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EDITOR'S NOTES

The January 2009 issue of Φιλοσοφία carries with it seven interesting articles and one book review, that is, one article each for African philosophy, ethics, modernism and postmodernism, philosophy of education, philosophy of language and hermeneutics, philosophy of mind, and political philosophy.

In the first article, Oladele A. Balogun tries to rationally defend the Yoruba belief in the living-dead. The belief has both social and moral functions in that it goads people to lead moral lives; imbues them with the spirit of hard work and industry that bolsters community integrity; and symbolizes continuity of both social structure and human community. The author maintains that this traditional belief when seriously adhered to will relieve many of the African social problems.

Jeffrey M. Centeno, in "Charles Taylor: Towards an ethics of intercultural dialogue," discusses the role of culture, viewed from a larger context, in hermeneutically understanding oneself. The self is interwoven with culture and personal identity is rooted in a cultural context. Therefore, an ethnic identity is a relation between the self and its cultural ground, and any question on ethnic identity necessarily involves a discourse on culture.

In "Foucault, popular culture, and television," Rhoderick V. Nuncio challenges the modernist meaning of popular culture where technology is its later extension. This extension has transformed the material modern culture into a visual postmodern culture. Moreover, this visual culture is dominated by the television which largely gives rise to regimented docile human bodies.

Danilo S. Alterado argues in the paper "Universities and democratization: Habermas on education" that Habermas ties up his ideas of an emancipated, enlightened society with the structures and processes of universities. The university is an ideal place for self-reflection and communicative action. Self-reflection is conducive in a democratic setting while communicative action helps boost the democratization of society. University education, which promotes and safeguards free-from-domination discourses, enhances the prospect of the democratization project.

Communication and understanding, says Xinli Wang in "Linguistic communication versus understanding," are distinct but it seems their difference is not so clear. It appears that the analytic version of propositional understanding and informative communication reduces communication to mutual *understanding* while the continental version of

hermeneutic understanding and dialogical communication reduces understanding to a process of *communication*.

Napoleon M. Mabaquiao Jr. argues in "Dreyfus on Heidegger's critique of Husserl's intentionality: A review" that there is no basic parallelism between Searle's and Husserl's theories of intentionality and therefore Searle's theory cannot stand in place of Husserl's theory; that Heidegger does not consider the intentionality of consciousness as primordial, but rather it is care that is essential in the thrownness of Dasein; and that Heidegger's privileging of the conscious over the unconscious is problematic as it lacks "textual evidence and explanatory power."

In "Herzen's Russian socialism and the Slavophiles' Christian communal socialism," Elena S. Grevtsova tries to show that they have more similarities than differences and that Herzen's project represents a specific variant of the Russian national culture as described by the Slavophiles.

Finally, we have the book review of James K. A. Smith's *Who's afraid of postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault to church*. Camille Leelin Ting agrees with Smith that the differences between postmodernism—as represented by Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault—and Christianity are superficial. Despite these differences, which are largely the result of misinterpretations, the claims of these postmoderns "have deep affinity with Christianity's central claims."

As usual, the editor hopes that these articles are not only informative but enjoyable and educational as well.

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IN DEFENSE OF THE “LIVING-DEAD” IN TRADITIONAL AFRICAN THOUGHT: THE YORUBA EXAMPLE

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The paper attempts to provide a philosophical justification for the belief in the living-dead among the traditional Africans using the Yoruba as an example. It argues that in spite of the various criticisms leveled against the belief in the living-dead among the traditional Africans, this belief can be rationally defended and philosophically understood within the conceptual scheme of the traditional Yoruba thought. The paper argues that the link between the living and the living-dead possesses social as well as moral functions. It encourages people to live morally so as to merit a good place in the other world. It imbues them with the spirit of hard work, industry, and integrity in the community. It symbolizes the continuity not only of the social structure but of the human community as well. Finally, the paper points to the need of reappraising this traditional belief in the living-dead in the quest of relieving contemporary African societies from their plethora of social predicaments.

I

The Yoruba constitute one of the major ethnic groups of modern Nigeria. They effectively occupy the whole of Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, Ekiti, Lagos, and a substantial part of Kwara State (Atanda 1980, 1). Aside from Nigeria, the Yoruba are also found in sizeable numbers in the southeastern part of the Republic of Benin, Togo, and Dahomey in West Africa, in West India and in South Africa. There is also a thriving Yoruba culture in South America and the Caribbean, especially Brazil and Cuba, where the descendants of the unwilling immigrants to the new world have been able to maintain their identity and preserve their cultural heritage (Gbadegesin 1991, 174). While the Yoruba are dispersed throughout the world, this

paper focuses on the Nigerian Yoruba. The reason for this choice is that the ancestral home of the Yoruba is in Nigeria and each of the Yoruba tribes in the Diaspora still traces its origin to this home where the culture thrives best. The Yoruba, whether at home or in Diaspora, have a unique and distinct cultural life and their lineage can be traced to Oduduwa with Ile-ife as the cradle of civilization. The traditional Yoruba are associated with various beliefs that cut across different strata of human existence. One of such beliefs centers on the concept of living-dead.¹

It is apposite at this juncture to discuss the traditional Yoruba belief on death before pitching our tent with their idea of the living-dead. Death is a universal phenomenon. It is neither a peculiar occurrence in the traditional Yoruba nor is it an exclusive preserve of any other cultural milieu. Rather, it is experienced in all cultures irrespective of race or creed. However, it is only the ontological meaning attached to death in a given tradition that makes it different from the other. For the Yoruba, death is an inevitable conclusion to man's earthly existence (Idowu 1962, 189). It is a compulsory process that every man must pass through. This explains why the traditional Yoruba will not hesitate to caution those who live as if they will not die by saying "*awaye Iku osi*" (every one is bound to die). They will further advise those who mock death that "*ma forun yomi, gbogbo wa lon lo...*" (celebrate not my demise, for we all are bound to die). Man is a sojourner on earth, so no matter how long he lives, death must come as a necessary end (Awolalu and Dopemu 1979, 253). The inevitability of death has always been expressed in traditional Yoruba proverbs like "*gbogbo wa la je gbese Iku*," that is, death is a kind of debt to be paid by all. It is the last of the rites of passage that a person has to go through on earth (after birth, puberty, and marriage) (Quarcoopome 1987, 124).

Wande Abimbola (1971, 74) views death among the traditional Yoruba "as a medium for the transformation of human beings from one level of existence in *aye* (earth) to another level of existence in *orun* (heaven). In other words, death is not the end of one's life but only a passage into another life. It is the end and, at the same time, the beginning of life.

Death seems to be a paradox among the traditional Yoruba. While it is believed that death is a necessary end, which must terminate all human activities in this physical world, it is equally believed that death is a transition from one state of existence to another.

In the conceptual scheme of the traditional Yoruba, man (*eniyàn*) is made up of three essential elements: (1) body (*Ara*), the physical frame, which houses the spirit; (2) spirit (*Emi*), which is better interpreted as the life-given entity; and (3) inner head (*Ori*), which is being regarded as the bearer of human destiny. The traditional Yoruba believe that when death occurs, the physical frame (the body) will be buried. This body rots in the ground while the essential element of man (the life-given force), or what

Awolalu and Dopamu call as “personality-soul” survives death and returns to *elemi* (the giver of the spirit), or the source of being from whom it comes. Like the Platonic conception, the soul for the Yoruba lives on either in perfect peace or in perpetual disturbance in some other worlds.

Contrary to the existentialist conception of death, the Yoruba conception is different. Martin Heidegger for instance, states that death is the end of Dasein, the end of Being-in-the-world. He conceives man’s whole life as a progressive journey to death. As soon as man is born, he is old enough to die. Another existentialist, Jean-Paul Sartre (1957, 533) believes that death is the annihilation of existence. It is an absurdity which removes all meaning from human existence. To be born is absurd and to die is meaningless. The traditional Yoruba, unlike the existentialists, do not conceive death to be a meaningless phenomenon. Rather, they attach a particular meaning to death, especially when it is an initiation into the ancestral world. Against this background, one may perhaps ask: What is the idea of “living-dead” among the traditional Yoruba? What are the conditions for being qualified as a living-dead?

II

Our purpose here is to present a careful analysis and exposition of the belief in living-dead as it is among the traditional Yoruba and clear it from various misconceptions. From the Yoruba conception, the paradox of death culminates in the idea of living-dead, which suggests the status of ancestorhood. In other words, the deceased continue to watch over the affairs of the living members of the families, helping the deserving ones, and punishing the delinquent from the spiritual abode. If an ancestor is a ruler, the scope of his activities goes beyond his family to his community. By implication, the phenomenon of living-dead implies that there is a link and communion between the dead and living. The living-dead serves as an impetus to the living and encourages them to be full of good works in order to get their favor. According to this belief, the living feels not only beholden to the ancestors for their help and protection, but they are also obliged to do honor and to render service to them as appropriate (Kwasi 1992, 138). Honor can be done to the ancestors in two related ways: one general, the other particular. The first is simply to live uprightly since living uprightly is a source of honor to one’s family and ancestors. To live with bad conduct is to bring disgrace to the family and displeasure to the ancestors. The second way of rendering services to the dead—more particularly than generally—is to complete the project(s) half done by the deceased. Honor, e.g., can be done to the living-dead by paying off some debts he left behind. There may also be children to be taken cared of, or specific instruction(s) to be done. These are reciprocal ways of offering sacrifices to the spirits of the ancestors for their care and protection of the living members of the family or clan. The significance of the above analysis

is to shed more light on the dichotomy between ancestor worship and ancestor veneration.

Ancestor worship, on the one hand, involves pouring of libation during funeral rites. Ancestral veneration, on the other hand, occurs when the descendants pray and thank the living-dead for the good welfare they have received from them. The living-dead or ancestors/ancestress are believed to have power to influence the affairs of the living for better or for worse.

On the belief in living-dead and who the living-dead really are, J. S. Mbiti (1969, 83-84) says that:

The living-dead are...the best of group of intermediaries between men and God: they know the needs of men, they have "recently" been with men, and at the same time they have full access to the channels of communicating with God directly or, according to some societies, indirectly through their own forefathers. Therefore men approach them more often for minor needs of life than they approach God. Even if the living-dead may not do miracles or extraordinary things to remedy the needs, men experience a sense of psychological relief when they pour out their hearts' troubles before their seniors who have a foot in both worlds.

While explaining who is regarded as the living-dead, Mbiti (1969, 25) likewise says that the living-dead "is a person who is physically dead but alive in the memory of those who know him in his life as well as being alive in the world of the spirits." Mbiti thinks that in so far as the memory of an ancestor is kept alive, such an ancestor is considered to be in the state of personal immortality. While we are not disputing Mbiti's thoughts, the belief in the living-dead among the traditional Yoruba extends more than keeping the dead in memory. The living-dead among the traditional Yoruba are believed to be the guardians of family affairs, tradition, and activities. The Yoruba draw inspirations, hopes, joys, and vitalities of life from their ontological relationship with their ancestors. It is therefore remarkable to say that one of the aesthetic values of life for the traditional Yoruba is in fact to become an ancestor or ancestress.

It must be noted, however, that not all persons in the traditional Yoruba become an ancestor worthy of being worshipped or venerated. Some conditions must be met.

The most essential condition for being elevated to the status of living-dead is that one must have lived a life worthy of emulation. What then are the criteria of the exemplary life? The first mark of an exemplary life, according to the traditional Yoruba, is marriage and having children. Permanent bachelorhood and spinsterhood will disqualify a person from becoming a living-dead because neither bachelor nor spinster can help

increase the family number. Those disqualified also include people who died of unclean diseases such as dropsy, leprosy, epilepsy, madness, smallpox, and the like. Such diseases are believed to be used by the gods to punish wrongdoers for their crimes. The second mark is that natural death in old age with befitting burial enhances one's reputation to the status of the living-dead. Unnatural deaths include suicide, death by drowning, and death on the battlefield in defense of the community. The last, however, is regarded as an act of bravery, an exception that qualifies one to become an ancestor because the living-dead are said to form a company of warriors in the other world, and so only the brave can be initiated. It is interesting to note that wealth can or cannot qualify one to become a living-dead depending on the circumstances.

A third exemplary mark of being a living-dead is one's high moral and ethical standard coupled with one's constructive qualities and meaningful contributions to the total welfare of the community. All these qualities are necessary requirements for being qualified as a living-dead.

Ideally, the concept of living-dead is often mistakenly used in association with some other related beliefs among the traditional Yoruba. In order to clear it from these misconceptions, there is need to make some clarifications on such beliefs as reincarnation and the "*akudaya* syndrome." One common thing about these phenomena is that they form part of the belief system of the traditional Yoruba. Moreover, their meanings are all related to death and the immorality of the soul.

Reincarnation, according to the Yoruba conceptual scheme, is the belief that the ancestors return in one or in several children of the family. In other words, although the soul of the reincarnated person has its own individual existence in the spiritual abode, some of his or her characteristic traits are made manifest in the grandchildren (Echekwube 1989, 137). When an ancestor is said to have reincarnated into a new baby, we simply mean that the family is not broken by the phenomenon of death. There are many justifications for the belief in reincarnation among the traditional Yoruba.²

The "*akudaya* phenomenon"³ constitutes an evidential base for classical reincarnation and not partial reincarnation as mentioned above. The concept "*akudaya*" stems from the combination of two Yoruba words. "*aku*" and "*daaya*," meaning "to die" and "to re-appear" respectively. The combination means, "the dead reappear again." It is a direct passage of the soul from one human body to another with accurate memory and consciousness of the past. Life identity does not even arise because the deceased can be identified and he can identify himself (Peter 1997, 38). The Yoruba believe that this type of classical reincarnation happens because of an untimely unnatural death. It is believed that after the death of young people, there is no immediate rest. Rather, they move from place to place in search for a new life (Makinde 1983, 39). Until the *akudaya* complete the required number of years they ought to have lived, they cannot rest in

a place of those who died in their old age. Perhaps, this will explain why the latter may assume the status of living-dead (provided certain conditions are fulfilled) and why the former cannot as yet join the living-dead.

The living-dead, collectively called *oku-orun*, are believed by the traditional Yoruba to be in *orun* (heaven). Though they were once human beings before they were elevated to another level of existence with greater authority (Abimbola 1971, 75), they are still not separated from their earthly families. In the traditional Yoruba context, the family is made up of the living-dead, the living, and the generation yet unborn. The living-dead are, therefore, continually interested in the well-being of the members of their family. They continue to protect their offspring from preventable misfortunes and punish any family member who fails in his filial or moral responsibilities. This goes to show that the living-dead are regarded as part of the social structure and this is manifested in the ancestral cult, like the *Egungun* festival. The festival is an indication of when the spirit of the deceased returns from heaven to visit his or her people. That is why they are called "*ara-orun*" (member of the other world).

Following the above analysis, the living-dead are ancestors with greater moral status and authority compared to those who are either partially reincarnated or fully reincarnated, the *akudaya*. Where both the partially reincarnated and the *akudaya* live on *aye* (earth) the living-dead reside in *orun* (heaven). The Yoruba believe that the partially reincarnated can be reborn to the same family while the *akudaya*, the classical type of reincarnation, do not go back to the same family but assume new lives elsewhere after their death. While the living-dead serve as intermediaries between the divinities, together with God, on the one hand, and men, on the other hand, they have the mandate to reward right conduct and to punish bad conduct of the tribe or of individuals for crimes committed against the ancestors. Reincarnation, in the partial or classical sense, cannot do this.

III

The belief in living-dead among the traditional Africans has been subjected to severe criticisms and objections from different scholars. The belief has been overwhelmingly condemned as a product of fantasy and illusion. Many have questioned whether the belief can survive rational investigation especially in the light of the contemporary world. Scholars claim that such a belief neither designates something tangible or observable nor does it refer to something that has an independent existence in the sense of being actual or true. The argument goes further that the belief in the living-dead exists metaphysically only in the minds of people but not in reality. It is susceptible to observational test with or without the aid of scientific equipment. One of the leading critics of the belief in the living-dead is Segun Ogungbemi (1997, 7). According to him:

...how do we know that the ancestors (living-dead) are actually living in the hereafter? Where is the hereafter located? Do we have concrete evidence that the ancestors actually provide protective power to their progenies? Generally, most African countries depend on foreign aid in order to make ends meet and when they are not forthcoming; life becomes hard on most Africans. The question one may ask is, where are the ancestors when their children rely on foreign aid to survive?

Following these fundamental questions, he then concludes that one is bound to cast doubts on the power and the willingness of the ancestors to help their suffering children and whether they exist at all.

Other scholars have criticized the belief in the living-dead in terms of self-contradiction. According to Pieper (1969, 24), the term "living-dead" involves self-contradiction because "the dead are in a state of non-existence with their identities lost forever." On the part of Oso (1978, 77), there is nothing like the world of the ancestors or of the living-dead. That is, the belief cannot be rationally defended. Scholars of like-minded opinion have criticized attempts at the empirical justification of the belief in the living-dead through testimonies of true life stories. They have branded such stories as either mythical or based on fallacious reasoning. The testimonies cited as evidences are regarded as make-beliefs created to safeguard the existence of a traditional dogma. In any case, these testimonies or stories based on practical experience could be through accidents and, at most, psychological. In order to philosophically substantiate this belief, the Yoruba need to show that his reasoning is necessarily valid and must be prepared to experimentally establish the causal relationship between the living and the living-dead. Otherwise, the much-acclaimed reciprocal communal relationship between the living and the living-dead becomes a pseudo assertion. In short, the Yoruba see connections where no such connection exists; they apply the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* argument.

Lukas criticizes the *Egungun* cult as a manifestation of the traditional Yoruba belief in the living-dead. According to him (1948, 43), the practice of giving a present to the *Egungun* has led to the transformation of the cult into a form of begging since the *ara-orun* collect money and even the presents from the living. Lukas (1948, 49) raises a related question: if the *ara-orun* are artistic symbolic representations of the living-dead in the traditional Yoruba, then what becomes of the presents they collect from the living? Are they taking the presents to use on earth or in their spiritual world?

On another note, Oso (1978) critically argues that the belief in the living-dead should be rejected and thrown out of their social structure since it is nonrational. He raises the following questions: Where were the living-dead when the colonial masters came to take the peace of the Yoruba,

to enslave the people, to punish, to make them suffer unjustly in their own land, and to take their valuables away from them? Where were they when the people were exported as goods to foreign lands to serve as slaves or refugees of the colonial master? Oso (1978, 77) concludes that the living-dead were not aware of these predicaments; maybe they were asleep during these tough periods or they intentionally left the living to go through these entire historical trauma.

IV

I shall attempt at this juncture to present a philosophical defense of the belief in the living-dead within the traditional Yoruba thought. The paper argues that in spite of the criticisms they were not strong enough to vitiate the philosophical significance of this belief. It is my conviction that this belief can be rationally defended and philosophically understood within the conceptual scheme of the traditional Yoruba. To pursue this thesis to a logical conclusion, I shall attempt a critique of the objections and draw conclusions relevant to nation building.

Firstly, it is unsound to deny the reality of the belief in the living-dead among the Yoruba because of its nonconformity to observational test. Many criticisms against this belief are based on the view of unobservability and not having an independent existence as an actuality. Hence, it is a fantasy or an illusion. It must, however, be noted that death, which is one of the conditions for joining the living-dead, is itself a phenomenon that has a nonphysical unobservable component, the lifting of the spirit from the body. We can only hear that someone has experienced such a lifting. Yet, each of those who testified on this experience has no means of demonstrating the experience to those who have not experienced seeing the spiritual lifting. Given this, whatever makes the critic to doubt the invisible reality of spiritual lifting in death must equally hold for the belief in the living-dead. We must note that most of the critics of the belief in the living-dead are Western-trained scholars whose philosophical orientation must have influenced their perception of the belief, which is real among the traditional Yoruba. It is easy for them, but difficult for the traditional Yoruba, to discredit stories and testimonies justifying the belief in the living-dead as make-up stories.

Those scholars who argue that the idea of living-dead is self-contradictory appear to lack the proper and adequate understanding of the nature of man among the traditional Yoruba. Within the conceptual scheme of the Yoruba, the notion of living-dead is not contradictory. Three different but related elements constitute the nature of man among the traditional Yoruba: *Ori* (inner head), *Ara* (physical body), and *Emi* (life-giving force). Of these three, only the *emi* is capable of immortality and is indestructible unlike the *ara* and the *ori* that are destroyed with the death of man. Characteristically, *emi* is known to have a quasi-immaterial nature. Given

this, it follows that within the traditional Yoruba thought, it is no contradiction to say that the body is dead and the *emi* is still living. Death is never, a barrier to the existing relationship between the dead and the living.

Critics have also attacked the validity of this belief on the ground that there is no causal relationship between the living and the living-dead, and the testimonies thereto are products of accidents. It seems that Ogungbemi and Oso do not possess an adequate understanding of the cosmological structure of the worldview of the Yoruba. The arguments of these two scholars boil down to the fact that the Yoruba have been historically conditioned with immense suffering. Given the protective power of the living-dead in guiding their families, clans, and communities from undue suffering, it follows that either the living-dead do not have the power much accredited to them or they are unwilling to save or help the suffering clan. Given the Yoruba hierarchical cosmological structure of the universe, the living-dead occupy only the third plane—serving as intermediaries between the living and God (together with the divinities). There is an extent to which the living dead can protect the living. Aside from this, a proper understanding of the dialectics of *Ire* (goodness) and *Ibi* (badness) within the Yoruba conceptual scheme will show that the experiences the Yoruba have been subjected to in terms of suffering does not imply the docility of the living dead.

Lukas's criticism of the *Egungun* cult is devoid of substance. Without mincing words, the criticism fails to capture the pragmatic essence of the cult. Far from being beggars, the *Egungun* cult is an appreciative expression of those living for the protection they have received and continue to receive from the ancestors, who are artistically and symbolically represented by a masked man. The Yoruba are psychologically attached to the belief that the *Egungun* festival is a period when the spirit of the living-dead always comes down to earth. In recognition of this festive mood, they offer presents to the *Egungun* who are understood as *ara-orun* (member of the other world), and not beggars. This practice is aimed at maintaining the living-dead in peace and happiness. By way of reciprocity, the living-dead attempt to ward off evil from the living. This belief is predicated on the idea that the living-dead are both more knowing and more powerful than those who still alive.

Given the above arguments, it follows that criticisms are misdirected and not properly rooted in the understanding of the cultural basis of the traditional Yoruba. The cultural importance of the belief in living-dead cannot be ignored or undermined. The link between the living-dead and the living serves as an encouragement for the living to do good works in order to get the favor of the living-dead. The firmness of this belief permeated the traditional Yoruba social structure, thus resulting into a morally ordered society where peace and justice are mutually reinforced. Through this belief, the people are constantly reminded that virtuosity,

among other things, is one of the important prerequisites of being admitted into the world of the living-dead. It is on this note that we shall now explore the philosophical significance of this belief in the living-dead with the view of strengthening our defense.

The philosophical significance of this belief largely dwells in the moral portrayal of what the ideal life ought to be among the traditional Yoruba. The belief marks the depth of the traditional Yoruba social, spiritual, and moral awareness. The living-dead are quite known for their enforcement of morals. Morals, broadly construed, cover ethical rules proper as well as customs and taboos. It is with respect to the last two kinds of rules of conduct—customs and taboos—rather than to the first—ethical rules proper—that the living-dead have their greatest philosophical significance. This is not because their status as guardians of morality of their living relatives (“morality” in the narrower sense) is not important (though often restricted), it is because, firstly, in the case of morality narrowly conceived (ethics proper), the ancestors can only enforce moral rules whose basis or validity is dependent on their own wishes, such as customs and taboos, which are frequently of their own making; and secondly, customs and taboos are more important to cultural individuality than morality, that is, moral rules as universals cannot figure in the differential of a culture. In the light of this, the belief in the living-dead is a source of the moral inclination of the people and cautions them to behave in particular ways that would not warrant the punitive action of the living-dead.

Far from being remote to the practical existence of the people, the traditional Yoruba belief in the living-dead has pragmatic tendencies. The ideal of immortality implies service to mankind. The afterlife of the living-dead is pictured as one of dignity and serenity. The main preoccupation of that existence is to do good for the living members of the family and clan. It is upon the ability to achieve beneficial interaction with the community of the living that the social significance of the living-dead is predicated. The practical import of this is the hope of the living to attain the enviable status of “living-dead,” thereby imbuing the people with the spirit of hard work, industry, and integrity in the community. Besides the fact that this belief contributes significantly to the meaningfulness of human social life, it can also be said to symbolize the continuity not only of the social structure, but also of the human community.

V

In conclusion, it is pertinent to say that efforts have been made in discussing the concept of the living-dead within the framework of the traditional Yoruba thought system. The phenomenon has been carefully clarified against various misconceptions. While it is stated that to become a living-dead is a positive system of value desirable in itself, we equally made it clear that not everybody is automatically qualified to become a

living-dead. In order to assume this status at death, some conditions must be satisfied while on earth.

The paper also analyzed the various criticisms leveled against the belief in the living-dead in traditional Yoruba. Counterarguments have been advanced against the criticisms in defense of the living-dead by showing the cultural and philosophical significance of the belief.

Critics may perhaps ask: can the traditional Yoruba belief in the living-dead survive the impact of foreign cosmologies? Though this question is fundamental in view of the Yoruba contact with the West and the Arabian World that have eroded the contemporary Yoruba culture, the meaning and significance attached to the belief in the living-dead has indeed been eroded. While before, when the belief was still held in high regard and exaltation, the vices of society were minimally reduced and bearable. But with foreign influences integrated in the Yoruba culture, the outcome has been a society where injustices pervade. The psychological awe and fear of the living-dead in the probation of the socially deviant and immorally flaunt are in fact rapidly declining. The erosion of such vital beliefs as the living-dead, through the Yoruba contact and interaction with the West and the Arabs, has led to various moral and social problems in contemporary Yoruba societies. If such phenomenon as religious conversion proceeded in a strictly logical fashion, it might be expected that the traditional Yoruba belief in the living-dead might be a thing of the past. While traditionally the Yoruba society was morally orderly in terms of customs and taboos, now it appears unsafe for living due to the uncontrollable spate of immorality and crimes. While acknowledging the significance of the belief in the living-dead, the Yoruba must critically examine, more than ever before, their acceptance of alien beliefs. If the belief in the living-dead can be upheld and philosophically defended as it was in traditional Yoruba thought, then contemporary and modern Yoruba societies will probably be better situated.

NOTES

1. J. S. Mbiti (1969) has made the phrase "the living-dead" famous. In his usage of the phrase, he means "the spirits of those who have recently died." But on our own part, the living-dead is not restricted to Mbiti's category, but is also extended to the ancestors who died a long time ago.

2. For more details on the justification of the belief in reincarnation, see A. O. Echekwube (1989, 214-28).

3. A detailed explanation of the *Akudaya* phenomenon is discussed by M. A. Makinde (1983, 36-37).

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CHARLES TAYLOR: TOWARDS AN ETHICS OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

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This article presents the hermeneutical role of culture in the process of understanding oneself seen within the larger context of culture. Chosen as an interpretive framework to argue for this point is the contribution of Charles Taylor's dynamic theory of culture.

The question of the self is interwoven with the discourse of culture. Every identity is rooted in a cultural context, which informs the identity's unique character. That is why an adequate account of ethnic identity involves an elaboration of the fundamental relation between the self and culture. A deeper understanding of this truth can lead to meaningful encounters of the living realities of cultures.

INTRODUCTION

The work of social justice profoundly demands an ethics of intercultural dialogue. For, without which, no lasting peace hoped for among cultures is possible. There is then the need to foster mutual argumentation of each other's conception of what constitutes a good life and to be willing to learn from one another. "If we are to discuss the basic question of human existence today, the intercultural dimension seems to me absolutely essential," thus claims one of this generation's important theologians—Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger [now Pope Benedict XVI] (2006, 73). In support of this claim, this work will heavily draw from Charles Taylor's hermeneutics of culture, viewed as an important contribution to the discourse of the human person fundamentally described as a dialogical self. Briefly, "hermeneutics of culture" refers to the critical appreciation of the interpretive structure of the totality of people's practices, vision of life, and habits of relations that provides everyone a background of meaning for self-understanding.

Part One of this paper presents an exposition of Taylor's account of culture, both as an interpretive and a transformative agent of human

development. For Taylor, culture consists in the individuals' practice of self-interpretation and self-transformation.

Part Two analyzes and appropriates Taylor's work into the elaboration of the cultural meaning of the self. Culture, as both a formative and a transformative process, is primordially constitutive with the making of the self, which is only possible within the context of an intercultural dialogue. In a pluralistic world, the challenge of ever being sensitive to and being responsible for the Other remains, lest the self loses its meaning.

Part Three concludes the study by affirming that the sustainability of identity in a multicultural society requires exploring dialogical possibilities among different cultures. Dialogical possibilities enable the creation of meaningful intersubjectivity, which puts in perspective every human person's efforts for self-realization within the hermeneutical space of culture.

I. CULTURE AS A HERMENEUTICAL SPACE

For the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor¹ the meaning of the self is rooted in and shaped by one's culture. Culture—as the constellation of interpretive practices, norms, and values—defines the individual's way of life. Indeed, culture edifies the human person's character.² That is, the hermeneutical significance of culture lies specifically in providing individuals the linguistic tools for self-understanding. Taylor (1994, 63) succinctly expresses that “an individual is sustained by the culture which elaborates and maintains the vocabulary of his self-understanding.” Culture is the condition of interpretation through culture's rich language habits.

It is precisely the linguistically formative character of culture that makes it the constitutive element of human development. The human person's becoming can only take place within the sphere of dwelling: *culture*. This characterization of culture as the sphere of dwelling behooves a phenomenological account of the homelike essence of culture. As noted in the foregoing, culture is a process that surrounds the life of individuals. It permeates every level of human experience, which consists in ways of interpreting actions, emotions, and relations with others. In short, the interpretation of our human condition is mediated by the linguistic context of culture. As David Tracy (1987, 9) elegantly puts it: “To be human is to act reflectively, to decide deliberately, to understand intelligently, to experience fully. Whether we know it or not, to be human is to be a skilled interpreter.”

Actions, for instance, can only make sense if seen in relation to a wider range of intelligible agency participated in by acting beings. Even emotions, according to Taylor, are necessarily interpreted and articulated. Emotion is the interpretation of our affective ways. Taylor (1985, 75) is explicit on this: “There is no human emotion which is not embodied in an interpretive language; for human emotion is only what is refracted as in

human language." Taylor claims that it is language, as socially interpretive, that makes our feelings understandable. Feelings are no mere emotional or psychological states; they are hermeneutical moments.

Language is descriptive of our emotions. We are able to describe and express our emotions because of an affective vocabulary. Thus, in the words of Taylor (1985, 75), "human emotion is interpreted emotion." Or consider, too, how our thoughts need a context of shared meanings to make them truly familiar, lest we get only muttered articulations. Taylor (1995, 23, 130) cogently explains this point:

Engaged agency is an agency whose experience is only made intelligible by being placed in the context of the kind of agency it is. Thoughts exist as it were in the dimension of meaning and require a background of available meanings in order to be the thoughts that they are.

As it were, individuals stand on the ground of culture upon which they secure their social balance. By "social balance" is meant the mode of relations that individuals find themselves situated in. Social balance is the essential dimension of being-with and being-for others that gives sense to one's existence. In other words, the meaning of one's existence hangs in this balance between sociality and responsibility. We experience this social balance in and through culture. Taylor's keen notes about culture deserve to be quoted at length, from which we can derive important insights. In *Hegel*, for instance, Taylor (1983, 381-382) writes:

What we are as human beings, we are only in a cultural community. The fact is that our experience is what it is, is shaped in part, by the way we interpret it; and this has a lot to do with the terms which are available to us in our culture. Culture shapes our private experience and constitutes our public experience, which in turn interacts profoundly with the private. The 'Sittlichkeit', i.e., the ongoing public life, is the essence, the substance of the self.

From the passage just cited we can see how Taylor's important communitarian⁴ reading of Hegel's theory of the ethical substance of the community leads him to argue for the hermeneutical significance of culture—culture being the embodiment of community. Taylor discovers in Hegel's social philosophy the basic feature of culture as a network of interpretive practices that shape the life of a community. According to Taylor, culture mediates the interpretation of experience. The interpretation of experience is necessarily culture-bound, insofar as the process of interpretation involves the usage of a language that is formed out of shared dialogical practices.

Every interpretation of experience implies expression and recognition. Alternatively, no interpretation happens unless it is made manifest through socially acceptable medium. And culture is that mediating ground of interpretation. It connects the individuals with the world by furnishing them with ways to understand their experiences. Culture binds the lifestyle of individuals with the presence of fashionable interpretive ways. Culture, then—being the complex configuration of embodied meanings—is the source of understanding.

II. THE LINGUISTIC CONTEXT OF THE COMMUNITY

In his celebrated *Sources of the self*, Taylor (2000, 34) argues for the inextricable linguistic structure of community out of which self-identity is constituted:

What I am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance for me. These things have significance for me, and the issue of my identity is worked out, only through a language of interpretation which I have come to accept as a valid articulations of these issues.

The life of the community is sustained in language, which orients it to its goal. Envisioning the direction of the community involves the articulation of and subscription to common linguistic data. “Without language at all,” Taylor (1985, 272) stresses, “we could not have what we describe as common understanding.” Language is, therefore, fundamentally a mode of experiencing the world, by means of a set of interpretive tools. Taylor describes language in a manner beyond the positivistic view of language as an instrument or tool for representing the world. Following the phenomenological insight, Taylor (1983, 380) describes language as “the particular way the human person situates herself within this cultural world that we call her identity.”

Self-interpretation implies the cultivation of linguistic qualities, which are embedded in culture. These linguistic qualities define the self. By and large, it is in and through language that worldviews are formulated and reformulated. However, language cannot be taken as an individual activity, for its origin and bearings are remarkably social in nature. As Taylor (1985, 237) elucidates: “Language originally comes to us from others, from a community.” With this note, we can see that language truly belongs to a broader sphere of interpretive background, from where words appear and against which they are meaningful. It is the language community that makes and sustains the modes of expression. Language is a public experience in and through which individuals express themselves with one another. Hence, every hermeneutical identity of the human person is profoundly embedded and embodied in a linguistic community. Taylor

(2000, 35) rightly states: "A language only exists and is maintained within a language community." Language, then, cannot be arbitrarily used, as if it were an object of personal dispensation, for it precedes us. Taylor (1983, 381) asserts that the life of language is "larger than that of the individual." Language is where the individual becomes present to herself, in the specific sense of self-understanding. Self-understanding presupposes dwelling in language. That is to say, as Taylor (1985, 231) tells us: "our language is always more than we can encompass; it is in a sense inexhaustible." How the expression of individuals is possible to acquire qualities of intelligibility can be traced to its roots in an interpretive web of relations. The manner of self-expression presupposes linguistic articulations, which derive from shared interpretive symbols. Intentions, for instance, become intelligible when expressed against the panorama of a common network of meanings. Taylor (1985, 291) clarifies that "to understand a language, you have to understand a form of life." And to speak of language as a "form of life" is to understand it as a common agency, an ethics, and of course, a culture. (This point was already raised by Ludwig Wittgenstein,⁵ from whom—as it can be argued—Taylor draws significantly, and for which reason Taylor is sometimes referred to as a neo-Wittgensteinian.) Herein then lies the paradox of selfhood, normally understood as a private reality.

The meaning of what is supposedly the private self arises from the public realm of language. Taylor (1985, 270) maintains that "the public space between us is founded on and shaped by our language." We can now understand how, for example, the fact of everyday interactions reveals that there are other selves to whom the self relates, in order to define itself. It is, therefore, the case that our elementary experience of learning a language, first and foremost, means acquiring it from an existing social practice. As Taylor (2000, 35) puts it so well: "There is no way we could be inducted into personhood except by being initiated into language. So I can only learn what anger, love, anxiety, the aspiration to wholeness, etc., are through my and others' experience of these being objects for us, in some *common space*" (italics added).

In the light of the communitarian paradigm, self-interpretation is always traced to a community of speakers. More than a collection of individuals a community means a situation of communication. "We are all inducted into language by an existing language community," asserts Taylor (1985, 237). It is this community of speakers that provides the vocabulary of self-interpretation for someone who belongs to it. That is to say, it is in and through the community that the self discovers its identity.

The community, which grounds the self, is the source of the discursivity enabling the self to be conscious of itself, by challenging the self to know itself in relation to other selves. Self-consciousness is the activity of returning to oneself, and thus of being present to oneself. The self is a product of dynamic interactions. Indeed, self-identity

requires self-discursivity. By reflecting on itself, the self moves to understand itself beyond familiar knowledge-patterns. A break within these knowledge-patterns allows the self to constitute itself in new modes of being. Taylor's argument for the communal basis of identity significantly puts into question a long-standing anthropological tradition. The tradition referred to here is that which sees the self as the center of knowing and acting, in reference to the world and others. On the contrary, Taylor contends that the self is not the center. Just like others, the self revolves around something greater than itself. He calls this the "web of interlocutors." Reconstructed through time and across traditions, the web of interlocutors indefatigably defines and promotes the social essence of language. It maintains the dialogical nature of linguistic relations, no matter how subtle they may be.

Taylor's communitarian hermeneutics consists in the full recognition of the social nature of language, of a community's shared vocabulary, through which we understand ourselves, others, and the world. So much so that "all experiences," propounds Taylor (2003, 27-28), "require some vocabulary, and these are inevitably in large part handed to us in the first place by our society, whatever transformations we may ring on them later." Taylor (1985, 234) holds that "language is fashioned and grows not principally in monologue, but in dialogue, or better, on the life of the speech community." It is actually from these critical engagements that the self realizes itself. Moreover, the unique character of oneself is defined, to a large extent, by the quality of relations that one keeps. For him (1985b, 198), the human person "cannot develop the fullness of moral autonomy, that is, the capacity to form independent moral convictions—outside a political culture sustained by institutions of participation and guarantees of perennial independence." Dialogue as understanding-with then becomes the norm for achieving genuine communicative existence.

The *gathering-together* quality of community becomes complete with the presence of the *coming-to-understanding* modality. The linguisticity of community defines the humanity of individuals in community. Individuals in community share a common language, enabling them to arrive at a possible consensus of reality. Jürgen Habermas (1992, 153) similarly emphasizes this matter:

The identity of socialized individuals forms itself simultaneously in the medium of coming to an understanding with others in language and in the medium of coming to a life-historical and intersubjective understanding with oneself. Individuality forms itself in relations of intersubjective acknowledgement and of intersubjectively mediated self-understanding.

The quality of a community, in terms of its being the individuals' ground of becoming, reflects the kind of responsibility that the members invest in their relationships. That is why there exists a social exigency for individuals to do justice to their society from which they obtain and sustain their identity. Clearly, individuals are called to be concerned about their society's wellbeing. For Taylor, then, interactions are always value-laden, since they give rise to an ethical assessment of individuals' tacit contributions to the characteristic of their community. The actions of an individual are interwoven with other actions constituting a shared agency. Every human activity takes place within the wider context of the community, from which the former derives description and evaluation. Taylor (2000, 35-36) provides us with the following account:

I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the family tree, in social space, in the geography of social statuses and functions, in my intimate relations to the ones I love. I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in another in relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of languages of self-understanding.

III. AN ETHICS OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

On the Question of Self-Transformation

Plurality is what we are. "There are other cultures, and we have to live together more and more, both on a world scale and commingled in each individual society," notes Taylor (1994, 25). The universality of cultural diversity shapes the landscape of ethnic existence. As Paul Ricoeur (2000, 210) asserts: "Plurality thus proves to be inherent in the question of universality." Hence, only in an intercultural network can individuals adequately define and sustain their being.

At the outset, Taylor suggests that the possibility of self-transformation involves developing a dialogical attitude towards a multicultural world. It is an attitude which is marked by the willingness to listen and learn from different cultures.⁶

The fact of multiculturalism simply eschews ethnocentrism. Multiculturalism, says Taylor (1977, 124-25), is

the fact that we are of many different faiths, beliefs, and moralities; that we are all less satisfied and dogmatic in our possession of the truth; that we are all therefore in some way searchers; and that the fact of pluralism has entered into the

very content of our varied beliefs so that we are already in dialogue within ourselves with the ideas of other.

While it is the case that individuals are defined by their own cultures, this cannot however be a justification for attempts to commit cultural isolation. Being multicultural individuals, we are inspired to look for and find, in every creative way possible, areas whereby we can encourage mutual understanding with other cultures. Efforts to forge cultural interactions are, then, in order. These attempts to engage in intercultural dialogues precisely take us to see beyond the confines of our own cultural paradigm. Intercultural dialogues spare us from the dangers of cultural hegemony or ethnocentrism. "That is why," Taylor (1995, 149) explains, "other-understanding changes self-understanding, and in particular prizes us loose from some of the most fixed contours of our former culture." This suggests that Taylor's works on the question of multiculturalism are never conclusive, because the reality of the plurality of cultures keeps on posing new challenges. That is, the presence of many cultures confronts us with an increased sense of responsibility, in building a world of solidarity. He (2000, 384) writes: "To be in tune with life is to acknowledge this solidarity." The reality of plurality, that is, the presence of the other or the different is, therefore, constitutive of our ethical dimension. Out of the diversity of our relations we create meaningful modes of being.

The presence of other individuals confronts the sense of who we are. The difference that they are challenges us to recognize the social basis of our identity. That is, our self-identity is importantly shaped by our relation to the *Other*. Martin Heidegger's interpretation, for instance, of Hegel is an important account of how identity arises from plurality. Heidegger (1994, 94) muses: "Each is an other through the other; each is the other of the other and from consciousness of it; each is different." Through the process of ontological dialectic, everyone assumes a part of everyone else. The ontology of identity lies, then, in plurality. "*Plurality*," claims the political philosopher Hannah Arendt (1978, 19), "*is the law of the earth*" (italics added). The term "ontology" here specifically means the widely social constitution of identity. Applied to cultural investigation, that there are other cultures besides our own, truly calls us to a life of moral commitment. In the words of Taylor (1994, 73):

There is perhaps after all a moral issue here. What the presumption of [equal work between cultures] requires of us is a willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions. What it requires above all is an admission that we are very far from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident.

Taylor recognizes the social source of genuine plurality which is itself a basic affirmation of diversity. Taylor underscores the responsibility for dialogue as an adequate approach to the reality of pluralism. He (1977, 125) says: "The dialogue, which is now largely a private affair, whose public expression is almost exclusively intellectual, would be given a central place by being woven into our public environment." For this reason, an adequate account of the question of what it means to live in multicultural conditions behooves an elaboration of the presupposition of the question. In short, for Taylor, the way to intercultural dialogue is to pass through the dynamics of self-understanding. That is, to reach a satisfactory encounter with other cultures means to inquire into the dimensions of the human person's *being-in-culture*. Self-examination is a prerequisite for the participation in intercultural encounters. This examination of being a cultural self ensures the possibility of a meaningful dialogue with others.

In the midst of various traditions and cultures, the individual stands always at critical junctures. There is no denying of the crisscrossing feature of the human condition, that is, an intricate web of relations. And this he tells us is our inescapable horizon. Taylor strongly suggests that there is no other way for individuals to lead a meaningful life in a pluralistic world, except to realize their dialogical nature.⁷ In *The ethics of authenticity*, Taylor (1997, 32-33) writes: "The general feature of human life that I want to evoke is its fundamentally *dialogical* character. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining an identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression."

Individuals make sense of their identity only against the horizon of shared activity of meanings, i.e., a complex mode of expression called *language*. Language necessarily then becomes the actualization of self-interpretation. But more importantly, language demands, adds Taylor (1997, 45), "the acknowledgement that our identity requires recognition by others." It is precisely the social character of language that puts speakers in a wider realm of living relations. If we follow Gadamer's (1995, 132) suggestion that language is "only fully realized within the context of life," then speaking is always speaking *about* something *with* someone. This suggests that the quality of one's identity is shaped, to a large extent, by one's speaking habits and speaking partners. Taylor (1995, 99) himself is so eloquent on this: "The language I speak can never be just *my* language; it is *our* language." The origin and destiny of language remains completely social. And elsewhere, too, Taylor notes that something assumes a specific nominal structure by way of customary name calling or labeling. This also applies to the recognition of a human person's identity. He (1991, 176) harps on the idea that "it is only through repeated acts of communication by members of a linguistic community that a structure has a real existence." In other words, from these considerations, we can see that the life of language lies in its being re-created with constant appropriation of meanings that are never neutral, but ethical. Meanings

necessarily qualify the kind of relationships we comport in terms of interpersonal contact and of the manner of coping with the world. The meanings we subscribe to shape the way we understand ourselves within the realm of ethical connectedness. Meanings are ethical for the reason that they define the person that we are and those we encounter. In other words, meanings, being inter-subjectively shared, are ethical because they constitute a community. "Interpretation," for Habermas, "cannot be ethically neutral."

Meanings make a community of free interactors and interpreters. Taylor (1985b, 39) expresses the following:

Common meanings are the basis of community. Inter-subjective meaning gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms, but only with common meaning does this common reference world contain significant common actions, celebrations, and feelings. These are objects in the world that everybody shares. This is what makes community.

Owing to the significance of the public mode of language, the process of self-discovery then proceeds through a critical interlocution. It is in these free exchanges of views and experiences that mutual recognition of each other's original worth as an individual is reached. Taylor (1983, 153) is compelling in this regard: "Human beings strive for recognition, for only in this way can they achieve integrity." That is, the human person's desire for recognition aims at the integrity of community.

People work together to achieve mutual recognition of their dignity as human persons. And this involves the "development of a greater web of inter-subjective meanings as people live in community," suggests Taylor (1985b, 39). Every human person recognizes her/his dignity only against the background of valuation, which is mediated by a common ground of understanding. "Our identity," Taylor (1985b, 35) concludes, "is therefore defined by certain evaluations which are inseparable from ourselves as agents." For example, the statement "I am important" is therefore not necessarily a self-serving claim in the sense that it is not an epistemological assertion; on the contrary, it is a dialogical recognition. Taylor (1997, 47) stresses: "My discovering my identity doesn't mean that I work it out in isolation but that I negotiate it through dialogue. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others." Taylor's argument has important repercussions on the meaning of working out our human existence. Taylor takes it to mean that the social setting of mutual recognition overcomes what he considers to be a misplaced understanding of the self. He refers to the folly of the atomistic notion of identity. Atomism is the view which holds that self-creation is possible apart from relations with others. It sees the self as the center of creative agency. Atomism is basically that proclivity of the self, in the words of Taylor

(1997, 60), to “slide towards self-centered modes of the ideal of self-fulfillment.” In effect, atomism breeds the culture of individualism, which leads individuals to believe in and behave according to the illusion of individualistic or puristic self-creation. This is, however, unfortunate, since the self eventually sinks into a fundamental loss of contact with itself. As already indicated above, a puristic anthropology is suspect, for it is deduced from a flawed and, worse, even from a dangerous premise.

On the Question of Self-Creation

No self-creation is independently made from crisscrossing relations. That is, self-creation which is an expediency of self-interpretation can only take place through critical appropriation of imbricate relations. There are no possible makings of the self without these unique relations. That is, attempts to aestheticize the self involves making the manifold relations that one bears into a free interchange of beautiful creations.

Self-creation then emerges from the aesthetic space provided for by the community. It is the community with its set of values that bestows individuals their sensibilities to judge the qualities of actions. The creative powers of the community give shape to the individual’s pursuit of a certain lifestyle. Thus, it is worth-noting that self-creation presupposes the experience of freedom that an individual enjoys, which is primordially granted and sustained by the community. That is, freedom is not exactly an individual capacity, for it arises from the community, which is the individual’s source of being. In other words, freedom which defines human agency is originally given than achieved. Taylor (1983, 92) elaborates: “I as a human person have the vocation of realizing a nature which is given. Freedom for the human person thus means the free realization of a vocation which is largely given.”

This is an important consideration, because it situates where the understanding of self-creation should properly be. The desire to define oneself in a particular manner interestingly finds expression in making one’s life a work of art, reminiscent of the Nietzschean persuasion of *aesthetic existence*. The self is a project in progress, because its quality is formed by the repetition of creative actions. Taylor (1997, 61-62) proffers that “we discover what we have it in us to be by becoming that mode of life, by giving expression in our speech and action to what is original in us. Artistic creation becomes the paradigm mode in which people can come to self-definition.”

Self-creation is a determination of freedom. Freedom is the fundamental *right to being* that the community bequeaths to individuals. Freedom implies expression, that is, the exteriority of being. Expression is a mode of being because revelation is the movement of being. This is certainly an important ontological matter, insofar as the essence of freedom lies in disclosure, that is, in letting beings be in their manifestness. This

is, of course, explicit in the works of thinkers, like Heidegger, who have developed a penetrating understanding of the essence of freedom. "Freedom is intrinsically exposing, ek-sistent," characterizes Heidegger (1993, 126). The freedom to-be entails the capacity to stand out for due recognition of one's being, that is, to express oneself. For how can an individual possibly exercise her freedom, if her expressions of it are deprived? Self-creation, then, involves self-expression.

On the Question of Self-Expression

"The human person completes herself in expression," asserts Taylor (1985, 233). Expression, whether verbal or otherwise, is a manifestation. Something comes to exist and manifests itself only in its expression, whereby it is also recognized. Taylor suggests that language is fundamentally expressive. He says (1985, 229) that "the expression dimension is fundamental to language, because it is only in expression that language comes to be." Expression, which is a mode of manifestation, is also a web of relation. It is specifically the "relation which involves a torsion between an expressor and an expressed such that the expressed does not exist apart from the expressor, even though the expressor relates to it as though to something completely different," to quote Gilles Deleuze (1993, 260). Expression, therefore, is that relation whereby a manifestation emerges, because both the expressor_s and the expressed form an external configuration. That is, it gives a unique form to who we are and to what we do. Taylor (1985, 238) is direct to claim that "expression shapes our human lives."

Of course, this means that whatever is expressed is made and seen against the context of sensible forms. This then takes us to the notion of embodiment (an important point already suggested above, in passing) as the primordial feature of expression. For Taylor (1983, 85), "the thinking rational subject can only exist embodied." Also, as he (1985, 219) puts it without fail: "Expression makes something manifest in embodying it. What expression manifests can only be manifested in expression." In a substantial sense, forms of expression expose our embodiment. This exposition reveals the meaningful character of our bodily nature, viz., embodiment is our fundamental mode of expression. "Our manner of being as subjects is in essential respects that of embodied agents," rightly notes Taylor (1995, 23). It follows that our inner depths are, as it were, given flesh, when expressed by means of a sensible medium: language. As a consequence, as embodied agents, all our actions will have to inevitably take on inextricable embodied manifestations. In this connection, we observe how even Jean-Francois Lyotard's (1998, 23) remark epitomizes this matter: "Thought is inseparable from the phenomenological body."

This is indeed a fundamental theme in contemporary anthropology. The thesis of embodiment cuts through the Cartesian anthropology,⁹ which denies the integrity of the body to the totality of the human person. Our

corporeal nature is truly constitutive of who we are. That is, embodiment pervades through every aspect of human life. There is no moment when one's intentions and actions are disembodied, since our body is our point of contact with the world. "Our experience is shaped by our bodily constitution" (Taylor 1998, 318). Deploying the pioneering work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty¹⁰ [1908-61] on the phenomenology of the body, Taylor (1983b, 142) makes this telling argument: "The subject and all her functions, however 'spiritual' they may appear, are inescapably embodied. The embodiment is in two related dimensions: first, as a 'rational animal', i.e., as a living being who thinks; and secondly, as an expressive being, that is, a being whose thinking is always and necessarily in a medium."

To speak, therefore, of self-expression is to speak of it as the act of making manifest what we think, feel, and sense, through a medium.¹¹ It is the mode of revealing who we are. More specifically, self-expression consists in the effort to articulate one's being, in creatively sensible ways. Embodiment provides the hermeneutical parameters of the depths of the self in order to make the latter intelligibly meaningful. Taylor (2000, 390) writes: "This notion of inner depths is therefore intrinsically linked to our understanding of ourselves as expressive, as articulating an inner source." In other words, self-expression is self-disclosure, in the sense that something is perceived as it is revealed. It is in perception that revelation is realized.

CONCLUSION

What has our present attempt amounted to? Charles Taylor is a key example in articulating the role of culture in understanding oneself as primarily a dialogical self. This has practical consequences, to wit. The point of it all is to keep the discourse of social existence going and to frame it in such a way that people remain interested in the good to seek a common path towards its realization.

An inter-cultural dialogue consists in the shared recognition of and mutual openness to evaluation of the interpretations of significance embedded in every culture. Charles Taylor's hermeneutics of culture—whose conspicuous arguments include (1) situating the self within a discursive community; (2) describing culture as source of self-understanding; and (3) arguing for a dialogical existence—actually indicates an abiding concern with the ontological status of culture. Culture is more than a historical content; it is an ontological context. The self constitutes itself as an interweaving of the elements of Being in the hermeneutical realm of culture. This is something that can be traced to Heidegger's important, albeit passing, remark on the relation of ontology to scientific endeavors in his ground-breaking achievement *Being and time* (1996). Heidegger's existential elaboration of the authentic self, which he calls *Dasein*, includes the serious study of culture. For Heidegger,

culture is where *Dasein* moves in the sense of self-interpretation and self-formation within the framework of anthropological paradigms. The study of culture presupposes a theory of the self. "Ethnology itself," writes Heidegger (1996, 47), "already presupposes an adequate analytic of *Dasein* as its guideline." Taylor, too, maintains that culture indicates an ambit of being where individuals define who they are. Accordingly, Taylor argues that culture refers to the fundamental constitution of the self. It is what pervades through the everyday existence of the self, since it grants the self specificity of being. The self exists in and through cultural possibilities. Because of culture the self is a potential existent. Its existence is a fundamental openness to the contingency of culture. In short, the existence of the self is a limited existence. As a limit to human existence, however, culture opens up, as well as defines, the possibilities the self can attempt to realize. Human possibilities depend largely on the interpretation of situations. (Any honest exploration of human possibilities must answer the question: "Does the situation allow?")

Taylor's self-interpretation by cultural recognition strongly suggests that we truly define *who* we are by radically situating *where* we are.¹² Ethnic identity precisely renders possible a holistic understanding of the truth of the process of humanity. That is, the question of the self, which is at the heart of Taylor's hermeneutics of culture, has enabled us to examine how the self is linguistically constructed through and connected with a world of relations. Of course, it is the linguistic character of the manifold modes of being with one another that keeps us in meaningful contact with ourselves and with the world. That is, language remains to be our primordial medium of experiencing who we are, and of creating the persons we desire to be. The plurality of language attests to the human exigency of being able to make sense of our human condition in this contingent world. It basically reveals the possibilities of creating ourselves through dynamic self-interpretations.

Moreover, by following Taylor's hermeneutical anthropology, we have seen how the self inextricably bears a cultural nexus, which accords the identity to the self. Self-identity arises from the interpretive ground of culture. The ground of culture is where the self develops and sustains itself in free self-understanding. Freedom is basically the freedom of culture, seen repeatedly above as a hermeneutical space of being. It is the freedom of movement within the enabling limits of culture. It is the condition of the human person's self-actualization. Culture is precisely *that* integral agency of human flourishing.

The human person as a cultural self is meant to bring us to a higher level of self-examination. Basically, a hermeneutics of culture calls us to look into ourselves and recognize our cultural situation. That is, a hermeneutics of culture argues that we are a self, because we are rooted in the interpretive context of dynamic interactions mediated by shared meanings. This cultural inwardness points to the truth of who we are.

Taylor (2000, 399) points out that “digging to the roots of our being takes us beyond ourselves.”

This meaningfully cultural constitution of the self inheres the fundamental challenge of intercultural exchanges, whereby we are called to strive to constantly and creatively dialogue with one another, in the hope of enriching one another’s horizons. That is, as members of what Taylor calls a “web of interlocutors” we are summoned to be sensitive to what others express, and also to what they do not. We admit that there are times, when respecting the silence that others keep is prudent. Otherwise, forcing them to talk when they are not ready will jeopardize the emergence of truth, and consequently cause serious consequences in relationships. In other words, if dialogue is meant to bring about mutual understanding among different individuals, by way of generous exchanges of aspirations and convictions, then it must also take into account that respecting the silence of others means letting them be. This is quite ethical, for respecting the otherness of individuals is truly preserving them in their integrity. The ethics of the Other demands an absolute recognition of the infinite otherness of every individual. It impels us to rethink our assumptions towards the presence of others. Finally, the ethics of the Other possesses the language of respect for the unfamiliar and of openness to the beyond. Every culture shares a feature or two of the unfamiliar and of the beyond. Failure to admit this fact makes genuine dialogue impossible.

NOTES

1. Professor Emeritus Charles Taylor (b. 5 November 1931) is a Roman Catholic Canadian philosopher (from McGill University, Montreal) in the post-analytic and post-phenomenological tradition. He is famous for his moral and political theories which are conveniently labeled as “communitarian.” [Other prominent philosophers identified with this camp are: Michael Sandel (*Liberalism and the limits of justice*); Michael Walzer (*Spheres of justice: A defense of pluralism and equality*); and Alasdair MacIntyre (*After virtue*)]. Taylor is also classified as one of today’s advocates of neo-Aristotelianism, which revives Aristotle’s notion of the “good life” and situates it within contemporary ethics, as an important hermeneutical contribution to the elaboration of an ethics of authenticity.

The question of the meaning of the self has been the constant theme in Taylor’s works. For him, the interpretation of the self is the abiding concern in the field of contemporary hermeneutics. The interpretation of the self involves an explication of its concrete expressions. Taylor argues that an adequate understanding of the self requires a deeper interpretive insight into the world, i.e., the totality of relations which provide the moral frameworks, within which the self creates and sustains itself. In other

words, hermeneutics as a theory of interpretation must affirm the embeddedness of the self in the world.

2. "Character" understood in its etymological sense, i.e., *charis*—Greek for inner strength—grows only in a cultural environment. Character, which constitutes the historical narrative of the unity of the self, is derived from the community. The contemporary virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 221) explains:

For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide.

3. The destiny of every individual refers to the experience of freedom, which is the fulfillment of one's historical existence. This goes without saying that destiny is the gradual unfolding of one's possibilities. Or, to use Jean-Luc Nancy's formulation (1993, 113): destiny is the "coming-up" or "the delivery of existence."

4. Communitarianism is a social and political theory that affirms the embeddedness of identities in communities and which criticizes views that undermine social values for the sake of individual interests. According to this theory, individuals develop their interpretive capacity for the notion of the common good on the basis of open participation, mutual dialogue, and shared values. Communitarianism poses an ethical challenge to everyone. Individuals have the responsibility to contribute to the deliberation and realization of the good of their community, since individuals owe their identity to their community.

5. Wittgenstein tells us that language is *always already* social in so far as it is founded on convention. The meaning, therefore, of a word is inextricably bound up with its beginnings in interpretive practices shared by members of a community. In his words (1974, 88): "It is what humans *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."

6. It is worthwhile to mention that a renowned proponent of ecumenical dialogue even calls *virtue* what we refer here as an *attitude*. Reflecting on humanity's pluralistic situation, the Swiss theologian Hans Küng (1991) concludes, "Therefore, the virtue of dialogability requires insight into the *historicity of truth* and the relativity of *one's own standpoint*."

7. This point is fully developed in the work of the renowned contemporary philosopher of hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), who in his *magnum opus*, *Truth and method*, stresses that dialogue constitutes a *fusion of horizons*, a formulation adapted by Taylor himself.

And the experience of this fusion is meant to bring about a transformation in the perspective of the dialogue partners. To quote Gadamer (1990, 306; 367; and, 379):

The horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself than there are historical horizons which have to be acquired. Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves. To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the subject matter to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented. It requires that one does not try to argue the other person down but that one really considers the weight of the other's opinion. To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were.

8. A word on the expressor: By expression, the expressor individuates itself, i.e., it differentiates itself from others, for expression is a style of being. It is through expression that an individual defines herself in a unique manner. It is this particular making of oneself that the individual is different from other individuals, who have also their way of expressing; thus, of defining themselves. This is the point, then, where expression becomes a mode of being.

9. René Descartes's search for the *indubitable* led him to construct one of the most, if not the most, intriguing mind-body dualism ever in the history of Western philosophy. For Descartes, the human person is basically a consciousness (a *thinking thing*) lodged in matter. (At least, that is the way it still suggests, after he expounded the spiritual essence of the human person to the detriment of the body.) As is well known, this brought about serious implications in the later formulations of the conception of the human person for some time, until strands of contemporary philosophy challenged it. Among these contemporary philosophies that developed and redefined the human person beyond the Cartesian model were phenomenology and existentialism. Other philosophical movements of rather relatively recent emergence, like structuralism, deconstruction, and feminism, have also asserted to see the human person in the most holistic way.

10. Merleau-Ponty's achievement as a philosopher in his brief intellectual career lies in his insightful argument that how we experience our bodies determines how we perceive the world. It is only in and through our bodily nature that the world is accessible to us in a special way. Merleau-Ponty, (1962, 206) in his monumental opus *Phenomenology of perception*, claims:

We are our body. In the same way we shall need to awaken our experience of the world as it appears to us insofar as we are in the world through our body, and insofar as *we perceive the world with our body.* But by this remaking contact with the body and with the world, we shall also rediscover ourselves. (Italics supplied.)

11. There exists an affinity between action and language, the latter being the medium of expression. This close connection between action and language reveals the identity of the agent to the public realm. Arendt (1958, 159) explains this point in the following: "In acting and speaking, human persons show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world."

12. We can see here how Taylor's theory of cultural identity can put in perspective the Armenian proverb: "Tell me who your friends are, and I will tell you who you are," by saying: "Tell me where you are, and I will tell you who you are."

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FOUCAULT, POPULAR CULTURE, AND TELEVISION

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This paper questions the meaning of popular culture under the auspices of modernity. The late transition and extension of modernity is technology. This eventual process is characterized by material culture. However, it is difficult to ignore the moment of postmodernity when the effects of the transition and the products themselves have given impetus to new constellations of discursive formation. The visual culture tends to dominate the scheme of things in popular culture. It is argued in this paper that popular culture operates through four rationalities; namely, dispersion, segmentation, integration, and extension. The first three are called the intention/logic of mass culture. The last element, however, speaks of the transition from modern to postmodern. From location to bilocation and virtual location—the entire route of cultural turns has made the possibility of postmodern regimented bodies through the television.

Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism and which, for the spectacle of public events, substitutes the uninterrupted play of calculated gazes. Thanks to the techniques of surveillance, the ‘physics’ of power, the hold over the body, operate according to the laws of optics and mechanics, according to a whole play of spaces, lines, screens, beams, degrees and without recourse, in principle at least, to excess, force or violence. It is a power that seems all the less ‘corporal’ in that it is more subtly ‘physical’.

—Foucault (1979, 177)

[T]elevision is a disciplinary time machine, a metronome rigorously apportioning the present, rerunning TV history, and anxiously awaiting the future...Time itself is a gendered, hierarchized commodity capitalizing on leisure...TV quantifies the body, collectively imagined by the networks as “the

audience”—measured by statistics, demographics, and people meters, correlated with supermarket purchases, and bartered according to calculations of time spent/money made.

—Mellencamp (1990, 240)

TECHNOMODERNITY AND THE FOUCAULDIAN PROJECT

Modernity has come in full circle during the advent of technology. It has captured the integration of the “universals” as logic of postcapitalism and that within the core of a systematized and organized society, subjects and bodies are produced. Undeniably, the essentialist rhetoric of governmentality around spaces of civilized and regimented ways of living necessitates the rupture of practices from actual to virtual surveillance. Foucault accentuates the meaning of discourse as formations of knowledge skewed in nonlinear time, dislocated places and implied reversal of contexts. Thus the politics of truth hides its truth-meanings as moments of untruth and the epistemology of power as the technology of relational microphysics. This discursive tempo and the decline of modernity, while it lost its morality to contingency and its rationality to regimes of fantastic narratology, have had tremendous impact on dispersing a disciplinary scaffold of holding back together fragments of an unfinished project.

What has happened is that aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity production generally: the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation. (Jameson 1993, 316)

As an effect, fetishism of desires and reification of pleasures over the commodities of late capitalism captures the shaping of docile bodies—bodies that are intersected and geographically diffused in the locality and universality of consumption. Technology as the material component of development never had a promising epithet to alleviate social conditions; instead, it has erected itself to placate man with machines, to replace pleasures with dreams and to persuade the self towards the idleness of bodies. Foucault (1979, 153) even notes that:

Over the whole surface of contact between the body and the object it handles, power is introduced, fastening them to one another. It constitutes a body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine complex. One is as far as possible from those forms

of subjection that demanded of the body only signs or products, forms of expression of the result of labor. The regulation imposed by power is at the same time the law of construction of the operation. Thus disciplinary power appears to have the function not so much of deduction as of synthesis, not so much of exploitation of the product as of coercive link with the apparatus of production.

This operation relies more on fastening a relationship that deals with the nearest distantiation of bodies with the machineries of technology. Once linked, it ascends to level of microphysics of power. Hence, the disciplinary system produces a disciplined body dispersed between the connection of production and consumption. The gloomy picture of modernity and technology is pictured out there—accessible in various ways and forms through practices of popular culture and as specifically mediated by television. There are many names for and degrees of mediation but television serves the dominant, if not hegemonic, tool of surveillance of modernity. Though television has become a phenomenal instrument to insist and preserve rationalization and the rationality of capitalism, it is without doubt that the coupling of theory and critique of popular culture using Foucauldian reading would open venues for debates. This paper runs the course of making a critical interrogation regarding the pervasiveness of popular practices and the inevitability of everyday televisual attraction and distraction. How does a Foucauldian reading situate the loci of power relations within spaces, mirage, subjectivities, bodies, sexualities, and disciplinarity of mass culture? How do mapping fissures, ruptures, and faultlines in the discourse and regimes of practices swell up resistance against the monolith of power? Nonetheless, it is very important to locate here the analogy of disciplinary society with popular culture and panopticism with television. With this in mind, concrete slices of Philippine TV experience or social realities would be used in order to see outside the perplexity and reflexivity of discursive formations in its localized regime or domain. In Foucauldian terms, this will to knowledge establishes the proactivity and productivity of power as relational—as well as spatial and virtual—in man's quest for ethics in contemporary culture.

TOWARDS A FOUCAULDIAN READING OF POPULAR CULTURE: REGIME AND OPERATIONS

Reason has its effects on unreason, on madness, and on the singularity of desire, replacing the logic of self-practice. When rationality ends its moment, the pandora's box of ceremonial attack on the sanctity of culture becomes imminent. It begins to be desanctified, multiplied, and scattered in the whole spectrum of consumerist behavior. This can only be rectified—to sanctify the virtue of modern wills and actions—under the

auspices of disciplinary movements. Moments, movements, and spectral gazes in the period of reckoning begin to tear up the leviathan, sovereign bodies as simply subjects without ends. Man is subjectified without reason and without ends. Thus, the whole mechanics and techniques of popular culture are disciplinary in nature. It has retained its logic and rhetoric since its inception and likewise has continuously reorganized consumers and value-users into semantic fashions of pluralizing the individuality of individuals. As popular culture is an offshoot of industrial, commercial, and capitalist regime, it makes certain statistics of individuals as the resultant mathematics for luring the capital back into the hands of the few through segmentation and distribution. Foucault (1979, 143) in *Discipline and punish* says that:

Each individual has his own place; and each place its individual. Avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions; analyse confused, massive or transient pluralities. Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies or elements to be distributed.

But what precisely is popular culture? Does it function with disciplinary control and in what guise or disguise? According to Storey (1995, 1):

Popular culture is always defined, implicitly or explicitly, in contrast to other conceptual categories: folk culture, mass culture, dominant culture, working-class culture, etc... [It] is in effect an *empty* conceptual category, one which can be filled in a wide variety of often conflicting ways depending on the context of use.

The meaning of popular culture is derived from a dichotomized categorization of culture. Popular culture is “low culture” as against “high culture.” On the one hand, the sanctity of “high culture” dates back to classical era when life integrated its essential elements with the universal degree of truth, beauty, and order. It duplicates the perfection of nature or transcends it. On the other hand, popular culture works within the duplicity of recreating nature and high culture, multiplicity of high-end patronage, and orthodoxy of articulated meanings formed and reformed discursively. The patronizing subjects become the rigid and anesthetized knowing patron. It encloses understanding of hierarchized discourse of high from low culture. Since it is discursive it has become difficult to detach itself from its historicity, its vocabulary and language. “Discourse unites both language and practice and refers to the production of knowledge through language which gives meaning to material objects and social practices” (Barker 2000, 78). In a dualistic sense, immersing the whole gamut of such social practices engenders the emergence of

the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as patrons of high culture and low culture, respectively. The cultural demarcation demanded social splitting for the exclusivity of patronage. Nevertheless, in the advent of the "culture industry" (term used by Adorno and Horkheimer which interchangeably refers to popular culture) using technology and advanced maneuvers of handling the appropriation and production of material objects, the classes consolidate themselves and rationalize reproduction and consumption. It entered into a new logic and spoke a new rhetoric of deception.

Interested parties explain the culture industry in technological terms. It is alleged that because millions participate in it, certain reproduction processes are necessary that inevitably require identical needs in innumerable places to be satisfied with identical goods...It has made the technology of the culture industry no more than the achievement of standardization and mass production, sacrificing whatever involved a distinction between the logic of work and that of the social system. (Adorno and Horkheimer 2000, 33)

Because classes blindly collaborated as producers and consumers, false consciousness surrounds the tie that binds them together and their affinity towards sustaining a deceptive social system. The cultural matrix of society affixes not only with the material and physical conditions of men but also with their cognitive disposition. The conscious subjects hide in the veil of suspicion and problematics. For Foucault, judging the attitude towards the Enlightenment as this is the turning point of modernity necessitates careful reflections of concrete practices. Mass culture industry, depicted as the moment when the arts and media technology dominates the subject-positions and subject-situations of consumers, initializes a critical movement of contestation. It is in this sense that Foucault (1984, 43) argues that

[w]e must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment. Such an analysis implies a series of historical inquiries that are as precise as possible; and these inquiries will not be oriented retrospectively toward the 'essential kernel of rationality' that can be found in the Enlightenment and that would have to be preserved in any event; they will be oriented to the 'contemporary limits of the necessary,' that is, toward what is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects.

It is in this context that during the Victorian Age, Foucault talks about the “repressive hypothesis” that which speaks about the denial of talking/discoursing about sex in public domains. Sex is taboo. As Foucault (1978, 1:24) argues, instead of repressing sex and sexuality, the era however showed how people reengaged the proliferation of sexuality as a discourse and sex as an open practice: “One had to speak of it as of a thing to be not simply condemned or tolerated but managed, inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all, made to function according to an optimum.”

This time, using the context and guise of popular culture, the repressive hypothesis is paralleled as the deceptive hypothesis. Adorno and Horkheimer (2000, 38 and 40) lash out a critical reading of mass culture as deceptive, and the culture industry and enlightenment as mass deception:

The culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually promises. The promissory note which, with its plots and staging, it draws on pleasure is endlessly prolonged; the promise, which is actually all the spectacle consists of, is illusory...The deception is not that culture industry supplies amusement but that it ruins the fun by allowing business considerations to involve it in the ideological clichés of culture in the process of self-liquidation.

And yet, though it might be deceptive in its barest and most contingent form, it remains true and real. The idea of truth and reality here is something momentarily captured in the conscious minds of those who proclaim the “popular” and “in-fashion” between the nexus of structure and agency. It says everything else is true whenever anyone grounds his/her feet on the soil, so to speak. Man’s historicity and his contextualization imprint a necessary connection with real time, in real place within a certain context. A boy reading *Marvel* comics, say of Superman, could never escape his reality even for a single moment because his consumption and reading practices are grounded on the principle of the “presentness of his engagement”; thus, relating himself with the act he manifests.

In short, escapism is not even a moment but a form of social relation of representing himself with his own acts and wills established in the consumption of goods and services of popular culture. Popular culture is business, an industry of efficient deployment of objects to subjects. It insists its viability in real engagement and transaction of individuals disciplined through the regularity of market exchange and trade-offs. Furthermore, it operationalizes through the processes of dispersion, segmentation, integration, and extension. These processes are the operations of regimentation within the disciplinary character of popular culture. Therefore,

popular culture is *never deceptive* for its minutest pace holds captive the conscious mind, telling it that the world is material and real, proclaiming even that it is relational and functional. It is a by-product of power-relations that would ultimately destroy the binaries common to the Frankfurt School's discourse on popular culture. The interstices of power dilute the metanarratives of fantasy and illusion.

Dispersion

The disciplinary apparatus of popular culture debunks the political spacing of the center and the periphery. It becomes a canonical preaching that the powerful remains at the center and the powerless in the margin or periphery. Dispersion expels the center and replaces the periphery with capillaries of power relations. The binary opposites of location are dispersed. Using the language of marketing—as where the market becomes a disciplinary institution—the center becomes the target field or domain for selling goods and services. Terms like “target audience” remain at the center. Geographic and demographic mapping puts the audience and the consumer at the heart of the metropolis. Thus, the malls or shopping centers are placed integrally in urban centers. The disciplinary tactic of establishing monuments, landmarks, and shopping malls side by side with the municipal government, parks, and churches are ways of architecturally centering people.

Business will not prosper without these strategic posting and positioning and thus, popular culture consequently animates and lives at these locations. What remain in the periphery would be the strategists for production, reproduction, and marketing. Literally the strategist positions himself in the periphery to capture the center. In fact, the center is the weakest location of all spatial considerations. Where the margin becomes so important, the capillaries that connect it to the center are transformed to assume the most resilient flow of exchange and transaction of power relations. This is where the periphery captures the center: the audience and the consumers.

Applying Foucault, the monolithic power that cascades down the center is cut short by resistances located in the interstices and micro-physics of power. One example is the competitive sale of electronic and video piracy. VCDs and DVDs as products of mass culture are duplicated illegally yet sold in sites near the Metropolitan center. As a response, the peripheral power of big companies integrates and invokes legal remedies. However, though Quiapo for that matter is restrained by authorities to become the piracy center of the Philippines, the sellers and consumers escape from it and stay in the capillaries—in sidewalks around and outside the area, and practically everywhere. The space and location are dispersed until finally one capillary site forms a new center. Foucault (1979, 146) comments that “discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the

transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position..."

Segmentation

Another operation is segmentation of consumer bodies. This disciplinary action coordinates the distribution and partitioning of individuals according to their taste, not of their class status; of attracting prospective buyers, not of fossilizing consumers; and of reconstituting identities according to the products they consume, not of breaking into pieces bodies and the self. Foucault (1979, 219) explains clearly:

That is why discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wondering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions. It must also master all the forces that are formed from the very constitution of an organized multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects of counter-power that spring from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it....

Segmentation presupposes identity formation. Defining consumer bodies, Elizabeth Jagger (2000, 51) says:

Rather than seeing identity as rigidly defined in terms of class..., postmodern writers have tended to introduce notions of fluidity and plurality into their formulations...Identities are no longer received automatically through the rituals and social practices of the traditional order, but are constituted through individual marketplace decisions.

Using their peripheral power, producers and market strategists position their products in different capillaries to advertise and sell them to consumers. Thus, images of the products have drowned the metropolis from tarpaulins, billboards, posters, cards, brochures, to still shots. Yet segmentation is not a necessary enclosure. Segmented bodies enact borderless stratification of consumers. No social status restricts patronage and consumption of cellphones, films, and television. Popular culture, though it appears as a totalitarian scheme of things, works in the interstices of human desire and pleasure. The effect of the spectacle in the minds of the people, though not necessarily buyers of goods and services, is residual egoism. Purchasing is a self act since the power to buy resides in the capacity to pay. As a consequence, those who restrict consumption deny participation. They become secluded, out-classed, out-fashioned. Frugality is the first thing popular culture denies. This is a form of punishment in the disciplinary

society. Those who do not participate in consumption in particular and in capitalist consumerism in general become segmented and in the end, objects of centralization. Market strategists will spend less on surveys and research of those who frequently consume. Instead, they would search the capillaries in the society to give faces to faceless consumers, to clothe bodies of naked frugality, and to dissuade competitors in order to capture this small percentage of nonparticipants.

Thus, disciplinary processes and procedures maintain the center as the active hive of material consumption. The malls must be filled in by shoppers, the parks with tourists, the theaters with viewers, the hotels with transients and honeymooners, and the houses with consumers. Segmentation attaches the division of consumption into different levels of patronage. Patrons increase as the whole universe of goods and services multiply in the social center. Those in the capillaries are encouraged to become docile and hungry consumers through constant advertisement and other means to embed them in a society of heightened production, reproduction, and consumption.

Integration

The next level of operationalizing popular culture in a disciplinary society is integration. Bodies, behaviors, deviance, and sexualities can be integrated in the consumerist society. Integration is rationalization and institutionalization of social practices. Vertical integration sums up one constellation of practices into similar categories. These categories are open for naming and branding. Nominal categories imposed by popular culture are polysemic. This part will discuss one relational picture to clarify integration using discourses on gender and sexuality. It is for this reason that gayness (or homosexuality), for example, as a category subsumes under the vertically integrated practices of comedy, hysteria, and beauty. The category mimics the othered otherness of women as gay men appropriate their sexuality. Hence, the laughing stocks like women and gay men distanced themselves from the malevolent seriousness of masculinity. To become a laughing stock is to be distanced and be put in the observatory gaze of domination of the serious. However, the comedians make counter-gazes as they invert their underprivileged positions into a resistant sexual identity. The inversion of women to gay men is necessary and potentially cultural. It is also political as it creates its own location as the othered otherness of women by displacing resistance in different sites.

[T]he disenchantment with liberation proceed merely from a growing awareness that gay life has generated its own disciplinary regimes, its own techniques of normalization, in the form of obligatory haircuts, T-shirts, dietary practices, body piercing, leather accoutrements, and physical exercise. (Halperin 1995, 32)

Gay men are the best comedians in showbizness. As they invent their distinct ways and praxis, they integrate their identities as a form of resistance to stereotyping and in effect scatter these sexual situations across the shades of other sexualities. And because good comedy is equated with gayness, men and women are horizontally integrated to assume the same level not as sexual markings but as sexual stereotyping. Here we take the examples of Dolphy, Vic Sotto, and Joey De Leon who portray best gay role characters and Maricel Soriano and Ai-Ai de las Alas who are known to be *babaeng bakla* (gay-women). Hysteria and beauty work similarly with these self-practices of vertical and horizontal integration. The institutionalization of homosexualities regards the power relations in microcosmic exercises of gayness as popular culture in beauty parlors, dressmaking shops, massage and sauna clinics, stand-up comedy bars and restaurants, stage play theaters, *tiangge* and shopping kiosks, and many others. These differentiation moves from sexualized to desexualized practices of pleasures. In this operational example alone, the multiplicity of exchange values through sexualization and desexualization of institution in its minutest social structures validates contemporary culture.

This is the background that enables us to understand the importance assumed by sex as a political issue. It was at the pivot of the two axes along which developed the entire political technology of life. On the one hand, it was tied to the disciplines of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces, the adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity. (Foucault 1978, 145)

Extension

The last operation in the regime of popular culture is extension. The cultural landscape finds new spaces from locality to globality, from two-dimensionality to three-dimensionality, from physical to virtual nodes of realities. Extension breaches the borderless space and the contraction of timeliness in asymmetrical plane. The consumption is replaced by internalization, the real with hyperreal. Hence, popular culture entered the domains of the spectacle: videototechnology, cinematic, and televisual productions. The consumption is not characterized by material but by symbolic appropriations. It is in this context that Baudrillard (1993, 343-44) asserts:

Simulation today is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map

that precedes the territory—Precession of Simulacra—it is the map that engenders the territory.

The three operations—namely dispersion, segmentation, and integration—are the intentional logic of popular culture. These are the disciplinary regimes in sustaining control and domination of individuals, bodies, sexualities, tastes, locations, spaces, and behaviors. The intention precedes extension. To demonstrate the indeterminacy of spaces and locations in this asymmetrical plane characterized by postmodern ruptures, this paper would discuss one product of technomodernity, that is, television. Televisuality of cultural meanings and social artifacts simulate the spectacle projected in the TV screen as real, with or without fixed references to external realities. This virtual extension of the real is hyperreality. What connects the regimes of modern practices with the postmodern turn of contemporary society lies in the simulacra of televisual effects. It is not the TV set which is postmodern (the machine is always modern!) but the extensional effects of technology determine its indeterminate turns.

THE PANOPTIC TELEVISION

What holds together capitalist society intact and moves forward to its future lie mainly on the level of providing its social agency with promises, dreams, and desires. As all social structures are established spatially and relationally with one another, the state's institutions and the whole social structures provide a completion of its unfulfilled promises. It is the retelling of narratives that social conditions are better off now. In order to intervene in the epistemic flow of discovering the truth, the irreversible moment happens. The material culture of society is being replaced by visual culture. It is in this moment that plurality and fluidity of images create the magic and utopia in a contingent promise of society. Technology upgrades itself as fast as possible replacing old ones and old modes of doing things or not doing things. In fact, one of the most captivating scaffolds of modern surveillance is television. It is panoptic and disciplinary. How can television become a disciplinary apparatus in society? Modern society's balance of power retains an objective, illusory, and transcendental dialectics of reason and unreason. The interplay promotes mechanism of deviating the unreal from the real, the illogical from the logical and thus severing attachment in the physical world. Foucault (2002, 231) says something related to this:

Utopias are sites with no real place. They are sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of society. They present society itself in a perfected form, or else society turned upside down, but in any case these utopias are fundamentally unreal spaces.

To be an unreal reality, utopias must become functional in society; otherwise, no better place exists out there other than the vision of madmen and derelicts. To be functional, modern society invents tools for the completion of a utopian regime. It is an extension of the state, the political economy, and the entire governmentality of society. It is television that functions as an example of this regime. It is “disciplinary” because there emerges complicity of the center, the periphery, and the capillary. Relational power is exercised even more tangible and physically visible in virtual locations and localities.

This new world cannot be experienced in the old way but, instead, consists of virtual realities that stimulate or replace earlier modes. As this world extends its effects, increasingly more areas of life become determined by its ontologically displaced realities. The result is a world that is largely virtual and often non-locational. Traditional signposts no longer operate effectively and people are frequently left floundering. (Pertierra et al. 2002, 2)

Television is a panopticon based from four characteristics: (1) intentional enclosure and disclosure, (2) nonspace extensional broadcasting, (3) visible and invisible gaze, and lastly, (4) implosion of memory, history, and virtuality.

Domestic Enclosure and Relational Disclosure

Foucault (1979, 141) says, “Discipline sometimes requires *enclosure*, the specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself. It is the protected place of disciplinary monotony.” The attempt to realize the entry of television sets in Philippine domestic homes was a political scheme. Television, which begun in the 1920s, was considered an extension of radio in the United States and some parts of Europe. It was designed as all-talk with visual events and visual effects. In the Philippines, the dawning of television was used as a catch net for votes for a second-term president. Before it was an issue of technology, it was enmeshed in the political ploy or propaganda game. Indeed, it is true that television in the Philippines is a product of cultural importation. It marks the entry of technical and technological innovation that engenders the possibility of sketching a cultural map of new media via the new political economy of imperialism and neocolonialism. The media implosion was dictated by political order when erstwhile propaganda manager, Judge Antonio Quirino, experimented to embody his brother, then President Elpidio Quirino, within the spectacles of framed and mediated television to win a reelection (Maslog 1990). But it was a failure. Elpidio Quirino lost in that election. True to any new entry level

technology, television at that time was a very expensive gadget. So expensive, in fact, that there was a failure to frame the centrality of a prospective audience—the masses. The audience was, instead, depoliticized, disembodied, and distanced from the ceremonial politics of the day. However, after several years through the mechanics of popular culture, television was cemented within the rubric of patronage and personality cults.

It took a capitalist decision to acquire DZAQ, which started broadcasting in 1953, as the first Philippine television before it hit the audience' chart. The Lopezes acquired it in 1957 and formed ABS-CBN. The domesticity of Philippine television glues its audience on the screen of recorded or live spectacle. The centrality of the target audience dwells in the family. That is the reason why, even today, ABS-CBN flaunts the station banner of *kapamilya* to enclose the audience. The specification of the place heterogenous to all would be the homes of millions of Filipino family audiences. The discursive formation of the family audience grapples to sustain the audience at the center not in the periphery. Hegemonic formations become obsolete in TV audiencing since Foucault takes the precedent of arguing for the diffusion of relations of power in spectacular apparatus. Once this is established, disciplinary enclosure takes its toll to collect the mandate of disciplining the regime of televisual experience.

Disciplinary precisions are employed and deployed through television programming. Like the discourse on the pedagogization of children, Foucauldian timetable in televisual contexts divides airtime and off-the-air programming between daytime and night-time intervals. The traditional TV programming works from six in the morning till twelve midnight—these are moments within the interval of day and night time shifts. Today, with the introduction of cable and satellite TV, shows and programs are integrated and stretched for a full 24-hour viewing pleasure. The surveillance takes a watchful task without sleeping. As noticed, morning shows are allotted for children programs and public service shows. Noontime slot is reserved for the variety show where the family can regroup in front of the television or where friends, officemates, and household helpers rest during lunchtime. The afternoon slots are for siesta time, which showcase cartoons, telenovela, and sports programs. The evening slots, from 6:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. are for primetime viewing. Commercial overloads are evident in the said time slots because paid advertisements compete for airtime plugging within airtime intervals of primetime shows. News, drama, comedy, and action shows occupy this time slot where big stars shine and where audiences are typically surveyed while they throw their gaze on the TV screen.

The partitioning of time and the distribution of programs per audience type work similarly with the operations of popular culture using dispersion and segmentation. What makes TV viewing disciplinary is that viewers glue their gazes at the screen, unconscious about their gazing practices. In

the long run the viewing practices unsuspectingly are reciprocated by a looking glass surveillance. TV stations study audiences and they behave according to the result of their surveillance. In effect, TV dictates the taste, fashion, and trends; shapes opinions and beliefs; brings before the eyes the unreal as real, the distorted as beautiful, and the physique as actual bodies. This whole universe of effects has begun to see that

[a] body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved...To begin with, there was the scale of the control: it was a question not of treating the body, *en masse*, 'wholesale', as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it 'retail', individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself—movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body. (Foucault 1979, 136-37)

"The panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen" (Foucault 1979, 201). The central tower is empty and has only blinds and windows to make effects as if everyone is being watched in the peripheral cells of the prison. However, television as a panopticon works in a different level. The central tower turns out to be the housing or the enclosure of audience. The peripheric ring refers to the channels in the television.

A whole problematic then develops: that of an architecture that is no longer built simply to be seen (as with the ostentation of palaces), or to observe the external space...but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control—to render visible those who are inside it; in more general terms, an architecture that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them. (Foucault 1979, 172)

The audiences see shifting windows of the panopticon by reshuffling channels using the remote control believing they were not seen or being surveyed because they are the ones seeing or watching. The different channels if spread out would constitute the peripheric ring where different TV stations compete and decide for the programming. The visual simulation of shows and programs on the television screen are pressed virtually in simultaneity.

Broadcasting and Nonspaced Television

The power of television runs across time and space. Broadcasting is a technical rationality evident in postcapitalism. TV domination connotes the breadth and spread of its broadcast infrastructure. To be consistent with the contention of this paper, broadcast towers are not in the center, it remains in the periphery if not in the capillaries of society. The center always belongs to the audience. Broadcasting is the necessary extension of the television set.

Along with a presumed if not self-proclaimed diversity, pluralism, and freedom of choice signaled by this new electronic satellite constellation, this liberated economics of broadcasting (broadcasting denotatively means disbandment, decentralization, and hence is accurate for television, but is now termed "narrowcasting") can also be read as standardization and specialization (the twin principles of industrial, monopoly capitalism). This is centrism in clever and evanescent disguise as intangible dispersion, occupying narrower bands of the spectrum but mimicking the networks just the same. (Mellencamp 1990, 2)

With this far-reaching control of broadcasting, its delimitation ironically becomes its extension. The concept of space (broadcast tower) is replaced by nonspace (broadcasting). It is thus assumed that broadcasting is omnipresent yet limited by its technical infrastructure. Its weakness lies in the visibility of the TV station tower or the broadcast tower. The bilocation of the broadcast tower and the panoptic television makes the nonspace ubiquitous. "Indeed, *distraction* is based upon the representation of *space* within *place* (in which, as we shall see, space becomes displaced, a *nonspace*) and the inclusion of...*elsewheres* and *elsewhens* in the here and now" (Mellencamp 1990, 195). Television has the power to mediate the everyday life of the people. Thus, for television and other media, Couldry (2000, 40) emphasizes this concern by stating that

[it] is necessary to highlight the complexity of the naturalization process itself. It is the media's multidimensionality which makes underlying issues of power so difficult to articulate. The media are both a principal focus of imagination, creativity and identification, and a principal source of information and representation; they help define both the facts of our social reality and our individual desires.

While the audiences enjoy fixity towards the visual image and event, social reality loses its reference in the televisual world. The overemphasis

of images and layers of meaning in watching television can erase reference to external reality. The mediation that has been created is more likely real than the real thing. With this, people tend to live by these images and meanings appropriated in their ways of living. How, for example, *Meteor Garden*, which includes the pop group sensation of F4 from Taiwan, can cause deviation and distraction in Filipino everyday life and thus create hyperreal attachment to this show is a wonder. Everything becomes *Meteor Garden* and F4. Television through broadcasting perpetuates popular culture. It is a new world order every day.

In a consumerist society, every institution engaged in commercial or business affairs like TV broadcasting is a disciplinary extension of rigid disciplinary centers like the military, the police, and the State. These commercial institutions are not antidotes to the regimentation of pain, punishment, and discipline imposed by the State. They are conduits or instruments of the State as disciplinary enclosures largely integral in the functions of our day-to-day affairs.

Visibility and Invisibility of Gaze

Foucault, in his essay *Of other spaces*, discusses the concrete and not so concrete (virtual) spacing of utopias and heterotopias. What is striking in his contention is the rhetoric of visibility that fades out as invisibility. Foucault (2002, 231-32) claims that

[t]he mirror is after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the mirror.

Like the mirror, the television is utopia. The mediation between media world and ordinary world produces a placeless place—the studio, shooting location, stage, elsewhere. People see themselves on television for they are considered everymen, elsewhere men. The perfection of media reality is the perfection of mediated sites of reality. News transmit facts of actual happenings, yet what the audiences see on screen are framed slices of reality—not its entirety. The television could not cover the visible reality of live news reportage. What renders factual are residual components of the invisible. Furthermore, heterotopia for Foucault (1979, 231) is the opposite of utopia:

Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location reality. Because these places are absolutely different from all the sites that

they reflect and speak about, [Foucault] calls them...heterotopias.

If utopias are mirrors, heterotopias are mirages. In televisual discourse, these are the effects of representation. A mirage points to an ideal location that brings relief and teleological ends. The multiplicity of shows and the fluidity of images, events, and discourses on television have formed a mirage of the spectacle. It is a mirage because it is difficult to separate facts from opinions, hard from soft news, politics from showbizness. Everything boils down to a series of derealized and nonspaced images. It could be that with this visual influence, the audience's gaze may implode within, leaving no trace, no origin, no memory, and no history to begin with.

Implosion of Memory, History, and Virtuality

Distraction as mediation of everyday reality leads to spatio-temporal implosion of televisual images that sink in the cognitive, psychological, and social elements of the self.

On television, duration of viewing time is also the prime experience of temporality. The work of time itself as decay is seldom represented in images of the human body or everyday life. Nor is the past so much remembered via narrative as it is rerun or embedded as archival images within contemporary, discursive presentation. Even the image quality of the past—records of grainy black and white—is gradually undergoing electronic revision to meet today's expectations. The phantasmagoria of television and its analogs is thus to be imagined less as escape to flickering shadows in the cave than as a productive force which shapes spatio-temporal and psychic relations to the realities it constitutes. The state of mind promoted within the realms of nonspace can be described as *distraction*. (Mellencamp 1990, 202)

Television is anti-genealogy because it erases memory and history. The indeterminate continuity of narratives and quasi-narratives in TV shows is captured by orality as discourse. Orality and virtuality implode together to give meaning to the presentness of history. In the mirror, anti-genealogy is genealogy (utopian) as it progresses from present to future and in between these two periods of time is the past. "Television, too, has been conceptualized as the annihilation of memory, and consequently of history, in its continual stress upon the 'nowness' of its own discourse" (Mellencamp 1990, 227). Television is not just text, it is an oral text: teletextuality. This means that time and space are

transposed as extensions of the phenomenon itself—televisual. This triangulation engenders the nonstatic and fluid character of time. Natural time is progressive while naturalized time in television is linear transgressive. Only then that through the mechanization of time that we can rewind time; if and only if, televisual images and events are recorded in VCR or in digital format. Thus, memory is unreal and inutile in TV discourse. The language of reading TV defies memory, for to render it possible is to end the contingency of televisual representation. In short, teletextuality (TV text) is always a constant history! What we can write as history are the events external to televisual representations but related to TV's evolution and development. TV here is objectified historically. But the historiography of teletextuality is impossible. Teletextuality is disciplinary because it is difficult to capture its history. Yet audience resistance to this monolithic scheme is just a matter of turning off the television set. Soon enough, the leviathan power of TV crumbles down and turns televisual power simply as off the air.

CONCLUSION: JUGGERNAUT OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE

In conclusion, this paper explains the effectiveness of Foucauldian reading as it relates to popular culture and the television. Rarely that the later Foucault is used to examine modernity and technology because his project remains genealogical—bringing into sight the history and governmentality of the self from Greek to Roman times. However, the early Foucault can pose a critical interrogation on the subject of this paper that pertains particularly to the disciplinary apparatus and operations of popular culture and the panoptic characters of television.

In questioning the meaning of popular culture under the auspices of modernity, the postmodern variety is introduced. Through four rationalities; namely, dispersion, segmentation, integration, and extension of mass culture, we have made a transition from the modern to the postmodern. The fact of virtual location has created docile bodies fixated on television and televisuality, for example. The political discourse on center and periphery is abandoned. The paper also argues that the center is the weakest site of power relations. TV audiences reside in the center while media strategists and producers remain in the periphery. Television, in one sense, replaces the prison in the disciplinary model of the social arena. Through broadcasting; the visible and invisible gaze; enclosure and disclosure; and implosion of time, memory, and virtuality, it would be reasonable enough to declare the panoptic characteristics of television.

The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion make

those on whom they are applied clearly visible. (Foucault 1979, 170-71)

It is understood that power relation is democratized in the interstices of social structures. The deployment of the regime of practices of the body transforms it into remaining at the center as a component of the audience. This reading is only but a small contribution to a wide variety of discourses on Foucauldian critical reflection. And it is at this moment that resistance is deployed against the moment of postmodernity, the moment of irreversibility when everything is reduced to megalomania and hyperreality. The juggernaut (as Anthony Giddens would always use to describe modernity) of contemporary culture would devour the meaning of the self, our existence devoid of purpose and reason, when the contemporaneity of the time and of cultural practices are left unquestioned and unchallenged.

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UNIVERSITIES AND DEMOCRATIZATION: HABERMAS ON EDUCATION¹

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This paper is an attempt to explicate Jürgen Habermas's discourse on education vis-à-vis his political project of a democratized society. Arguably, Habermas sees in the structures and processes inherent in the universities an ideal place for self-reflection and communicative action. Thus, his idea of a university is tied up with the potentials of establishing an emancipated, enlightened society. The agencies of self-reflection hinge with democratic practices and processes, and the facility of communicative action even in a differentiated and specialized learning practices and processes in a bundled lifeworld in the universities boost the prospect of a democratized society. Together with other institutions that promote, enhance, and safeguard avenues of discourses free from domination, university education contributes to the realization of the democratization project.

Educational philosophy aims to bring about a transformed quality of social existence in terms of putting into question the social role of education in its capacity to make individuals socially responsible. Specifically, it gears towards the shift of emphasis of education from simply being an accumulation of knowledge to the reproduction and utilization of knowledge for societal transformation. Technically, the former refers to the epistemological task while the latter to the political task of education. These two are not opposing functions but complementary ones. The quest for esoteric factual knowledge is in itself a self-legitimizing end of any scholarly endeavor, just as Aristotle says, "[A]ll men desire to know." However, the quest for knowledge is not for knowledge's sake. Social and political thinkers agree that knowledge is to be at the service of freedom. Knowledge is therefore not for the sake of contemplation, but for the sake of action that is directed to human liberation. In our contemporary times, there is a need in every society an agency whose main purpose is to think as profoundly as possible society's most puzzling problems (see Brubacher 1978, 12). Talking about the

function of institutions of higher education, Alfred North Whitehead (1929) expresses it well when he remarks that the justification of the university is not found in the mere knowledge conveyed to students, nor in the opportunity for research provided to the faculty but in the uniting of the young and the old in the imaginative consideration of learning. This means that the atmosphere of excitement that arises from active imagination transforms knowledge; and in such atmosphere, a fact no longer remains a mere fact but becomes impregnated with untold potentialities. The quest for knowledge is, then, more than just idle curiosity, for education, says Whitehead (1929, 1-2, 4), is “the acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge,” and “education with inert ideas is not just useless: it is, above all things, harmful!”²

This leads us to the political task of education. In a nutshell, this is to say “education in service of the nation.” Education has a role for a transformed quality of social existence. This political task of education comes as no surprise because the great philosophers of education have treated education as part of politics: Plato in his *Republic*, Aristotle in his *Politics*, and Dewey in his *Democracy and education*.

The epistemological and political tasks of education place the institutions of “higher education”³ in a pivotal position in the whole process of educating. In the elementary and high school levels, students learn to gather information about themselves and their environment, but in the universities, students are engaged with the ideas that demand higher levels of abstractions and generalizations (Whitehead 1929, 26). Both the capability for higher level of abstraction and generalization as well as the ability for technical knowledge and skill are necessary in this transitory stage of formation where the student becomes ready to assume greater responsibility for society. Here, knowledge and technical expertise are acquired not merely as a matter of idle curiosity but because of its far-reaching significance to society. Problems of government, industry, agriculture, labor, raw materials, international relations, education, health, and the like, once solved empirically, demand expertise and the best place to procure such expertise and people trained in their uses is the institutions of higher education. Speaking about the university in American life, John Brubacher (1978, 12), quoting an American educator, convincingly states:

[The university] is next to government itself, the chief servant of society, the chief instrument of social change... It is the source, the inspiration, the powerhouse, and the clearing house of new ideas.

Given such a crucial role, institutions of higher education, colleges, and universities perform their epistemological and political accountability to the students and to society as a whole.

In a parallel manner, Jürgen Habermas gives premium value to university education as a potential vehicle for attaining the prospects of democracy. His philosophic accounting on university education is not meant to think little of the other institutions of education vis-à-vis the prospect for democratizing society but rather to tell us of the proper context in which we should read him as well as to manifest the crucial role institutions of higher education perform for societal transformation. Habermas speaks of his theory of “university” education in two correlative fronts: namely, the necessity of self-reflection for the democratization of the university system and the persistent affinity of the university system to the background of communicative meaning—the *lifeworld*. By “lifeworld” is meant the constellation of the people’s worldviews, value systems, norms, and practices. The *democratization* of the university is an exemplary condition for the self-reflection of the sciences and research, and as well as the democratic practices and processes within it. Its affinity to the lifeworld spells out the much-needed background and horizon of meaning that boost up the prospect for a *communication* free from domination. These are the two essential features “university” education possesses that bolster the promise of a democratized society.

Furthermore, these “two correlative fronts” illustrate the development of Habermas’s thought, from his theoretical formulation of Critical Theory in his early works to his “linguistic turn” in the *Theory of communicative action*. Even in this paradigm shift, Habermas maintains the emancipatory potentials embedded in institutions that propel self-reflection, democratic practices, and communicative rationality such as the university. It is in the university environs, in Habermas view, that a transformed society can set out.

HABERMAS’S “IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY”

Habermas’s “idea of a university” holds an ideal that is a condition for a democratic society. Habermas speaks of this idea not to transport us away from our history towards a utopian dream of an ideal community. His idea of a university is drawn from concrete historical events of a people continuously seeking for self-understanding.⁴ It is an idea that is deeply rooted in the context of the struggle for reforms within the university setting and society in his native Germany. He firmly believes in the importance the university contributes to the economic growth of his country as well as to the self-understanding of its people. More importantly, he sees in the structures, practices, and processes inherent in the university a more promising arena for social integration that does not compromise culture with economic progress. In spite of the plurality of worldviews and interests that proliferate and compete for human allegiance and attention within it, he considers the university as an avenue that provides a participatory context where people can discuss and aspire to reach universal understanding (Ibana 1998, 31). Foreseeing the eminent danger of the

one-sided form of rationality being utilized in the university and the growing tendency of the fragmentation of its various functions once held as unity, he has taken into himself the responsibility to be one of the active advocates for the democratization of the university and its close affinity with the lifeworld. Opposing both the idealist and conservative tendencies as well as the apolitical stance of reforms, Habermas zealously proffers a more positive and an onward looking position.

The several waves of reforms for the university have generally failed primarily because agents have been stubborn to consider a very crucial feature intrinsic in the university, that is, its close affinity with the communicative background of meaning (lifeworld). The call for reforms was basically focused on the growing "panic attitude" that the spirit/soul holds the idea of a university as dead. The reforms were generally premised from German Idealism's belief that institutions were forms of objective spirit⁵ and such "spirit" had become dead, which led to the prevailing crises. Habermas (1989, 101) summarizes their argument:

An institution remains capable of functioning only as long as it embodies in living form the idea inherent in it. As soon as the spirit leaves it, an institution rigidifies into something purely mechanical, as organism without a soul decomposes into dead matter. Once the unifying bond of its corporative consciousness disintegrates, the university too ceases to form a whole.

Helmut Schelsky (see Habermas 1989, 119), another proponent of the reforms, confirms Habermas's observation when he remarks that the general failure of renewal was due to the "fact that under the pressure of increasing complexity, the systems of science and scholarship had become extremely differentiated and thus could no longer be held together in its functions by a shared guiding image." In other words, the normative model in which the idea of a university is founded is already insufficient and cannot keep pace with the intrinsic dynamics of differentiation in the sciences and research.

Confronted with the same, but deviating from Schelsky, Habermas comes up with a more positive assessment. For him, the idea of a university is not completely dead for as long as the bundling of its complex functions has not yet been completely torn apart, and that the increasing differentiation of science and research are not to be purely interpreted with the functionalist tendency. He (1989, 107) argues,

Processes of differentiation that have accelerated over the last two decades do not have to be described in terms of systems theory, and they do not have to lead to the conclusion that universities have left the horizon of the lifeworld behind completely.⁶

For Habermas (1989, 107), the universities are still rooted in the lifeworld through the bundling of its different functions under the roof of one institution. The awareness that under this roof the process of acquiring scientific knowledge is intertwined not only with the technical development and preparation for academic profession but also with general education makes the transmission of culture and the enlightenment in the public political sphere possible. Although the scientific and scholarly learning processes become exclusively specialized for the function of research, for Habermas (1989, 107), they are still connected and dependent upon the university forms of organization, that is, on the internally differentiated complex that includes the training of future scientists and scholars, preparation for the academic professions, and participation in processes of general education, cultural understanding, and the formation of public opinion.

A hindrance for the reforms to effect real change is their inability to supply the much needed anchorage in which the growing differentiated functions of science and scholarship find their unifying vortex. Habermas (1989, 116) observes—while agreeing with Schelsky—that what was crucial in these reforms is that their inherent developmental tendencies are one-sided and need re-connection, and formative countervailing forces must come into play. He reiterates his belief that the “differentiated system of science and scholarship should not simply merge with the economy, technology, and administration but rather should remain rooted in the lifeworld through the traditional bundling of its functions.” Habermas (1989, 118) elucidates further:

I had the same hope as Schelsky—that in this dimension of scientific self-reflection it would be possible to make the connections of research processes to the lifeworld transparent in terms of those processes themselves, and not only their connections to the application of scientific and scholarly information but also and especially their connection to culture as a whole, to general processes of socialization, to the continuation of traditions, and to the enlightenment of the political public sphere.

Here, Habermas holds the obstinate belief of the close relationship of the lifeworld with the university system in spite of the prevailing complexity in it. The practice/agency of self-reflection becomes vital in the difficult retrieval of the bonding of science and research with the lifeworld. Self-reflection entails not only inward looking movement but also an outgoing act, e.g., intersubjectivity through communicative action. Therefore, in responding to the query, “on what could an integrative self-understanding of the corporative body of the university be based?” Habermas (1989, 123) ardently states:

The corporative consciousness of the members of the university, however diluted it may be, may even be strengthened by such a reminder—but only if the work of remembering itself takes on the form of scientific analysis and does not remain a mere ceremony designed to compensate for the technocratic daily life of the university with pious sentiment. The corporative self-understanding of the university would be in trouble if it were anchored in something like a normative ideal, for ideas come and go.⁷

Following the wisdom of Schleiermacher,⁸ Habermas (1989, 124) continues:

I seriously believe that in the last analysis it is the communicative forms of scientific and scholarly argumentation that hold university learning processes in their various functions together.

Habermas makes a significant turn by making communication as the norm that keeps the idea of a university ever alive even in a highly differentiated society. Note that it is communication that grounds intersubjective understanding within the differentiated lifeworld of the university. He firmly believes that only when university members recognize the enduring potentials of the communicative forms alive within the structures, practices, and processes of the institution that it can hold its various functions together and withstand the challenges of modern times.

Furthermore, in describing the ideal communicative structure of the university, Habermas (1989, 112) points to the discursive form of the seminar where the relationship of the teacher and the student becomes completely different. Through the cooperative structure and in the principle of egalitarian complementarity, both the teacher and students learn and exist for the sake of science. In a seminar form of handling classes, the students become not just passive recipients of knowledge but become responsible participants of the learning processes. They determine the topics to be discussed, read the assigned readings, prepare before coming to class, and actively participate in the discussions.

Likewise, Habermas reminds us of the public character of the enterprise of knowledge within the university. He (1989, 124) says:

The specialized internal public spheres come together and branch off again in the university's organized public events. The old-fashioned title of *ordentlicher öffentlicher Professor* [literally, ordinary public professor] serves to remind us of the public character of lectures, seminars, and scientific and scholarly cooperation among working groups at institutes affiliated with the university.

Furthermore, Habermas believes that what we do in the university would be eventually carried out even outside the university premises. Therefore, Habermas's interest in the communicative structures of the university is not confined to the academic procedures. His concern is in understanding the democratic structures of modern societies that are exemplified and transmitted by the university.

Even outside the university, scientific and scholarly learning processes retain something of their original university form. They are sustained by the stimulating and productive forces of a discursive debate that carries with the promissory note of the surprising argument. The doors stand open; at any moment a new viewpoint may emerge, a new idea appears unexpectedly. (Habermas 1989, 125)

However, Habermas regrets that he cannot speak of the communication community of researchers as exemplary because the egalitarian and universalistic content of its communicative forms are only true of scientific and scholarly activities in the university and not yet of the structures of society as a whole. Nonetheless, his hope lies in the emancipatory potentials of communicative rationality shared by both.

TASK OF THE UNIVERSITY

Habermas's idea of a university is necessarily coupled with his emancipatory interest for society. This implies a very sensitive task the university has to fulfill for society. Habermas (1970, 2) reiterates the conventional functions of universities, that is, they must transmit technically exploitable knowledge in order to meet society's need for qualified new graduates and at the same time be concerned with the expanded reproduction of education itself. Aside from this, institutions of higher education must not only transmit technically exploitable knowledge but also produce it. They, therefore, serve as centers of scientific and technical research and development essential for progress.

However, Habermas does not settle with these conventional functions assigned to universities. More than the efficient effort of responding to the needs of industrialization, the universities have the responsibility for the creation of a critical culture conducive to a democracy. It has the task of fashioning a political consciousness of the citizenry that allows and keeps a public sphere needed for a democratic political culture. Habermas strongly argues for this almost forgotten principle in education. He (1970, 3-4) says:

University planned as a center of industrial development suggests the peculiar idea that research and instruction today have to do only with the production and transmission of technically exploitable knowledge...I should like to argue against

this...and advance the thesis [that the university has the task] that goes beyond the production and transmission of technologically exploitable knowledge. The enterprise of knowledge at the university level influences the action-orienting self-understanding of students and public. It cannot define itself with regard to society exclusively in relation to technology, to systems of purposive-rational action. It inevitably relates also to practice, it influences communicative action.

According to Habermas (1970, 4), if the university is exclusively adapted to the needs of industrial society, then behind the back of its efficient efforts, it could be just as ideologically effective as the traditional university used to be. It could pay for its unreflected relation to practice by stabilizing implicit professional standards, cultural traditions, and forms of political consciousness, whose power expands in an uncontrolled manner because they come from established institutions. In other words, the university becomes a legitimizing apparatus for the dogmatic tendencies of modern societies. Habermas sees the growing depoliticization of the public sphere and the continuing regulation of the state apparatus on social and cultural concerns. The public sphere is the realm in which individuals gather to participate in open discussions on matter of common concern.⁹ The continued repression of a democratic moral and political culture by one-sided rationalization of the sciences, economy, and state bureaucracy is, in Habermas's view, the chief threat to a transformed society.¹⁰

Therefore, aside from the functions related to economics, training, and research, Habermas insists on three other indispensable responsibilities that the university should consider seriously. First, the university has the responsibility of ensuring that its graduates are equipped with the proper values and attitudes expected of a professional. He calls this as "extrafunctional abilities." By these abilities, Habermas (1970, 2) means "all those attributes and attitudes relevant to the pursuit of a professional career that are not contained in professional knowledge and skills." Put simply, students are habituated with professional ethics that champions the practice of critical thinking, democratic processes, and human rights. He is not necessarily saying that the university has to produce all these virtues proper for professionals, but by way of the pattern of socialization processes and integration that it creates in day-to-day life in the university, such values and attitudes are caught.

Second, the university has the responsibility of transmitting, interpreting, and developing the cultural tradition of the society. The influence of interpretations provided by the university particularly from the hermeneutic sciences, i.e., social sciences and humanities, on the self-understanding of the general public become evident. According to Habermas (1970, 2-3), no matter how positivistically disciplined in their methods, the hermeneutic sciences cannot completely escape in their studying active

traditions the constraint of either continuously reproducing them, or developing them or critically transforming them.

Third, the university has also the task of forming the political consciousness of its students. The task of providing political education to students is vital to the cultural self-understanding of the people. The goal of education in the university level is to make students become reliable citizens for a democratic order (Habermas 1970, 3-4). A depoliticized university which cuts its ties to the political and the public realm runs the risk of becoming a rationalization to the irrational tendencies of the structures of society.

Central to the carrying out of these tasks is the agency of self-reflection. For Habermas, the practice of reflection is closely related to the practice of democracy. Starting from a traditional philosophy of science, he demonstrates this thesis by showing first the reason why there is such an apolitical stance of the enterprise of knowledge in the university. Habermas argues that the reason for a depoliticized university can be traced back to the fundamental separation of practice from science as propounded by Hume. Hume demonstrated that normative statements cannot be derived from descriptive statements. It follows that one should not confuse decisions about the choice of norms, that is, about moral or political problems, with problems of the empirical sciences. While from theoretical knowledge we derive rules for instrumental action, from practical knowledge, we derive rules for communicative action. The logic of this separation suggests an institutional separation; thus, "politics does not belong [to] the university except as [an] object of science that proceeds according to [a]political method" (Habermas 1970, 6).

The theory of Hume is not false. However, it fails to consider the metatheoretical discussions, which are the medium of scientific progress. By "metatheoretical discussion," Habermas (1970, 6-7) points to the "methodological discussions of the utility of an analytic framework, the expedience of research strategies, the fruitfulness of hypothesis, the choice of methods of investigation, the interpretation of the results of measurements, etc." This kind of discussion follows rules similar to those utilized in critical discussions on practical questions. The critical argumentation that leads to the approval of procedures and the acceptance of norms can be supported or weakened by arguments, that is, it can at least be rationally assessed. This is the task of critical thought both for metatheoretical and practical decisions.

Whether such argumentations or discussions are utilized in the domain of empirical sciences or for practical concerns, they are cases of rationalization of a choice through the medium of unconstrained discussion. This is the democratic form of decision-making—that is, where all decisions are to be made equally dependent on a consensus arrived at in discussions free from domination. The "principle of public discourse eliminates all force other than that of the better argument" and "majority

decisions are held to be only a substitute for the un compelled consensus that would finally result if discussion did not always have to be broken off owing to the need for a decision" (Habermas 1970, 7). Expressed in Kantian terms, the principle "only reason should have force," links the democratic form of decision-making with the type of discussion to which the sciences owe their progress. This shows the "subterranean unity of theoretical and practical reason." Here, Habermas underscores the intrinsic relation of theory and practice even in the academic environs.

Subsequent to this argument, Habermas hinges the role of philosophy with the other sciences.¹¹ Though it no longer occupies a privileged position in the enterprise of knowledge, philosophy retains its universal power in the form of self-reflection to the sciences. Having become circumscribed as a specific discipline, philosophy can legitimately go beyond the area reserved to it by assuming the role of an interpreter between one specialized narrow-mindedness and another (Habermas 1970, 8-9; 1991). Since each autonomous discipline can no longer be encompassed by philosophical reflection, philosophy can now migrate into the various sciences and settle in each of them as its corresponding form of self-reflection. It emerges from the scientific disciplines and then transcends them critically by taking them as its object. By investigating the limits and the conditions of the individual sciences, it keeps them open in the face of their narrowing relations to the world. Through this, philosophy regains the whole scientific civilization as its object (Habermas 1989, 117). Likewise, it is this immanent philosophizing that confirms the validity of the transposed scientific results into the lifeworld. Therefore, the demand of self-reflection in the sciences makes them critically aware of their own presuppositions. Habermas sees the potential of democratization in the enterprise of knowledge when "the sciences practice reflection." He (1970, 9) forcefully argues:

This dimension must not be closed off. For only in it is possible to fulfill in a rational fashion those three functions which the university must in some way deal with over and above the production and transmission of technically exploitable knowledge. Only in this dimension can we promote the replacement of traditional professional ethics by a reflected relation of university graduates to their professional practice. Only in it can we bring to consciousness, through reflection, the relation of living generations to active cultural traditions, which otherwise operate dogmatically. Only in it, finally, can we subject to critical discussion both attitudes of political consequence and motives that form the university as a scientific institution and a social organization.

Here, Habermas (1970, 5) demonstrates the immanent relation between the enterprise of knowledge at the university and the critical

enterprise. The practice of reflexivity in university education, therefore, requires the price of transformation of its internal structures. The capacity for political action within the university in the form of participatory self-management is exemplary. Thus, a democratized university both in the content of education as well as in internal processes and structures, is crucial for the democratization of society. This is like saying, "transforming university education for transforming society," or in the vision of Fichte, to "see the university as the birthplace of an emancipated society of the future" (Habermas 1989, 111, 118).

Borrowing from Talcott Parson's work on the sociology of higher education, Habermas (1989, 121) recapitulates the fourfold function the university fulfills at the same time: The core function (a) of research and training of new scientists and scholars goes hand in hand with (b) academic preparation for the professions and the production of technically usable knowledge, on the one hand, and (c) the tasks of general education, together with (d) the contribution to cultural self-understanding and intellectual enlightenment [of the political public sphere], on the other hand. Habermas (1989, 122) firmly believes

the learning processes that take place within the university not only enter into an exchange with economy and administration but also stand in an inner relationship to the functions through which the lifeworld reproduces itself. [They] extend beyond professional preparation to make a contribution to general processes of socialization by training in the scientific mode of thought, that is, in the hypothetical attitude towards facts and norms; they go beyond the production of expert knowledge to make a contribution to intellectual enlightenment with their informed political stands on concrete issues; they go beyond reflection on fundamental issues and questions of methodology to contribute to the hermeneutic continuation of tradition through the humanities, and to self-understanding of the scientific and scholarly disciplines within the whole culture through theories of sciences and scholarship, morality, art and literature. It is the organization of scientific and scholarly learning processes in the university...that continues to root the differentiated specialized disciplines in the lifeworld by fulfilling these various functions simultaneously.

UNIVERSITY AND LIFEWORLD

One of the crucial points of Habermas's idea of a university is its close affinity with the lifeworld. Habermas holds the thesis that the university setting—even how differentiated in its scientific and scholarly functions—aligns itself to the institutions that allow the production and reproduction of

the lifeworld. This notion of the lifeworld anchors Habermas's powerful critique of modern society and the prospect for an emancipated society.

According to Habermas (1987a, 2: 140ff., 318-31, 338-43), the claims of communicative action in everyday social life are often not questioned or criticized because they are raised within the contours of an undisputed, shared lifeworld. The lifeworld offers the commonly accepted background knowledge within which action can be coordinated. It is the unquestioned, sometimes unquestionable background of meanings that are "always already given" in everyday life. It secures the continuity of traditions and the coherence of knowledge that are necessary for the sustenance of mutual understanding. In the course of social evolution, however, modern society has split off or uncoupled the subsystems of the economy and the bureaucracy from the lifeworld to function independently. The lifeworld is no longer the basis of communicative action aimed at understanding. Communicative action is understood in terms of the functionality of the steering of media, money, and power. In the event of the "colonization of the lifeworld," the communicative potentials aimed at understanding in the lifeworld are eroded in terms of the systemic imperative of monetary and bureaucratic systems. The specialized media of money and power have become the new steering mechanisms that determine the direction of everyday life. They have replaced the original insights derived from the linguistic discourses of everyday life and translated the quality of human relationships into relations of money and power.

The spectacle of an economy steered by money and a state administrative system regulated by power extends their colonizing tentacles to cultural institutions like the schools and universities. In modern societies, subsystems are not interlocked and they operate autonomously attending to their specialized singular function and one kind of activity. The generalization that all systems of action, every domain of social action and integration, has to adopt the form of functionally specialized subsystem decoupled from one another and differentiated through steering media has been applied even to cultural systems of action like the scientific and scholarly activities. Agreeing with Schelsky's description, Habermas argues that this is an overgeneralization on the part of systems theory and this cannot be true to all domain of action. For Habermas and Schelsky, universities have their own unique inherent dynamics where institutional development in terms of functional differentiation happens within the same institution and there is scarcely any loss of function through transfer of tasks to other agencies. Habermas (1989, 120-21) is convinced that a different social integration in the university even how specialized and differentiated, remains within the nucleus of a system of institutions that bundles functions. Although processes of differentiation had accelerated in the universities, they do not have to be described in terms of systems theory and they do not necessarily have to be construed in a way that the universities have left the horizon of the lifeworld. Within the university, the general processes of socialization, cultural

transmission, and social-integrative will-formation, through which the lifeworld reproduces itself, are carried out under the highly artificial conditions of academic learning processes programmed for the acquisition of knowledge. As long as these complex bundling of functions are carried on under the roof of one institution, the universities are still rooted in the lifeworld. Habermas (1989, 107, 116) insists that a differentiated system of science and scholarship should not simply merge with economy, technology, and administration but rather should remain rooted in the lifeworld through the traditional bundling of its functions. The schools and universities are public domain and they should serve the public interest.

Habermas further reiterates the function of the lifeworld as the horizon-forming context of meaning and the resource of possibilities. He (1989, 120) asserts:

Norms and value orientations are always embedded in the context of a lifeworld; however differentiated the lifeworld maybe, it remains a background totality and it draws all processes of differentiation back into its totalizing vortex. The function of the lifeworld—the reproduction of culture, socialization, and social integration—may become differentiated into special domains of action, but in the last analysis they remain enclosed within the horizon of the lifeworld and intertwined with one another.

UNIVERSITY, ENLIGHTENMENT, AND THE DEMOCRATICIZATION PROJECT

In his inaugural lecture when he assumed his professorial chair at Frankfurt, Habermas provides a vision of society that is intrinsically connected with his philosophical research project. He (1971, 314) writes:

...only in an emancipated society, whose members' autonomy and responsibility had been realized, would communication have developed into the non-authoritarian and universally practiced dialogue from which both our model of reciprocally constituted ego identity and our idea of true consensus are always implicitly derived.

Habermas consistently defends the Enlightenment belief of a transformed society that is rested on the idea of the enlightened employment of rationality in all aspects of societal life. The embodiment of reason in the political and cultural realm means the establishment of a form of government that guarantees civil liberties and institutionally secures the public sphere, so that political power can be rationalized through the medium of public discussion to reflect the general will and common

interest. Likewise, the embodiment of reason in the economic sphere means the establishment of a social space for the free pursuit of individual interest, so far as it is compatible with a like pursuit by all other individuals. This will eventually result in a continuous increase in the general wealth of society and the growing equality of the shares falling to its individual members. This is Habermas's regulative ideal—the *telos* of his philosophical works. Relying on the emancipatory potentials of communicative rationality, he ventures toward the realization of an enlightened/democratized society via the restoration of the communicative structures of inter-subjective and intra-subjective relationships. This vision of emancipated society via the agency of communicative reason is a Habermasian reformulation of the Kantian project of enlightenment (see McCarthy 1999, 164-80).

One of the philosophical and most influential projects under the banner of "enlightenment" was espoused by Kant. In his famous essay "What is enlightenment?" Kant urges modern human beings to "have courage to use your own reason!" [*Sapere aude!*¹²] This slogan served as the battlecry of human emancipation from "self-imposed tutelage" towards the ability to "make use of his understanding without direction from another" (Kant 1993, 145). This Kantian dictum has been usually construed in individualist terms because of Kant's strong notion of rational autonomy. However, in the same essay Kant (1993, 147) likewise hints the insight that one's use of reason is best done not alone but in concert with others. Therefore, the Kantian project of enlightenment can be understood in terms of the freedom to make public use of one's reason. This insight of the use of one's thinking in concert with others is also present in other Kantian writings, e.g., the maxims of common human understanding in the *Critique of judgment*: the first maxim, "to think for oneself" is balanced by the second, "to think from the standpoint of everyone else." Kant likewise speaks of publicity as a condition of right in his account of justice in "Perpetual peace" and other political writings. Kant characterizes the public use of reason as open, critical, free from coercion, and subject to the requirements of consistency and coherence. Therefore, the Kantian project of enlightenment can be said as the gradual extension of one's use of reason in cultural and political public domains (see McCarthy 1999, 164).

Seen in this light, we see the close affinity of the Kantian project of enlightenment with Habermas's democratization project. On this reading, the democratization project is the "communications-theoretic reworking of Kant's idea of the public use of reason" (McCarthy 1999, 165). Analyzing rationality in terms of communication and centering it in the appeal to reason in order to gain intersubjective recognition for contestable claims, Habermas ties public reason to the procedures, forums, practices, and institutions in which validity claims are critically tested in various forms of public discourse. By making communication as the norm, Habermas makes the linguistic turn of the Kantian project and went farther to extend the same to practices and institutions of public cultural and political realms. By

institutionalizing the practices and processes of an enlightened and democratic public use of communicative rationality in concrete societal structures, Habermas hopes to realize a transformed society.

Is something like this Kantian project of enlightenment (rephrased in Habermasian terms) still viable today? Habermas would respond to this affirmatively. He (1981, 1987b; Schmidt 1982) considers his task as an extension of modernity's (enlightenment) unfinished project. Habermas continues to believe on the emancipatory potentials of modernity. In the present context in which faith in the Enlightenment project of good society promoted by reason is a fading hope and a spurned ideal, Habermas remains unwavering in his belief. He maintains that rationality is embedded in the institutional and cultural structures of society. The public use of "theoretical" reason has, though imperfectly, been culturally developed and embodied in the arts and sciences, universities and research institutes, publishing houses, and professional journals, etc., of the scientific and scholarly worlds. On the other hand, the public use of "practical" reason has, though with complex results, been developed and embodied in the legal and political practices and institutions of modern democratic societies (see McCarthy 1999, 168). This myriad task of the public use of both theoretical and practical reason can be carried out in the university through its differentiated and specialized bundling of functions. It is a promising avenue to realize this project because of its democratic and communicative structures inherent in it. For him, the function of the enterprise of knowledge in the university level is the production of a "critical mass of citizens" or a "critical emancipated citizenry" needed for the maintenance of a democratic culture. The universities offer opportunities for enlightened and democratic discourses. The communicative structures, learning processes, and practices in the university are potential arena for communicative rationality. By and through these, the schools and universities expand as well as shield the public sphere. By virtue of its transitory position in society and the type of learning it imparts to students, it is located at a very ideal place where democratic citizenship can be cultivated and enhanced. Through the university, people learn to practice the virtues of democracy. These virtues are not only taught explicitly but they are also imparted by the way teachers teach their students. It is in this light that Habermas speaks of the educative enterprise in the university level as very critical for societal transformation.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Habermas's idea of a university is closely linked with the potentials of establishing an emancipated, enlightened society. The agencies of self-reflection with their democratic practices and processes and their facilities of communicative action—even in highly differentiated specializations in a unified lifeworld—bolster the prospect of a democratized society. Together with other institutions that promote,

enhance, and safeguard avenues of free discourses, university education contributes to the realization of this project.

NOTES

1. Submitted to this journal earlier in 2005, this paper was delivered as a Philippine National Philosophical Research Society lecture held at De La Salle University on 11 February 2006.

2. By inert ideas, Whitehead means “ideas that are merely received into the mind without being utilized, or tested, or thrown into fresh combinations.”

3. The phrase “higher education” is an inclusive term and a generic one to indicate the area of education with which we are concerned in this work. It refers to two or more years following immediately the secondary education whether spent in college or not. Likewise, it also refers to graduate education. Another word used to refer to the same is “tertiary education,” a term that complements elementary and secondary education. We have also the words “college” and “university.” “College” usually refers to the first two to five years beyond high school, and a college may or may not be a part of a university. “University” is the institution of most inclusive scope in its academic offerings. It is most often used to designate the whole higher education.

4. Habermas has participated actively in the concrete issues of his time. He was an adviser to the leftist student movements advocating for the democratization of the university in the 1960s. However, even as he sided with them on the issue of democratization, Habermas repudiated them on their apathy to communicative action. He likewise participated in the so-called “Historian debate” where he figured prominently, arguing in various venues and mediums against conservative German intellectuals who wanted to revise the reading of the atrocities committed against the Jews during World War II. Cf. *Towards a rational society: Student protest, science and politics* (1970); *The new conservatism: Cultural criticism and the historian’s debate* (1989). The former is cited by Rainier R.A. Ibana (1999).

5. German Idealism, particularly the Hegelian type, holds the thesis that in any given time in history institutions are the embodiments of the “Spirit” (*Geist*) in its journey to absolute self-knowledge. The university as an institution has lost its “spirit” or has become dead as manifested by the fragmentation of its various functions and the high differentiation of science and research. This is the view of reformers led by Karl Jaspers.

6. Habermas speaks of social evolution in terms of a twofold perspective, namely, the lifeworld and the system. The splitting off of these two and one encroaching into the other’s domain (in this case, the systems—economic and state bureaucracy—penetrating into the lifeworld) perpetrate, in Habermas’s view, the social pathologies in modern societies. In as much as he forcefully argues against the colonization of the lifeworld, he likewise

bats for the emancipation of institutions, e.g., the university, civil society, etc., from the colonizing grip of economic and political systems.

7. These words of Habermas are to be understood within the context of the lecture he (1989, 100) delivered to the University community of Heidelberg in the summer of 1986. This lecture is a part of a series of lectures organized on the occasion of the six hundredth anniversary of the founding of the University of Heidelberg.

8. Schleiermacher, the father of the Hermeneutic tradition, according to Habermas (1989, 123-24), had provided already the answer to the query, On what could an integrative self-understanding of the corporative body of the university be based? "The first law of all efforts directed towards knowledge is communication; and in the impossibility of producing anything without language."

9. Habermas (1995) speaks of the emancipatory potentials of modernity by pointing to the appearance of a democratic public realm (e.g., cafés, newspapers, journals, etc.) in the eighteenth century. However, he likewise observes the retreat of Western industrial societies from a democratic culture with its norms of civic participation, ideological debates, and political accountability. He details its enfeeblement in the nineteenth century under the impact of capitalism, party politics, and the commercialization of the media.

10. A similar description of the decline of a democratic political culture can be read in the essays in Habermas (1970), particularly "Technology and science as ideology."

11. The role of philosophical reflection in the sciences is likewise propounded by Habermas (1971, 314-17) in the first public pronouncement of his research project when he assumed his professorial chair at Frankfurt in 1965.

12. "Dare to know!" This was the motto adopted in 1736 by the Society of the Friends of Truth, an important circle in German Enlightenment.

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LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION VERSUS UNDERSTANDING

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It is a common wisdom that linguistic communication is different from linguistic understanding. However, the distinction between communication and understanding is not as clear as it seems to be. Presumably, the relationship between linguistic communication and understanding depends upon the notions of understanding and communication involved. Thinking along the line of propositional understanding and informative communication, communication can be reduced to mutual understanding. In contrast, operating along the line of hermeneutic understanding and dialogical communication, the process of understanding is in essence a process of communication.

INTRODUCTION

It is a common wisdom that linguistic communication is different from understanding. Apparently, there are two sides to any process of linguistic communication: the speaker's side and the hearer's side. Accordingly, the process of linguistic communication seems to consist of two separate stages: the act of communicating—the speaker transmitting a message to the hearer, and the act of understanding—the hearer comprehending the message transmitted.

However, such a common wisdom is just that—*common* wisdom lacking philosophical justification. Philosophically, the distinction between linguistic communication and understanding is not as clear as it seems to be. This is why there is a strong tendency among many of reducing linguistic communication to *mutual* understanding or vice versa. For some, especially many analytical philosophers, linguistic communication is nothing but back-and-forth mutual understanding. Because people are interested in communication, they believe, people are interested in mutual understanding. On the other hand, for continental philosophers like Hans-Georg Gadamer, the process of understanding is essentially a process of linguistic communication.

Of course, as anyone can guess, those analytical philosophers and continental philosophers operate on different notions of linguistic understanding and communication: for many analytical philosophers, both understanding and communication are propositional by nature while for many continental philosophers they are hermeneutic. This is why a clear line between linguistic understanding and communication is virtually non-existent in related literature; most writers use the two concepts interchangeably. Worse still, many are contented with vague and pragmatic pronouncements on the notions of understanding and communication. Consequently, it is often felt that the distinction between linguistic understanding and communication is as elusive as a line on the sand. Therefore, to clarify the relationship between linguistic understanding and communication, the different concepts of understanding and communication—especially the propositional sense and the hermeneutic sense—must be identified.

PROPOSITIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND INFORMATIVE COMMUNICATION

Propositional Understanding

German psychologist Karl Bühler (1934, 35) puts forward a tripartite schema of language functions, which places the linguistic expression in relation to the speaker, the world, and the hearer: the speaker comes to an understanding with the hearer about some states of affairs in the world. A linguistic expression functions simultaneously as symbol (correlated with states of affairs), as symptom (depending upon the speaker's intention), and as signal (its appeal to the hearer). Jürgen Habermas (1992, 57), following K. Bühler, J. L. Austin, and John Searle, identifies those three aspects of linguistic expressions as the three structural components of the meaning of an utterance: one is its propositional content, namely, what is said literally and explicitly with a linguistic expression, which is supposed to represent states of affairs; second, is its expressive content, i.e., what is *intended* with a linguistic expression by the speaker; and third, is its illocutionary content, namely, what is *used* in a speech act to enter into a relationship with the hearer.

A complete understanding of a sentence could mean, besides to grasp its propositional content, to capture the illocutionary force that the sentence induces on the hearer, the speaker's particular intention in uttering the sentence on a particular occasion, or the speaker's propositional attitude associated with the utterance. However, since the propositional content of a sentence is the semantic foundation upon which the other dimensions of its meaning depends, to understand a sentence could mean to comprehend its propositional content or the thought expressed. I call this essential dimension of linguistic understanding propositional understanding, which constitutes the central core of any notion of understanding (see Wang 2003, 55).

Among many accounts of propositional understanding, the truth-conditional account of understanding is by far the most appealing (see Davidson 1984, 17-36). According to it, the Tarskian semantic notion of truth plays the most essential role in linguistic understanding: to understand a sentence, it is necessary and sufficient to know its truth-conditions; to understand a language is to know the truth-conditions of any sentence of the language. Propositional understanding is founded on the monologue model of meaning, according to which the meaning of a text is determined by the author's intention alone, along with the necessary linguistic conventions of the author's language. The text is self-enclosed and its meaning is self-contained—simply there to be discovered—independent of the interpreter. The aim of understanding is comprehension, namely, to grasp the original meaning of a text. Hence, to understand a text is to recapture the author's intention through decoding the meaning of the text. To do so, one has to purify one's own prejudices and immerse oneself in the original context.

Informative Communication

As other notions hailed as unmixed goods, the notion of communication suffers from the misfortune of conceptual confusion. Nevertheless, we can still identify two dominant models of communication. One has to do with the transmission of information—either as psychological entities (such as ideas) or as linguistic entities (such as propositional contents, literal meanings)—which is commonly referred to as the *transmission* model of communication. The transmission process could be one-way, from the sender to the receiver without any feedback from the receiver, not necessarily a bilateral process of exchange and interaction between the sender and the receiver. If this linear transmission model is folded up to connect its one end with the other so as to make it a two-way, bilateral process of exchange between the sender and the receiver, the result is another model of communication, i.e., the *exchange* model, which is supposed to involve interchange, mutuality, reciprocity, and engagement, such as the exchange of ideas in dialogue, psychosemantic sharing, even fusion of consciousness (see Peters 1999, 8).

It is John Locke, more than anyone else, who provides articulate defense of the two doctrines foundational to the classical transmission model: the private mind filled with ideas and linguistic signs as empty vessels to be filled with ideational contents. For Locke, language is “the great instrument” that makes the inner life of ideas publicly accessible and transports ideas from one speaker to another. When we communicate with others, we trust our private ideas to public symbol proxies by virtue of encoding them as linguistic signs. An act of communication is successful if the hearer can replicate the speaker's ideas without distortion in terms of decoding the linguistic signs (see Radford 2005, 16-24).

Locke's notion of private ideas and his commitment to the individual as sovereign in meaning-making make linguistic communication both necessary and impossible. It is fundamentally impossible to communicate accurately the ideas in the mind of one person to stimulate the same ideas in the mind of another, unless we can read each other's minds. Therefore, for Locke, all communication, both intra- and inter-language communication, is inherently imperfect. Communication breakdowns loom large in Locke's scenario.

To remove its mentalistic elements but preserve its basic spirit, that is, linguistic communication as the process of transferring messages from one speaker to another by means of language, let us substitute thoughts expressed by declarative sentences for Lockean private ideas. The notion of thought used here is *extensional*, not as the *intensional content* of the mind, such as Lockean ideas or other propositional attitudes, which characteristically differ from one individual to another, but rather as the propositional contents asserted by sentences. What distinguishes (objective) thoughts from (purely subjective) mental contents is that thoughts can be, or at least are capable of being true or false while mental contents cannot. Thoughts are publicly accessible to all the competent speakers of a language and communicable among them. So construed, linguistic communication becomes transmission of thoughts from one speaker to another in terms of a language. I will refer to this model of communication as informative communication. It is the most prevalent conception of communication in industrialized cultures and becomes the standard model of linguistic communication adopted by most analytical philosophers since the linguistic turn in the middle of the twentieth century.

INFORMATIVE COMMUNICATION AS MUTUAL PROPOSITIONAL UNDERSTANDING

Informative communication is apparently different from propositional understanding since the process of informative communication consists of the act of communicating (a thought is put forward from the speaker to the interpreter) and the act of understanding (the thought put forward by the speaker is taken in by the interpreter). Thus, propositional understanding seems to be necessary, but not sufficient for informative communication.

Nevertheless, although informative communication cannot be reduced to one-way propositional understanding, it could very well amount to, in essence, mutual propositional understanding. First of all, informative communication is obviously propositional in essence. Like propositional understanding, the transmission model premises on the monologue model of meaning. The model reduces the act of communication, which is supposed to be an "alive," interactive, dialectic process to a "dead," static, monological propositional understanding: there is a fixed, self-sufficient

thought in the mind of the speaker; she conveys the thought to the interpreter in terms of a sentence. The sentence is self-closed; its meaning is self-contained, independent of the interpreter, and simply there to be comprehended. For communication to be successful, the interpreter has to recapture the speaker's intention and to understand the sentence as the speaker intends and expects it to be understood.

Second, both the act of communicating and the act of understanding are in essence a one-way linear transmission of message. There is, in fact, a strong tendency in the related literature of identifying communication with mutual understanding. For many analytical philosophers, linguistic communication is nothing but back-and-forth propositional understanding between two speakers. Such a reading of communication as mutual understanding is logically implied and widely promoted by the transmission model of communication. The goal of communication, according to the model, is simply transmission of thoughts from one side to the other. The purpose of transmitting thoughts from the speaker to the interpreter is to have the interpreter understand them. As long as the interpreter comprehends the thoughts transmitted, the goal of communication is obtained. Hence, the act of communicating could be reduced to the act of understanding; the former is only the means to the latter. Simply reversing the above process from the interpreter to the speaker, we have the act of mutual understanding. Communication is thus reduced to mutual understanding.

To think beyond communication as mutual understanding, we should ask ourselves such a question: What do we want to get from communication, especially from cross-language communication? To understand each other, of course, one may answer. But why do we care whether or not we understand one another? What is the purpose of understanding anyway? Or, more precisely: What does understanding one another enable us to do? The answer cannot be that we want to understand simply for the sake of understanding. We have at least as much interest in learning from one another and coordinating our actions in a social setting through understanding. For those and other purposes, we need to hammer out disagreement and reach consensus. To do so, only passively understanding one another by passing on information is not good enough; it requires critical engagement between two sides: to respond effectively to the other side's requests, to exchange thoughts effectively, and to engage in constructive dialogue and argumentation with one another. Unfortunately, this crucial aspect of genuine communication is missing from the above standard model of communication and understanding. We need to go beyond informative communication and propositional understanding.

Lawrence Grossberg (1997, 27) points out that "we were living in an organization of discursive and ideological power that could be described as 'the regime of communication'." What Grossberg has in mind is the transmission model of communication. By calling it "the regime of

communication," Grossberg does not intend to treat the transmission model as a legitimate description of a process or a phenomenon; rather, he treats it as a certain way of thinking and talking about communication, a particular conceptual framework which Michael Reddy calls the "conduit metaphor." Using Michel Foucault's terminology, it is only a particular *discourse* about communication. As a dominant discourse, the transmission model does have a tremendous hold over us. We are trapped in the reality created by this way of talking, which has sedimented in our use of everyday English language. The best strategy to escape the tight grip of the regime of communication created by the discourse of the transmission model is, I think, to deploy a different set of discursive resources for the articulation of communication: the hermeneutic discourse of communication that uses dialogue, rather than transmission, as the central metaphor. For this, we had better turn to Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics.

HERMENEUTIC UNDERSTANDING

Propositional understanding may proceed without much trouble in normal discourse in which understanding occurs among the speakers of the same language or of two different, but fairly closely related languages. In contrast, propositional understanding in abnormal discourse may turn out to be problematic. By "abnormal discourse," I mean the discourse using two substantially distinct languages, especially two incommensurable theoretical languages, such as the Aristotelian language and the Newtonian language of mechanics. In abnormal discourse, a sentence that clearly expresses a proposition when considered within the context of one language may lack any propositional content when considered within the context of another incommensurable language. In the following quotation, Gadamer (1986, 226) drives home the point that propositional understanding is doomed to failure in abnormal discourse:

There are no propositions that can be understood exclusively with respect to the content that they present, if one wants to understand them in their truth....Every proposition has presuppositions that it does not express. Only those who think with these presuppositions can really assess the truth of a proposition. I maintain, then, that the ultimate logical form of the presuppositions that motivate every proposition is the *question*.

The task of hermeneutics in general is to render intelligible a text that was previously considered alien in abnormal discourse. The best alternative in this situation is to work out the basic presuppositions of an alien language by engaging in a dialogue to ask questions, to hypothesize the alien's way of thinking, and to make comparison between one's own

language and the alien's. To do this, the interpreter inevitably becomes involved in the hermeneutic circle between his or her own language and the alien's. It is when propositional understanding in abnormal discourse fails that hermeneutic understanding takes over.

In contrast with the monologue model of meaning underlying propositional understanding, Gadamer's notion of hermeneutic understanding subscribes to what I will call the dialogue model of meaning. According to it, meaning is neither in the author's head nor inherent in a text. Instead, the meaning of a text can only be determined and contextualized through a dynamic interaction and transaction between the text and the reader's participation through the process of understanding. Understanding must be conceived as a part of the process of *the coming into being of meaning*. Understanding of what a speaker is saying thus becomes an activity of participation, engagement, assimilation, and dialogue: the interpreter's participation in the reformation and enrichment of its meaning, the engagement between the speaker's and the interpreter's languages, assimilating what is said to the point that it becomes the interpreter's own, and ultimately a dialogue between the interpreter and the speaker. "For language is by nature the language of conversation; it fully realizes itself only in the process of coming to an understanding" (Gadamer 1989, 446). In a dialogue, there are no fixed propositions, only questions and answers that call forth new questions in turn.

In fact, such a dynamic notion of understanding is best conveyed by the German term for "understanding," *Verstehen*. To use "*Verstehen*," Gadamer intends to stress its close affinity to *Verständigung*, "coming-to-an-understanding" or "reaching-an-understanding" *with someone about something*. Since meaning is always coming into being through the "happening" of understanding and understanding always happens within certain contexts, hermeneutic understanding is an open-ended process, which can never (ontologically) achieve finality; it is always open and anticipatory.

Gadamer's dialogue model of meaning/understanding has a direct impact on the role of the interpreter's own prejudgments or tradition in understanding. Theoretically, when one tries to understand a language from an alien tradition, one cannot simply replace one's own tradition by the alien's. It is neither possible nor desirable. Genuine otherness can be revealed to one only against the background of one's *oneness*; thus, one can experience the genuine *otherness* only by placing *oneself* in the other's tradition while still situated within one's own tradition. Based on the dialogue model of meaning/understanding, if one's participation in understanding is part of the making of meaning, it is an illusion to think that one can eliminate one's anticipatory prejudgments or prejudices, somehow abstract oneself from one's own historical context or cultural/intellectual tradition in order to leap out of one's situation and jump into the other's mind. When one initially approaches an alien text, one always understands it through the lens of one's own fore-meanings and other

prejudices conditioned by one's tradition, which makes one's initial understanding possible. But one's projection of meanings often hinders one's understanding of the other. This is especially the case when one attempts to understand texts belonging to other traditions that are significantly distinct from one's own. Therefore, "we cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning about the thing if we want to understand the meaning of the other" (Gadamer 1989, 268).

It is here that Gadamer formulates his own version of the hermeneutic circle. For Gadamer, hermeneutic understanding is the dialectical interplay between the interpreter's fore-structures and the text to be understood, not just between part and whole of a text. On the one hand, although the interpreter has to rely on his or her fore-structures and prejudices in any understanding, he or she must be "on guard against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought" which lead to misunderstanding (Gadamer 1989, 266). The interpreter must be open-minded, to listen to, to share, to participate with the text so it can "speak to" him or her. On the other hand, openness and receptiveness to the text are possible only because of the fore-structures and prejudices that are constitutive of the interpreter's being and only in terms of "*justified* prejudices" which open and guide him or her to the other's language. This requires that the interpreter be able to identify unjustified prejudices, revise them, and replace them with "more suitable ones." Therefore, hermeneutic understanding involves constant movement from less suitable prejudices to more suitable ones. Thus, coming-to-an-understanding is a dynamic process, involving the dialectical interaction between the prejudices conditioned by one's tradition and what is to be understood.

DIALOGICAL COMMUNICATION

Since Martin Heidegger announced his distaste for any notion of communication as mental sharing through transmitting information, no one in the Heideggerian heritage has any taste for communication as information exchange or thought transmission as described by the transmission model. For Gadamer, the concept of communication no longer refers to a linear one-way transmission of some self-contained units of meanings—no matter which are ideas, thoughts, or propositional contents—from one person to another, from one language to another, or from one time or place to another, as if meanings could travel intact. Nothing "moves" in hermeneutics. Since the term "communication" has been so heavily associated with the transmission model—always appearing alongside terms such as "sender," "receiver," "encode," "decode," and "transmission"—Gadamer prefers to discuss communication in the context of a much different set of terms such as "understanding," "interpretation," and "conversation."

In all his works, Gadamer had been drawn to what we can learn from Plato about Socratic dialogue, which is, to Gadamer, the clue to reveal

the nature of substantive hermeneutic understanding. It is Plato who made us realize the hermeneutic priority of questioning in all experience, all knowledge, and discourse. Especially, there is a close relation between questioning and understanding which is "what gives the hermeneutic experience its true dimension" (Gadamer 1989, 374). With R. G. Collingwood, Gadamer contends that, just as all knowledge starts from questions, all understanding begins with questions. We can understand a text only when we have understood the question to which it is an answer.

Thus, a person who wants to understand must question what lies behind what is said. He must understand it as an answer to a question. If we go back *behind* what is said, then we inevitably ask questions *beyond* what is said. We understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the horizon of the question—a horizon that, as such, necessarily includes other possible answers. Thus the meaning of a sentence is relative to the question to which it is a reply, but that implies that its meaning necessarily exceeds what is said in it. (Gadamer 1989, 370)

The real and fundamental nature of questioning is its openness. Questions always bring out the undetermined possibilities of a thing to be understood. This is the reason why understanding is always more than merely re-creating the author's intention or the text's original meaning. One's questioning of a thing to be understood opens up possibilities of its meaning. What is meaningful passes into one's own thinking on the subject in the context of one's own horizon. The fullness of meaning is constantly in the process of being redefined and can be realized only during the dialectic interplay of question and answer.

Such a dialectic interplay of question and answer, which leads to genuine understanding, is actually a reciprocal relationship of the same kind as conversation or dialogue. As such, genuine understanding turns out to be a process of *reaching* or *coming to* an understanding through conversation. A conversation partner does not receive completed meanings from another partner. Meanings are co-created and refined as both interlocutors immerse and engage in an alive conversation through questioning and answering. In contrast to the traditional binary mode of understanding—*one person* understands something *unilaterally* since the person who performs understanding has no part in meaning creation and what is to be understood cannot speak back—Gadamer in essence pushes toward a tripartite model of understanding: *one person* comes to an understanding with *another person* about a *subject matter* through conversation, the dialectic interplay of questioning and answering.

If to understand means to come to an understanding with each other through conversation, then the further question is: What is the primary purpose of conversation? What does conversation enable us to achieve?

For Gadamer, it is to reach agreement with one another on some subject matter. "Understanding is, primarily agreement.... In general one attempts to reach a *substantive agreement*—not just *sympathetic understanding* of the other person—and this in such a way that again one proceeds via the subject matter (Gadamer 1989, 180; emphases added). In fact, the German term *Einverständnis*, which is closely associated with the term *Verstehen* (understanding) means "understanding, agreement, consent." "Coming to an understanding with someone on something" means "coming to an agreement with someone on something."

Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that he understands not the particular individual but what he says. What is to be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be at one with each other on the subject. (Gadamer 1989, 385)

In order to reach substantive agreement with each other about some *subject matters* through conversation, one cannot either impose one's own point of view or tradition onto the other (the projective understanding) or place oneself into the other's horizon¹ with the sole purpose of knowing "objectively" the other's horizon (the adoptive, "sympathetic" understanding). Genuine conversation is not assimilation by making the other like oneself or making oneself like the other. In both cases, one has stopped trying to reach a genuine agreement with one another. In the first case, one induces the other to absorb one's own horizon and tradition, thereby concealing the other's otherness; thus, one cannot reach agreement with the other; in the second case, one unnecessarily allows the other's horizon and tradition to engulf one's own which makes one who he or she is, thereby making one's own standpoint "safely unattainable." Again, no genuine agreement can be reached between one and the other. In contrast, to reach genuine agreement through authentic conversation, "both partners are trying to recognize the full values of what is alien and opposed to them. If this happens mutually, and each of the partners, *while simultaneously holding on to his own arguments*, weighs the counterarguments, it is possible to achieve...a common diction and a common dictum" (Gadamer 1989, 387; emphasis added). The process of reaching such an agreement is what Gadamer calls the process of fusing horizons: a fusion between the horizons of two parties through conversation, whereby one party's horizon is enlarged and enriched in terms of the engagement with the horizon of the other's, not *replaced* by the other's.

In his *Truth and method*, Gadamer rarely uses the term "communication" in discussing conversation for the reason mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, it should be clear that through his hermeneutic discourse of understanding, he not only presents a concept of understanding different from the notion of propositional understanding, but also opens up a new discourse of communication that has "conversation" or "dialogue," instead of "transmission," as its central metaphor.

What characterizes a dialogue, in contrast with the rigid form of statements that demand to be set down in writing is precisely this: that in dialogue spoken language—in the process of question and answer, giving and taking, talking at cross purpose and seeing each other's point—performs *the communication of meaning* that, with respect to the written tradition, is the task of hermeneutics. (Gadamer 1989, 368; italics mine)

For Gadamer, the process of substantive hermeneutic understanding—the process of "coming-to-an-understanding" and "coming-to-an-agreement" through genuine conversation—is, in essence, communication. To distinguish it from the dominant standard discourse of communication as transmission (informative communication), I will call Gadamer's new discourse about communication *dialogical* communication. According to it, communication is a process of mutual creation of meanings in the flow of a living genuine conversation between two dialogists. The act of communication is co-created by both interlocutors acting and reacting to each other's utterances, with each utterance creating the conditions for the next one to follow.

In fact, it is not exactly accurate to call Gadamer's dialogue model of communication a *new* discourse. Historically, the transmission model came much later than the dialogue model of communication. The standard transmission model was framed by Locke's empiricist philosophy of knowledge in the seventeenth century, further supported by the invocation of unconsciousness (Eduard von Hartmann, Frederick Myers, William James, and Sigmund Freud) during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, enhanced by the computer metaphor of an information processing paradigm dominant within the field of modern experimental, cognitive psychology since the middle of the twentieth century, and established as a dominant, legitimate scientific model of communication by the information theory (Claude Shannon, Warren Weaver, and Norbert Wiener) around the 1950s. The notion of communication theory, founded on the transmission model, is no older than the 1940s.

However, the dialogue model can be traced back to as early as the ancient Greek philosophy, especially Plato's discourse on the primacy of dialectic dialogue—the art of question and answer, objection and rebuttal, argumentation and persuasion—in seeking truth and knowledge. Plato's discourse on dialogue started the exchange model of communication, according to which communication is supposed to involve interchange, mutuality, reciprocity, and engagement. Based on this Platonic tradition, a colloquial sense of communication calls for open and frank dialogue. It is not simply talk; it refers to a special kind of talk distinguished by disclosure and reconciliation: disclosing one's oneness to the other and the other's otherness to oneself (knowing oneself through knowing the other and knowing the other through knowing oneself), and reconciling oneself and the other.

In the 1920s, we saw the revival and rehabilitation of the Platonic dialogue model in Martin Heidegger's metaphysics and John Dewey's pragmatic philosophy. Heidegger's notion of communication is neither semantic (meaning exchange), nor pragmatic (action coordination), but ontological (world disclosing and otherness' openness). Communication is, for Heidegger, the interpretive articulation of our "thrownness" into a world together with people to whom we want to open ourselves to hear their otherness. With Heidegger, Dewey views language as precondition of thought and dismisses a semantic view of language as interpersonal plumbing, carrying thought and meaning as a pipe carries water, which is the semantic foundation of the transmission model of linguistic communication. Unlike Heidegger, Dewey's notion of communication is more pragmatically orientated: communication as partaking, namely, taking part in a collective world, not simply sharing the secret of consciousness or transferring meanings. Gadamer's conversation model is a further development of this trend. It is in the hands of Gadamer that the dialogue discourse of communication reaches its maturity and universality.

We have seen that the relationship between propositional understanding and informative communication is asymmetric since propositional understanding is necessary, but not sufficient for informative communication. Nevertheless, informative communication amounts to, in essence, mutual propositional understanding since both the act of communicating and the act of understanding are by nature a one-way linear transmission of message. In contrast, the relationship between Gadamer's hermeneutic understanding and dialogical communication is symmetric: the process of hermeneutic understanding (*Verstehen*)—the process of "coming-to-an-understanding" and "coming-to-an-agreement"—is essentially conversation or communication (*Mitteilung*). On the one hand, we can reach understanding only through conversation or communication; on the other hand, to communicate is to understand through conversation. We can say, to a certain extent, that

while communication is, in the transmission model, reduced to mutual understanding, understanding is, in Gadamer's hands, elevated to communication.

CONCLUSION

We have shown that the relationship between communication and understanding depends upon the notions of understanding and communication involved. Thinking along the line of propositional understanding and informative communication, communication can be reduced to mutual understanding. Operating along the line of hermeneutic understanding and dialogical communication, the process of understanding is, in essence, a process of communication. That is why many philosophers intuitively use the two notions interchangeably although many of them have never made a case of why it is justifiable to do so.

However, dialogical communication should not be confused with (mutual) propositional understanding. Based on the dialogue model of communication, the goal of communication is not merely comprehension—mutual understanding through transmission of information. Instead, communication aims at cooperation based on agreement. Besides, genuine communication is not monological, passing on fixed, "dead" meanings from one language to the other. Rather, it is dialogical, a process of mutual creation of meanings in the flow of a living genuine dialogue. Conversely, hermeneutic understanding should not be confused with informative communication either. The former is dialogical by nature while the latter is monological.

NOTE

1. One's particular horizon or viewpoint is formed by one's particular tradition, culture, language, historical past, and situation, which embrace not just immediate context of fore-meanings that one is currently engaged with, but the broader context that conditions them.

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DREYFUS ON HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL'S INTENTIONALITY: A REVIEW

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This paper primarily disputes Dreyfus's account of Heidegger's critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality. Specifically, it raises objections to the three central claims of such an account; namely: (1) that Searle's theory of intentional action can be used as a stand-in for Husserl's; (2) that Heidegger rejects the primordially of the intentionality of consciousness; and (3) that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional actions and he privileges the latter over the former. I show the first to be unwarranted owing to a lack of fundamental parallelisms between Searle's and Husserl's theories of intentionality. I show the second to be mistaken for failing to take into account Heidegger's strategic handling of the concept of consciousness and for contradicting Heidegger's concept of care as the essential meaning of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Lastly, I show the third to be highly problematic for lacking in textual evidence and explanatory power.

INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger's *Being and time* (1962) is generally regarded, among others, as a critique of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. But Heidegger, perhaps out of respect for Husserl as a former mentor, has never in such a work really stated his objections to Husserl's phenomenology in a straightforward fashion. For whenever he is said to be criticizing the views attributable to Husserl, or advancing the views that seem to contradict Husserl's, he never mentions Husserl's name nor the technical terms that Husserl uses like "transcendental ego," "noesis," "noema," "bracketing," and "intentionality of consciousness." As a result, the exact nature and range of his critique of Husserl's phenomenology have not been altogether clear, thereby lending itself to various interpretations.

One controversial account that specifically focuses on Heidegger's critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality is put forward by Hubert Dreyfus, a leading Heideggerian scholar in the contemporary period. On Dreyfus's view, what such a critique primarily consists in is Heidegger's rejection of the Husserlian position that regards the intentionality of consciousness as the primordial form of intentionality. Heidegger, according to Dreyfus, advances a contrary view in which the primordial form of intentionality does not involve consciousness or mental activity. Dreyfus, however, admits that the contrast between the views of Husserl and Heidegger on intentionality cannot be directly demonstrated owing to the fact that Heidegger does his analysis of the phenomenon of intentionality in the realm of actions whereas Husserl does his in the realm of consciousness. To deal with this difficulty, Dreyfus uses John Searle's theory of intentional action, which Dreyfus believes to be grounded in a general theory of intentionality that shares fundamental principles with Husserl's, as a substitute for Husserl's would-have-been theory of intentional action had Husserl extended his theory of intentionality to the realm of actions—just like what Searle did to his own theory of intentionality. And consequently, by showing how Heidegger's account of intentional actions contrasts with and refutes Searle's, Dreyfus hopes to show how Heidegger rejects Husserl's theory of intentionality.

I find such an account to be highly contentious; and in this paper, I intend to raise objections to its three central claims; namely: (1) that Searle's theory of intentional actions can be used as a stand-in for Husserl's, (2) that Heidegger rejects the primordially of the intentionality of consciousness, and (3) that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional actions and he privileges the latter over the former. Consequently, my discussion is divided into three parts. The first examines the bases of Dreyfus's contention that Husserl's and Searle's theories of intentionality share fundamental principles. The second looks into how Heidegger regards the relationship among *Dasein*, consciousness, and intentionality. And the third evaluates the grounds and coherence of Dreyfus's claim that Heidegger subscribes to an unconscious form of intentional action.

HUSSERL'S AND SEARLE'S THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY

The following passage outlines the strategy that Dreyfus adopts to demonstrate his own account of Heidegger's critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality:

Since Heidegger focuses on action as the area in which it is easiest to see that our experience need not involve a mind/world split, I too will concentrate on action. But since Husserl never worked out a theory of action, I will turn to the work of

John Searle who defends a detailed version of the intentionalist account of action Heidegger opposes.... (Dreyfus 1993, 3)

Dreyfus (1984A, 4) believes that he is justified in doing so for he finds fundamental parallels between Searle's and Husserl's theories of intentionality. The idea is that if Searle's and Husserl's theories of intentionality share fundamental views or principles, then Husserl, in principle, would have explained the nature of intentional actions in the same way that Searle does. Among such deep affinities that Dreyfus attributes to Searle's and Husserl's theories of intentionality, I find the following to be the critical ones.

First, Dreyfus claims that both Searle and Husserl in their theories of intentionality subscribe to the Cartesian view of the mind-world split (or the subject-object dichotomy)—referring to Descartes's view that regards mind as existing independently of the world—that Heidegger rejects. As Dreyfus (1994, 5) writes:

... Descartes adds that in order for us to perceive, act, and, in general, relate to objects, there must be some content in our minds—some internal representation—that enables us to direct our minds toward each object. This "intentional content" of consciousness has been investigated in the first half of this century by Husserl and more recently by John Searle. Heidegger questions the view that experience is always and most basically a relation between a self-contained subject with mental content (the inner) and an independent object (the outer).

It is well established that Husserl subscribes to the Cartesian view of the mind-world split. Such view, to begin with, is what essentially makes Husserl's phenomenological reductions possible, for the bracketing of the various relations that consciousness may have had with the world is possible only under the assumption that consciousness exists independently of these relations. The same is true of Heidegger's rejection of such a view, for such rejection follows necessarily from his description of the fundamental being of Dasein as a *being-in-the-world*. Accordingly, Dasein's existence is inextricably tied up with its various relations with the world; and if this is true of Dasein as a whole, then it must also be true of its consciousness. But the contention that Searle also subscribes to the same Cartesian view is way off the mark; and this is for the following two reasons.

One is that Searle's own position on the issue on the ontological status of the mind, which he calls *Biological Naturalism*, is premised on the rejection of the Cartesian principle of the mutual exclusivity of the mental and the physical. As he (1999b, 50-51) explains:

Both dualism and materialism rest on a series of false assumptions. The main false assumption is that if consciousness is really a subjective, qualitative phenomenon, then it cannot be part of the material, physical world....The way Descartes defined "mind" and "matter," they are mutually exclusive....I am suggesting that we must abandon not only these definitions but also the traditional categories of "mind," "consciousness," "matter," "mental," "physical," and all the rest as they are traditionally construed in our philosophical debates.

Needless to say, the rejection of such principle carries with it the rejection of the Cartesian mind-world split, for the physical and the mental can only be mutually exclusive if and only if each exists independently of the other. Consequently, Searle argues that consciousness is both physical and mental: it is physical in the sense that it is a higher-level biological property that is caused by some physical properties of the brain; while it is mental in the sense that it is not reducible to some physical properties.

The other is that Searle's theory of intentionality argues for the contextual nature of intentional mental states (or intentional states). According to Searle (1983, 19, 143), a particular intentional state can function only in the context of a *Network* of other intentional states, which in turn can function only given the context of a *Background* of non-intentional skills, abilities, and "know-how":

An Intentional state only determines its conditions of satisfaction—and thus only is the state that it is—given its position in a *Network* of other Intentional states and against a *Background* of practices and preintentional assumptions that are neither themselves Intentional states nor are they parts of the conditions of satisfaction of Intentional states. (Searle 1983, 19)

For the necessity of the Network, Searle (1983, 20) gives the following example. Suppose Jimmy Carter desires to run for the Presidency of the United States. This desire only makes sense or has the conditions of satisfaction that it has because of its position in a Network of other intentional states that Carter has, which presumably includes the following:

...the belief that the United States is a republic, that it has a presidential system of government, that it has periodic elections, that these involve principally a contest between the candidates of two major parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, that these candidates are chosen at nominating

conventions, and so on indefinitely (but not infinitely). (Searle 1983, 20)

But in order for the Network itself to function, Searle (1994, 176) contends that it needs a *Background*:

In addition to the Network, we need to postulate a Background of capacities that are not themselves part of that Network. Or rather, the whole Network stands in need of a Background, because the elements of the Network are not self-interpreting or self-applying.

Thus, suppose we have a desire to get some food from a refrigerator. In addition to a Network of other intentional states that we presumably have, such as the feeling of hunger, the desire to eat food, and the belief that by eating food we will satisfy our hunger, such desire is possible only against a Background of capacities (like the biological capacity to get up, walk towards a refrigerator, and use our hands in opening a refrigerator), practices (like the practice of storing food in refrigerators), and abilities or "know-how" (like knowing how to open a refrigerator). Searle (1983, 143-44) classifies the elements of the Background into two kinds: the *Deep Background*, which includes all the non-intentional contextual features that are common to all cultures, such as our biological capacities to walk upright and to eat by putting food in our mouths; and the *Local Background*, which includes all the non-intentional contextual features that vary from culture to culture, such as our local cultural practices. The necessity of the Network and Background for intentional states to function can only mean that such states do not exist independently of the world.

These two reasons also explain why Searle (1999c, 2) himself reacted vehemently against Dreyfus's attribution of such a view—the Cartesian mind-world split—to him:

An early example of Dreyfus's systematic misunderstanding is his claim that I think of intentionality as a relation between "a self-contained subject with mental content (the inner) and an independent object (the outer)." Dreyfus also calls this the "subject-object" conception of intentionality. It ought to worry him that I never use expression like "self-contained subject" (in fact, I am not quite sure what it means); nor do I characterize my own views as the "subject-object conception", and it ought to worry him further that I explicitly expressed objections to the metaphors of inner and outer....

Secondly, Dreyfus claims that Husserl's distinction between the *matter* and *quality* of mental acts is the same as Searle's between the

intentional/representative content and psychological mode of intentional states (or its counterpart in speech acts, between the propositional content and illocutionary force of speech acts).¹ For Husserl, the quality of a mental act refers to its *type* or *psychological mode*, while its matter to its *content*:

The two assertions '2 x 2 = 4' and 'Ibsen is the principal founder of modern dramatic realism' are both, *qua* assertions, of one kind; each is qualified as an assertion, and their common feature is their *judgment-quality*. The one, however, judges one content and the other another content. To distinguish such 'contents' from other notions of 'content' we shall speak here of the matter of judgments. We shall draw similar distinctions between *quality* and *matter* in the case of all acts. (Quoted in Sajama and Kamppinen 1987, 68)

The distinction between the content and quality of intentional states, however, is something that is generally accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind, as evidenced by the widespread use of the term "propositional attitudes"—which are meant to highlight such distinction—to refer to intentional states. That being the case, it is actually the particular way in which one accounts for the nature and possibility of intentional states that philosophers of mind take issues with one another. Searle and Fodor (see Fodor 1993) for instance, may agree on the existence of propositional attitudes but they differ in their accounts on how such states function. Consequently, the mere fact that Searle and Husserl share the said distinction does not really establish much. And as a matter of fact, they actually hold some incompatible views about the nature of intentional states, foremost of which concerns the nature of the content. Accordingly, Husserl divides the content of mental acts into the *real* and the *ideal*, where the real is the content that is part of the mental act while the ideal (which Husserl eventually calls *noema*) is the abstract content that is not part of the mental act but which is responsible for directing the mental act to an object (see Sajama and Kamppinen 1987, 64-69). This distinction of Husserl does not have a parallel in Searle's theory, for on Searle's view the content of an intentional state is just the representation of the intentional state's conditions of satisfaction. But more importantly, this distinction of Husserl cannot be accommodated in Searle's theory in light of Searle's rejection of the need for any transcendental explanation for how an intentional state acquires its conditions of satisfaction. For, as explained earlier, Searle believes that it is the contextual features of intentional states (the Network and ultimately the Background) that enable such states to function. And it is precisely for this reason that we find Searle, after agreeing with Frege on the concept of propositional sense as truth-conditions, rejects the abstract status that Frege attributes to sense (Searle 1983, 197-98). The

Fregean sense, incidentally, for a number of contemporary Husserlian scholars, is the basis or model of the Husserlian noema.²

Thirdly, Dreyfus (1984a, 5) claims that though both Husserl and Searle begin their investigation on the nature of intentionality with an analysis of language, both actually believe that the intentionality of language is merely derived from the intentionality of consciousness. On the one hand, Husserl regards *linguistic sense* (the sense of linguistic expressions) simply as the linguistic or physical manifestation of *noematic sense* (the noema of mental states). As Smith and McIntyre (1984, 182) attest:

Husserl's general view is that words used in speech acts, of whatever kind, express as *their* meanings the noematic Sinne of acts of consciousness: the meanings (Bedeutungen) expressed in words are themselves the meanings of acts, i.e., noematic Sinne.

Searle, on the other, regards the direction of fit of a particular speech act as derived from the direction of fit of the intentional state that serves as the sincerity condition of that particular speech act.³ The reason that the direction of fit of an assertion, for instance, is word to world is that the direction of fit of its sincerity condition, which is a belief, is mind to world. Be it as it may, there is, however, a significant difference between these two accounts. For while Husserl's noematic and linguistic senses are not in need of any context⁴—for it is the noema *alone* that makes noematic and linguistic senses possible or that makes conscious states and linguistic expressions intentional, Searle, in contrast, regards intentional states as necessarily contextual—the need for the Network and Background. For this reason, this particular affinity between Searle's and Husserl's theories of intentionality, just like the one previously considered, turns out to be superficial as well.

And fourthly, Dreyfus (1984a, 5-8) claims that Searle and Husserl share some basic views about the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states. One of these alleged views is that one's knowledge of the conditions of satisfaction of mental states is self-evident:

Searle points out that we do not need some special sort of evidence to find out what we mean, what would satisfy our intention, or in general what our intentional states represent....In exactly the same vein, Husserl takes it for granted that phenomenological reduction gives "apodictic evidence" to the intentional content of our current mental state. (Dreyfus 1984a, 6)

Another is that the representative content of a mental state represents its conditions of satisfaction independently of how such conditions are realized:

Searle...develops his theory of intentionality by generalizing an account of intentional content very close to the one Husserl held in *L. I.*, viz. that the representational content of a mental state is simply whatever conditions of satisfaction those mental states which pick out the same object in the same respect have in common.... Searle, like the early Husserl, contends that one can determine the logical properties of intentional states without taking a stand on how the representational content is realized. (Dreyfus 1984a, 8)

On closer inspection, it shall be observed, however, that Husserl and Searle subscribe to such views for different reasons. As stated by Dreyfus himself, in the case of Husserl, such views are the result of the phenomenological reductions. That is to say, the absolutely necessary knowledge that is supposed to result from the reductions is what makes one's knowledge of the conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state self-evident; and since these reductions dissociate intentional states from their relations to the external world, their conditions of satisfaction are therefore independent of how such conditions are realized in such world. Consequently, for Husserl, it is from their noemata that intentional states derive their conditions of satisfaction. In contrast, in the case of Searle, these views are the result of the contextual features of intentional states (the Network and Background); and it is precisely these features that make one's knowledge of the conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state self-evident and logically independent of its realization. In this consideration, these views about the conditions of satisfaction that Husserl and Searle share do not really constitute an affinity that can be regarded as fundamental. Just like the two previous ones, this similarity between Husserl and Searle is likewise superficial.

DASEIN, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND INTENTIONALITY

We shall now examine Dreyfus's contention that Heidegger rejects the primordial status of the intentionality of consciousness. To properly do this, we need to examine first how Dreyfus reads Heidegger with regard to the relationship among Dasein, consciousness, and intentionality, as this reading forms the basis of the said contention. For this purpose, let us use as our guide the following passages from Dreyfus's book, *Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and time, Division I* (1994):

(1) Heidegger accepts intentional directedness as essential to human activity, but he denies that intentionality is mental, that is, as Husserl (following Brentano) claimed, the distinguishing characteristic of mental states. (Dreyfus 1994, 50)

(2) Heidegger...takes comportment or intentionality a characteristic not merely of acts of consciousness, but of human activity in general. Intentionality is attributed not to consciousness but to Dasein. (Dreyfus 1994, 51)

(3) Heidegger holds that all relations of mental states to their objects presuppose a more basic form of being-with-things which does not involve mental activity. (Dreyfus 1994, 52)

Two claims need unpacking here: the first is that Heidegger attributes intentionality not to consciousness but to Dasein (passage 2), and the second is that Husserl subscribes to the view that regards intentionality as the defining feature of mental states (passage 1) (following Harney,⁵ we shall henceforth refer to this view as *Brentano's psychological thesis*). The first, on the one hand, serves as the basis for the contention that Heidegger regards intentionality as an essential feature of human activity but not of mental states (passage 1), which in turn serves as the basis for the central contention that Heidegger regards the more basic form of intentionality as something that does not involve mental activity (passage 3). The second, on the other, serves as the basis for the further contention that Heidegger's putative idea that the more basic form of intentionality does not involve mental activity constitutes a critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality.

The critical question concerning the first claim is: *When Heidegger attributes intentionality to Dasein, is it really the case that he does not attribute it to Dasein's consciousness or mental states?* This question requires an examination of how Heidegger handles the concept of consciousness in light of how he intends to deal with the question concerning the meaning of Being. Accordingly, Heidegger (1962, 72) includes the term "consciousness" among those that he intentionally avoids for strategic purposes:

...if we posit an "I" or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content [Bestand] of Dasein....The Thinghood itself which such reification implies must have its ontological origin demonstrated if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to understand *positively* when we think of the unreified *Being* of the subject, the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person. All these terms refer to definite phenomenal domains which can be 'given form' ["ausformbare"]: but they are never used without a notable failure to see the need for inquiring about the Being of the entities thus designated. So we are not being terminologically arbitrary when we avoid these terms—or such expressions as 'life' and 'man'—in designating those entities which we are ourselves.

Heidegger tells us in these remarks that he avoids terms like “man,” “consciousness,” “life,” “soul,” “spirit,” “I,” and “person” because of the tendency to reify the meanings of such terms; that is to say, to regard the meanings of such terms as the “things” or substances to which such terms must refer. Heidegger is aware that if he uses these terms, he will then be forced to deal with the philosophical issues attendant to such tendency; and this will just divert his investigations from his primary objective, which is to deal with the question concerning the meaning of Being through an existential analytic of Dasein—an analysis of Dasein not in terms of its “what” (or in terms of its “thinghood” or “substantiality”) but in terms of its “who” (or in terms of its modes of being). As Heidegger (1962, 245) clarifies:

Thereby the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand gets passed over, and entities are first conceived as a context of Things (*res*) which are present-at-hand. “*Being*” acquires the meaning of “*Reality*”. Substantiality becomes the basic characteristic of Being. Corresponding to this way in which the understanding of Being has been diverted, even the ontological understanding of Dasein moves into the horizon of this conception of Being. Like any other entity, Dasein too is *present-at-hand* as *Real*. In this way “*Being in general*” acquires the meaning of “*Reality*”. Accordingly the concept of Reality has a peculiar priority in the ontological problematic. By this priority the route to a genuine existential analytic of Dasein gets diverted....

That being the case, Heidegger’s avoidance of the said terms does not mean that he does not regard what they signify as essential to Dasein. In avoiding terms like “man,” “life,” and “consciousness,” Heidegger presumably does not mean that being a man and having a life and consciousness are not essential to Dasein. In the case of consciousness, the significance that Heidegger attributes to Dasein’s consciousness is evidenced by the various mental terms that he uses in describing Dasein. Heidegger (1962, 172-88, 214-17, 228-35, 343, and 349), for instance, talks about Dasein’s *moods* or *states of mind* such as *anxiety*—which he differentiates from *fear*, *curiosity*, *resoluteness*, and *anticipation* of one’s own death.

Foremost of such mental terms is “care,” which describes the essential character of Dasein’s being-in-the-world:

Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand could be taken in our previous analyses as *concern*, and Being with the Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as *solicitude*. (Heidegger 1962, 237)

And as the essential characteristic or meaning of Dasein's being-in-the-world, there is thus nothing more fundamental or primordial than care as a description of Dasein's being-in-the-world. As Heidegger states:

'Earlier' than any presupposition which Dasein makes, or any of its ways of behaving, is the '*a priori*' character of its state of being as one whose kind of Being is care. (1962, 249)

The ontological elemental totality of the care-structure cannot be traced back to some ontical 'primal element', just as Being certainly cannot be "explained" in terms of entities. (1962, 240-41)

Consequently, to say that there is a form of being-in-the-world that does not involve consciousness and consequently to mean that there is a form of being-in-the-world that is not characterized by care is definitely not Heidegger's view. When Heidegger attributes intentionality to Dasein, it is therefore more logical to suppose that Heidegger attributes intentionality to the consciousness of Dasein. If Dasein's being-in-the-world is what makes Dasein intentional and this being-in-the-world is essentially characterized as care, then Dasein's intentionality is a feature of care, which in turn is a feature of its consciousness. What cares (or what has solicitude and concern) in Dasein is obviously its consciousness. Furthermore, Heidegger's avoidance of the term "consciousness," as we have earlier shown, merely serves a strategic purpose—for Heidegger to keep his investigations on track—and not a denial of the reality of consciousness nor a downgrading of its value to Dasein.

Turning now to the second claim, the critical question here is: *Does Husserl really subscribe to Brentano's psychological thesis?* It is well established that Brentano (1973, 88) regards intentionality as the defining feature of the mental, and the following are his classic remarks to this effect:

Every mental phenomena is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomena includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

But it is contentious whether Husserl follows Brentano's psychological thesis. It is true that Husserl makes certain remarks which seem to show

that he follows Brentano's psychological thesis. For instance, he writes in *Phenomenology and the crisis of philosophy* (1965, 90) that: "To the extent, however, that every consciousness is "consciousness-of," the essential study of consciousness includes also that of consciousness-meaning and consciousness-objectivity as such." However, he also has remarks wherein he qualifies that not all mental phenomena are intentional. Consider, for instance, the following that he makes in *Ideas* (1982b, 199):

Intentionality is an essential peculiarity of the sphere of mental process taken universally in so far as all mental processes in some manner or other share in it; nevertheless, we cannot say of *each* mental process that it has intentionality in the same sense as when we say, e. g., of each mental process...that it is a temporal [mental process].

One may well accuse Husserl of inconsistency, or at the very least, of ambivalence. But according to some scholars, the passage just quoted from his *Ideas* contains his definitive position. Sajama and Kamppinen (1987, 102), for instance, explain that Husserl, in the same passage, is saying that there are non-intentional mental phenomena that are somehow connected to the intentional ones; and they cite sensations as examples of these non-intentional phenomena. Smith and McIntyre (1984, 2) share this interpretation:

Unlike Brentano, Husserl does not insist that every mental occurrence be characterized as intentional. In particular, he takes pure sensations (what he calls the "sensory material", or "hyle", of perception) to be non-intentional, though he suggests that they occur only as constituents of complex intentional phenomena, specifically perceptions (cf. *LI*, V, § 15; *Ideas*, § 36, 85). And he suggests that feelings and moods, of the sort mentioned above, are sometimes better classified with sensations than with the intentional (*LI*, V, § 15).

Smith and McIntyre (1984, 2-3) also share with Sajama and Kamppinen (1987, 118-19) the observation that Husserl eventually fails to demonstrate the connection between non-intentional and intentional mental phenomena, thereby putting into question the universal validity of his phenomenology. Be it as it may, these considerations show that there are more reasons to believe that Heidegger's rejection of Brentano's psychological thesis does not necessarily amount to a rejection of Husserl's theory of intentionality.⁶

Still, that intentionality is not the defining feature of mental states does not imply that the intentionality of such states is not the primary kind of intentionality. Searle, for instance, categorically holds that intentionality

is not the defining feature of mental states. He (1983, 1) believes that there are mental states such as certain forms of nervousness and undirected anxiety that are not intentional. Yet he (1999b, 93) believes that the intentionality of mental states is the intrinsic or primary kind from which the intentionality of other phenomena such as actions and language is derived. In like manner, Heidegger's rejection of Brentano's psychological thesis need not lead to a rejection of the view that the intentionality of consciousness is the primary kind of intentionality.

INTENTIONAL ACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS

We now come to the examination of Dreyfus's contention that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional action and privileges the latter over the former. Speaking of Heidegger's phenomenology and referring to Heidegger's concept of intentional action as "comportment" and to the unconscious type of intentional action as "absorbed coping," Dreyfus ("The primacy of phenomenology over logical analysis," n.d., 8) writes: "Only phenomenology can reveal the two different types of comportment and that, of the two, absorbed coping is primordial." Dreyfus (1993, 6), however, admits that Heidegger is sketchy about absorbed or skillful coping—indirectly admitting the lack of textual basis for his contention—and for this reason turns to Merleau-Ponty's concept of skillful coping in order to explicate Heidegger's putative concept of the same:

Heidegger's account of the phenomenology of everyday involved coping is rather sketchy but we can draw on Merleau-Ponty for a fuller description. According to Merleau-Ponty, in everyday absorbed coping, there is no experience of my causing my body to move. Rather acting is experienced as a steady flow of skillful activity in response to one's sense of environment....When everyday coping is going well we experience something like what athletes call flow, or playing out their heads. One's activity is completely geared into the demands of the situation. That is, one is absorbed in one's activity, and therefore one has no self-referential experience of oneself as causing the activity.

In accordance with Merleau-Ponty's description, Dreyfus (1993, 7) cites the following types of activity as examples of skillful coping: "*skillful activity*, like playing tennis; *habitual activity*, like driving to the office or brushing one's teeth; *casual unthinking activity*, like rolling over in bed or making gestures while one is speaking; and *spontaneous activity*, such as fidgeting and drumming one's fingers during a dull lecture" (italics mine).

Two questions need to be raised here. First, *can Merleau-Ponty's concept of skillful coping explicate Heidegger's putative notion of an unconscious form of intentional action?* And second, *is it really the case that skillful coping does not involve any mental activity?* The first question is similar to the one regarding Dreyfus's claim that Searle's theory of action can stand in for Husserl's. But unlike the case of Searle and Husserl, Dreyfus does not show what legitimizes his use of Merleau-Ponty's concept of skillful coping as a substitute for Heidegger's. But whether or not Dreyfus is warranted in doing so, the mere fact that Heidegger is sketchy about the phenomenon of skillful coping when such phenomenon is supposed to be a critical component of his critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality is sufficient to cast doubt on the plausibility of Dreyfus's claim that Heidegger subscribes to an unconscious kind of intentional action.

The second one has actually been a point of contention between Dreyfus and Searle. Against Dreyfus's view, Searle strongly contends that skillful coping is very much a conscious activity. In the following, he (1999a, 8-9) argues for his case using Dreyfus's typical example for skillful coping—tennis playing:

The problem with Dreyfus's example is not that it is false; rather it is beside the point, because it fails to capture the level at which tennis players (as well as basketball players, carpenters and philosophers) are consciously trying to do something when they engage in "skillful coping". The tennis player is above all trying to win, and he is trying to win by—for example—hitting harder serves and hitting his ground strokes closer to the base line. All this is intentional, all of it involves "beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.", and all of this is left out of Dreyfus's account....

Searle's reaction to Dreyfus's view can be explained by his views concerning the relation between consciousness and mentality and how such relation applies to intentions. Accordingly, while Searle (1999b, 40-41) considers consciousness as the defining feature of mentality, he (1999b, 86) however, also subscribes to the view that mental states can be unconscious:

Even when unconscious, the unconscious mental state is the sort of thing that could be conscious. I have to say "in principle" because we need to recognize that there are all sorts of states that the person cannot bring to consciousness because of repression, brain injuries, and so on. But if a state is a genuine unconscious mental state, then it must be at least the sort of state that could be conscious.

Searle differentiates unconscious states from nonconscious ones in that while it is in principle possible to bring unconscious states to consciousness, it is not so in the case of nonconscious states. The possibility of bringing unconscious states to consciousness is real (for Searle, maintains consciousness as the defining feature of mentality); as such, unconscious states are still mental while nonconscious states are not. As examples of unconscious states, Searle cites our beliefs that we are not conscious of at the moment but which we can in principle bring to consciousness if we so desire. On the other hand, Searle cites the physical states of machines as examples of nonconscious states.

Regarding intentions, Searle (1983, 84-96) distinguishes between *prior intentions* (or intentions before the performance of actions) and *intentions in action* (or intentions simultaneous to the performance of actions). An intentional action, on Searle's account, necessarily has an intention in action but need not have a prior intention. More precisely, Searle believes that an intentional action necessarily consists of an intention in action and a physical movement that such intention causes. An intentional action, however, may or may not have a prior intention; and if it does have a prior intention, its prior intention is what causes the intention in action, which in turn causes the physical movement. Now, since intentions obviously are mental states, Searle also distinguishes between conscious and unconscious intentions. Searle, however, only speaks of such distinction in relation to intentions in actions, implying that prior intentions are always conscious. And with regard to conscious intentions in actions, Searle (1983, 90-91) also refers to them as *experiences of acting*:

The Intentional content of the intention in action and the experience of acting are identical. Indeed, as far as Intentionality is concerned, the experience of acting is just the intention in action. Why then do we need both notions? Because the experience of acting is a conscious experience with an Intentional content, and the intention in action is just the Intentional component, regardless of whether it is contained in any conscious experience of acting.

Consequently, Searle regards our intentions in actions that we are not conscious of at the time that we are performing certain actions as states that we can in principle bring to our consciousness. A boxer, for instance, normally has a game plan before he goes to a boxing match. This game plan, we can say, consists of the boxer's prior intentions, which he presumably is very much conscious of. But while already in the boxing match, these prior intentions cause the boxer's intentions in actions which in turn cause his physical movements. Now it may happen that the boxer is not conscious of his intentions in actions while performing the physical movements caused by these intentions, but this does not mean that he does

not have these intentions in action. For if interviewed later on, he may be able to describe the details of what he is trying to do in every round.

In contrast, regarding skillful coping as a nonmental activity, Dreyfus seems to hold the view that the mere absence of consciousness already means the absence of mentality, such that if we perform an action without being conscious of any intention that causes it, then we perform such an action without any mental activity. Compared to the position of Searle, this view of Dreyfus lacks *explanatory power*. For one, how could one account for the fact that the boxer, in our previous example, could perfectly describe what he was trying to do during the match though he was not conscious of his intentions while performing physical movements during the match? More importantly, how on this view could one distinguish intentional from non-intentional actions? If actions involved in skillful coping are not caused by intentions (for claiming that intentional actions can be performed without any mental activity amounts to claiming that such actions can be performed without intentions), how could such actions qualify as intentional in the first place? It seems that Dreyfus's notion of skillful coping blurs the difference between intentional and non-intentional actions.

CONCLUSION

Our investigations have shown that Dreyfus's account of Heidegger's critique of Husserl's intentionality theory is implausible for the following reasons. First, Dreyfus's strategy to use Searle's theory of action as a stand-in for Husserl's theory is unwarranted because the affinities that Dreyfus attributes to Searle's and Husserl's theories of intentionality are either not affinities at all, as in the case of the mind-world split, or are affinities that are not really fundamental, as in the cases of the content-quality distinction concerning mental states, the relationship between language and consciousness with regard to their intentionality, and the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states. Secondly, such an account conflicts with Heidegger's idea of care as the fundamental characteristic of Dasein's *being-in-the-world* and fails to take into account Heidegger's strategic handling of the term "consciousness." And thirdly, Dreyfus's strategy of using Merleau-Ponty's concept of skillful or absorbed coping to explicate Heidegger's putative notion of an unconscious kind of intentional action is highly problematic for lacking in textual evidence and explanatory power.

Given all these, what then constitutes Heidegger's critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality? I believe the answer lies in Heidegger's rejection of the Cartesian view of the mind-world split. If we will recall, it is primarily because of Husserl's assumption of such a view that leads him to appeal to an abstract reality, the *noema*, to explain how it has become possible for consciousness, which is essentially independent of

the world, to be related to the world. In this light, when Heidegger rejects the said Cartesian view through his description of Dasein as fundamentally a being-in-the-world, he, in effect, likewise rejects the need for the Husserlian noema, or more generally, the need for any transcendental grounding of the possibility of intentionality. This I believe is what mainly constitutes Heidegger's critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality.⁷

NOTES

1. Dreyfus, in this regard, is just following the same observation earlier made by J. N. Mohanty (quoted in Dreyfus 1984a, 5): "Husserl's 'act-matter' may correspond to what Searle calls 'propositional content,' and Husserl's 'act-quality' to 'illocutionary force'."

2. Many contemporary Husserlian scholars like Dagfinn Føllesdal (1984a), Hubert Dreyfus (1984b), Maurita Harney (1984), Seppo Sajama and Matti Kamppinen (1987), Harrison Hall (1993), and David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre (1984), believe that Husserl's concept of noema and the role it plays in his theory of intentionality parallels Frege's concept of sense and the role it plays in the latter's theory of semantics.

3. Eventually, Searle (1983, 11) explains that the direction of fit of a speech act and that of its sincerity condition are basically the same: "Notice that the parallelism between illocutionary acts and their expressed Intentional sincerity conditions is remarkably close: In general, the direction of fit of the illocutionary act and that of the sincerity condition is the same...."

4. Incidentally, this differentiates the Husserlian linguistic sense from the Fregean sense (see Mabaquiao 2005).

5. According to Harney (1984, 15-16), Brentano lays down the two important theses that constitute his theory of intentionality: the psychological thesis which takes intentionality as the necessary and sufficient mark of the mental, and the ontological thesis which holds that the status of intentional objects is mental or that intentional objects are mental entities (or entities that are immanent in consciousness).

6. Consequently, it also does not constitute a critique of Searle's theory of intentionality; for while Searle (1983, 1) regards intentionality as an important feature of mentality, he, however, does not consider it as the defining feature of mentality.

7. Incidentally, our investigations have also shown that Heidegger and Searle are the ones who share fundamental views, not Husserl and Searle—as Dreyfus claims. Both Heidegger and Searle reject the Cartesian view of the mind-world split, and both do so for generally the same reason: that consciousness is necessarily contextual—for Heidegger, it is because of Dasein's being-in-the-world; while for Searle, it is because of the necessity of the Background for intentional states to function. In this regard,

Searle (1983, 153-54), in fact, likens his Background to Heidegger's equipmental world:

One could argue, and I have seen it argued, that what I have been calling the Background is really social, a product of social interaction, or that it is primarily biological, or even that it consists of actual objects in the world such as chairs and tables, hammers and nails—'the referential totality of ready-to-hand equipment,' in the Heideggerian vein. I want to say there is at least an element of truth in all these conceptions but that does not detract from the crucial sense in which the Background consists of mental phenomena.

Moreover, both eventually reject any transcendental grounding of the possibility of intentionality, as Heidegger rejects the need for the Husserlian noema while Searle rejects the abstract status of the Fregean sense.

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HERZEN'S RUSSIAN SOCIALISM AND THE SLAVOPHILES' CHRISTIAN COMMUNAL SOCIALISM

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The philosophy of culture and the philosophy of history were the popular topics of the developing Russian history of philosophy in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In the following article, A. I. Herzen's socio-cultural project is examined and compared with the Slavophiles' Christian communal socialism. Herzen's type of socialism appears to be a specific variant of the Russian national culture as the Slavophiles depicted.

The most important subject of Alexandr Ivanovich Herzen's creative works was the socialism in Russia. In the elaboration of its theory of society and personality, this subject has gone through a difficult and polysemantic way of perception and critical comprehension by West European doctrines.

Herzen's socialistic concept was developed during the many years he spent living in a foreign land—such as Italy, France, and Great Britain—up to the time he wrote the letters, “To an old comrade,” a year before his death in 1870. The best way, however, to name Herzen's opinions on socialism is not as a “theory” or a “conception” but as a “social project.” This project, which has been worked on many times, before and then after the peasant reform of 1861, still remained sketchy as it did not get a definite theoretic formulation. This fact was influenced, on the one hand, by Herzen's nonrecognition of social theories that claim to be a “final word” in science and, on the other hand, the awareness that socialism is an intermediate, though not a necessary final stop on the way to historic development. Herzen (1954-60, 6:110), from time to time, did not exclude from his theorizing the fact that socialism will develop all its phases up to “its extreme consequences, till absurdity.” Then from the titanic breast of the revolutionary minority will tear out the scream of dissatisfaction, “will start all over again the mortal fight in which socialism will take place in modern conservatism and will be prevailed upon by the upcoming, unfamiliar to us, revolution...”

Herzen's creative nondogmatic thought is distinctly reflected in his attitude towards socialism. In the soviet age, Herzen's socialistic views

were stated in a reductively political form. It was constructed in a series by a Russian thinker, A. I. Volodin (1973), and other specialists of social political theory, the final goal of which was an effective statement oriented on the needs of revolutionary socialistic propaganda, on the pages of Herzen's edition, including "Kolokol" ("The bell") and "Polyarnaya Zvezda" ("The polar star"). A peculiar "social determinism" took place and also a desire to see in all of Herzen's theoretic reflections the search for "a proper revolution theory." The first sketch of a theory of "Russian socialism" was given, according to Z. V. Smirnova (1968, 370), in the article "Russia," written in the autumn of 1849. This was, in her opinion, the completion of Herzen's "spiritual drama."

The interpretation of "spiritual drama" and "Russian socialism" is not accurate. Herzen's "spiritual drama" in this case is thought of as a short-term episode, ridden by what Lenin called a "break-up of bourgeois illusions in socialism." It turned out that for just one year (or even less) in his life as theoretic publicist, Herzen was not a socialist and all the rest of his years were a sort of an ascension over the socialistic theory. As a matter of fact, "the spiritual drama" was not just some sort of a short-term episode, which Herzen "overcame" and "walked out" of. It tremendously influenced all of Herzen's philosophy, and gave it a specific existential orientation. Depicted in the work "From the other shore," this existential orientation served as the philosophical and methodological basis of all the subsequent creations of Herzen. It was based on the idea of a primacy of personality and a denial of Western civilization and culture. As V. V. Zenskovsky showed, Herzen's disappointment with the West was not short-term, but continuing. As a Russian thinker, Herzen "was fascinated not by the ideal, which the West lived by and, in fact, lives by today" (see Zenskovsky 1997, 61), but by the ideal of a free personality. This was not "an adoption of Hegel's dialectics," which allowed Herzen, as Lenin said, "some right to dialectic materialism, but stop in front of historic materialism." "A personality," stated G. G. Shpet (1921, 149, 195) impartially, "is a burning center of Herzen's philosophical as well as practical worldview." Moreover, "Herzen's worldview as a whole is an apotheosis of personality."

A strict ideological emulation of Lenin's appraisal definitely distorted the main point of Herzen's philosophy. Soviet scientists claimed that the summit of Herzen's thought, right after Lenin's, was not the original existentially-oriented philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of culture of a Russian thinker, but Herzen's earlier works which, as a matter of fact, were not related to the works of the emigration period and, of course, not also related to the other works, which probed the project of Russian socialism. In reflecting this dominating point of view, Volodin (1970, 193) claimed that the "summit of Herzen's philosophical thought still remained his 'Letters about nature's exploration'."

From the above, it follows that a project of Russian socialism should be evaluated by analyzing the intrinsic impulses of Herzen's Marxist model

of philosophical thought, which he never followed. Saying that Herzen made an unconscious "stop in front of historical materialism" or that he got close to a "severe invincible class struggle of the proletariat" (according to Lenin) does not clarify but, on the opposite, obscures the essence of "Russian socialism."

It is quite interesting that Herzen used the term "Russian socialism" for the first time only in 1866, in his article "Order triumphs!" This is proof of the fact that the project of Russian socialism, as mentioned above, was the result of a long-term work and not an immediate reaction to or a "going out" of the "spiritual drama" of the year 1848.

In 1866 Herzen (1954-60, 19:193) wrote:

We call a type of socialism, which goes from the land and peasant life, from actual plot of arable land and the existing redivision of fields from the communal and communal administration—the one that goes together with the crew to the economic justice, to which socialism in general aspires and which the science proves—Russian socialism.

By defining his formula of "Russian socialism," Herzen at the same time distinguished it from "the theory of precisely western socialism," which developed in Petersburg. As one of those who earlier espoused the ideas of "Petersburg socialism," Herzen meant by it as "the theory of all the fourierists" (held by the M.V. Butashevich-Petrashevich-Petrashevskij's circle) and the theory of "strong personality" (held by N. G. Chernyshevskij).

It is quite interesting that earlier in 1860, when the authors of the anonymous "Letter from the Province" criticized "Kolokol" ("The bell") and demanded to call Russia to axe,¹ Herzen tactfully responded by saying that the discovered contradictions were simply differences of opinion of adherents. "We differ not in the idea, but in the means, not in the routes but in the way we act. You represent one of the extreme expressions of our movement." However, in defending his personal opinion, Herzen (1954-60, 11:239, 241) stayed inexorable: "To brooms you should call,² not to axes." Later, to the supporters of "Western socialism," Herzen also related the activities of "Young Russia," who had the same radical positions. However, if the formula of "Russian socialism" of 1866 was a result of quite a long-term work of Herzen's thought, then which components formed it and what served as a primary basis or step towards its further development? Researchers practically have the same opinion on this account. Herzen used the idea of commune, Russian commune (from this point Herzen also used notions like "communal socialism") in order to define socialistic ideas. The fact that Herzen, in his definition of "Russian socialism," pushed for the existing communal way of country life, was regarded by Soviet researchers as coming from a different side. It was

stated, in particular, that "in his statements about the importance of a commune in Russian life and in his description of a commune, Herzen learned upon Gakstgauzen quite often" (see Anonymous 1987, 67). Westfall Baron A. Gakstgauzen, who visited Russia in 1847, published a two-volume work, "Research of interior relations, people's life and in particular country institutions in Russia," in which for the first time in Western editions he mentioned the existence of a commune as a special Russian institute—a regulator of daily relations of peasant life. However, how could the qualified historian Z.V. Smirnova (and other Soviet authors) be unaware of the fact that Slavophiles based their social philosophy and philosophy of history upon a commune? It was the Slavophiles (and not Gakstgauzen) who were the "pioneers" of this social institute. The reason for which Smirnova separated Herzen from the acquaintance with Slavophiles' ideas is understandable. During the Soviet period, the relation of Herzen's and the Slavophiles' philosophic ideas was not only neglected, but the critique of "theoretic error" was also considered obligatory as well as the critique of the "metaphysics and antihistorism of Slavophiles" (see Smirnova 1973, 149, 195). And it is quite interesting that this fact took place in the best, in our opinion, soviet research of Herzen's philosophy, which is the Smirnova's monograph.

Herzen knew quite well who the original beginners of the commune in Russia were. He recognized they were the Moscow Slavophiles who opened their eyes and luckily addressed the attention of Homyakov, Kireevskij, and other Slavophiles. Gakstgauzen was an observer who informed the West about the Russian country commune and its deeply autonomic social roots (see Herzen 1954-60, 19:187). Therefore, Gakstgauzen was "one of the first" (though not the first), and not in Russia but in the West, who described the commune to the world. This circumstance was used by Herzen, who on purpose "promoted" the work of the German baron as he knew quite well that the opinions of the Russian Slavophiles as philosophers would hardly be heard in the West. Some Russian thinkers more than once stressed that Gakstgauzen's judgments about Russia were right. It is worth mentioning that Engels (see Anonymous 1987, 67), in his humiliating and groundless critique of Herzen's "Russian socialism," often referred to the fact that Herzen's ideas were taken from Gakstgauzen: "Herzen, a Russian landowner himself, learnt from Gakstgauzen for the first time his peasants owned land altogether and used it to depict Russian peasants as truthful bearers of socialism."

As a matter of fact, the primary sources of the project of "Russian socialism" were the ideas of Slavophiles, and Herzen pointed out this fact in the post-reform period, at the moment when the project itself got more or less clearer outlines and when the role of Slavophiles in preparing for the peasant reform became obvious. Looking at Y. F. Samarin, the most famous expert of the commune subject and author of the "Regulations," dated 19 February 1861, Herzen (1954-60, 18:276) stressed the fact that "the leading

axis" of his and the Slavophiles' views were the same—"this is our attitude towards the Russian people, belief in them, love of them...and the desire to participate in their destinies." The similarity is also stated in the succeeding passage: "by denying the *salus populi* and bloody progress, [we] are for the autonomy of each area, for commune, [and] for the right to own the land."

Let us compare this expression with the ideas of Samarin (1996a, 431):

The commune commencement makes the basis, the ground of all Russian history, its past, present, and future; seeds and roots of all the great that rise high to the surface, and no matter, no theory that refutes this basis will reach its goal, will live.

The comparison of the project of "Russian socialism" with the ideas of the Slavophiles definitely does not suggest the elucidation of the common character of social and political views, for the common character of this kind between Herzen and the Slavophiles did not exist because the Slavophiles were supporters of the monarchy, and Herzen, of the "social and cultural project of a Russian thinker." However, the constructions of the Slavophiles in the field of philosophy of culture and their attitude towards the "problem of civilization" are evidence of their similarity and even closeness in character with Herzen's views. At this point, the ideas of Samarin (1996b, 529) come to mind as he converted the comparison "Russia-West" precisely to "civilization, the determined product of a nation's life." Moreover, the level of development of a civilization, determined by "a combination of conditions of everyday comfort, accumulated by factual knowledge [meaning the level of science development] and external formats of communal life" (Samarin 1996b, 547)—is not the main index of its quality. It is not the degree of development that is important, but "the content" of civilization, which rises up from fundamental peculiarities of the communal way of life. Samarin and Herzen shared the opinion that in Russia, at the time of the peasants, the existence of the peasant commune forms this peculiarity. However, there were certain differences in Samarin's and Herzen's interpretation of the commune. Samarin (1996b, 431) considered a commune to be the basis of the "orthodox Russian civilization" and the "communal commencement"—"a justified commencement of spiritual communication which was brought into it by the church." Herzen also considered a commune to be a potentially socialistic institute, as a key factor in transforming an autocratic state into a federation of free self-governing communes. Herzen's commune socialism was in fact "an anthropological socialism" because he was interested first of all in the ways of emancipating the human personality. In contrast to Chernyshevskij, Herzen was not concerned about the substantiation of economic effectiveness of "communal proprietorship," that is, the collective property in comparison to private property. Though Herzen was not satisfied with the existing condition of the commune and did not consider its precedence more effective from an

economic point of view, he thought nevertheless that with the relaxation of the regime and the political pressure of "governmental civilization" to a commune, it will lose its fiscal traits and give more space to the freedom of a personality.

Herzen, like the Slavophiles, thought that since the time of Peter the First the "governmental civilization" had lost its national character and had acquired a kind of character that was opposite to the commune. The government and the nobility, given responsibility over the rest of the population, "moved the country towards the Western way of progress." The governing social environment became the basis of the "instructing government," which practically controlled all spheres of activities, created by a formal organization "as an experience" of experimental regiments, factories, villages, and small rural districts. In its activities, the autocratic government was based on corruption which, by following orders of Peter the Great, transformed Russia in accordance with the Western model of a progressive state.

It is important to mention that neither Herzen nor the Slavophiles can be considered to be "haters of the West." The Slavophiles deeply honored the Christian West ("the land of holy miracles," according to A.S. Homyakov) and Herzen highly appreciated Western science and enlightenment. They only discussed the claims of the West to be the exponent of "common, obligatory, worldwide civilization" (see Samarin 1996c, 543). It is interesting that Herzen, while accepting his duty to the Slavophiles, but ignoring the theological and philosophical aspects of their doctrine (this position is quite natural for a thinker with a nonreligious orientation), viewed the Slavophiles as representatives of a new social science that was just starting to emerge in Russia. This science, according to him, placed the understanding of "non-Western life" to the top, and this life was based on "a different understanding of a person's attitude towards the land and people, who are close to him." Herzen actually looked at the Slavophiles as nontraditional theorists (not of the Western type) of socialism. If transported through time into the present, they can give us the answers to questions which the West "failed" to understand. The difference between the Russian and Western approach is that the latter comes from an ideal and rejects tradition, "the legend," while the Russian approach comes from the following persuasion: "The stronger, the firmer, the richer the legend, the more persistently it stands up for itself, the more the ideal penetrates into it, pulling it on its side" (Herzen 1954-60, 15:146). Later, Herzen's thought—as shown by S.N. Bulgakov, who supported nondogmatic Marxism—was also inspired by the ideas of Christianity, or "nonrevolution." In Bulgakov's words, a type of socialism, which in his opinion was reflected by the Slavophiles:

Cultural conservatism, loyalty to the legend, that was connected with the ability to develop—this was the kind of a building, that in fact could become salutary in history, if it would have been implemented.

It is also significant that the project of "Russian socialism" was reinterpreted according to Christian socialism during Herzen's life. F. M. Dostoyevsky (1989, 19) did that in "the soil period" of his creative work, after having met Herzen in London in 1862:

Not in communism, not in mechanic forms, contains Russian socialism...[Herzen] believes that Russian socialism will eventually be saved only by a worldwide unity in the name of Christ. This is our Russian socialism.

A number of subjects of "Russian socialism," the project that Herzen exposed are simply modified expositions of internationally well-known clauses borrowed from the Slavophiles, particularly A. S. Homyakov and K. S. Aksakov. Significantly, the chapter on Moscow's pan-Slavism and Russian Europeism from the work, "About the development of revolutionary ideas in Russia" (1850), ends with the words that socialism presents "a bridge, on which we"—that is, Herzen and the Slavophiles—"may give each other's hands" (Herzen 1954-60, 7:248). Then in the following year, in 1851, in his letters to J. Mishle and, in 1854, in his letters to V. Linton, Herzen explains the essence of his project in more details, using a number of subjects mostly taken from the Slavophiles. For instance, we have (1) the idea about the dissidence of Russian culture as a result of the reforms of Peter the First into two parts: one of the nobility and the other of the people, the peasants; (2) the thesis about the nonnational character of Petersburg's government, filled with "knights of the provinces, thousands of diplomats, generals, spies, and other dignitaries of German origin" (Herzen 1954-60, 13:184); and (3) Aksakov's modified concept about land and state, about the nonpolitical character of the Russian agricultural people and their nonintervention or noninterference and unwillingness to participate in the life of the state. Herzen (1954-60, 12:185) said: "Slavic peoples like neither the idea of a state nor the principle of centralization. They enjoy living in separate communes, which they would like to safeguard from government interference of any king."

The statement of the "Russian socialism" project in Herzen's publications as well as in foreign literature was accompanied by one more problem—the question on the disclosure of several Western prejudices, fears, and inadequate notions about Russia. These were published by Russia's enemies or by those who, for a long time, were simply mistaken in the belief as to the true concept of Russian life. On this account, Herzen [1954-60, 20 (1):50-53] mentioned that the West write about Russian life in "books, articles, brochures in French, German and English; they speak a lot, and they polish weapons...[but] only one thing is missing—a serious study of Russia." They write about Russia with "badly concealed spite," "they try to spit on Russia." However, in spite of all this, it is quite obvious that "they simply do not know anything about Russia." Yet in spite of not knowing

Russia “they scream, and these screams are full of worry and bitterness, they invent ethnographic insults.” One of the insults in Polish publications consisted of the claim that Russians belonged not to the Iranian (settled) but to the Turanian (nomadic) community of Indo-European nations. Herzen [1954-60, 20 (1):53] replied by saying that the Russian national consciousness does not suffer from any kind of “zoological punctiliousness: we are satisfied that in our veins runs Finnish and Mongolian blood; this puts us in close, fraternal relations with those pariah races about which philanthropic European democracy cannot even mention without contempt and insult. Also we do not have to complain about the turanian element.” Herzen, of course, defends not the government, but the Russian people and culture, its equivalence and comparability with other European cultures.

The last of Herzen’s works dedicated to socialism were the letters “To an old comrade” (1869), which were addressed to M. A. Bakunin. The notion of “Russian socialism” is not mentioned here on purpose and, in general, this last work rather gives the impression of a question mark than a period, which puts an end to all of Herzen’s creative works. Here, just as in his work “From the other Shore,” which opened the immigration period, there are no “final decisions.” Nonetheless, this absence of a major conclusion does not in any way reduce the value of this work.

Totally new on the part of Russian socialism is Herzen’s mentioning of “International,” a reference to the Communist First International, and on this account in soviet history, the critics stated that Herzen was “on the way to the proletarian revolutionary character” (see Pavlov 1977, 93). However, they did not pay attention to the fact that Herzen [1954-60, 20 (2):583] who was familiar with the functioning of the various socialistic organizations, warned about the possibility of the appearance here of “different advanced theodicies and cosmologies,” which gives a hint on the emergence of Marx’s leadership and character.

It is extremely important to note Herzen’s new principal position [1954-60, 20 (2):590] that “one cannot make people freer than they are inside themselves. Strange as it may seem, but experience shows that people implement forcibly the burden of slavery easier than the gift of excessive freedom.” Herzen used the notion of “excessive freedom” for the first time. Before that, when he wrote about the project of “Russian socialism,” he only said about “the lack of freedom.” He generally looked at freedom as the highest value, in accordance with his existentially-oriented philosophy, an aspiration for which it justifies by itself the purpose of human existence. Here, in our opinion, happened the collision of two approaches, which were equally peculiar to Herzen’s creative work—the organic and the existential.

The organic approach, which Herzen presented as a sort of a mutual theory of development both in the organic and social worlds, explains the possibility of deflecting the deterministic movement from the gradual phase-to-phase way of cultural and historical development.

CONCLUSION

Herzen's project of "Russian socialism" is a variant of the organic theory, which assumes the deviation from the average European model of development of civilizations. In Herzen's last work, a more "strict" display of the organic approach is observed. This is corroborated by the idea of the succession of cultures, which as expressed by Herzen, makes up the content of history in which the historical unity of humanity is mainly shown.

NOTES

1. "Call to axe" is the Russian idiom for "Call to revolt."
2. "Call to brooms" is the Russian idiom for "Call to order."

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Submitted: 14 November 2006

BOOK REVIEW

James K. A. Smith: *Who's afraid of postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault to church*

**Grand Rapids: Baker Academic
2006, 156 pp.**

James K. A. Smith's *Who's afraid of postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault to church* aims at "demythologizing" postmodernism by showing that its thoughts have a deep affinity with Christianity. Although some of the claims of this book stem from other thinkers, the author considers his analyses as supplementing earlier works. In every chapter, he introduces a film, discusses a philosopher's thought, clarifies misunderstandings, and explores the implications of these to the postmodern church.

The first chapter opens with a scene from the movie, *The matrix*. The author compares Neo's experience of disorientation with Plato's account of emerging from the cave. He relates this experience with contemporary culture as it shifts from one construction of reality to another. The strategy Smith employs is to engage the "unholy trinity" (Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Michel Foucault). He shows how their claims have been misunderstood and how understanding these in their context would enable Christians to recapture some truths overshadowed by modernity. He emphasizes that there is a resonance between ancient and postmodern thought, as Derrida engages Plato and Augustine, as Lyotard works with tribal culture, and as Foucault analyzes ancient practices of discipline.

The second chapter discusses Derrida's *deconstruction*, and how it applies to Scriptures. Derrida's concept that "there is nothing outside the text" is introduced by the film *Memento*. In the movie, Lenny, the lead character, is aided by texts to have an experience of the world, for without these he would not remember anything. Smith discusses Derrida's philosophy of language, pointing out that in interpreting texts, there is no realm of unmediated experience. His philosophy can be seen as antithetical to Christianity because the gospel could be considered as an interpretation; this means that it is not something objective. Smith attributes this Christian aversion to the modern claim that knowledge is true only insofar as it is objective. To prove Derrida's thought, Smith gives two gospel accounts

describing the crucifixion of Jesus: one from the perspective of a bystander and the other from that of a Roman soldier. To experience the same event does not mean to experience the same event objectively. All experience is interpretation. Therefore, Derrida notes the role of a community in determining the context of the text and in generating various interpretations. Smith ends the chapter by applying Derrida's thoughts to Scriptures, i.e., that there is nothing outside Scriptures, that the world must be understood through the Scriptures, and that it must be done through the "Spirit-governed" community of the church.

The third chapter introduces Lyotard's "incredulity towards metanarratives" by the film, *O brother, where art thou?* The film highlights the postmodern tension experienced by Everett, the central character, who embodies the modern perspective. Postmodernism is characterized by the loss of confidence in the modern conception of the rational and scientific as the sole guarantor of truth; for Lyotard, the same is true of metanarratives. Christians, Smith says, would find Lyotard's thoughts toward metanarratives antithetical to their faith because it is based on the Bible. Smith clarifies this by arguing that Lyotard is not against metanarratives per se but on the claims they make. Metanarratives are distinctly modern because of their appeal to universal reason. The heart of Lyotard's argument is to show that science is based on a narrative; something it adamantly dismisses. This is because "whenever science attempts to legitimate itself, it is no longer scientific but narrative, appealing to an orienting myth that is not susceptible to scientific legitimation" (p. 68). In relation to this, Smith points out that postmodernism does not reject Christianity because it legitimizes itself not in universal reason but in faith. Postmodernism, Smith argues, reveals that everything is grounded on a narrative, thus "granting the legitimacy of a philosophy that grounds itself in the Christian faith" (p. 73).

The film, *One flew over the cuckoo's nest*, introduces Foucault's concept that "power is knowledge" in the fourth chapter. The film shows a hospital setting where the control of institutions is explicitly exposed in the guise of reasons such as "cure" and the "good of the patient" (p. 84). Foucault analyzes how society disciplines and transforms people through institutions such as schools, prisons, and hospitals. Smith discusses Foucault's *Discipline and punish*, which tracks the history and evolution of punishment and prisons. This book documents the formation of a "disciplinary society," the primary goal of which is the creation of the individual through mechanisms of power. Smith agrees with Foucault's analysis that discipline should be understood more positively by Christians. The goal of Christianity is to mold people in the image of the Son by its disciplinary formation. Foucault seems to suggest that modern society took over religious disciplines and rituals; he, therefore, compares the mechanisms of discipline within a convent and within a prison. However, Smith refutes this by differentiating good and bad discipline. For him, discipline is good if it directs people toward their end and bad if it

does otherwise. Therefore, Christianity is good because its end is proper to human beings.

The last chapter talks of Radical Orthodoxy, which totally strays away from the Cartesian equation of knowledge as certainty. This anxiety is seen in Derrida's statement, "I don't know; I must believe" (p. 118). Smith interprets this lack of knowledge or uncertainty as recourse to believe. But, Smith does not give up knowledge altogether. Such knowledge, he argues, rests on revelation, which is not universally demonstrable but is a matter of interpretation. In Radical Orthodoxy, therefore, knowledge is confessed without certainty, and truth without objectivity. Further, this movement holds an "incarnational logic" which assumes that humans are creatures who find their identity only by being traditioned well. Note that the emphasis does not lie on tradition merely because of a longing for the past or an aversion to modernity's eroding effects.

I commend the author for using simple terminology in explaining philosophical concepts. I agree with his contention that postmodernists are misunderstood by many Christians. As to his attempt to relate postmodernity with Christianity, I say he was able to do so, but I doubt if the "unholy trinity" would be happy with the interpretations of their work in this light. Firstly, Derrida was critiquing metaphysical first principles, which Christians could never live without as it is the foundation of their belief. Secondly, when Derrida said "text," he meant language in general; the author seemed to have tied down this concept to Scriptures. This would result in a relatively narrow worldview, which is not the intention of Derrida; for him, the text would always be unstable and, therefore, subject to endless interpretations. However, the Church could not adhere to the notion of Scriptures as subject to endless interpretations. A concrete instance of this is the non-inclusion of the Gnostic gospels in the Bible, such as those of Thomas, Judas, and Mary. From Foucault's philosophy, Smith takes the concept of discipline as a means to further Christianity's end, i.e., the formation and development of good Christians. This creative twist seems to undermine the philosopher's advocacy of questioning institutions which enforce discipline, particularly the very metanarratives that legitimize them (Lyotard).

All in all, I say this book is a good introduction to postmodernism, especially if one has qualms over its message for a religious point of view. Smith's points are well-documented, and his utilization of films to introduce the concepts is unique and postmodern. The films manifest these concepts well, making it easier for the readers to relate and understand the philosophies involved. Smith captures postmodernism in a Christian light. This is indeed a contribution to the clarification and appreciation of postmodern philosophies, the cultural scenario of the period, and one's Christian faith.

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**PHILIPPINE NATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL
RESEARCH SOCIETY LECTURES,
2007-2008***

2007-2008 **THEME: ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY
METAPHYSICS AND IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF CULTURE**
Venue: De La Salle University

1. Lauren Velasco, MA [De La Salle University].** Zen and culture. 30 June 2007, Saturday. 1300-1500 HRS. DLSU William Shaw Little Theater (WSLT).

2. Maxwell Felicilda, PhD [San Beda College]. Philosophical reflections on the role of technology in the perpetual subjugation of the OFW psyche. 28 July 2007. 1300-1500 HRS. Yuchengco Rooms (YR) 407-409.

3. Jeffrey Centeno, MA [St. Louis University]. Sources of the self: Reflections on Charles Taylor's philosophy of culture. 11 August 2007. 1300-1500 HRS. WSLT.

4. Noelle Leslie de la Cruz, PhD [De La Salle University]. The philosopher as wanderer: An ekphrastic engagement with Caspar David Friedrich's paintings. 29 September 2007. WSLT.

5. Jeremiah Joaquin, MA [De La Salle University]. Why talk about God: Speculations and disputations in Medieval metaphysics. 1300-1500 HRS. 20 October 2007. WSLT.

6. Dennis Apolega, MA [De La Salle University]. Naturalism, personal identity, and "person." 17 November 2007. 1300-1500 HRS. WSLT.

7. Juan Rafael Macaranas, PhD [DLS-College of St. Benilde]. Understanding and appreciating our Filipino philosophy. 26 January 2008. 1300-1500 HRS. WSLT.

8. Natividad Manauat, MA [De La Salle University]. Philosophy and popular culture. 23 February 2008. 1300-1500 HRS. WSLT.

9. Juan Rafael Macaranas, PhD [DLS-College of St. Benilde]. The icons of Filipino multiple intelligences: An invitation to philosophical mindfulness. 15 March 2008. 1300-1500 HRS. WSLT.

*This is the last set of PNPRS lectures sponsored by the DLSU Philosophy Department.

**Educational institutions in brackets: where the respective speakers are presently employed.

10. Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, MA [De La Salle University]. The value of thought experiments in philosophical reasoning. 9 May 2008. 1300-1500 HRS. WSLT.

11. Panel Discussion: Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, Beverly Zarsa, Leslie de la Cruz, Dennis Apolega [All from De La Salle University]. Philosophy: Looking through the looking glass. 28 June 2008. 1300-1500 HRS. WSLT.

PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION OF NORTHERN LUZON (PANL)

6TH REGIONAL ANNUAL CONVENTION, 2008

THEME: *Philosophy and Human Formation: Keeping the Intellectual and Religious Tradition Open in the Age of Globalization*

VENUE: Maryhurst Seminary, Baguio City

DATE: 17-18 October 2008

Plenary Lectures

1. Julius Mendoza, PhD [U. P. Baguio, Baguio City]. Globalization, uncertainty, and tradition.

2. Andres Cosalan, MA, STL, SSCL [Institute of Catechetical Instruction, Diocese of Baguio]. Paul and the intellectual current of his time.

Concurrent Lectures

1. Jeffrey Centeno, MA [St. Louis University, Baguio City]. Philosophy as living wisely: Going back to the basics.

2. Fides Bitanga, MA Cand. [Mariano Marcos State University, Batak, Ilocos Norte]. Forming the human spirit through the preferential option of the *saying* over the *said* in the Age of Globalization.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Φιλοσοφία

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