Φιλοσοφια
Volume 27, 2: 2026

THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF AESTHETICALLY ENJOYING NON-CONSENSUAL DEEPFAKE ART

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This paper explores the moral permissibility of aesthetically enjoying non-consensual deepfake art – synthetic, ultra-realistic audio, visual, and audio-visual media. Recent studies on deepfakes have focused on epistemic threats, manipulation, and misinformation; little attention has been given to their artistic use, specifically at the intersection of art and the infringement of a person's right to personal data. This project addresses that gap by asking whether it is morally permissible to aesthetically enjoy such representations. Drawing on Noël Carroll's deflationary approach to aesthetic experience and Robert Sparrow's framework on representation, normalization, and character from his "Robots, Rape, and Representation," the paper argues that aesthetic enjoyment of non-consensual deepfake art is morally problematic. Such artworks not only violate individual rights but also risk normalizing non-consensual practices and cultivating the vicious character of their audience. This study concludes that non-consensual deepfake art, no matter how aesthetically enjoyable, is not exempt from moral scrutiny and recommends safeguards in its creation and consumption.

Keywords: Aesthetic Enjoyment, Character, Non-Consensual Deepfake Art, Normalization, Representation

INTRODUCTION

In the paper "Deepfakes and Epistemic Rights: Violations to the Knower and the Known," John Martin Diao examined how deepfakes infringe upon the epistemic rights of individuals as a knower and as a known (revealer of information) (NRCP Journal, in press). In that study, a typology of deepfakes was developed using two dimensions based on the deceptiveness of the creation (with the binary of deceptive and not deceptive) and the maliciousness of the creator (with the binary malicious and not malicious). The intersections of these dimensions created a typology of four

categories of deepfakes: deceptive and malicious, not deceptive but malicious, deceptive but not malicious, and not deceptive and not malicious.

	Deceptive	**Not Deceptive**
Malicious	Deceptive and Malicious	Not Deceptive but Malicious
Not Malicious	Deceptive but Not Malicious	Not Deceptive and Not Malicious

Figure 1. *Typology of Deepfake Creation*

The problem with this initial structural conceptualization is that it considers only the deepfake content itself. It does not put into the picture the more complex interrelationship among the content creator, the subject, the content, and the audience/consumer. Thus, to provide a more articulated conceptualization of the complex interrelationship, we further draw a generic map of this interrelationship:



Figure 2. *Interrelationship in Deepfake Creation and Circulation*

Between the creator and subject, their interaction may occur with or without consent and with or without malice; between the subject and the deepfake content, the subject's likeness is used with or without consent; between the creator and deepfake content it creates, the creation process may involve malice or no malice and deception

or no deception; and between deepfake content and the audience/consumer, the viewing of the deepfake may involve malice or no malice, deception or no deception. In this diagram, we have added consent as an additional dimension to emphasize the importance of obtaining consent to use one's image and likeness in creating deepfake content.

This diagram may be used to explain cases of deepfake use, especially those that infringe on the rights of individuals. For instance, the case of deepfake phishing of a targeted multinational firm employee who sent out the supposedly requested twenty-five million United States dollars (USD) to the scammers after an online video conferencing call (Chen and Magramo 2024). The creators of the deepfake were the scammers, who created the content with malicious and deceptive intent to scam the consumer, which is the employee who sent out twenty-five million USD. To achieve their goal, the scammers, in the absence of consent, used the identities (subjects) of the company's Chief Financial Officer and other employees familiar to the consumer to make him believe that the video conference call was legitimate, only to find out that it was part of the scheme. See the figure below for the diagram of this case.



Figure 3. *Interrelationship in the Case of Deepfake Phishing*

However, for this paper, we will explore the non-malicious and non-deceptive quadrant in the typology as seen in Figure 1. Specifically, the interrelationship among Creators, non-consenting Subjects, Deepfake Content, and Audience/Consumer. We will explore this interrelationship in the context of the moral permissibility of aesthetically enjoying non-consensual deepfake art. The non-consensual nature here lies in the absence of the subject's consent for the use of his image/likeness as content

of a deepfake art. For the aesthetic enjoyment we draw "aesthetic enjoyment" as an additional dimension in the relationship between the deepfake content and the audience/consumer. Whether it is morally permissible for the audience/consumer to aesthetically enjoy it is the answer this paper endeavors to provide, a topic that sits at the intersection of ethics and aesthetics. See the figure below for the diagram of this interrelationship.



Figure 4. *Interrelationship in the Deepfake Creation and Circulation of this Paper*

Deepfake, synthetic ultra-realistic audio, visual, and audio-visual media, is a portmanteau of the terms deep learning and fake, reflecting the technology's reliance on deep machine learning techniques to create convincingly fabricated media content (Finger 2022). The process typically begins by feeding Artificial Intelligence (AI) models with input data such as images, videos, or audio recordings to copy. Currently, with the use of Generative AI (Gen AI) such as ChatGPT and Google DeepMind's Veo, users can simply prompt text to generate media content. In fact, in Acim et al. (2025, 2), they listed five techniques used to create deepfakes: GANs, Autoencoders and Variational Autoencoders, Deep Learning Architectures, Machine learning Algorithms, and Transfer Learning.

The accuracy, accessibility, and creative potential of deepfakes have drawn attention from scholars. Much of the literature has examined their epistemic, moral, and psychological harms. For instance, Rini (2020), Fallis (2020), and Habgood-Coote (2023) emphasize the epistemic threats they pose, particularly the erosion of trust and

information sources, or how scholars have overreacted to it. Meanwhile, Ohman (2020), de Ruiter (2021), and Rini and Cohen (2022) focus on the ethical implications of manipulation, deception, and emotional harm. Other scholars like Kerner and Risse (2021) highlighted the importance of epistemic rights and justice in the digital lifeworld. Risse (2021) also argues for epistemic rights to strengthen human rights in the digital age, especially in what is known as Industry 4.0, where algorithmic mediation affects our access to information and self-presentation.

Deepfakes are used in entertainment, education, satire, marketing and advertisements, information drives, and art. In the film industry, for example, deepfakes are used to complete scenes without requiring actors to reshoot. Museums have used deepfake technology to create interactive exhibits, such as the reanimation of the painter Salvador Dali at the Dali Museum in Florida (Mihailova 2021).

Prelević and Zehra (2023, 93) discuss how deepfakes have emerged as a compelling medium within contemporary art. Unlike the traditional artworks, which center on "artwork autonomy, the artist…, and meaning of the artwork," contemporary art is audience-centered, contextual, and interrelated. Through 'deepfakes' immersive and illusionistic qualities, it allows viewers to interact with resurrected artists, celebrities, historical figures, and cultural icons, or even to "wear" the artist's identity through face-swapping. Yet, these artistic innovations are without moral risk, especially when the individuals portrayed have not consented to the use of their image or likeness.

What makes this study interesting is its distinctive place at the crossroads between the right to artistic freedom and the right to control one's own identity. While overtly exploitive uses like deepfake porn have been widely condemned, artistic uses of deepfakes can be more ambiguous. Artistic expression might be invoked to defend non-consensual deepfake art practices. However, if unaddressed, these risks normalize the violation of individual rights to consent, privacy, autonomy in controlling their identity, and intellectual property, especially when used for commercial exploitation (hereafter referred to as personal data rights).

A recent study by Matthews and Kidd (2024) has listed three unexplored problems of deepfakes: veritic epistemic luck, epistemic rights, and the effects of deepfakes on the epistemic character. Cavendon-Taylor (2024), in his topical mapping on deepfakes, mapped out the existing philosophical research, which tells us that there is a small literature on deepfakes and aesthetics. Its approach concerns the epistemology of deepfakes or the epistemic worth of photographs and videos in a time of deepfake proliferation, leaving the intersection of aesthetics and ethics largely unexplored.

This conceptual-philosophical research seeks to address that gap by asking: Is it morally permissible to aesthetically enjoy non-consensual deepfake art? And answers it through applying Noël Carroll's deflationary approach to aesthetic experience and Robert Sparrow's "Robots, Rape, and Representation" as a framework for normative and conceptual analysis.

By applying Robert Sparrow's contention on representation, simulation, and character as developed in his "Robots, Rape, and Representation," the study offers an approach that assesses the ethical (non-)permissibility to aesthetically enjoy non-consensual deepfake art. But before that, aesthetic enjoyment is framed in Noël

Carroll's deflationary approach to aesthetic experience. This enables us to experience deepfakes not only aesthetically but also with other responses that can be used as a lens to understand or critique them. Furthermore, by using Carroll's deflationary or content-based approach, we can classify deepfakes as an art based on their design appreciation and/or quality detection. This is, aside from Prelević and Zehra (2023, 93-95), that deepfake art is a contemporary art form. In the third section, I discuss how Sparrow's concerns about representation, normalization, and character share the same concern with problems arising from non-consensual deepfake art. The fourth section discusses the implications for aesthetic enjoyment of non-consensual deepfake art. This will be followed by thought experiments and a conclusion.

This project contributes to debates in aesthetics and ethics and offers a timely insight into how deepfakes challenge traditional notions of art appreciation and moral responsibility.

AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT AND DEEPFAKE ART

Before we assess the moral permissibility of aesthetically enjoying a non-consensual deepfake art, it is important to clarify what is meant by aesthetic enjoyment and how this concept applies to deepfake art. Immanuel Kant, in his third critique, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (2020, 156-161), defines aesthetic enjoyment as a disinterested and subjective form of pleasure. This response arises from the interplay of the faculties of imagination and understanding (Zangwill 2024). It is disinterested in the sense that it is not driven by personal desires, utility, or moral concerns. In contrast to pleasure based on personal interest, like satisfying a desire or pleasure. Moreover, it is subjective because it comes from an individual's experience (King n.d.). But Kant maintains that beauty is universal because we experience the same pleasure from our disinterestedness.

Since aesthetic enjoyment or pleasure comes from our disinterestedness, aesthetic judgment does not come from pre-existing concepts or information about the art. Pleasure springs from the perceptual experience of man to the object of art and the harmonious interaction of his faculties. Under Kant's framework, one might appreciate a deepfake art solely for its beauty, regardless of its contextual or conceptual baggage.

However, Noël Carroll in *Beyond Aesthetics* (2001) rejects this claim. Carroll holds that this view is too narrow as it focuses only on disinterestedness and ignores the narrative, emotional, and cognitive dimensions in artworks, especially in literature and films. This outdated view cannot account for the engagement with emerging art forms, where encountering the work is important. Carroll accounts for context, narrative, authorial intention, and even moral or emotional background, which are also valid responses when encountering artworks. For example, a viewer's appreciation of the 1997 film Titanic is not reducible to disinterestedness but includes the emotional effect, historical context, and character development.

Instead, Carroll proposes a deflationary or content-oriented account of aesthetic experience. This decentralizes aesthetic experience as the highest form of response to engaging with art, as it is one among many. This stripped off a certain hierarchy of engaging with art with aesthetic experience seen "honorifically" but instead treats it

"descriptively" as it is one among many "appropriate response[s] to an artwork" (Carroll 2001, 61). Carroll avoids having a view that overgeneralizes and narrows the experience of art. But holds that experiencing an art is an engagement that may evoke different responses - such as, but not limited to, aesthetic experience through design appreciation or quality detection, or political indignation. Further implication of Carroll's claim is that aesthetic enjoyment of art is one among many, since there are other responses that viewers might have in encountering art, such as emotion or the morality one perceives. This perspective opens space for a broader, more inclusive understanding of what it means to enjoy art.

Applying Carroll's concept of aesthetic experience to deepfake art reveals several implications. First, one can aesthetically appreciate a deepfake art based on its design appreciation, like the sophistication and smoothness of transitions. However, viewers may also engage with deepfakes through other lenses. That is, they may laugh at its humor, feel disturbed by its realism, or raise moral and political objections.

Second, Carroll's rejection of the narrowness of the traditional approach highlights that an artwork's aesthetic merit does not shield it from ethical evaluation. A deepfake may be visually beautiful, but if it is created without the consent of the person it represents, it may still be morally troubling. Thus, the enjoyment it produces is not divorced from the conditions of its creation. Lastly, under a deflationary view, aesthetic enjoyment does not exempt viewers from reflecting on an artwork's social, political, and moral dimensions. It counters the idea that art is just art, as if devoid of context.

APPLYING ROBERT SPARROW'S "ROBOTS, RAPE, AND REPRESENTATION"

Robots, Rape, and Representation

Robert Sparrow in "Robots, Rape, and Representation" (2017) addresses the moral permissibility of creating robots designed to simulate non-consensual sex. While he acknowledged that robots are non-sentient and therefore incapable of actual suffering, Sparrow argues that their use carries moral weight, not because robots are harmed, but because of what they represent, normalize, and affect the character of those who engage with them.

But for the sake of this paper, we turn our focus on Sparrow's arguments on representation, normalization, character, and the designer's responsibility to apply these as a framework to assess the moral permissibility of non-consensual deepfake art.

Sparrow argued that there is an underlying problem with raping robots. Although robots are non-sentient and are incapable of consenting, unless programmed to do so, engaging in sexual intercourse with them is technically masturbation, for sex is reserved for sentient beings (Sparrow 2017, 471). However, the representational provision that the robot be created to represent a woman and programmed to refuse consent to simulate rape (fantasy) sets a different tone. The question is no longer about the capacity of robots to give consent, but on what it represents – rape of a robot as a "sexual substitute" for rape of a woman (Sparrow 2017, 468-469).

In extension, "[w]hat does that say about a society that tolerates these activities?" (Sparrow 2017, 471). Banking on the idea of advertising, allowing such sexual fantasy is a strong force that translates to action. Sparrow closely identifies it with Pavlovian conditioning – a trigger in the form of sex-bots and pleasure through raping them. A culture that normalizes this kind of assault, which "exhorts and encourages it," will eventually cause harm to real women. That is, tolerating the enjoyment of raping a robot in the form of a woman disrespects women and leads to assaulting them.

Moreover, coming from virtue ethics, Sparrow argues that engaging in such pleasure brings harm to the character of individuals. Since thoughts and desires form part of the individual's character, which in turn reveals the dispositions of moral agents in isolated incidents. Enjoying raping "women" robots reveals their characters to have "vicious dispositions – … to be sexist, intemperate, and cruel" (Sparrow 2017, 473). Although raping robots does not necessarily translate to harming them, our treatment of robots serves as an opportunity to "demonstrate virtues and vices."

Lastly, designing robots for rape, alone, is morally problematic for the reasons that, if Sparrow is correct, 1. it leads to actual rape of women, 2. would be disrespectful to women as it expresses "sexist and morally repugnant attitudes," and 3. it will be a moral hazard to the character of its user. Hence, creators of such robots are responsible for creating one, especially if it is predictable that their creation will be used for its adverse effects (Sparrow 2017, 474).

Hence, the moral permissibility of raping and creating robots in the image of women for rape is problematic because of what it represents, what is normalized, and the harm it brings to the character of its users.

Extending Sparrow's Framework to Non-Consensual Deepfake Art

While deepfakes and sex robots are distinct, Sparrow's framework provides a powerful lens for evaluating the moral permissibility of non-consensual deepfake art.

1. Representational Violation

At its core, non-consensual deepfake art uses a person's identity without permission, representing them in contexts or performances they never agreed to. This is morally troubling even though it is not exploitive. Like the rape of robots that Sparrow critiqued, these deepfakes are not devoid of moral concerns since they are representations of real people, created for the enjoyment of viewers. If the rape of robots represents the rape of women, a deepfake art represents a real person in the absence of their consent. The harm arises not just from the outcome of the artwork but from its failure to respect the personal data right of the person being represented.

Some might object that the intention of deepfake creation is noble, for example, raising health and well-being awareness. This view risks bypassing the core issue: the absence of informed consent. The violation of which, regardless of its benefits, already questions the moral value of the media content. Respecting the rights of people to determine how their image and likeness will be used is as important as making a deepfake for whatever moral end; it must not be bypassed, regardless.

2. Normalization of Non-Consent

Secondly, normalizing the use of non-consensual deepfakes, like normalizing the rape of robots, exhorts and encourages the violation of everyone's rights to personal data. One might think that everyone becomes an eternal content whose image and likeness can be uploaded to an AI application to perform whatever the prompter wants them to do. Normalizing this violation disenfranchises people from data ownership of themselves. Adding injury to this is commercial exploitation – especially on deceased artists whose identities were used for profit.

Some might claim that the creation of a non-consensual deepfake art is done for a noble cause. The answer to this can perhaps be through this question: to what extent does a "noble cause" qualify as a justification for the violation, and when can we say that a certain magnitude is already an abuse of that justification? Certainly, that will be difficult to answer, and to put it in the subjective judgment of users, then what is the guarantee that their "noble cause" of making a non-consensual deepfake art is certainly a "noble" one? Until that is determined, the safest solution is to make a deepfake art with the involved party's informed consent.

3. Moral Character and Designer's Responsibility

The consumption of non-consensual deepfake art, the same as raping a robot, damages the characters of both the viewers and the creator. A person who patronizes non-consensual deepfake art, and knowingly enjoys it, to use the words of Sparrow, "reveals them to have a vicious disposition" (Sparrow 2017, 473). Since our desires form part of our character, and our disposition is a reflection of it, knowingly enjoying non-consensual deepfakes is a show of moral insensitivity on the part of the viewer to the right violations. It further reinforces the normalization of casually violating the rights of all else for the sake of art.

Creators, too, bear significant responsibility. Like the creators of robots for rape, deepfake artists who use someone's identity without their permission not only contribute but also initiate the normalization of making non-consensual artworks. Artistic freedom does not absolve one from moral accountability. The accountability or moral responsibility of the creators is not only to the persons they deepfake, but also to the viewers whose character has been harmed because of their creation.

IMPLICATIONS FOR AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT

The moral concerns outlined above have significant implications for the moral (im)permissibility of aesthetically enjoying non-consensual deepfake art. Non-consensual deepfakes are a clear infringement on an individual's right to their data. Enjoying such artworks without considering these conditions risks trivializing the moral significance of consent. Even if a deepfake art demonstrates aesthetic experience, its artistic merit does not negate the ethical harm caused in its production. Carroll's deflationary view reinforces this claim: aesthetic appreciation is not hierarchically superior to other responses, such as moral or political critiques. Art is not immune to moral scrutiny. This claim challenges a possible defense that deepfake art is created under "artistic freedom." It may be so, but it does not entail exemption

from moral accountability. A society that allows such practices endorses a norm where consent is treated as optional for creative work.

If non-consensual deepfakes become normalized, the moral and even the legal guarantee of personal data protection will be eroded. Widespread creation and enjoyment of non-consensual deepfake art could make the non-consensual usage of identity seem acceptable and even inevitable. This normalization disempowers individuals over their personal data and posthumous representation, opening the gate to systemic exploitation. It is a Pandora's box; when opened, no one is spared from being violated. The same can be said of the enjoyment of non-consensual deepfake art.

Furthermore, patronizing and enjoying non-consensual deepfake art while aware that it violates the rights of individuals to their identity is no less problematic. Rather than abstaining out of respect for those rights, consumers intentionally engage with the content despite knowing it causes direct harm. This is a clear indication of a malcharacter – a vicious one that gets pleasure from exploiting the other. In this sense, taking pleasure in non-consensual deepfake art molds or reveals a morally vicious character.

Lastly, springing from Carroll's claim that aesthetic experience, therefore aesthetic enjoyment, is not hierarchically superior among other responses, experiencing deepfake content too can be subjected to other lenses. By that, a deepfake video might invite aesthetic experience due to its design appreciation, while causing moral responses. That is, the aesthetic quality of the art does not immunize it from the violations it caused and label it as artistic value because moral or political responses to deepfake art are equally meaningful. Hence, a non-consensual video, which might be praised for its cunningness and sophistication, is not excused from being accountable for the moral harms it caused. By extension, the creator is not therefore excused from responsibilities in the guise of artistic freedom, artistic expression, or freedom of expression.

It is, of course, a different story if the person consuming a non-consensual deepfake art is not aware that it is a non-consensual one. In instances like this, they may be excused. However, once they are informed of its violation, the succeeding enjoyment of it, if they still subscribe to the art, is already a deliberate action. It is also important to point out that it is incumbent upon humans to be critical of what they consume, i.e., if they know the person is dead already and there is a deepfake art of that person, their ability to suspect must trigger them to check if the media content did not commit any wrongdoings.

In a post-mortem right, one may raise the case that the deceased consented to the proliferation or usage of his/her identity even after death. It can also be the case that the deceased consented to allowing his estate to consent post-mortem. In this instance, the art springing from this is not non-consensual.

Hence, if one sees a deepfake art, which may manifest as music, a music video, an interactive resurrection of an artist, etc., it is important to have a critical mind. Is this a deepfake art? Does this represent a person? Is it created from their likeness? Is it consensual? As moral agents, it is incumbent upon humans to be vigilant of the rights of others.

In summary, aesthetic enjoyment of non-consensual deepfake art cannot be morally neutral. Creating or enjoying such works with full awareness of their origins

violates and reinforces the normalization of the violation of every man's right to their data. Carroll's deflationary approach makes clear that aesthetic pleasure is one among many valid responses to artwork. Similarly, Sparrow's framework enlightens us how non-consensual deepfakes, their creation, and enjoyment, are morally problematic despite their aesthetic value.

THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

To elucidate the framework above allows us to give three thought experiments:

1. Deepfake Art Museum

Suppose that a certain museum curates a deepfake art exhibition where historical figures and celebrities interact with the visitors. The goal of the exhibit is to reimagine the lives and messages of historical figures through deepfakes. In one installation, the deepfake creator features a deceased author supposedly reading to her audience a chapter of her book. The contents were on current political issues. However, what she read was not written by her and did not reflect her political views. But the visitors were mesmerized by the realism of the installation, even praising the artistry of its making. Yet, despite the fascination, some guests express discomfort. They note that the novelist's estate was not consulted, and there is no consent for the digital resurrection of the subject.

Using the interrelationship as drawn in Figure 4, the artist who joins the exhibition is the creator of the deepfake content, the deceased author is the subject of the deepfake content, and the deepfake content depicts the author supposedly reading a chapter of her book. The audience/consumer is the museum goers. In this case, the museum, the artists, and the deepfake content created have no intention of any malice or deception of the audience. However, there is no consent from the subject or its estate.

This case illustrates the complexity of how to evaluate cases under Carroll's deflationary view. While aesthetic appreciation of the exhibit's realism and design quality is a legitimate response, it is one among other responses viewers might have. Some may experience moral uneasiness or political indignation, both of which are equally legitimate responses to the artwork. Aesthetic enjoyment, here, is not isolated from moral reflection. That is, the same art piece can simultaneously provoke concern about the moral cost of its creation.

Applying Sparrow's framework, the exhibition also performs a representation violation and contributes to the normalization of non-consensual use of an individual's data. By publicly celebrating art that digitally resurrects the dead without authorization, the museum and the artist endorse a cultural norm in which the images and videos of individuals are open for artistic use without any moral or legal restraint. Such normalization risks undermining public sensitivity to the necessity of consent in artistic practices or other activities. Furthermore, by allowing audiences to enjoy these works aesthetically, the museum and artist also shape the moral character of their audience, conditioning them to take pleasure in morally compromised representations.

2. Film for a Cause

Suppose a non-profit organization produces a short film using deepfakes of cancer survivors and recently deceased patients to raise awareness and funds for research. The organization's creative team debates whether to use real patient likenesses. One argues that realism will maximize donations; another insists that using anonymous composites would respect privacy. They proceed with the real faces, reasoning that the end, which is saving lives, justifies the means. The film became viral, garnering praise for its emotional impact, realism, and artistry, and as a result, received a significant amount of donations. Yet, weeks later, the families of the deceased discover the video and feel violated by the unapproved resurrection of their loved ones. Can the good achieved justify the harm done? In Carroll's deflationary account, the audience's emotional engagement coexists with moral unease; it reveals that aesthetic enjoyment is inseparable from ethical context. In the lens of Sparrow, this is a violation of representation and normalizing this violation, which risks shaping a culture that devalues the people's right to determine their privacy under the guise of noble causes.

In this case, the creator of the deepfake content is a non-profit organization, the subjects are cancer patients, the content is a deepfake to raise awareness, and the audience is the target donors. No consent was given by the patient or from their estate to allow the creators to make a deepfake using their image and likeness. However, the deepfake creators do not have any malice or intent to deceive in making it.

In Carroll's deflationary approach, the audience's response is not limited to aesthetic admiration. The artistry seen in the artwork is coupled with moral unease. The emotion evoked in the content that moved them to tears and donate is tied to the violation of an individual's right to determine their own data.

Applying Sparrow's framework, the short film illustrates how representation, normalization, and character intersect in the moral evaluation of non-consensual deepfake art. Representationally, the film uses images of real individuals to promote a cause they did not consent to support. In doing so, it implicitly normalizes not asking for consent under the assumption of a noble cause. The project risks teaching society that the nobility and success of an end can excuse the ethical violation of means. This normalization desensitizes people to the importance of consent in artistic and moral practice.

3. Personal Consumption

Suppose a deepfake artist creates deepfake portraits and videos of living public figures (politicians, athletes, celebrities) depicting them in erotic or humiliating scenes. But these renders are displayed only in his private collection, which he views from time to time. The artist insists that no harm is done because the works remain unseen by the public and that the enjoyment of these artworks is purely aesthetic, crediting it to the realism and expressive quality of the AI renderings. In this case, the artist is both the creator and consumer of deepfake content. While the Public figures are the subjects whose consent was not secured. There is, further, no malice and deception intended by all parties.

This case is unique since it raises the question of whether private creation and consumption of non-consensual deepfakes absolves one from moral responsibility.

Under Carroll's deflationary approach, the creator/consumer may aesthetically appreciate and enjoy the deepfake art, especially its realism, quality, scene framing, and even the narrative that dictates the flow of the content. But Carroll's framework sees aesthetic experience just one among many valid responses to the artwork. The creator/consumer's appreciation cannot be isolated from the moral aspect, since aesthetic enjoyment does not suspend moral accountability.

In Sparrow's lens, even if no harm was done to the public figures, the creator/consumer's enjoyment of non-consensual deepfakes reveals something about his moral character. His pleasure came from representations that embody the violation of others' autonomy and dignity. In virtue ethics, this cultivates a vicious disposition, a disregard for the rights of others. Moreover, the act of repeated consumption for enjoyment risks normalization, despite being private, an internal normalization of moral wrongdoings in the belief that no violations are done due to its private creation and consumption. As Sparrow argued regarding the sex of robots, engaging in acts that represent harm, even if done privately, can erode moral awareness and lead one's disposition to cause it to real persons.

The privacy defense fails to protect the creator/consumer from moral responsibility and accountability. Just as a person's internal thoughts or fantasies can reveal their character, so too can their aesthetic choices. Enjoying non-consensual deepfake art in private is not morally neutral because it signals an indifference to the importance of consent and respecting the personhood of others.

Hence, this case demonstrates that, despite no public dissemination or tangible harm occurring, it is still morally problematic to aesthetically enjoy non-consensual deepfake art. What is at stake and highlighted is the formation of moral character, which may take the form of gradual conditioning of the self to find pleasure in what should evoke moral discomfort.

The three thought experiments collectively demonstrate that it is not morally problematic to aesthetically enjoy non-consensual deepfake art, regardless of the context in which it is produced or consumed. Through Carroll's deflationary approach to art, these cases show that aesthetic enjoyment is one among many valid responses to art, and it cannot override moral accountability. That is, what is aesthetically pleasurable cannot be abstracted from the moral or political content of the artwork. Meanwhile, Sparrow's framework exposes how non-consensual deepfake art affects and stirs the individual and societal moral compass.

CONCLUSION

Aesthetically enjoying a non-consensual deepfake art is morally problematic. Using Carroll's approach to aesthetic experience, art encounters can have different responses aside from aesthetic enjoyment. This helps us understand that engaging with art is not necessarily in its disinterestedness but also other responses that one might get from it, such as humor, moral indignation, or political criticism. This subject's art is not only about art criticism but also about its moral value. Furthermore, we critiqued non-consensual art using the framework we got from Sparrow's "Robots, Rape, and Representation." Through representation, normalization, and character, we argue that

non-consensual deepfakes art is not just about art, but also about the representational violation, normalization of that violation, the effects of creating vicious characters, and the responsibility of the creator. Combining Carroll and Sparrow reveals that the aesthetic enjoyment of non-consensual deepfake art cannot be divorced from its moral or political context.

The claim of this paper is not just about the harms to persons, but the kind of society we wish to create against the backdrop of technological advancements. Like the creation and participation in robots for rape, the creation and enjoyment of non-consensual deepfake art is consenting to a kind of society that does not respect the rights of every individual. While we promote technological advancement, we should equally promote respecting everyone's rights as we move in that direction.

That being said, these are our recommendations: In creating laws about deepfakes, deepfake art must also be addressed, especially on the extent of its use and the necessary safety nets to ensure that no one is harmed in its making. It is also important to open a discussion and determine the ethical usage of deepfakes. The technology opens a lot of doors to enhance our living, but it equally exposes us to harm if we let it be.

To prevent rights violations from non-consensual deepfake art, there must be consent verification and labeling of the media content. For instance, platforms like social media or museums require creators to secure explicit informed consent from the person or their legal estate. Also, labeling of the media content, especially if it is a deepfake representing a person, must be implemented. This enables transparency to viewers.

It is also important that platforms or institutions that promote the use of deepfakes should provide audience awareness to critically engage with deepfakes. This can take the form of disclaimers or educational prompts that will inform viewers about the ethical practices of deepfake use.

Institutions that promote or use deepfakes should have a code of ethics that prohibits the creation, proliferation, or display of non-consensual deepfake artworks. For instance, when an educational institution calls for deepfake artworks submission for arts festival showrooms, they must implement guidelines that the institution and the participants must adhere to.

Lastly, for topical recommendations, future studies may use or critique the typology and/or diagrams of the interrelationships in the deepfake creation and the effects it causes. Future research can also examine the moral boundaries of using a deceased person's image and likeness in deepfake art, and whether consent given in life extends after death. A cross-cultural study can also be conducted on the diverse traditions (especially their legal framework) that conceptualize consent, representation, and respect in digital or AI-generated artworks.

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Acknowledgment

The authors are grateful to Dr. Beverly A. Sarza of De La Salle University-Manila's Department of Philosophy for her valuable comments and suggestions during the initial formulation of this manuscript. Her recommendation to engage with Robert Sparrow's "Robots, Rape, and Representation" and her generosity in providing a copy of the article helped shape the theoretical framing of the study.

Declaration of AI Use

Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools, such as Grammarly and ChatGPT, were used to enhance the paper's grammar, argument, and overall presentation. The ideas, arguments, and personal insights remain original, with AI serving only as a tool for language and argument refinement and clarity.