the world is understood. Thus, “Modernity, both in its formation and function, is intrinsically linked to the mind and to rationality—understood as the product of various scientific endeavors. Rationality, in this context, serves as the primary framework through which knowledge is structured and through which human engagement with nature and life is shaped to reflect perceived reality. Consequently, all forms of thought and modes of existence are expected to conform, either directly or indirectly, to rational standards” (Triki 1922,28).

For Nietzsche, rationality signifies not only the dominance of reason in modern philosophy but also the various ways in which reason manifests and preoccupies contemporary thought. He argues that modern thinking is characterized by an excessive reverence for reason, leading to an overemphasis on reason in philosophical discourse. While philosophical modernity claims to have broken with metaphysics, theology, and traditional ethics, “rather, philosophy has made of this rupture its very essence, the core of its value, and the source of its self-pride; its foundation is the belief in the power of reason and the human will” (Tourain 1992, 24). However, Nietzsche’s critique reveals that beneath the surface of these concepts lies a profound nihilism and cultural decadence. It becomes evident here that the return to Nietzsche and the re-reading of modern rationality in a critical light pave the way for a creative philosophy oriented towards the future. Hence lies the importance of his critique of the present and of the times, attempting to understand them as they truly are, and to trace some of the glaring contradictions and forms of dissonance within the European chaos. It is precisely in this context that this study falls, aiming to understand the nature of the Nietzschean critique of modern philosophical rationality, and consequently to answer the following problem:

To what extent, in Nietzsche’s view, has modern philosophical rationality substantiated the claim that philosophy since the Enlightenment has successfully severed its ties with metaphysics, theology, and traditional ethics? What are the origins and structures of the key concepts that emerged in this period, and what is the nature of the forces, whether active or reactive, that brought them into being? Is Nietzsche’s critique of philosophical rationality merely a series of indiscriminate attacks on modern philosophy, or does it represent a deliberate and methodical effort to rewrite the history of modern philosophical thought?

THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALITY

In Nietzsche's assessment, the critiques directed at metaphysics over the past centuries have not succeeded in eliminating the metaphysical illusion. Rather, the very movements that sought to dismantle metaphysics have, whether consciously or unconsciously, fallen into the same illusion. Nietzsche contends that the characteristics of philosophical rationality mirror those of traditional metaphysics: it is a mode of

thought grounded in the logic of dualisms, a thought system that places unquestioning trust in consciousness, and ultimately, a mode of thinking that has an uncritical faith in language.

Metaphysics and the Logic of Dualities

Modern nihilism emerged as a direct consequence of the metaphysical thought that long dominated Western civilization. This nihilism resulted from the collapse of a philosophical system grounded in dualities, particularly the distinction between the “false world” and the “true world.” Although this metaphysical framework was shaken, especially by Kantian philosophy, it did not disappear entirely. The traditional metaphysical dualism of the "real world" versus the "apparent world" still holds a significant place in modern philosophy, including in Kant's (1724-1804) own philosophy. However, the question remains: how is this distinction between the two worlds maintained in modern philosophical thought?

Kant criticized traditional philosophy and liberated philosophy from its illusions by showing the mind its claims and limits (Emmanuel 1980, 34). Nietzsche does not hide this Kantian attempt to liberate the mind from metaphysics, and to evacuate the tragic character of life, but Kant's end was only the end of the thing in itself and the apparent, freedom and necessity, etc. If we realize with Nietzsche that the essence of metaphysics is the thought of dualities, we know that Kant never left the metaphysical area, “but that the Kantian criticism and the nature of dualism – in Nietzsche's view - about the nihilism of modern times” (Ansell Pearson 1987, 316).

It follows that critical philosophy did not put an end to the extension of metaphysics at the heart of but rather revealed it. Kant tried to clarify the illusions of the metaphysical mind, but he did not realize the real reasons that explain those illusions, which are only realized by turning back, that is, by genetics, and Kant did not leave metaphysics because he did not ask the questions who and why.

Moreover, what confirms the metaphysical character of Kantian philosophy, its concept of transcendence seems to be directed here mainly at Kant's theory of the thing in itself, the basis of the traditional distinction between the “sensible world” and the “supersensible world”. Also, according to Nietzsche, the thing in itself cannot be a subject of knowledge but only a subject of thought; that is, it is Naumann, but is not this last distinction itself a metaphysical Kantian deception?

Therefore, Nietzsche rejects the mere distinction between thing in itself and phenomenon just as he rejects the distinction between self and object:

As one might guess, it is not the opposition between subject and object which concerns me here; I leave that distinction to those epistemologists who have got tangled up in the snares of grammar (of folk metaphysics). Even less am I concerned with the opposition between 'thing in itself' and appearance: for we 'know' far too little to even be entitled to make that distinction (Nietzsche 2001, 214).

All of this confirms the Kantian distinction between phenomena and things in themselves, “dividing the world into a ‘true’ and an ‘apparent’ world, whether in the

style of Christianity or in the style of Kant (a sneaky Christian to the end) is merely a move inspired by decadence – a symptom of declining life” (Nietzsche 1977, 21-22).

We may think that Hegel (1770-1831) undermines the idea of transcendence when he identifies thought with existence, but it is a hasty belief, which Nietzsche denies in two ways. Nietzsche shakes these identities when existence is considered just an interpretation, and therefore, there are no present facts; there are only interpretations, and there is no existence of events in themselves. However, what happens is a set of phenomena chosen and collected by an interpreting being. Rather, saying that things have nature in themselves, independent of interpretation, is a futile hypothesis behind them. It assumes that interpretation is not important, and that a thing, if isolated from all its relations, and from the perspectives related to it, remains something that (Nietzsche 1978, 143) does not exist, a precursor between thought and existence, meaning is not something inherent to existence, received by the self, but rather is created by the will of force. Hence, it makes no sense to acknowledge the identification between the mental and the spiritual.

Hegelian philosophy is an extension of metaphysics; the Hegelian spirit is itself the metaphysical ideal, where the decline of natural reality is amplified in the process of the soul's self-conscious transcendence of the world. The soul is the perfection that underlies cosmic diversity. In contrast, there is an imperfect existence; did Hegel (1944) not write: “The worst idea that crosses the mind of a man is better and higher than the greatest that nature produces,” and that “what is intellectual is more supreme than what is natural (8). Therefore, Nietzsche considers that the Hegelian spirit is an idea that was invented to devalue the tangible, because he says that everything that is mentally realistic confirms this, and it is clear then that modern philosophy remains when it uses the concept of the thing in itself or mental reality as an extension of traditional metaphysics and a face of nihilism.

Raising awareness

Modern philosophy is still dealing with the value of consciousness, its essence, and transcendence, as philosophers have reduced life to consciousness, and they have made it the goal of life. If we examine the genetics of consciousness, we will realize that the early Greek philosophers, starting with Socrates, expressed the conditions of impulses by placing the state of consciousness in terms of the highest, honorable, and most precious state, and appreciating it to the extent of sanctifying it, is a serious mistake. Rather, what misled philosophers and became the whole philosophy draws its starting point in what you call the facts of consciousness back to Descartes (1596-1650), he says: “I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing” (Descartes n.d., 27). The Cartesian ego is conditioned by consciousness and thought.

This consciousness, which is glorified by philosophical modernity, is therefore only a tool of generalization and flattening, considering that everything that becomes conscious finds itself at the same glance flat and miniature. Nietzsche regards this illusion as dangerous, particularly in light of the growing dominance and authority of the mind, which now arrogantly claims the capacity to comprehend everything, “and

anyone who lives among the most conscious Europeans even knows that it is a disease” (Nietzsche 1974, 300). Consciousness, in its essence, is corrupting; it undermines the instincts, which have deteriorated under its increasing influence. The cultural veneration of consciousness compels individuals to adopt a Socratic posture, resisting instinctual drives through the permanent light of reason. In this framework, clarity and intellectual illumination are pursued at all costs, while any elevation of instinct or the unconscious is seen as a path to decline. Yet, as Nietzsche reveals, such a view is itself deeply problematic and calls for critical re-evaluation. We realize, with Nietzsche, that “rationality at all costs, a life clear, cold, careful, aware, without instinct, in resistance to the instincts, was itself just a sickness, another sickness” (Nietzsche 1997, 17).

MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE METAPHYSICS OF LANGUAGE

Language plays a central role in the thought of metaphysical philosophers, who regard it as a faculty capable of constructing illusory and fictitious essences. By reducing diverse experiences to similar propositions, they assume that through language and the totality of constructed meanings, one can ultimately attain mastery over the world. This belief rests on the conviction that words convey a superior form of knowledge about things themselves. Such an approach is emblematic of traditional metaphysics, which continues to uphold the assumption that language transparently expresses the truths of reality—when, in fact, it merely weaves together a fabric of linguistic constructions.

To illustrate, we consider the concept of the “thinking I,” which, as Nietzsche observes, is not an empirical or necessary truth but a linguistic construct rooted in grammatical convention. Descartes begins by presupposing the existence of a “thinking thing” and, from this, infers that this entity must be the “I.” This inference reflects an underlying belief that every action must be attributed to a subject, a notion Nietzsche identifies as a grammatical prejudice. It also echoes a more primitive cognitive framework—one in which the world is interpreted exclusively in terms of actions and agents. According to Nietzsche, language itself originates from such a rudimentary stage of psychological development, shaping and limiting our capacity to think beyond its inherited structures:

In its origin, language belongs to the time of the most rudimentary type of psychology: we encounter a crude set of fetishes when we become conscious of the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language, or, to put it plainly, *reason*. *Reason* sees actors and actions everywhere: it believes in the will as an absolute cause; it believes in the ‘I,’ in the I as being, in the I as a substance, and *projects* its belief in the I-matter onto all things—that’s how it first *creates* the concept ‘thing’... Today we know that it is just a word (Nietzsche 1997,20).

Belief in language, in this context, reflects trust in its capacity to penetrate beneath appearances, access the realm of essences, and express them through arbitrary, distorted, and hybrid grammatical forms. Consequently, Nietzsche makes extensive

use of the philosophy of language as a tool in his critique of metaphysics, precisely because metaphysical categories are both born from and sustained by language. As Nietzsche observes, philosophical concepts do not emerge arbitrarily or in isolation; rather, they evolve in conjunction with one another, embedded within a network of interrelations.

Does the use of metaphysical categories deceive us into projecting a human-made logic onto the world? a process made possible only because we are beings who use language. From this perspective, Nietzsche, as a philologist, actively dismantles these deceptive assumptions. In doing so, he may be seen as laying the groundwork for a theory of language (Eugéne 1970, 41) that destabilizes modern metaphysics by rethinking the fundamental relationship between words and things.

On the other hand, language proves itself by its concepts of becoming, and since the world changes constantly, language, in Nietzsche's estimation, is unable to express it as it imagines it, and even the tools of linguistic expression are not usable to express becoming, because language calculates the statement of existence on things. Language falsifies reality because it obliterates diversity and freezes becoming, and grammar is the guarantor of the continuation of God's shadows and presence in language, and of the idea of the mind as the essence of thinking.

Then, philosophical modernity is still trapped by language because it still believes in its capabilities, and modernity reveals with this belief its misery and ugliness. "It is a disruption that challenges the foundations of philosophical modernity by exposing its metaphysical underpinnings" (Lefebvre 1975,172).

THE MORAL ORIGINS OF THE MAJOR CONCEPTS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALITY

Nietzsche tries to reveal the moral basis of all the major concepts of modern philosophical reasoning, and the nature of the values, thus the nature of the will that lies behind them, and their attitude to life. He does not look at metaphysics from a purely ontological point of view so much as from a moral one. So that the investigations of existence in his estimation become solutions to moral problems, as he says:

The right answer would rather have been, that all philosophers, including Kant himself, were building under the seductive influence of morality—that they aimed at certainty and "truth" only in appearance; but that in reality their attention was directed towards "majestic moral edifices (Nietzsche 1911, 4).

Since our conceptions of the world are morally grounded, the former cannot be understood without revealing the latter. If we are to understand metaphysical claims, we must know the morality for which they are intended. Hence, the origin from which philosophy emerged is not epistemological but moral: "I do not believe that an impulse to knowledge is the father of philosophy, but that another impulse, here as elsewhere,

has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken knowledge) as an instrument” (Nietzsche 2006, 11).

And here, as elsewhere, philosophy is mistaken in claiming to be guided solely by the will to knowledge. Indeed, this claim may be a trick by ethics itself, which is looking for a mask to hide behind, considering that the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is the final trap that ethics sets for man. But what relationship does modern metaphysics have with ethics? Whether it comes to believing in the existence of a real world, or believing in the mind and its sayings. In logic and its principles, what lies at the heart of all this are ethical assessments of life aimed at achieving benefit and preserving survival.

THE DECADENT ETHICAL ORIGIN OF THE 'REAL WORLD' CONCEPT

Despite the jolt that shook the European consciousness and led to the death of God, the demigods and their shadows still haunted this consciousness, which explains the continued existence of philosophers who speak of the other world or the real world. Therefore, under the influence of a morality of decadence that not only subordinated religion and society, but also philosophy, which became an expression of decadence. The other world is only a new form of moral evaluation, in which the person directs his gaze towards another world. And this is what Zarathustra expressed: “Intoxicating joy is it for the sufferer to look away from his suffering and forget himself. Intoxicating joy and self-forgetting, did the world once seem to me” (Nietzsche 1917, 29). Hatred of the apparent world creates the world of truth; hatred of our world makes it creative; and hatred of reality becomes a means of creating another world. It follows that the fundamental belief of the metaphysicians is the belief in the contradiction of values: this world is worthless and evil, so another world is the world of truth and goodness. Hence, the basis of metaphysics is moral. As Granier's peers note, “If we describe this dualism as moral, we do so to emphasize that the preferred field in which this dualism operates is ethics, and to emphasize also, and more importantly, that dualism is generated by a creative interpretation of the world that sees that good is absolutely contrary to evil, and therefore is not a commonality between their natures and their origin” (Granier 1982, 36-37). Among the modern philosophers to whom this critique applies is Immanuel Kant.

KANTIAN CONCEPTS AND THE PROMOTION OF THE OTHERWORLD

Kant was unable to transcend his ethical concerns—concerns that led him to construct a new moral world underpinned by absolute concepts. This moral world, according to Kant, is none other than the “true world.” Among the Kantian concepts that Nietzsche critiques are the notion of “categorical imperatives,” which he addresses in the following:

My friend! The term tickles my ear and makes me laugh despite your very serious presence. I am reminded of old Kant, who helped himself to (*erschlichen*) the ‘thing in itself’ - another very ridiculous

thing! - and was punished for this when the 'categorical imperative' crept into (*beschlichen*) his heart and made him stray back to 'God', 'soul', 'freedom', 'immortality', like a fox who strays back into his cage". (Nietzsche 2001, 188).

The result was the establishment of an absolute moral kingdom, the kingdom of preemptory orders. That is the real world that Kant produced; it is the world of moral absolutes, and this world was not born of an epistemological desire as much as it was born of the fear that he felt in the face of the emptiness that his criticism led to the pure mind. Rather, it can be argued that the critique of pure reason was nothing but a mask by which Kant concealed his true moral goals.

It is, then, an ethical need that has created the real worlds, the conclusion reached by Nietzsche is that Kant went to hunt down divorced women and refuted them, but the backdoor philosophy (Nietzsche 1997,60) returned with the same absolute alive, the one who is not amenable to knowledge but must be recognized to gain the work its meaning so that, "Kantian criticism becomes like a snake that bites its guilt with a kind of narcissistic admiration" (Morel 1985, 257).

THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF THE REAL WORLD ACCORDING TO MODERN PHILOSOPHERS (LEIBNIZ, SPINOZA, HEGEL)

Leibniz considered our world to be the best of all possible worlds. Didn't God create the world? In reality, there is no meaning to the concepts of "worse" or "better" in our world. These are merely moral judgments. "It is quite clear what the world is not good and not bad (to say nothing of its being the best or the worst)- and that the terms good and bad have only significance with respect to man" (Nietzsche 1909,44).

Spinoza (1632-1677) has, as it were, clad his philosophy in mail and mask. In fact, the "love of his wisdom," to translate the term fairly and squarely, is intended to strike terror at once into the heart of the assuillant who should dare to cast a glance at that of personal timidity and vulnerability. Does this masquerade, that of a sickly recluse, betray? (Nietzsche 2006, 10, 10, 10)

Hegel's philosophy, at least in part, is nothing other than history itself, which appears as the medium in which moral ideas are revealed and gradually transcend themselves (Nietzsche 1976, 162). In Nietzsche's estimation, these are moral ideas. According to Hegel, whatever happens in history is good, and the world cannot be otherwise, because it becomes what it is by virtue of a cosmic necessity—the necessity of the path that Spirit traverses in order to reach its completion. Thus, everything that is born within this path is the product of this infinite capacity, that is, the product of the universal divine Mind. The conclusion is that everything that unfolds is good in its process, being the utmost manifestation of the Divine.

According to Hegel, what appears unjust to us is merely due to a limitation in our perception of things—an inability to direct our attention toward the essential depth of things, to discern the characteristic of positivity, and to grasp the rational within the real. From this logic, the actualized Spirit is the true Good, and whatever it brings about is divine; God cannot be the source of evil. Thus, the significance of Hegelian

philosophy lies in its construction of a pantheistic unity of being, within which one cannot possibly feel that evil, error, and suffering are arguments against divinity. Consequently, behind the belief in the ideal of Reason and the consideration of existence as reason, there lies a moral interpretation of the world.

The Moral Basis of the Concept of Truth

Just the talk about "truth" comes down to Nietzsche's appreciation within a moral field, and this is confirmed by Nietzsche in his book *The Gay Science*, where he says: "Will to truth - that could be a hidden will to death. Thus, the question 'Why truth?' leads back to the moral problem... why morality at all, if life, nature, and history are immoral? No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in science presupposes thereby affirm another world than of life(...) and insofar as they affirm this other world, must they not by the same token deny its counterpart, this world, our world?" (Nietzsche 2001, 201).

Therefore, Nietzsche questions the concept of truth because he shifts the center of gravity and authority within the discourse of philosophy, where he becomes, in the eyes of the metaphysical philosopher, the supreme authority, the best value, the idol, and the holy God, who is beyond doubt or criticism, yet poses a problem about the value of truth. By critically examining the value of truth through a genealogical lens, Nietzsche asks: Who is in search of truth? What is their model? What is their will to power? What do they aim to find in truth? This line of questioning highlights a blind spot in Kant's and other philosophers' thinking. "In fact, we made a long halt at the question as to the origin of this will-until at last we came to an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question" (Nietzsche 2006, 5).

Nietzsche's focus is not on the essence of truth itself but on the will to truth, a concept largely ignored by philosophers. It is this will that has continually shaped their thinking and underpins their systems, albeit in a concealed manner. Nietzsche was the first to recognize this. As such, his question is not what the truth is but rather who seeks the truth and what is their ultimate purpose? Ultimately, Nietzsche asks, "Why truth?" - a question he addresses in *The Gay Science*, where he offers his response: 'Will to truth' does not mean 'I do not want to let myself be deceived' but - there is no alternative - 'I will not deceive, not even myself'; and with that we stand on moral ground (Nietzsche 2001, 201).

Morality is what underlies the will to truth. The very concept of deception is fundamentally moral, for evil is to deceive ourselves. As for the good, it is the truth, and evil is becoming and the sensible, whereas the good is permanence and the intelligible. Consequently, this distinction between error and truth arises, a distinction of moral origin.

Therefore, behind the concept of truth lie practical motives. Truth is honesty, while error is deceit, and no truth fails to determine value. It is never fully realized as a concept, and everything depends on what we think about and on its meaning. The truths we assume are always grounded in the meaning we conceive and the values we believe in. Who lies behind that belief and conception but the will to power? For when it comes to truth, meaning is present. Regarding the truth as it is, we must ask what power is hidden within the thought of this truth, and consequently, what its meaning

and value are. Truth does not exist; it is created. The will to truth is the will to act, and enjoying the truth is enjoying power—that is, the power of meaning and value. What is the source of the enjoyment of truth? First, one no longer fears straying from the right path; second, this pleasure increases our sense of empowerment. Indeed, we can say with Jean Wahl that “the will to truth is another name for the will to power” (Wahl 1963, 52), which interprets the world.

This will, which creates truth, good, error, and evil; and invents meaning and value, does so out of a vital necessity for self-preservation, which means seeking what is beneficial. Indeed, the primary measure for the enjoyment of any truth, whatever it may be, is as follows: what is not useful for self-preservation does not arouse people's interest. The second measure is that people prefer, among various possible ways of viewing a thing, the one that is most beneficial to them. Hence, “the impulse truth has proved to be also life –preserving” (Nietzsche 1974, 123). Truth is not that which corresponds to reality, nor is it something absolute or a thing in itself; rather, it is a reference humans need to eliminate the fear of the unknown. It is a comforting, consoling, and useful idea.

The so-called truth is, in the end, nothing but a falsity, a useful falsity that seeks to appear as the truth by masking metaphors and similes. However, life only cares about its continuity and progress, and to this end, it uses any means, even if that means is a falsehood. Thus, illusion is not the opposite of truth but truth itself. However, belief in the “real world” and in “truth” is not the only moral belief, as is belief in reason, its principles, and concepts.

THE MORAL BASIS OF REASON AND ITS IDOLS

Reason is the basis of modern philosophical reasonableness and rationality, as philosophers believed in its ability to discover the truth and to understand existence. It was regarded as the absolute ruler, deriving its value from itself, and as the primary and irrevocable instrument of rule. For this reason, it was considered the basis of modernity in all its branches. However, what if it turns out that the mind does not derive its value from itself, but from our moral trust in it? Nietzsche (1942, 6) says of this:

Logical judgments are not the deepest and most fundamental to which the daring of our suspicion descends: the confidence in reason, which is inseparable from the validity of these judgments, is, as confidence, a moral phenomenon.

We trust reason because it allows us to shape man according to the life we desire, and that trust is the basis of our confidence in life itself. Therefore, Nietzsche considers that Platonic dialectic and trust in reason are based on moral tribal judgments. He also attacks modern philosophical rationality, arguing that modern philosophical thought is still metaphysical because it remains grounded in concepts he believes regulate the world and enable us to know it. These concepts do not derive from the world or from experience, and therefore, in Kantian terms, they are not empirical but transcendent. Among these concepts are logical symmetry, essence, causation, and self. All of these

concepts are present in modern philosophies, albeit to varying degrees. Spinoza's philosophy emphasizes "essence," and Kantianism considers causality a statement of comprehension, and Cartesianism is the foundation of the concept of "subjectivity." But Nietzsche jiggles all these mental concepts when he refers to them as grounded in a moral basis and a vital necessity, namely, the preservation of survival. In doing so, he essentially shook the foundations of philosophical modernity.

CRITICISM OF LOGIC

According to Nietzsche, the main reason for modern philosophical nihilism is the belief in tribal principles of reason and fixed propositions. These were considered the basis of logic, from which the world is represented, to the point of identifying logical with ontological, starting from an Aristotelian tradition that recognizes the congruence between the principles of logic and reality (Nietzsche 1976, 58). In Nietzsche's words, the origin of philosophy is its belief that logic is the domain of truth rather than the realization that it is a means imposed by vital utilitarian motives. It is believed that we can solve the dilemma of ontology and the illusions woven by metaphysics around the world. Before addressing the issue of existence, the issue of logic must first be solved. Jean Granier was right when he commented on this issue, saying: "Had modernity been able to reflect on this simple sentence of Nietzsche, I would have realized the invalidity of all data about science" (Granier 1971, 275), considering that it is still believed by some positivists that the value of science is the value of logic and that the first derives its certainty from the second.

Nietzsche's concept of logic has no realistic "Ontological" basis, as Aristotle claimed, but this objection to Aristotle should not lead us to believe that Nietzsche can only be a Kantian. It is true that, in some sense, Kant objects to Aristotle's view that logic is nothing but transcendentalism connected to the mind of man and his sayings. But Nietzsche does not attribute logic to what is transcendental, necessary, and holistic, as Kant does, but to a new origin, namely instincts that relate not to the mind but to the body. "Therefore, we should not confuse the genetic approach to logic with the Kantian critical approach" (Kaufman 0986, 127). When we say that Nietzsche attributes logic to a new origin, namely instincts, we do not mean that it falls into the same category as Aristotle's; that is, we do not mean that the rules of logic are facts created by instincts. Rather, they are necessary illusions of life generated by the play of instincts. They are of essentially utilitarian biological origin, that is, they are the result of an irrational factor.

It follows from this that the principles of thought are essential illusions of life, useful and useful, and tools for nail and possession, as the mind sees itself in need of them in order to think, invent them, and project them to the world. This applies, for example, to Kantian tribal rulings, as Nietzsche says about this: "it is high time to replace the Kantian question, 'how are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' by another question, 'Why is belief in such judgments necessary?'" in effect, it high time that we should understand that such judgments, must be believed to be true (Nietzsche 2006, 21)." The categories of reason, then, are nothing but instruments for subjecting the world to the desires of a human being who is in a state of perplexity, a constant

feeling of danger in the face of the unknown and the sudden, and he finds tranquillity in the familiar and the obvious.

The truth is that Nietzsche does not reject logic because it is useful, but rather rejects the metaphysical illusion of an a priori factual or transcendental basis for logic. He also rejects philosophers' lack of awareness that logic is a necessary illusion. What Nietzsche aims at is realizing that logic is merely a procedural function that we can use (Haar 1993, 131), but we should constantly be aware that it is a useful illusion. This vital origin of logic also applies to all its principles, which have been imbued in metaphysical philosophy with an eternal and constant character. On top of these principles, we find the essence.

CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE

What applies to logic in general applies to its limits, among which is the concept of substance, which Nietzsche reduces to an imaginary image of the control of becoming. Thus, the imaginary world of substance becomes a necessary construct, as it is through this concept that reason attributes stability to the universe, thereby leading to the freezing or immobilization of becoming. Nietzsche believes that this exclusion of becoming - whose philosophical embodiment is found in the victory of the philosophy of Parmenides (515-440 BC) over the philosophy of Heraclitus (544-480 BC) - reveals a fear of contradiction and becoming, because the perception of the universe as a form of essences and things gives it stability that comforts the mind and the senses and facilitates the task of dealing with it. However, if we imagine that permanent change prevails, things flee from before us, drifting in the stream of becoming, so it is impossible to fix and control them (Zakaria 1985, 70).

Nietzsche does not hide his admiration for Hegel (1770-1831), who recovered the process, as he enumerates the gains of philosophical thought, for which thanks are due to German minds. "The astonishing bad habits when he dared to teach that species concepts develop out of each other. With this proposition the minds of Europe were performed for the last great scientific movement, Darwinism could have been no Darwin for without Hegel there" (Nietzsche 1974, 305). However, later, according to Nietzsche, Hegel subjected the process to mental concepts, ultimately speaking of the Absolute Spirit and the completeness of consciousness. It is as if Hegel, who looks at becoming, ends in being established (completeness of consciousness), and, when he looks at multiplicity, ends in oneness (absolute consciousness).

Nevertheless, the Heraclitian idea of becoming, which Hegel attempted to revive, is well worth engaging with in modern philosophy. This idea was neglected by Kantianism, which ultimately established closed schemata of knowledge and a static conception of consciousness. It was also neglected by Leibniz, who, although he worked to fragment the category of the unity of substance by speaking of monads, never left the realm of metaphysics. Monads are multiple, static substances.

Leibniz (1646-1716) contributed to shattering Spinoza's metaphysics of the unity of substance through his formulation of *Monadology*, yet he still remains part of the metaphysics of substance because he did not incorporate the historical element into his conception. Therefore, Nietzsche will attempt to open Leibnizian monadology to

Hegelian historical philosophy, but where does this lead? It leads to the metaphor of the will to power, where Leibnizian and Hegelian elements intertwine in its definition, and in both cases, Nietzsche escapes the metaphysics of substance on the grounds that:

1. The existence of multiple divergent forces (the Leibnizian element) that are nevertheless mutable/changing (the Hegelian element)
2. The existence of a dynamic view of reality: meaning to conceive of reality as monads, and to represent it as force/energy.
3. The existence of a perspectival conception of the world: since the universe is nothing but the sum of monads, and there is no world outside of monads; that is to say, they are mere perspectives, “for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its our own corner” (Nietzsche 1974, 336).

However, according to Nietzsche, Leibniz did not push this interpretation to its extreme and ended up in metaphysics, specifically when he connected it to God as the “Monad of monads”. Nietzsche considers it [or rather, within Leibnizian philosophy] the creating, infinite, absolute, eternal Monad... and the absolutely and universally self-sufficient Monad in every respect. Meanwhile, all monads, without exception, depend on it and cannot survive for a single moment without its assistance, because they emanate from it and are entirely subordinate to it in their existence and actions. “Thus, God is the primordial unity or the original simple substance, and all created or derived monads are His artifacts, which arise, so to speak, thanks to constant divine emanations or flashes from one moment to the next” (Leibniz 1900, 140). Yet, from Leibniz to Nietzsche, with the death of God—which freed the monadology from the confines of theology—perspectivism regained all its richness. For science is a set of forces that serve as perspectives, and thus Nietzsche violently shatters the metaphysics of substance.

CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY

The concept of causality is one of the basic pillars of formal logic and a mainstay of metaphysical thinking. Nietzsche believes that reason is only an attempt by us to organize the world in a way that makes it reasonable and acceptable, and a resurrection of a certain rhythm in a world devoid of every system and teleology, with the goal of controlling the frightening nebula to save life. And that is... “thus, the drive to find causes is conditioned and aroused by the feeling of fear” (Nietzsche 1997, 34).

Due to the fact that the causal explanation is the one most familiar to him, he turns to it as the only explanation. Nietzsche's critique of the principle of causality is very similar to the critique later advanced by logical positivism and finds its origin in Hume's critique, in which Nietzsche asserts that the sequence of successive events does not allow us to conclude a necessary relationship between cause and effect. And that the mere succession of the two incidents is not evidence that one has the power that generates the other, which is the power implied by the idea of the attic. As for the idea of power at the basis of the attic, it comes from anthropomorphism, due to the belief that the relationship between incidents is similar to that between the human will and

its effects. Nietzsche says that saying that: “there is no cause without cause and that every cause has cause... It is a generalization of another, narrower saying that wherever an act occurs, there is a will” (Zakaria 1985, 51-52).

Nietzsche considers causality to be a false concept that the mind invents and imposes on things, since there are no absolute rational causes in reality. In his view, this concept is rooted in the world of internal realities that cannot be proven—namely, the will, the soul, and the self. He says:

In every age have believed that we know what a cause is: but where did we get our knowledge, or more precisely, our belief that we have knowledge about this§ from the realm of the famous "internal facts", none of which has up to now proved to be factual (Nietzsche 1997, 31).

This belief in the existence of a cause leads to the belief that we “act,” and that we act because we are beings of will, soul, and ego—that is, we are selves. However, Nietzsche adds the following: “Today we don’t believe a word of all that anymore, the internal world is full of optical illusion and mirages: the will is one of them. The will no longer move anything, so it no longer explains anything either...what’s the consequence of this, there aren’t any mental causes at all” (Nietzsche 1997, 32).

But how can we psychologically explain our need for reasons? Nietzsche answers that: “Tracing something unfamiliar back to something familiar alleviates us, calm us, pacifies us, and in addition provides feeling of power. The unfamiliar brings with it danger, unrest, and care—our first instinct is to do away with these painful conditions” (Nietzsche 1997, 33)

In this context, Kant believes that causality does not exist in things themselves; therefore, it has no ontological basis, and in this respect, Nietzsche anticipates this view. However, Nietzsche’s flaw is that he considered causality as an a priori category of the understanding, whereas it is actually the result of an interpretation of the world driven by vital utilitarian motives. What Nietzsche admires most about Kant is that he placed a question mark before the concept of causality, which was previously believed to be derived from things themselves. “Kant’s tremendous question mark that be placed after the concept of causality” (Nietzsche 1947, 125).

Thus, in Nietzsche's perspective, causality is just a false idea that the mind fabricates and attaches to things. In fact, there are no mental reasons at all, and reasonableness is not a condition for existence, even if it is a psychological pillar of human existence.

CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SELF

Nietzsche brings the concept of "self" out of the circle of metaphysics and out of the circle of philosophical modernity in its Cartesian and Kantian forms. In this regard, he is close to critical modernity by trying to overturn the traditional theory of the “self” Ego, which revolves around the idea of the ego's logical essence. This idea is considered the basis of the treatises of Descartes and Kant on the ego, which Nietzsche openly objects to.

Critique of the Concept of the "Self" in Descartes' Philosophy

It seems that the encounter with Nietzschean thought gives a tremendous jolt to who you are in the Cartesian school, but a horror is tyrannized by Cartesian thought as soon as it enters the Nietzschean space (Boudot 1970,151). If Descartes (1596-1650) is confused in his meeting with Nietzsche, it is in the matter of self." For Descartes was not careful with Nietzsche's expression when he coined the sentence, "I think, therefore I am." However, in Nietzsche's estimation, he declares, "Descartes remained a prisoner of the word trap" (Nietzsche 1976, 367), which means that Descartes, who set the rules of the method and always emphasized the value of truth and logic, does not work with all that. It is a mockery of a philosopher who claims maturity and freedom from the prejudices and judgments of childhood. So what Nietzsche meant to Descartes was that he broke the rules of his own method and made a mistake because of a reversal of caution. Thus, the disadvantage of Descartes is that he did not work with his method; he rushed and fell into what he warns us about: the prevailing views and prejudices. Therefore, according to Nietzsche, the fault of Descartes is that he did not take root in a method of doubt.

Nietzsche, then, attacks the Cogito and sees in it only a word, not an idea, because it does not refer to any real fact: to think of an abstract, imaginary thing, since what is called an intellect is nothing but the symbolic language of instincts. This first illusion generates a series of other illusions, including the thinking self, in which the ego is considered an actor, that is, the cause of change, as Descartes considered: "I is the condition think is the predicate and' s conditioned to think is an activity for which one must suppose a subject as cause" (Nietzsche 2006, 72). The mistake Descartes made, as well as considering the self as the essence, is that it proceeds from the assumption that he considers certain: there is something that thinks, and then moves, without any justification, to the fact that the thing that thinks is "I" and that the "I" is a cause, and thus there is an illusory causation between the "I" and thinking. We are facing a series of suspicions and beliefs, not a series of facts or clear certainty: Cogito, in fact, is one word, but its meaning is complex, as there is one thing in the word:

First: There is something that thinks.

Second: I believe that I am the one who thinks.

Third: Even if the second proposition is uncertain—since it is merely a matter of belief—the first proposition also contains an implicit belief: namely, the assumption that thought must be attributed to a subject or agent. This is, as Nietzsche observes, nothing more than a grammatical presupposition—a belief in grammar. (Nietzsche 1976, 367)

Descartes thinks that there is something that thinks, and then he thinks that the thing that thinks is "me" and the result is: something that thinks. What is the connection between them? other than a belief in causality, in substance, and in language.

We are faced with a complex issue that is really a series of beliefs, including the belief that there must be something that thinks, "that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that ab thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an "ego", and finally, that

it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking, that I know what thinking is" (Nietzsche 2006, 23).

These are all a series of beliefs that do not solve problems but instead ask questions of them: Where did the word thought come from? On what basis is "I" talked about, and why is "I" considered a cause, specifically a cause of thinking? Nietzsche responds to this belief in grammar, the belief that led Descartes to say I think when he felt the existence of thinking. It is nothing but an expression of the grammatical use we are accustomed to, which puts every actor. In short, we are here against a previous assumption with a metaphysical logical character, not against a direct issue: following the path taken by Descartes does not lead to anything certain, but rather to a firm belief that is long common among people, and the result is that the so-called "thinking self" is an illusion of grammar and a metaphysical example: "The "ego" itself is merely "supreme swindle" an "ideal" (Nietzsche 1911, 64).

Kant's critique of the concept of "self"

Nietzsche was aware of Cogito Descartes' Kantian criticism and founded it:

First: It cannot prove the existence of the ego by proving the existence of thinking alone because the knowledge of the ego must be generated in thought from two basic sources: sensitivity and understanding.

Second: He cannot prove the ego in terms of its own characteristic that distinguishes it from all external things, as Descartes claimed. The proposition that the ego can exist in the sense that the existence of its essential quality is distinct from its body and all external things is an analytical proposition, that is, contemplative of Kant's belief, and lacks objective value.

Third: Descartes equates the ego (I) with the soul, and acknowledges the possibility of knowing it, but Kant denies the possibility of a certain knowledge of the self because it is one of the things in itself. The thing in itself may be a subject of thought, but it is not a subject of knowledge (Kofman 1989, 152).

In Nietzsche's estimation, the Kantian critique of the concept of the self is an expression of a characteristic feature of modern philosophy, namely, suspicion of Christianity, an openly or implicitly anti-Christian philosophy. Nietzsche does not hide his appreciation of the Kantian refutation of the concept of self as represented by Descartes, but Kant did not, in Nietzsche's view, accomplish the radical critique of the concepts of self and cogito. Nietzsche criticizes the unity of the ego, arguing that it is not possible to talk about the transcendental "I think," to ensure the syntactic uniformity of the multiple and the disparate, without making a mistake regarding the significance of the "unity" itself. If I have unity within me, it is certainly not in my thinking ego, in feeling and thinking, but in the wisdom of my body, which is preoccupied with preserving survival. My conscious ego is nothing but an instrument of my body. Thinking itself is not an activity of "I am thinking" but an organic activity; that is, every intellectual activity finds its origins in the state of the body with which it is associated, and the mind is only an instrument of its instincts. It cannot be free because it sharpens within the clash of different instincts.

However, would not the metaphor of Nietzsche's "will to power" be a new formulation of the concept of "self" so that Nietzsche would be a metaphysician if this is true?

Even if Nietzsche used the phrase the will to power, he did not mean a metaphysical subject, as it is the field of multiplicity and fragmentation that has created for itself an imaginary unity. Behind unity, then, there is fragmentation, and behind the unity of the ego itself, there is diversity and multiplicity; they are forces and motives. Although it is difficult to represent this plurality, as it is because it is from the field of the subconscious, and the mere attempt to express it in language traps us in the saying of unity. Thus, we do not have in our possession any organ with sufficient insight to be able to perceive this esoteric world to such an extent that we feel the structure as if it were a unit. (Colli 1987, 65)

As Eugène Fink (1905-1975) notes, the interpretation that sees the will to power as the Nietzschean expression of existence and as an extreme case of modern subjective metaphysics is a biased interpretation (Fink 1965, 227-228). The reason is that Nietzsche not only undermines the concept of "existence" but also explodes the concept of "self," thereby confirming his transcendence of modern metaphysics. The concept of the self is only a linguistic concept, the same as the concept of existence and the other metaphysical journal of the understanding, and this criticism falls within the framework of undermining the origin and reference. Nietzsche explodes the concept of subjectivity in at least one way:

First: Nietzsche transforms the original, from a principle to a conglomeration of forces fragmented by the will to force.

Second: Nietzsche establishes perspective, so that it is difficult to combine the multiplicity of viewpoints on the one hand and the unity of the self on the other. (Schumann 1982, 66).

Third: The self is only one of the interpretations of the will of power, so that the self that turns engages in the game of interpretation, is no longer itself only a perspective position of the will of power.

It seems difficult, then, to proceed from the metaphor of the will to power to regard Nietzsche as an extension of subjective metaphysics. This critique of the plausibility of philosophy is a shake for philosophical modernity as a degenerate moral metaphysics, and it engages in an attempt to carry this modernity as the cause of self-awareness of what is problematic, bringing it to awareness of its illusions and out of the circle of forgetting: forgetting the illusory character of its sayings. It leads her to the self-awareness she usually claims as her foundation, as if Nietzsche were more modern than modernism itself.

THE THEOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALITY

It is strange to talk about the religious origin of modern philosophy. Modernity in general and philosophical modernity in particular have often been defined by

criticism of religious thought. Yet we realize that the solutions of modernity have not completely undermined religious thought. Although the advent of modernity marks the end of Christianity as a social and political system, this modernity still retains religious imprints to this day. The theological past still extends into the present, albeit invisibly within philosophy itself. Therefore, Nietzsche tries to reveal and fight it. He says about that: Upon this theological instinct, I make war: I find the tracks of it everywhere. (Nietzsche 1931, 51).

When Nietzsche emphasizes the idea of fighting the theological instinct, it is an awareness that modern philosophy could not overcome religion, and we did nothing but escape to the future the Kingdom of God, and brought down to earth the religious example and gave it a human connotation. Religion as a vision of the world has vanished, and God is dead, but his shadows still inhabit philosophy.

As philosophers frequently philosophized under the custom of religious habits of that “metaphysical need,” they developed a doctrinal opinion that really bore a great resemblance to the Jewish, Christian, or Indian religious views- a resemblance, namely, that children usually bear, which was not clear in their motherhood (Nietzsche 1909, 115).

It is a strange, subtle collusion between a declining theology and a rising philosophy: "some philosophic doctrine has lain itself into its system in order that it may be found there later, but this is a theological trick of the time when a religion already doubts itself" (Nietzsche 1909, 115). Hence, it may be said that philosophy is itself represented by theology: either as a servant of religion in an era when Christianity was sovereign, or as a religion based on wisdom, or because philosophers proceed based on their own feelings generated by religious education, raise them to the status of the essence of man, and then involve them in the formulation of their teaching syllabi.

In both cases, ancient or modern, the philosopher could not be independent of the priest's image. Philosophy has been and continues to be burdened by the historical conditions of survival and by its coexistence with religious dogmatism. She, in turn, took a dogmatic form that made the philosophers “The Tyrants of the Intellect” (Nietzsche 1924, 337), claiming to identify the good in itself and the truth in itself, the philosophers did nothing but proclaim and prove their sovereignty in the way the priests did with their talk of God. Thus, philosophy is a distorted theology and a philosopher is half-priest: what is a true priest, and what is a true philosopher, that is, a philosopher at noon.

We can observe the overlap between the philosophical and the theological in the era of modernity by emphasizing that the philosophical ideal is the same today as the religious ideal. It is the ascetical ideal. What philosophers do is the same as what the priest does: the search for other worlds and the contempt for life.

PHILOSOPHY AND ASCETIC IDEAL

Nietzsche addresses the ascetic ideal as the third stage of nihilism, following resentment (ressentiment) and the unhappy consciousness, and as their transcendent

intensification. Thus, the ascetic ideal is not a late development but has been present from the outset of nihilistic consciousness:

In its first meaning, the ascetic ideal represents a synthesis of resentment and the unhappy consciousness, whereby the two converge, reinforce each other, and mutually intensify. In its second meaning, it refers to the totality of mechanisms through which resentment, and the suffering associated with the unhappy consciousness, become liveable and sustainable, enabling their structuration and dissemination across social and cultural domains. In its third meaning, it reflects the will that enables reactive forces to gain dominance (Andalusi 2006, 22).

Overall, the ascetic ideal is the expression of the intrinsic relationship between reactive forces and nihilism—a relationship that positions nihilism as the motor of reactive life (Deleuze 1962, 167). This raises a critical question: what role do philosophy and philosophers play in relation to the ascetic ideal? Can we identify any among them who genuinely stand in opposition to it, or is philosophy itself complicit in reinforcing this life-denying ideal?

They promote this idea in their speeches. However, this belief relies on the strength of ancient faith, and it is understood that “wherever the strength of a belief becomes prominent, a certain weakness is the improbability of proof” (Nietzsche 2006, 111).

The ascetical ideal is the image of philosophy, and it has taken on its spiritual form. It is the image of belief in truth. This is because the force that drives philosophy toward asceticism is the absolute will to truth, which is a belief in an ideal that serves as the value of values. What is clear is that the issue is about belief, not about putting the truth into question. Nietzsche says:

On this question, turn to the most ancient and most modern philosophies: all of them lack a consciousness of the extent to which the will to truth itself needs a justification, here is a gap in every philosophy – how does it come about? Because the ascetic ideal has so far been *master* over all philosophy, because truth was set as being, as God, as the highest authority itself, because truth was not *allowed* to be a problem. Do you understand this ‘allowed to be’? – From the very moment that faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, *there is a new problem as well*: that of the *value* of truth. – The will to truth needs a critique (Nietzsche 2006, 113).

Hermeneutics reveal that it is the will to truth that drives philosophy to asceticism, based on belief in an absolute metaphysical value, and that philosophy, through its philosophers, took into account the role of the presbyter in the psychological, religious, moral, and intellectual formation of modern Western man in the extent of theological influence and dominance over philosophy. The early upbringing began with Socrates (399 BC) and Plato (427-347 BC), it wore a priestly figure and kept borrowing the priest's mask and hiding behind his ascetical ideal. Correlation, however, was not so much a response to an internal need or subjective demand of philosophy as it was to the historical and social conditions for the emergence of philosophy.

In this sense, Nietzsche believes that Kant's victory over dogmatism should never be considered a victory over the ascetical ideal. On the contrary, Nietzsche considers it a model of the degeneration of German philosophy with theological foundations, contrary to what is rumored: "Do people in all seriousness still really believe (as theologians imagined for a while), that, say, Kant's *victory* over theological conceptual dogmatism ('God', 'soul', 'freedom', 'immortality') damaged that ideal?" (Nietzsche 2006, 115).

Furthermore, the positions of agnosticism and transcendental philosophers were strengthened after Kant; they were freed from the tutelage of theologians:

What good luck he showed the secret path on which, from now on, they could independently and with the best. Scientific decorum pursue their heart desires. Likewise, who would blame the agnostics if, as worshippers of the unknown and the secret, they worship the question mark itself as god... what a triumph for the ascetic idea (Nietzsche 2006, 115- 116).

Kant did not overcome this idea. Although he introduced a certain suspicion into German philosophy by denying the possibility of knowing things in themselves, he eventually reverted to theology. When it denies the possibility of knowing God, it justifies religion by making it free from all doubt, and when it limits knowledge, it leaves room for theology: there is no knowledge, so God exists.

However, if idealistic philosophy could not break free from the ascetic ideal because it remained confined to its principle of the beyond (or the transcendental), what can be said about atheistic (i.e., materialistic) philosophies that recognize nothing but the earthly world? Did they manage to free themselves from the ascetic ideal?

Nietzsche's atheism is linked to the de-divinization of the universe and the twilight of theological and metaphysical interpretations. This is evident in the philosopher Schopenhauer, whom Nietzsche considers the fruit of the slow evolution prepared by German philosophy. His error and value simultaneously lie in his ability to push forward where Western philosophy failed, as he refused to interpret the world based on a transcendent principle. He stripped the world completely of all interpretations, including those that deified it, leaving human existence to confront its own harshness and nakedness for the first time. However, according to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer could not break free from the ascetic ideal: he opposes it only superficially, whereas in reality is:

And thus not so much its remnant as its kernel. Unconditional, honest atheism (its air alone what we breathe, was more spiritual men of the age) it is not only one of the ideal's last phases of development... one of its. Final forms and inherent logical conclusion (Nietzsche 2006, 118).

Given the limitations of Schopenhauer's (1788-1860) philosophy and the philosophical standpoint that opposes prevailing norms, and since the will to truth is the ultimate modern form of the ascetic idea, philosophical thought has consequently always tended to begin with dissimulation and masking—that is, by adopting

previously established archetypes of the thinking human, such as the priest and the cleric. "The ascetic ideal served the philosopher for a long time as outward appearance, as a precondition of existence; he had to play that part (*darstellen*) in order to be a philosopher; he had to believe in it in order to be able to play it (*um es darstellen zu können*). The peculiarly withdrawn attitude of philosophers, denying the world, hating life, doubting the sense desensualized" (Nietzsche 2006, 84).

PHILOSOPHERS AND THE QUEST FOR OTHER WORLDS

Among modern philosophers, some thought is deeply tinged with religious undertones. From Nietzsche's perspective, such thinkers were never truly detached from the theological worldview—a vision that, in his estimation, seeks to extinguish the brilliance of life. The religious outlook on existence, Nietzsche contends, still dwells within the old house of philosophy, refusing to depart from it. As he puts it, "the philosophers to treat all the sensations which they discovered in themselves as the fundamental nature of man in general, and therefore to allow their own religious feelings an important influence in the building up of their systems (Nietzsche 1909, 115). They are concerned with the ascetic ideal that hovers over life, so it resorts to the use of means to maintain its survival and continuity, and on top of those means are the paradoxical ideals, which are not just a perception of the world, nor even just engaging in a certain ideal, but can have several connotations and can occupy in its favor multiple and diverse worlds. This is the case of modernist philosophers whose philosophy is understood only in the context of the dominance of the ascetic ideal through the search for new worlds that serve and nourish it.

In the same sense, Nietzsche sees that the God of Descartes is the guarantor of the sincerity of knowledge, which is perfection, goodness, and honesty. Descartes had a perception that within a Christian and moral thought, he believes in a good God, the creator of things. It is the sincerity of God that guarantees us the judgments of our senses. Hence, the Cartesian God is the same as the religious and moral God, as truth, its search and hope for realization have no meaning except that we accept the existence of a moral God similar to us. The result is that Descartes has fallen into the trap of religion.

Pascal (1623-1662), for his part, was not immune from such religious influence. "Take Pascal, for example, the greatest of all Christians in his combination of ardour, intellect, and honesty" (Nietzsche 1924, 191). For his mind is tainted with Christianity: the corruption of Pascal, who believed that his intellect had been tainted by original sin, whereas it was actually destroyed by Christianity (Nietzsche 1931, 45).

If he believed, like Descartes, that Christianity is like a beast, Descartes tames the beast by bringing order to its chaos, whereas Pascal considers it untameable and unorderable except through the Christian faith. Pascal held that, without Christianity, you are a monstrosity and a chaos, just as nature and history are. Pascal could have wagered, in his famous wager, on the truth of God's nonexistence even at the cost of damnation, but he preferred the illusion of eternal salvation—a weakness of will that reveals the extent of the corruption he had inflicted upon himself. Perhaps what also confirms this corruption is Pascal's internalization of the idea of original sin, which

led him to a sense of guilt and a troubled conscience. He regarded Christianity as a means of purifying the self from error, but also as the realm of truth; it is therefore true because it is necessary for humanity, and that is his error: he wanted to prove that Christianity is true and failed to realize that there can also be necessary errors.

Alongside Pascal, we find the philosopher Hegel, whom Nietzsche considered to be among the “philosophical warkers” (Nietzsche 2006, 151). Nietzsche grew up in Hegelian philosophy, affirming the idea of becoming. However, Hegel was not bold enough to confront the implications of this idea, so he retreated into theology, and everything was directed toward the will to deify the whole in order to find comfort and happiness within an existence that bears the marks of God as thought. God within Hegel's skull became transparent and intelligible in relation to himself (Nietzsche 1988, 11).

This leads Hegelian philosophy to revert to a period before the Kantian moment, which brought doubt about the possibility of knowing God. So, what is philosophy if not the philosophy of thought seen through the Christian Logos? It can be described as a philosophical theology (Lowith 1969, 33), especially since Hegel's view of Christianity was not a rejection of the intellectual worth of absolute religion but a reaffirmation of it.

All these philosophers, to varying degrees, have confronted a void created by their criticism of traditional values. However, they could not handle the outcomes of this critique and hence returned to theology in search of truth. As Nietzsche (1923) notes in *The Birth of Tragedy*, it is a clear sign of the deep wound within modern culture that the rational individual, disturbed and disillusioned, no longer feels capable of trusting the brutal flow of existence.

DEVALUATION AND CONTEMPT FOR LIFE

Nietzsche declares through Zarathustra that he loves nothing from the heart of the individual but life (Nietzsche 1917,12). The construction of dance, life is only dance, play, body, chaos, becoming, and war, and what is true wisdom other than enduring all that and proving it. However, philosophers still hate life like the clergy. Most of the greatest sages in every age hold the same perception of life as worthlessness. Their virtues are ascetic: “We know what the three great catch words of the ascetic ideal are: poverty, humility, chastity” (Nietzsche 2006, 124). Poverty is manifested in renouncing glory and worldly powers; humility is reflected in moderation and seclusion, as the philosopher finds comfort in a certain degree of independence and withdrawal. Chastity, finally, is expressed in the renunciation of sexual desire and the rejection of the senses, and the fear of having sex with women, which applies particularly to Schopenhauer, “for we must not underestimate the fact that Schopenhauer, who actually treated sexuality as a personal enemy (including its tool, woman, that instrumental diabolic)” (Nietzsche2006,261). Without women, sensuality and the whole existential will to exist will remain. The struggle against desire is a common theme among most philosophers. There have been philosophers (from India to England, taking the opposite poles of a talent for philosophers) who

exhibit a genuine philosopher's irritation and rancor against sensuality. Schopenhauer is just the most eloquent (Nietzsche 2006, 47).

Thus, philosophers retreat into knowledge, thereby making it a form of intellectual Stoicism. The legacy of philosophical rationality has led to the creation of a world beyond our earthly one—a world that has distanced us and diverted our concern from life itself. Indeed, this detachment has engendered among philosophers a profound sense of resentment, along with an exaggerated reverence for cognitive and theoretical pursuits at the expense of the body and the earth. As a result, the foundations of theoretical thinking and the ideal of the 'theoretical man' have been solidified, leaving one almost unable to escape the notion of the 'other world' imposed by religion.

CONCLUSION

Nietzsche's genealogical critique of philosophical rationality challenges deeply embedded assumptions that have long escaped scrutiny, particularly the belief in a transcendent world. He argues that metaphysics is not merely theoretical but is grounded in moral and religious values that devalue life and elevate abstract ideals. For Nietzsche, the supposed objectivity of reason conceals ethical and theological underpinnings, revealing a persistent metaphysical-religious orientation even in modern philosophy. This orientation, he claims, reflects a reactive, life-denying attitude that continues to shape philosophical thought, especially through its quest for "other worlds" and its disdain for the concrete realities of earthly existence.

Characterizing Nietzsche as entirely anti-rational misrepresents his critique and overlooks its nuance. Nietzsche's challenge to the rationality upheld by dogmatic philosophers is not a rejection of reason per se, but a denunciation of how reason has been historically misapplied, employed beyond its legitimate scope, and used without regard for its limits or internal conditions. Consequently, it is inaccurate to portray Nietzsche as a mere destroyer of rationality because of his entanglement with metaphysics, religion, and morality, or to blame him for the perceived crisis of Western modernity and the supposed signs of cultural decline. Rather, Nietzsche's critique reflects a will to re-legislate and reorient philosophy, breathing new life into it by uncovering the generative and transformative values essential for the future.

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