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Starting with the January 2007 issue of this journal, references by any article to the logical term *proposition*, except in contextual historical citations, will be replaced by the term *constative*. Please see R. Gripaldo's "Meaning, proposition, and speech acts" in *Issues in contemporary Western philosophy,* Islam-West Philosophical Dialogue (2003), edited by Ali Naqi Baqershahi and Roya Khoii and supervised by Seyyed Mohammed Khamenei. Papers read during the World Congress on Mulla Sadra in May 1999. Vol. 6. Tehran: Sadra Islamic Research Institute. Also in 2001, *Φιλοσοφια: International Journal of Philosophy* 30/2 (1). See his papers, "The rejection of the proposition," delivered in 2008 during the 22nd World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul and "Constatival logic: An essay in the philosophy of logic," published in 2010, *Φιλοσοφια* 39/11 (1) and in 2011, *Φιλοσοφια* 40/12 (1), respectively.

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EDITOR'S NOTES

This issue of *Philosophia* contains seven interesting papers: one each in epistemology, hermeneutic anthropology, hermeneutic Marxism, Filipino philosophy, philosophy of culture, philosophical psychoanalysis, and process philosophy. It has a book review, a book note, and some book notices.

In "John Greco on the nature and value of knowledge," Pamela Ann Jose takes the view that Greco's epistemic theory, on the basis of his virtue reliabilism, remains inadequate to solve both problems on the nature and the value of knowledge for as long as it fails to determine the extent to which one derives success in attaining knowledge from one's abilities.

Ferdinand Tablan in "Meaning and value of work: A Marxist perspective" traces the roots of the relationship between man and work to the Marxist theory of alienation. He argues that the separation between man and work leads to either alienated work or alienated worker. The paper tries to analyze how employee experience in relation to employee work can shed light to the problem of employee satisfaction.

In studying Paul Ricœur's view on perspective—particularly its cognitive, affective, and practical aspects—Ferdinand D. Dagmang tries to show in "Ricœur on perspective: Understanding ourselves as relational and dialogical beings" that understanding these aspects will make us better persons. The reason is that people are naturally embedded in the plurality of perspectives which are reflected in the various perspectival conflicts or tensions.

Feorillo P. A. Demeterio III embarks on the analysis of the concept "Filipino philosophy" by various Filipino authors. In "Status of and directions for 'Filipino philosophy' in Zialcita, Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, Mabaquiao, Gripaldo, and Co," Demeterio attempts to synthesize the divergent thoughts of these seven scholars as to what constitutes Filipino philosophy, identifies their strengths and weaknesses, and pinpoints those views which can lead promisingly to the development of "Filipino philosophy."

Indigenous philosophy is a segment of the Philosophy of Culture. The issue of indigenous self-determination is tackled in Noel G. Ramiscal's "Indigenous philosophy and the quest for indigenous self-determination," where he examines some philosophical and legal issues relating to indigenous knowledge and the heritage the indigenes have acquired and constantly moulded to enable them to survive physically, culturally, and spiritually.

Ian Parker's paper discusses Jacques Lacan's novel approach to Freudian psychoanalysis that differentiates the registers constituting the *Borromean knot*, namely, those of the "symbolic," the "imginary," and the "real." In "Pathology and creativity: A sinthomatic reading of Lacan's Seminar XXIII," Parker tries to show the shift from the "symptom" focus to the "sinthome," thus marking the shift to a "later Lacan." Instead of a coded message to the Other (symptom), the

subject uses a device (sinthome) "by which the subject configures and is configured by a little circuit of messages." In some situations, the sinthome holds together the Borromean knot. The rest of the paper discusses the main points of Seminar XXIII and the rewriting of Freudian clinical work.

In "God in Whitehead's process metaphysics," Martin O. Onwuegbusi examines Alfred North Whitehead's conception of God in contrast to that of traditional theism. Whitehead is a panentheist. God, for him, did not create the universe out of nothing, but He is self-creating the universe as part of Himself, that is, as mind-thought (primordial nature) and its physical manifestations (consequent nature). This is significant because He is not apart from nature and the experience of humankind is part of his own experience.

As a reiteration, *Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy* [see vol. 41/13 (2), 2012] adopts *page length* as criterion for the classification of a book review (five pages and above), book note (four pages and below), and book notices (half a page or less). These may be descriptive or evaluative.

Danilo S. Alterado reviews Michael Kirwan's book, *Girard and theology* where he outlines Girard's mimetic theory as Kirwan interprets it. Girard is a French-American literary critic whose influence is far reaching as it seeps down to literature, theology, cultural anthropology, philosophy, and psychology. The main line of Girard's work relates to his religious conversion which renounces mimetic desire. It is interesting to note that, for Girard, human beings borrow all their desires from others and in the process are enmeshed in mimetic rivalry when one and the same object is desired by many. This could lead to violence unless a scapegoat is found. Humankind will forever be in this mess of mimetic desire, violence, and the scapegoat mechanism unless it finds its redemption elsewhere.

Finally, Wilfried M. A. Vanhoutte discusses in his book note Theodore Gracyk's introductory work on the philosophy of art where distinctions about the meaning of "art," "artistic value," "artistic appreciation," "artistic criticism," "aesthetics," and the like, are important. Art can mostly be, of course, visual, but it can also include literary and performing.

With all these interesting—and even thought-provoking—philosophical ideas, I hope you will enjoy and appreciate them as much as I did.

Rolando M. Gripaldo
Editor

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JOHN GRECO ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE

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This paper discusses the tenability of John Greco's solution to the problems of the nature and value of knowledge in his book, Achieving knowledge (2010). *Divided into two parts, the discussion (1) specifies how both problems have developed until the current period and (2) determines whether Greco, with his virtue reliabilism, supplies an adequate solution to both problems. I take the view that regardless of Greco's adoption of a contextualist semantics, his epistemic theory remains inadequate so long as it is unable to specify the extent to which a person's abilities can be appropriately involved in the attainment of knowledge or any success from ability.*

PROBLEMS OF THE NATURE AND VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE

Roots of the problems

The presumption that an adequate account of knowledge requires both an adequate account of the nature and value of knowledge dominates contemporary epistemology. The primary source of this presumption is Plato's *Meno* (2005). In the dialogue, after Socrates demonstrates that both knowledge and true belief are valuable since they are both good sources of information, Meno inquires on why we attribute greater value to knowledge compared to true belief and what distinguishes one from the other.[1] Meno's inquiries are based on the following assumptions. First, social constraints dictate the value of both knowledge and true belief which places them at par with one another. Hence, a component of knowledge which is not determined by social constraints must be the source of its additional value compared to mere true belief.[2] Second, if one follows the first assumption, what distinguishes knowledge from true belief is a component of the former which is dependent on the disposition of the knower.[3] Both of these assumptions can also be seen in Socrates' answer to Meno's inquiries as he states:

> As long as they stay put, true beliefs too constitute a thing of beauty and do nothing but good. The problem is that they tend not to stay for long; they escape from the human soul and this reduces their value, unless they're anchored by working out the reason. And this anchoring

> is recollection...When true beliefs are anchored, they become pieces of knowledge and they become stable. That's why knowledge is more valuable than true belief, and the difference between the two is that knowledge has been anchored...For all practical purposes, then, true belief will do us just as much good as knowledge and be no less beneficial than knowledge, and armed with true belief a man will do just as much good as anyone with knowledge. (98a-c)

Socrates' answer shows us the following. First, true belief is ephemeral and second, knowledge is true belief anchored by reason. Knowledge then has greater value compared to true belief since the former is dependent on the knower's disposition, the knower's ability to reason.

It is important to note at this point that in an earlier passage in the dialogue Socrates claims:

> [T]he truth of things is always in our souls, (this means that) the soul must be immortal, and this means that if there's something you happen not to know at the moment—which is to say, something you happen not to remember at the moment—you can confidently try to search for it and recall it. (86b)

If we juxtapose this passage to Socrates' answer to Meno's inquiries, we can better understand why knowledge is more valuable compared to true belief given that their only distinction is the former's dependence on one additional component which the latter lacks. Both passages show us that we have access to truth hence we have the capacity to have true beliefs. True beliefs, however, are fleeting. Knowledge, on the other hand, is more stable since it is true belief controlled by reason. Knowledge manifests the knower's firmer access to reality which is made possible by the knower's self-conscious use of his reason.

There are several points that must be emphasized in this Platonic account of knowledge. First, it highlights the intrinsic as opposed to the extrinsic value of knowledge. Second, it traces the intrinsic value of knowledge to the knower's exercise of his capacity to use his reason to ensure the stability of true belief. Finally, it shows the interdependence of the accounts of the nature and value of knowledge. I shall return to these points later on. For now, suffice it to state that traditional epistemology adopted all of these points except the second one which is apparent in its adoption of the definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) prior to and even after the attacks to the JTB.[4]

According to the standard definition of knowledge—as JTB—in epistemology, a subject *S* knows a constative[5] *p* if and only if (1) *S* believes *p*, (2) *p* is true, and (3) *S* is justified in believing *p*. The JTB, in this sense, introduces three necessary and jointly sufficient components of knowledge; these being belief, truth, and justification. Recall that earlier, an almost similar definition of knowledge is given in Plato's *Meno*. The JTB, however, traces its roots not to the *Meno* but to one of Plato's earlier works, the *Theaetetus* (n.d.). It is important to note that by adopting the final definition of knowledge that Plato considered in the *Theaetetus*, traditional

epistemology focused on propositional knowledge. Though the definition of knowledge in the *Theaetetus* is literally similar to the definition of knowledge in the *Meno*, if we follow my interpretation of the *Meno*'s account of knowledge above, we will notice that the *Meno* account highlights the dependence of knowledge on the subject's dispositions or capacities in comparison to the *Theaetetus* account of knowledge which highlights the factual content of knowledge claims. This move in traditional epistemology, that being its adoption of the *Theaetetus* version of the JTB as its pet epistemic theory, seems puzzling since even Plato (n.d.), in the *Theaetetus*, expressed misgivings with the definition of knowledge as justified true belief.[6]

In the *Theaetetus*, Plato highlights the impossibility of arriving at an account of knowledge based on justification that is not circular.[7] He maintains that equating the justification of a true belief with recognitional knowledge, the ability to distinguish the characteristics of what one knows from the other members of its class, involves appealing to knowledge once again. Such is the case since in order to distinguish the object of one's knowledge from the other members of its class, it is necessary for one to know, at the minimum, the bases of the classification and/or membership of the object of one's knowledge among other things. For instance, for a person to supply a rational explanation of his true belief that "The kiwi is a flightless bird," it is necessary for the person to supply a rational explanation of what counts as a *kiwi,* a *flightless object*, a *bird*, and a *flightless bird.* This leads to an appeal to knowledge once again, that being the person's knowledge of the members as well as the class of kiwis, flightless objects, etc.

GETTIER'S CHALLENGE AND ITS EFFECTS TO THE SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEMS

Despite the reservations that Plato raised with the JTB, it was only after Edmund Gettier's publication of "Is justified true belief knowledge?" (1963, 121-23) that the inadequacies of the JTB were fully emphasized. Recall that the JTB considers justification, truth, and belief as the necessary and jointly sufficient components of knowledge. Gettier, however, through his counterexamples, demonstrated that it is possible for *S* to have a justified true belief in *p* while not knowing *p*. His counter-examples show that there are scenarios wherein, due to both good and bad luck, *S*'s justified true belief in *p* is derived from *S*'s justified false belief in *p*. In these scenarios, *S* has a justified true belief in *p* due to good luck but *S* does not know *p* due to bad luck. Since it is presumed that an adequate account of the nature of knowledge must survive all the counter-examples against it, Gettier's exposure of the JTB's deficiency led to the renewal of the search for an adequate account of the nature of knowledge.

An observation of the field of epistemology during this period of renewed interest in the search for the nature of knowledge shows that there is an increase in the diversity of the methodologies used in determining the nature of knowledge. Although these approaches can still be broadly divided into the normative and naturalistic approaches, the methodologies differ, at the minimum, in terms of their (1) adoption of an internalist or externalist standpoint, (2) their focus on

either the properties of constatives or the properties of the subject, and (3) their espousal of a single or a plurality of epistemic goods. Brief characterizations of these differences show the following.

First, those who adopt a normative approach provide evaluative grounds in their assessment of epistemic justification whereas those who adopt a naturalistic approach supply descriptive grounds in their assessment of epistemic justification. Although current approaches tend to include both evaluative and descriptive grounds in their assessment of epistemic justification, epistemologists tend to explicitly subscribe to either one of these methodologies. It seems to me that this tendency is largely a result of whether they place greater importance on the evaluative component as opposed to the descriptive component of epistemic justification in their methodologies.[8] It may be argued that there is the introduction of what Linda Zagzebski refers to as the "aretaic approach" in epistemology. It seems to me however that a closer look at the theory, in this case her aretaic approach, shows that it can generally be categorized as a normative approach to knowledge.[9]

Second, the distinction between internalism and externalism can be broadly understood in terms of their contrasting views about our access to both knowledge and the justification of our beliefs. There are two ways in which we may understand internalism and externalism. In the case of *internalism*, it refers to the claim that our justified beliefs or knowledge are either limited to those we have conscious access to or to the limitations of our existing conceptual scheme. *Externalism*, on the hand, is the denial of either the first or the second sense of internalism.

Third, the distinction between the focus on either the properties of propositions or the properties of the subject can be understood in terms of the direction of analysis of the components of knowledge. Whereas the traditional approach in epistemology is to place primacy on the properties of propositions, other methodologies, in this case the methodologies of responsibilist and reliabilist virtue epistemologists, place primacy on the normative properties of agents (Zagzebski 1999). At the onset, it may seem that the difference of the direction of analysis of the components of knowledge in virtue epistemology is a ground for considering that the aretaic approach mentioned above makes it an entirely distinct methodology from the normative and naturalistic epistemic approaches, however much the appeal to virtue highly differs in the responsibilist and reliabilist versions of virtue epistemology. For instance, although both responsibilists and reliabilists highlight the causal role of virtues in the knowledge acquisition process, they disagree over what constitutes an intellectual virtue.[10]

Finally, in line with the dissimilarity of the epistemic theories due to their view about epistemic goods, the rift in contemporary epistemology is between those who hold that there is one as opposed to a plurality of epistemic goods. Another basis for the split in epistemological perspectives can be traced to the type of epistemic goods championed by an epistemological theory. For instance, one epistemic theory may consider understanding to be the primary epistemic good as opposed to knowledge whereas another epistemic theory may hold an opposite view.[11]

Regardless of these differences, besides their adherence to either a normative or a naturalistic methodology, they are also similar in terms of their production of

counterexamples. These highlight the problems caused by both epistemic luck and the lack of coordination between the truth and justification components of the JTB on any account of knowledge. This account attempts to formulate a stronger version of the JTB through the reinforcement of its justification component and/or through the addition of a fourth condition which when combined with justification, truth, and belief will lead to what they consider to be a sufficient definition of knowledge.

From the similarities and differences of the approaches mentioned above, I will focus on the similarities between their attempts to supply both the nature and value of knowledge, that being their tendency to highlight the problems caused by both epistemic luck and the lack of coordination between the truth and justification components of the JTB on any account of knowledge which attempts to formulate a stronger version of the JTB. As was mentioned earlier, an adequate account of the nature of knowledge must sufficiently address any counterexamples against it. One of the manifestations of the influence of Gettier's counterexamples is the multitude of counter-examples it has inspired in the existing literature.[12] Despite the continually increasing number of Gettier-type counter-examples, Linda Zagzebski (1996, 288-89) notes that they all share a similar form as she claims:

> (W)e can construct Gettier cases by using the following procedure: Start with a case of justified (or warranted) false belief. Make the element of justification (or warranted) false belief. Make the element of justification (warrant) strong enough for knowledge, but make the belief false. The falsity of the belief will not be due to any systematically describable element in the situation, for if it were, such a feature could be used in the analysis of the components of knowledge other than true belief, and then truth would be entailed by other components of knowledge, contrary to the hypothesis. The falsity of the belief is therefore due to some element of luck. Now amend the case by adding another element of luck, only this time an element that makes the belief true after all. The second element must be independent of the element of warrant so that the degree of warrant is unchanged.

It has also been mentioned earlier that Gettier's counter-examples and consequently all Gettier-type counter-examples emphasize the problems caused by the role of epistemic luck in allowing *S* to unconsciously derive a justified true belief in *p* from *S*'s justified false belief in *p*.[13] With this in mind, Duncan Pritchard (2010, 36) has shown that epistemic luck in all Gettier-type counterexamples can be classified into environmental luck and Gettier-intervening luck.[14] Pritchard (2010, 36) maintains that luck in cases of environmental luck takes the form of external luck since it is "the epistemically inhospitable environment (which) ensures that an agent's belief is...only true as a matter of luck such that he lacks knowledge" whereas in the Gettier-intervening cases, luck takes the form of internal luck since "the kind of epistemic luck in play...'intervenes' between the agent and the fact, albeit in such a way that the agent's belief is true nonetheless."[15]

In line with Zagzebski's demonstration of the form of all Gettier-type counter-examples and Pritchard's classification of the types of epistemic luck introduced in all Gettier-type counterexamples, it is important to recognize that all attempts to supply an adequate account of the nature of knowledge which opts to save the JTB must deal with the following argument:

> (1) For the JTB to be an adequate account of knowledge, it must avoid Gettier-type counter-examples, more specifically it must avoid any counter-argument which shares the form of all Gettier-type counter-examples.
> (2) Gettier-type counter-examples are unavoidable.
> (3) Hence, the JTB, regardless of the attempts to strengthen it, will remain an inadequate epistemic theory.

In the process of addressing this argument, more specifically the second premise above, these attempts to save the JTB must provide an adequate solution to the problem of both environmental and Gettier-intervening luck in their modified version of the JTB. Within this context, it seems that if one is able to defend a modified version of the JTB by showing that the Gettier-type counter-examples are avoidable then one has provided an adequate account of the nature of knowledge and one can proceed to supply an adequate account of the value of knowledge over true belief. However, such is not the case.

ANOTHER CHALLENGE: THE COORDINATED ATTACK PROBLEM

Luciano Floridi (2011, 209-23) argues that all Gettier-type counter-examples are, in principle, logically unsolvable since they share the form of the coordinated attack problem which has already been proven to be unsolvable in epistemic logic (see Halpern 1995, 11). The coordinated attack problem highlights the problem of coordinating the beliefs of epistemic agents in a multiagent distributed system.[16] In a nutshell, the problem shows that given at least two epistemic agents in a multiagent distributed system characterized by message delays, there is no point in time in which both epistemic agents have common knowledge. Due to this, there is no point in time in which the actions of both epistemic agents are coordinated. Floridi maintains that the same problem is raised by the Gettier-type counterexamples as they emphasize that the JTB is unable to supply an adequate account of the nature of knowledge since there is a lack of coordination between two of the JTB's knowledge delivering components, these being truth and justification. Floridi (2011, 220) maintains:

> The argument is that knowledge fails in Gettier-type counterexamples because there are cases in which, although (truth) T and (justification) J are both available to (a subject) S, one can still show that there is no coordination between T and J or, better, Gettier-type counterexamples prove that it is impossible to guarantee that an epistemic commitment by the system T + J will be safe and hence successful in delivering

> propositional knowledge that p. This possible lack of coordination cannot be overcome because it is caused by a lack of common knowledge, not by S, but between the two agents T and J, and not of justified true belief, but of the relevant circumstances, that is, coordination, in which the system can make a safe epistemic commitment.

Floridi's argument for the logical unsolvability of the Gettier-type counter-examples, in this sense, emphasizes that epistemic theories are distributed knowledge systems. In the case of JTB, its deficiency stems from its inability to ensure the coordination between the truth and justification components of its system. If we connect this to the form of the argument mentioned above, Floridi's argument shows the logical impossibility of disproving its second premise. Such is the case since the problem raised by Gettier-type counterexamples to the JTB is a form of the coordinated attack problem and given the impossibility of solving the coordinated attack problem, it follows that the problem raised by Gettier-type counter-examples to the JTB is unsolvable.

Within this context, any attempt to save the JTB from Gettier-type counterexamples, so long as it does not disprove the unsolvability of the coordinated attack problem, is bound to fail. In a similar manner, any attempt to supply both the nature and value of knowledge which follows the form of the JTB is immediately questionable so long as it does not offer a feasible solution to the coordinated attack problem.

So far, I have presented an overview of the development of the problems of the nature and value of knowledge. In a nutshell, the problem of the nature of knowledge is concerned with the formulation of an account of the nature of knowledge which is immune from all the possible counterexamples that may be thrown against it whereas the problem of the value of knowledge is concerned with supplying an explanation for why knowledge is more valuable compared to true belief. In terms of the development of the former, I have shown that attempts to supply an adequate account of the nature of knowledge have continuously been characterized by the adoption and/or defense of a version of the standard tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In a similar manner, in dealing with the problem of the nature of knowledge, there has been a continuous emphasis on the inadequacy of any version of the JTB. In terms of the development of the latter, I have shown that the argument for the greater value of knowledge compared to true belief is developed through creating a distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic values of knowledge and by tracing the source of the intrinsic value of knowledge to an element of knowledge which true belief lacks. I have also shown that even in the initial formulation of the problem of the value of knowledge, the element which differentiates knowledge from true belief is dependent on the knower's capacity. In terms of the conjunction of both problems, I have demonstrated that there is a presumption that an adequate solution to the problem of the value of knowledge is intricately linked with the solution to the problem of the nature of knowledge. With these in mind, we are now in a position to

determine the adequacy of Greco's solution to the problems of the nature and value of knowledge as they are presented in his book, *Achieving knowledge*.

GRECO'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE NATURE AND VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE

What follows are the main ideas behind Greco's explanation[16] of what counts as the nature of knowledge and why knowledge is more valuable compared to true belief as they are presented in line with Greco's elucidation of his reliabilist approach to epistemic normativity. I will begin the section by supplying Greco's reliabilist approach to epistemic normativity. From this, I will explicitly state his solution to both the problems of the nature and value of knowledge. The section ends with an analysis of Greco's solution to both problems.

Greco's virtue epistemology

In explaining Greco's reliabilist approach to epistemic normativity, let us begin by explaining Greco's notion of epistemic normativity or epistemic justification.[18] He defines epistemic normativity in the following manner: "*S*'s belief that *p* has knowledge-relevant normative status (it has all the normative properties that knowledge requires) if and only if *S* believes the truth because *S*'s belief is epistemically virtuous." To understand Greco's notion of what counts as an epistemically justified belief, one must trace how Greco's epistemic theory is influenced by Aristotle's virtue ethics.

From Aristotle's ethical theory, Greco (2010, 43-44) adopts his characterization of abilities. Aristotle, in his characterization of abilities, maintains that they have both a motivational and reliability component since abilities are always geared towards the attainment of the good and they are always reliable in the attainment of the good. A virtuous person, in this sense, is motivated towards the good and due to this he consciously ensures that his actions follow reliable methods for the attainment of the good. Following Aristotle's ethical theory, Greco maintains that a state of knowledge has both a motivational and reliability component. To account for both components, he introduces two notions: (1) epistemic responsibility and (2) epistemic reliability. He states that a belief is epistemically responsible only if it is a product of an intellectual ability which a subject uses as a result of his motivation to believe the truth. On the other hand, a belief is epistemically reliable if and only if it is a product of an intellectual ability which is reliable at producing true beliefs. Applying Aristotle's characterization of a virtuous moral state to a knowledge state, Greco then maintains that a belief is epistemically virtuous so long as it is both epistemically responsible and reliable. In this sense, a subject's belief is epistemically virtuous only if the subject's belief is a product of an intellectual virtue which the subject consciously uses because he knows that it is a reliable tool that will allow him to attain true beliefs. It is important to note, however, that Greco emphasizes that even if a belief is epistemically virtuous, it does not necessarily entail that it is normative. Such is the case since the normativity of a belief is derived from the success of one's epistemically virtuous belief.

Even in his account of epistemic normativity, one can already see how he traces the normativity of knowledge to the reliability of a subject's intellectual ability. Contextualizing his account of epistemic normativity to his explanation of the nature of knowledge will, however, explicitly demonstrate how he uses a simple reliabilist approach to explain the normativity of knowledge. Greco's (2010, 12) virtue-reliabilist approach presents the following account of the nature of knowledge: "*S* knows *p if and only if* (1) *p* is true; (2) *S* believes *p*; and (3) *S* believes the truth because *S*'s belief is produced by intellectual ability" (KSA). Notice that his KSA is primarily a restatement of his characterization of epistemic normativity above. The only difference lies in the KSA's formulation in line with the standard simple process reliabilist framework in epistemology. In the same vein as other reliabilist approaches, his KSA includes three components: belief, truth, and justification. In addition, like other reliabilist approaches, his framework understands epistemic justification externally. Its emphasis on external justification, however, differs from other forms of externalism as it highlights the role of intellectual abilities in the formation of knowledge. KSA's externalist perspective is apparent as it considers the facts produced by a subject's intellectual ability to be contingent on the context of the subject's practical reasoning environment. By doing this, his KSA is able to show that a subject, regardless of his utilization of an intellectual ability, so long as the ability does not successfully conform to the conditions in his environment, will not generate a belief with knowledge-normative status. It is important to note that despite the KSA's emphasis on the context-dependence of knowledge, KSA is still able to maintain the stability of both knowledge and knowledge-language. Knowledge is stable because intellectual abilities are a part of character and character is stable (Greco 2010, 150). Knowledge-language, on the other hand, is stable since what counts as knowledge will always be constrained by the pragmatic function of our knowledge language.[19]

Before explicitly providing his solution to both the problems of the nature and value of knowledge, it is important to note how his reliabilist account of epistemic normativity is based on the thesis that "knowledge is a kind of success from ability" (Greco 2010, 1). From what has been discussed so far, it is apparent how Greco's virtue theory is able to consider knowledge as a form of ability. Ability—whether it is an intellectual, athletic, culinary skill, etc.—is a character trait which reliably produces a particular end. The success of an ability, however, is also dependent on the person in possession of the ability. This means that an ability's success is dependent on a person's well-motivated and reliable use of his ability. For an ability to be used successfully, it is important for a person to be well-motivated since the success of an ability is caused by a person's motivation for success. For instance, a rabbit breeder's ability to continuously produce rabbits with soft and shiny fur is caused by his motivation to produce a rabbit with those characteristics. In a similar manner, a person is able to reliably use his intellectual abilities to attain true beliefs because he is motivated to attain true beliefs. For example, a blind person is able to create a mental representation of the objects in front of him since he honed his sonar skill to be reliably used to perceive the objects in front of him partly as a result of his motivation to correctly perceive the objects in front of him.[20] On the other hand, for an ability to be used successfully,

it must also be used reliably since the reliability of an instrument is always attuned to a particular end in a particular situation. For instance, if a person has excellent cooking skills, although the person's cooking skill is reliable at producing good food, it is not reliable in constructing computers. In a similar vein, even if one's ocular skill is reliable in typical everyday contexts, they may not be reliable inside a carnival's house of mirrors.

So far we have already accounted for the reliability of abilities. Greco (2010) also considers abilities as normative in character. Such is the case since the development of an ability involves training and discipline. In other words, it requires "hard work" which makes it an acquired excellence. Since it is an acquired excellence, a person can be attributed with responsibility for using his ability. A person's painting skills is developed through training. Perhaps the person will introduce himself to different painting styles and methods which he will later on use to develop his own painting style and method. In a similar vein, to know the solutions to more complicated mathematical proofs, a person must study and practice solving mathematical proofs.

Greco's solutions to the problems

Within this context, I will now specify Greco's solution to both the problems of the nature and value of knowledge. Recall that the adequacy of an epistemic theory which attempts to strengthen the justification component of the JTB will be assessed, at the minimum, in terms of how it shows that Gettier-type counterexamples are avoidable. In the process, it must also show that it can avoid cases of both environmental and Gettier-type intervening luck. Given that Greco strengthens the justification component of the JTB, his epistemic theory must address these requirements.

His solution to these requirements is implicitly seen in the elucidation of Greco's aforementioned epistemic theory. To solve the problem caused by the lack of coordination between the truth and justification components of the JTB as well as the problems caused by epistemic luck to the JTB, Greco highlights the causal role of a subject's intellectual abilities in the knowledge acquisition process. Recall that for Greco, one can only be held responsible for one's true belief just in case it is caused by one's use of one's reliable intellectual ability due to one's motivation to believe the truth. For instance, if I have a true belief that "Angus is a rabbit," I can only be held responsible for my true belief only if I use my perceptual ability to determine that the companion animal in front of me, whose name is Angus, is indeed a rabbit as opposed to a cat, dog, hamster, or pig. In a similar manner, if I am in a rabbit show, I can only be held responsible for my true belief that the rabbit in the second stall is a miniature lop if I used my perceptual ability to determine that the rabbit I am looking at is indeed a miniature lop as opposed to a mini lop. In this sense, if the rabbit that I am looking at is a mini lop and it only happened to be the case that there is also a miniature lop in the second stall then I cannot be held responsible or I cannot be credited for my true belief.

The examples of knowledge states provided above manifests Greco's (2010, 106) adoption of a contextualist semantics or a semantics of causal explanation.

His adoption of a contextualist semantics in his explanation of knowledge allows him to make a subject's intellectual ability as the "necessary part of a much broader set of causal conditions...[that] counts as 'the explanation' or the 'cause' of a... knowledge attribution." The subject's intellectual ability, in this sense, "has a default salience in explanations of true belief." He maintains, however, that the causal role of a subject's intellectual abilities in explaining his true belief becomes questionable in cases characterized by epistemic luck, as can be seen in Gettier-type counter-examples, since these are cases that manifest an abnormal causal chain. The abnormality of the causal chain within Gettier-type counter-examples is apparent as either the intervening factor between the person's belief and the state of affairs or the environment becomes explanatory salient in determining whether the subject has a true belief. In other words, in cases that show Gettier-type intervening luck, the deviance in the causal chain is due to the explanatory salience of the intervening factor between the person's belief and the state of affairs. In cases that show environmental luck, on the other hand, the deviance in the causal chain is due to the explanatory salience of the abnormal environment in which the subject formulates his true belief.

To further understand this, it is important to note that Greco (2010, 106) emphasizes the two primary functions of explanatory salience. First, it is "a function of our interests and purposes" and, second, it is "partially a function of what is normal or usual." In both cases of epistemic luck, the pragmatic function of explanatory salience is "trumped by abnormality." In other words, the abnormality of either the internal or external conditions in the Gettier-type counterexamples trumps the pragmatic role of our knowledge-language. Due to this, a subject, regardless of well-motivated use of any intellectual ability to attain a true belief, will not have knowledge in the cases described in the Gettier-type counterexamples.

Given Greco's abovementioned solution to the problem of the nature of knowledge, what follows is the solution to the problem of the value of knowledge over true belief.[21] His solution to this problem appeals to both the motivational and reliability component of what he refers to as an *epistemically virtuous true belief*. In line with the discussion in the initial part of this section, knowledge has more value compared to true belief since it is virtuously formed (Greco 2010, 100). In this sense, its value is not merely limited to its pragmatic function in practical reasoning. It is valuable in itself as it displays a form of human excellence. Greco (2010, 98) emphasizes this as he claims, "(T)here is a clear difference in value between knowledge and mere true belief. In cases of knowledge, we achieve the truth through the exercise of our own intellectual abilities, which are a kind of intellectual virtue."

Assessment of Greco's account of the nature of knowledge

So far, I have given a general overview of Greco's reliabilist account of epistemic normativity. In addition, I have also shown how his reliabilist account of the normativity of knowledge explains both the nature and value of knowledge. We are now in a position to determine whether Greco's epistemic theory supplies an adequate account of the nature and value of knowledge.

Recall that in the first section of the discussion I have shown that any epistemic theory which adopts the form of the JTB is immediately questionable so long as it does not supply a feasible solution to the coordinated attack problem. Such is the case since all Gettier-type counterexamples are a kind of coordinated attack problem. If an epistemic theory that adopts the form of the JTB does not provide a feasible solution to the coordinated attack problem, it follows that it cannot prove that Gettier-type counter-examples are avoidable. It has already been emphasized, however, that if an epistemic theory which adopts the form of JTB wants to supply an adequate account of the nature of knowledge, it must initially prove that Gettier-type counterexamples are avoidable. Consequently, an epistemic theory's failure to show that there is a solution to the coordinated attack problem shows that it cannot supply an adequate account of the nature of knowledge.

With this mind, to assess the adequacy of Greco's account of the nature of knowledge, it is crucial to determine if his epistemic theory can supply a feasible solution to the coordinated attack problem. Such is the case since Greco's explanation of knowledge adopts the form of the JTB.[22] If Greco's epistemic theory is unable to supply an adequate solution to the coordinated attack problem, it means that his epistemic theory's account of the nature of knowledge is inadequate.

As was noted in the initial section, Gettier-type counter-examples have the same form as the coordinated attack problem as they highlight the lack of coordination between the truth and justification components of the JTB. Coordination between both components is impossible since there is no point in time in which both truth and justification can have a common reference or can share the same content. Due to this, they cannot work together to supply knowledge.

Initially, it seems that Greco's epistemic theory is capable of handling this problem. To begin with, it seems that his KSA ensures the coordination between the justification component and the truth component of his account of knowledge since they are both dependent on the subject's well-motivated exercise of his reliable intellectual ability. In fact, the justification component of the KSA affects its truth component due to its adherence to a contextualist semantics. By adopting a contextualist semantics, the truth-value of a belief in the KSA becomes partially dependent on the context in which the belief is formed. Remember, Greco's adoption of a contextualist semantics allows him to emphasize the explanatory salience of a subject's intellectual ability in his acquisition of true beliefs.

The problem, however, is that what the coordinated attack problem emphasizes is that regardless of whether one strengthens the justification component of the JTB by anchoring a true belief on a reliable and stable disposition of the subject, it still remains to be the case that both truth and justification cannot be coordinated in the JTB. Recall that the JTB considers justification, truth, and belief to be the necessary and jointly sufficient components of knowledge. Such a definition requires that there is always successful coordination between all three components. Floridi (2011, 218) notes, "Unless the coordination is guaranteed, only a risky attack can be launched, but this begs the question, since the problem requires the launching of a completely safe attack."

It seems to me, however, that Greco's KSA cannot ensure a completely safe attack. Consider the following situation. John began creating a proof for Fermat's last theorem. Halfway through his proof, however, he had a heart attack and died. After his death, his son, Renz, while perusing through his father's papers, discovered the unfinished proof and successfully finished it. Following Greco's characterization of knowledge, it seems that John cannot be credited with the proof's solution. However, it only seems fair that he should be credited with it. After all, he began what Renz finished. This situation is highly similar to cases of testimonial knowledge, wherein a person's true belief about a state of affairs is derived from another person's firsthand knowledge about the same state of affairs. In response to these scenarios, Greco (2010, 83) maintains:

> Credit for success, gained in cooperation with others, is not swamped by the able performance of others. It is not even swamped by the outstanding performance of others. So long as one's own efforts and abilities are appropriately involved, one deserves credit for the success in question.

All seems well then. However, does that also mean that if I deliberately erase one of the lines in John's proof even before Renz found it, then I can also be credited with their proof? In other words, up to what extent can another person's abilities be appropriately involved in the attainment of knowledge or any success from ability? Greco is unclear about this.

Within this context, it seems that until he specifies the limitations of what counts as an appropriate involvement in determining whether a subject can be credited with knowledge, then Greco's epistemic theory cannot launch a completely "safe attack," which is required by the coordinated attack problem. Due to this, at this point, his theory still does not prove that the Gettier problem is solvable. Remember, if one adopts the form of the JTB, one's epistemic theory will only be adequate so long as it is able to show that the Gettier problem is solvable. To show this, one must also show that the coordinated attack problem is solvable. In order to solve the coordinated attack problem, one must present an account of the nature of knowledge which guarantees the coordination of the components of the JTB in all its accounts on the nature of knowledge. It seems that until he specifies what counts as an appropriately involved ability in the knowledge acquisition process, Greco's virtue-reliabilism is still inadequate.

I have no reservations in relation to Greco's solution to the problem of the value of knowledge over true belief. I agree that if one adopts a virtue theoretic approach, it is possible to maintain that knowledge is more valuable compared to true belief since it is a manifestation of human excellence. What seems shaky, however, are the effects of whatever constraints Greco will impose on his notion of epistemic normativity when he clarifies what he means by the appropriate involvement of an ability in the attainment of knowledge in his account of why knowledge is more valuable than true belief.

CONCLUSION

I will end this paper with a few remarks on Greco's virtue-reliabilism's place in contemporary epistemology. It seems that along with other virtue epistemologies, Greco's epistemic theory demonstrates our return to our roots. If we will follow my interpretation of Plato's *Meno*, as early as Plato's time there has already been an emphasis on tracing the reason for the value of knowledge over true belief to the subject's disposition. In the same vein, as early as Plato's *Theaetetus*, doubts have been raised on the standard tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief. It seems puzzling then that we have been preoccupied with the JTB. This return to our roots seems to be fruitful and, hopefully, will continue to be fruitful in enabling us to understand how we know. Perhaps, by further emphasizing how the normativity of knowledge is derived from our character traits, we may further understand how the constitution of our minds affect how we represent the world. Moreover, through virtue epistemology, we may permanently put an end to claims that highlight the plurality of truths due to the lack of their stability.

NOTES

1. This is apparent in the following exchange between Socrates and Meno wherein Meno—after Socrates says that "(t)rue belief…is just as good a guide as knowledge, when it comes to guaranteeing correctness of action"—inquires, "(w)hy, if this is so, knowledge is so much more highly valued than true belief and on what grounds one can distinguish between them" (97c-d).

2. Robin Waterfield (2005, 182), in his footnote to 97d of his translation of *Meno*, says that we can understand Meno's observation that we attribute greater value to knowledge in comparison to true belief in several ways. It may be understood to refer to either our pretheoretical conviction of true belief's lesser value compared to knowledge or to the prominence of this view during the time of Socrates and Meno since it was a position also espoused by both Xenophanes and Parmenides at that time. Regardless of whether we interpret Meno's claim in the first or the second sense, or in both, all these senses highlight how the social function of knowledge affects its value. For instance, even the manifestations of our pretheoretical conviction that knowledge is more valuable than true belief, which are evident in human curiosity and the development of increasingly sophisticated methods of inquiry, are largely affected by social constraints.

3. It is plausible that Meno has already presupposed the abovementioned assumptions as he posed his inquiry. Prior to this section, Socrates claimed that knowledge is a form of excellence or virtue (89a). The initial claim mentioned above highlights how excellences are best realized by participating in the social arena. The second claim, on the other hand, highlights how excellences are primarily dependent on an agent's capacity to consciously act virtuously.

4. In relation to the first point, although the JTB does not adhere to Plato's metaphysical assumptions, it remains to be the case that the JTB is also grounded

on its own metaphysical claims. For example, the different versions of the JTB presuppose the existence of a mind-independent world.

5. A constative is a generic term that can refer to any sentence that is true or false; it can also refer to the content of any true-or-false sentence. See Gripaldo (2009 and 2011).

6. Refer to 201c to 210b for Plato's discussion of a theory of knowledge highly similar to the JTB. Plato offers definitions of knowledge in these sections. Initially, he offers a loose definition of knowledge through Theaetetus' recollection of the definition from an unnamed source as "true opinion accompanied by reason" (201c). A few sections from this, he offers a stricter definition of knowledge through Socrates' description of "perfect knowledge" as "the addition of rational explanation to true opinion" (206c). Although Plato uses the terms "reason" and "rational explanation" here, these are typically equated with the justification requirement of the JTB account of knowledge.

7. At least, this is the case with the final sense of what Plato equates with a rational explanation in the dialogue. From Theaetetus' initial restatement of the definition and Socrates' rewording of the definition to emphasize the role of explanation in it, Socrates specifies possible interpretations of what counts as a rational explanation of a true opinion, these being: (1) an analysis of true opinion's simple parts (202b), (2) speech (206d), (3) a specification of the elements of knowledge (207b), and (4) a specification of the characteristics of what one knows which differentiates it from the members of its own class (208c). Plato endorses neither one of these interpretations as the *Theaetetus* ends its discussion of the JTB with Socrates stating that "neither perception..., nor true opinion, nor reason or explanation combined with true opinion could be knowledge" (210a-b).

8. A very interesting example of this can be seen in Arbol Fairweather's (2011, 1-20) claim that Duhem-Quine's naturalism is a form of virtue epistemology.

9. I will not elucidate on this further. Suffice it to say that even if the aretaic approach focuses on the virtues of the individual, it continues to adopt the JTB's framework as it merely considers the individual's virtue as the basis for the justification constraint of the JTB. For the initial introduction in contemporary epistemology of the aretaic approach and its implications for a theory of knowledge, refer to Linda Zagzebski (1996).

10. Zagzebski, in comparison to Greco (n.d.), for example, does not consider ocular or sonar skills as virtues as she limits virtues to acquired excellences, such as courage and wisdom.

11. Notice that this difference highlights the effects of one's conception of the value of knowledge to one's conception of the nature of knowledge. On a different note, broadly speaking, an epistemic good is that which has epistemic value. If an epistemic theory places greater value on our capacity to synthesize our beliefs, the epistemic theory will place primacy on understanding over knowledge. Other epistemic theories, on the other hand, claim that we can never determine why knowledge is more valuable than true belief and, hence, we ought to focus our attention on other epistemic goods. Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), for instance, argues that we should focus on "objectual understanding" rather than knowledge.

12. The most prominent examples include Giner-Goldman's barn façade case, Lackey's testimonial knowledge case, Lehrer's Nogot case, Chisholm's Sheep case, Whitcomb's hoodlums case, Pritchard's force-field case, Kvanvig's Grabbit case, and Bonjour's clairvoyant case. For a description of these counterexamples, refer to Greco, *Achieving knowledge* (2010, 73-90 and 156-57).

13. Zagzebski maintains that not all Gettier-type cases involve "double-luck." She (1999, 115) remarks:

> Not all counterexamples in the Gettier literature have the double luck feature, although, of course, I have argued that cases with this feature can always be produced whenever there is a gap between truth and the other components of knowledge. But in every Gettier case there is some element of chance or luck.

14. Pritchard (2010, 36) espouses this classification; however, instead of referring to them as Gettier-type counterexamples, he refers to them as cases of veritic luck. For the sake of consistency, I will continue to adopt the label Gettier-type counterexamples throughout the rest of the discussion when I am referring to cases of veritic luck.

15. Given this distinction, Giner-Goldman's barn façade case, Lackey's testimonial knowledge case, Whitcomb's hoodlum case, and Pritchard's force-fields case may be classified as cases that exhibit environmental luck in comparison to Lehrer's Nogot case, Chisholm's Sheep case, and Bonjour's clairvoyant case which may be classified as cases that exhibit Gettier-intervening luck. Despite this distinction, Zagzebski's recipe for the formulation of Gettier-type problems can also be applied to cases of environmental luck so long as one ensures that luck is a result of the conditions in the agent's environment. I suppose, if one follows Pritchard's classification of veritic luck, Zagzebski's recipe is better referred to as a recipe for creating cases that display veritic luck rather than for creating cases that display Gettier-intervening luck. For the purpose of this paper, I will refer to counterexamples that display both environmental and Gettier-intervening luck as Gettier-type cases.

16. Epistemic agents here refer to "resources that have to be coordinated to deliver a product" (see Floridi 2011, 215).

17. In the text, Greco (2010, 4-5) notes that his account of knowledge is limited to supplying an explanation of what knowledge is as opposed to what it is not. He maintains that his exposition of his virtue epistemology does not "pretend to give a conceptual analysis...nor an ontological analysis" of knowledge.

18. Greco equates epistemic justification with epistemic normativity. He (2010, 17-18) maintains:

> The sort of normative status I am interested in here is often labeled "epistemic justification." But...the term has been used to name a variety of normative properties.... In the interest of clarity, therefore, I have decided to use the term "epistemic normativity" to label my present topic—that is, the full normative status required by knowledge.

19. This emphasis on the stability of knowledge-language despite the variations in what counts as knowledge within similar contexts due to the differences in the type of intellectual ability different subjects use in producing a belief in the same context also highlights one of the main distinction of Greco's epistemic theory from other types of reliabilism, that being his adherence to a contextualist semantics.

20. I am here referring to the use of echolocation by visually impaired individuals.

21. I will not elucidate on the swamping problem, that being the problem of how it is possible for both a reliable an unreliable instrument to produce the same result. Greco's solution to this problem, that is, his appeal to the intrinsic value of knowledge due to its manifestation of a human excellence, is already apparent in his explanation of epistemic theory.

22. Despite Greco's (2010, 174-96) claim that his explanation of knowledge is not meant to supply necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, his emphasis on the explanatory salience of a subject's intellectual abilities along with his emphasis on the truth and belief components of knowledge seems to indicate otherwise. This is especially apparent in his adoption of Moore-Reid's view on perceptual knowledge.

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RICŒUR ON PERSPECTIVE: UNDERSTANDING OURSELVES AS RELATIONAL AND DIALOGICAL BEINGS

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This study deals with the cognitive, affective, and practical aspects of perspective. Paul Ricœur's analysis of perspective in Fallible man *assists the course of this study which will show that plurality in perspectives is inherent in nature and that the natural embeddedness of people in perspectives is characterized by tensions between the legitimacy and illegitimacy, closedness and openness, and fallibility and infallibility of perspectives. The idealized requirements of the expansive language of relations and dialogue will always face these tensions that are naturally built into the ways of humans.*

INTRODUCTION

Fallible man (Ricœur 1986) forms part of a larger project that appeared in French as the philosophy of the will, which included *Freedom and nature: The voluntary and the involuntary* (Ricœur 1966) and *The symbolism of evil* (Ricœur 1967). These works belong to Ricœur's so-called prehermeneutic anthropology that dealt with the perennial themes of consciousness and materiality, the human and the whole, that is, the two dimensions that characterize all constituent features of human existence (see Dauenhauer and Pellauer 2011). *Fallible man,* along with *The symbolism of evil*, actually extends Ricœur's account of freedom which he initially studied in *Freedom and nature*. There, in those three major works, Ricœur has elaborated how humans have to struggle with the tension between self and embodiment in the world. Nonetheless, Ricœur insists that it is in that struggle that humans, albeit constrained by limits, boundaries, or perspectives, would be able to exercise their freedom—a freedom that ultimately constitutes personalities or identities.

The basic position of Ricœur's earlier anthropology in his philosophy of the will did not change with his turn to hermeneutics. In this hermeneutic anthropology, fragility, which was highlighted in humanity's perspectival nature, formed the backdrop of his study of humans. Ricœur does not depart from *Fallible man* inasmuch as his later works take for granted finitude and infinitude and fallibility and infallibility, understood to determine the objectifications of human

freedom in cultural representations, which hermeneutics seeks to investigate and understand.

In *Fallible man*, Ricœur points out that it is possible for humans not to avoid error, that is, to misuse freedom. This is the human predicament that is basically built into the gap between embodiment in the world and the human ability to grasp better insights. In this gap lies the "fallible" disposition of the human being. In the words of Ricœur (1986, 1):

> ...this global disposition consists in a certain noncoincidence of man with himself: this "disproportion" of self to self would be the *ratio* of fallibility. "I should not be surprised" if evil has entered the world with man, for he is the only reality that presents this unstable ontological constitution of being greater and lesser than himself.

It is in *Fallible man* where we could listen to Ricœur's constant refrain that emphasizes the fragility of the human condition. This fragility that is built in the constitution of the human being has been elaborated through the notion of perspective.

This article will focus on the notion of perspective which Ricœur has analyzed in *Fallible man*. It will present a more systematized study and comprehensive notion of perspective. This is done to show the place of perspective in perception, in the use or production of insights/knowledge and, especially, in the performance of action. It will try to show, in Ricœur's terms, humanity's disproportion as well as its struggle to rise above limits by way of and in pursuit of freedom.

PERSPECTIVE AS INHERENT IN THE HUMAN CONSTITUTION

Ricœur sees perspective as part of the fundamental structure of being human. His philosophical anthropology shows the inherent character of perspectival limitation and mediation in perception, reflection, and action.

Perspective is intrinsic to the thinking process, something inherent to cognition; and cognitive activity manifests thought as a process of thinking about something. This is not all, however, for to think is not only to think per se about something but to think about something "from the perspective of," to contemplate is to contemplate on something "from a specific perspective," and to examine is to examine something "from a certain perspective."

When we talk of perspective, we also speak of action done from a given starting point, for a human being is an actor. Moreover, a human being also feels and desires. In fact, affectivity leads to some actions. Thus, we speak of a human being as thinking, feeling, or desiring and acting from a certain perspective. In fact, we should say that every human being is always "a human being living from within a certain perspective."

Perspective, thus, is a limiting notion, a "trap"[1] that keeps one from infinite or limitless expansion. One is finite in such an inevitable limitation. The human being, however, is not solely finitude. One is also infinite in the sense of one's drive for self-transcendence. One is a mixture, a mélange of possibilities of fault

and virtue, of what is base and noble. The human being is a locus of incongruous attributes.

The notion of perspective itself carries the meaning of disproportion between finitude and infinitude. Perspective is not only a limiting point but also an expansive point of departure.

Ricœur is concerned not so much with the concrete manifestations of fault but with fallibility. He (1986, 133) says: "What is meant by calling man fallible? Essentially this: that the possibility of moral evil is inherent in man's constitution." This inherent constitution he further qualifies as not to constitute a metaphysical evil, as in Gottfried von Leibniz (2007), but only a limitation. In fact, he does not label the human being as "ontological nothingness"; the understanding of the human being as limited already shows that one is something rather than nothing. Ricœur (1986, 134) focuses on the disproportionate character of the human being as between being and nothingness; and he identifies the disproportionate relation of finitude to infinitude as "the ontological 'locus' which is 'between' being and nothingness, his 'quantity of being'. It is this relation which makes human limitation synonymous with fallibility."

Fallibility also "designates the occasion, the point of least resistance through which evil can enter into man...." (Ricœur 1986, 141). The human being is precisely capable of evil because of his/her inherent limitation, but where lies this limitation of perspective in humans? What does Ricœur mean when he says that the fallibility of the human being is in one's perspective?

In discussing Ricœur's notion of perspective, we are neither entering into a wider discussion about his larger project on the topic of the philosophy of the will, nor focusing our interest on the notion of human fallibility. There is no need for Ricœur to remind us of our own fallibility. What interests us is Ricœur's discourse on perspective and its manifestations in the power of cognition and the will. It is Ricœur's idea that we investigate the phenomenological method he is using. From such an investigation, we expect to make a case on moral/ethical cognition as essentially perspectivally mediated, as limited and infinite, as a mélange of regionalism and universality. We also expect to strike into the point of departure of every cognition and commitment as well as the instances where its direction may be seen as expansive or contractive. Ricœur's ideas, therefore, will serve as a frame of reference in every effort to enter into dialogue and mutual-understanding.

Cognitive perspective

The first instance where Ricœur discusses the notion of perspective is in the process of knowing. By doing this, he is not reducing the human being into a knowing being. Rather, it is Ricoeur's (1986, 17) decision

> ...to situate all of man's characteristics with reference to the one which a critique of knowledge brings into focus. This leaves everything to be worked out subsequently; but all the questions, those concerned with doing and those with feeling, if they are preceded by an investigation

> of the power of knowing, are placed in a special light which is suitable for a reflection on man.

Ricœur opts for an approach that brings out the critical function of "transcendental reflection"—an examination of the power of knowing—in the task of a critical test of the basic categories of anthropology, especially those that characterize action and feeling. He (1986, 17) speaks of such priority in the following terms: "In that the first 'disproportion' liable to philosophic investigation is the one which the power of knowing brings into view."

Secondly, and because it is a reflection that begins with the object or with the thing, the specific disproportion of knowing is discovered in such a reflection upon the thing. For Ricœur (1986, 18), reflection always takes the phenomenological method. It is not introspection but one that "takes the roundabout way via the object." This is also the reason why he calls it *transcendental*, i.e., "it brings into view on the object that in the subject which makes the synthesis possible." *Synthesis* here means power, the strength of reflection, which Ricœur calls "consciousness" represented in a correlate as in saying "consciousness of," i.e., intended consciousness. From here, we move toward an understanding of the mélange in cognitive perspective.

The idea of finitude and infinitude is discovered in the process of knowing, reflection. This process shows to somebody the dual tension between receiving the presence of objects or things and the power of determining the meaning of these things. This idea of the dual tension is important since we take it for granted that we know many things when in fact our knowledge of many things is predefined by our culture or by other people who came before us and had the privilege of defining, in the past, the meaning of things today. To illustrate, before one understands music as music for people's entertainment, who predefined this? Our predecessors, of course. Some people recently have considered music as useful for raising healthy orchids in their nurseries. Thus, music cannot just be as limited to human entertainment, but also be given another dimension as one important for horticulture. Other peoples of the future may also attach newer meanings or dimensions to their music. As Ricœur (1986, 19) says:

> To receive is to give oneself intuitively to their existence; to think is to dominate this presence in a discourse which discriminates by denomination and connects in articulate phrasing.

It is in this perceptiveness considered as receptivity or passivity where cognitive limitation lies. Thus, it is passivity to stick to a singular use of music even if this is the primary meaning of music that gets into our head. This passivity, however, could be inevitable since perception is always a perception of some-body: "my finitude consists in the world appearing to me only through the mediation of the body" (Ricœur 1986, 20).

The world appearing to me is the correlate of my existence—my bodily existence that is "primordially an opening onto the world," and receptivity is the initial mode (primary mode) of bodily mediation between me and the world as

the object of my reflection. My finitude consists in the finitude of receiving, in the perspectival limitation of perception. This limitation "causes every view of [something]...to be a point of view on [something]...." Here we are forced to perceive an object in its one-sided, limited, unilateral presentation without our power of being able to demand that it discloses itself from all points of view, from all angles of vision. However, this fact of insurmountable limitation in perception is only noticed or realized if one reflects on the object's appearance as an appearance from a certain point of view.

If one realizes that perception is only a portion of an appearing object then one is brought back to a realization of the self as a finite center of perspective. Here we are taught about the structure of bodily mediation in perception as basically opening and limiting, expanding and contracting. We are open to things through our body but limited in our perception as we receive objects from a zero origin. Even if we are also capable of movement and thus able to change our vantage point, that does not change the initial narrowness of our vision, which is always determined and limited. In Ricœur's (1986, 23) own words:

> This peculiar finitude is identified with the notion of point of view or perspective...it belongs to the essence of perception to be inadequate, to the essence of this inadequacy to refer back to the one-sided character of perception, and to the essence of the one-sidedness of the thing's profiles to refer back to the otherness of the body's initial positions from where the thing appears. The fact that the free mobility of my body discloses this law of essence to me does not make the law unnecessary. It is precisely necessary that motor spontaneity originate from a zero origin. To perceive from here is the finitude of perceiving something. The point of view is the ineluctable initial narrowness of my openness to the world.

Although the notion of perspective shows the limit of perception as well as every person's existential condition as flawed, we may regard it positively as an element of fundamental human condition without which openness to wider horizons cannot materialize. It is in a human being's grounding where the expansive reflex is able to get launched. A transcendental effort always starts from the base.

From here we go to the "other line" of the disproportionate poles in the process of reflection—a line which he designates as a movement of transgression of finitude. *Transgression* here means a stepping over or breaking through. This transgression of finitude is itself initially realized in a human being's self-knowledge of finitude. By calling the perspectival limit in receptivity "finitude," the subject has gone beyond the limitation. The human being has given a "name" to the actual limitation and is able to transgress that condition.

The giving of unity of the perceived object (e.g., a piece of wood) by the signifying label of a word (e.g., fuel) discloses two tensions: the perspectival limitation of looking at an object and the subject's power of signifying which opens up "truth" that has not been disclosed in that limited manner of appearance. The subject's significations are determinations that transgress this limitation of

perspectival perception and bring into light the meaning of the objects in concrete terms or concepts beyond the limit of a simple receptivity. Thus a person may give the new meaning of "utility" to the things dumped to him by another as trash.

A person does not only think when s/he signifies but also affirms freedom in his/her speech. In fact, even in receptivity we may be able to say that our receptivity becomes a transgression by our own express affirmation or denial of the object. In signifying, we observe the assent and the specific moment of speech that is already an action.

The subject is not limited to meaning-giving, in the process of signifying, but he is also brought to self-affirmation. In the noun-giving speech, we already know the built-in intention of the subject, his/her freedom. Thus, says Ricœur (1986, 37) "freedom and truth form the noesis-noema pair which is constitutive of human affirmation," but there lies in signifying and affirming the tension between finitude and infinitude because in signifying I give expression to freedom and to the truth only at the risk of error. I am at the mercy of the objects' unilateral appearing and of my perspectival limitation even in my own determinations where lies the breach between the finite and infinite, the disproportion between sensations and understanding.

Affective perspective

A study of the affective aspect of perspective is needed for a better understanding of the notion of perspective. The latter aspect (understanding or cognitive) becomes less abstract in the light of the former (affective).

Affective perspective is not a value-laden notion meant to criticize the effect of affection/passions to cognition. It is rather a qualifying term to designate that which enables one to apprehend things with interest. Affective perspective forms part of the human structure; it is especially anticipated in human decisions.

Human projects pass the preliminary stages of determinations of the will through motivations, which precisely are fired by affectivity/passions. The human will, driven by motivations, is passionately driven insofar as the things that appear are interesting.[2] The world is interesting to us because we are affected by it, and we leave a trace of our affections as we express them in our practices. Thus, things are always affectively grasped and appropriated by our motivation-driven decisions as these things also impress on us their significance. Motivation, however, is a new kind of receptivity characteristic of finitude. Ricœur (1986, 52) says:

> It is no longer the sensory receptivity of seeing and hearing, but the specific receptivity which signifies that I do not create my projects radically from nothing, no more than I produce my objects through creative intuition. I posit actions only by letting myself be influenced by motives.... A human freedom is one that advances by means of motivated projects.

Human freedom, thus, is not an infinite quality. It is based on the structure of fallibility and openness to infallibility. We talk, therefore, about the receptivity

of perception and desire in the exercise of freedom as being determined within the mélange of finitude and infinitude that is characteristic of humanity; but desire is also an openness "to all the affective tones of things that attract or repel me." This intentionality of desire is what Ricœur calls its clarity of orientation and election, a "drive toward." In the experience of (in)tending toward things as interesting things "I am out of myself," but more often than not, there is an opacity in the intending affectivity that is confused in its movement. This opacity is the reverse of openness to things; it is the "underside of the intentionality of desire." When one is stuck in the feeling of desire and not in the openness, finitude in perspective is displayed. This happens when the "total and undivided experience of my body...is no longer traversed by all its intentions toward the world but turned back into itself, no longer a mediator but feeling itself. Coenesthesis is precisely this" (Ricœur 1986, 54).

Coenesthesis is like being caught up in the feeling of one's own mood and seals up the mediation of the body to the world. Instead of openness, there is an affective closing which may turn towards bigoted decisions. It is in this affective closing that a person is no longer able to communicate creatively to others and to the things in the world. Thus we describe people as being caught up in their own emotions when they are so affected by intense desires. One who feels joy every time s/he prepares food for orphans cannot make that feeling of joy as the sole basis of helping orphans. The sadness felt in seeing abandoned orphans could also fire one's actions, even if one does not feel glad in the prospect of preparing meals for them.

To limit oneself to a single affection would confuse the medium for the object. Instead of taking heed of affectivity's centrifugal direction, it becomes an overpowering object of desire. The object of desire becomes a force that blocks one's intention or movement towards the world of other beings—preventing openness and the virtue of listening to develop. Instead of opening up towards infinite possibilities the self is then enclosed in the finite desire that does not go beyond itself. Ricœur (1986, 23) writes: "It is here that egoism, as well as vice, finds its opportunity: out of difference or otherness it makes a preference."

Preference, however, when it is still open to others is not finitude; it is finitude when preference is restricted and limited to self-love. Then it is "affective finitude, difference in love with itself" (Ricœur 1986, 37).

Practical perspective

The same ideas of perspectival finitude and infinitude apply to the habitual behaviors that mark people's actions. We are open to infinitude insofar as our habits enable us to be disposed to the world of diverse activities in a moral feeling of respect, but we are finite in our shrinkage to habits that become rigid and inflexible. In our contraction to inflexibility we dispose ourselves to atrophy. The liberating powers of habits as virtues no longer serve the purpose of giving ease and spontaneity to our actions. Power is translated into impotence when habits are contracting rather than expanding. Rather than freedom, only bondage is served

in hardened habits. The yoke of narrowmindedness presses on the person's neck as he rigidly submits to his own ossified habitual actions.

To make one's habit of taking antibiotics the standard approach to curing disease cannot be justified when we realize the self-limiting character of many infections (e.g., bronchial infections). Many new practices (new habits) would point to more wholesome ways of promoting a person's health. For example, by cultivating a person's sense of self-importance and, thus, one's joy and interest in life, the use of many kinds of drugs could be avoided. When helped to reach a more vigorous state through natural remedies (e.g., massage, reflexology, food supplements, herbal-based medicines, etc.) that encourage or usher presence, touch, company, joy, and hope, one's body could easily combat harmful organisms that invade it. Thus, with one's natural defenses fortified by the desire to live, antibiotics could be needless, if not a useless expense.

The idea of perspective as the locus of finitude and infinitude is, thus, expressive of human nature's openness to the choice of either wholeness or decay. As one closes within perspectival limitations, narrowmindedness, navel-gazing, and imbalance follow; when one sincerely reaches out to other perspectives or points of perspectival limits, broadmindedness, expansiveness, and sensitivity to others result. There is no question of abandoning one's perspective, however. A healthy perspective-formation is even necessary. What is wrong is the giving in to the finite movement of a developed perspective that is already closing in on itself. It is thus desirable to cultivate the infinite side of perspective, which can only be done actively and with determination. This infinite movement of perspective is always an openness toward the external world—basically an initiative to a reversal of perspective itself.

Practice itself, when oriented to the world of other practices, can be a cure to ossified habits. We are constantly reminded of creativity as being able to go beyond conventional ideas or frames of reference. Instead of insisting on a reproduction of habitual practices or rituals we are informed that simple but determined strokes of unconventionality could trigger off a transformation process that could change not a few people's outlook and behavior. It would be simplistic to generalize this idea to apply as well to hypostatized macrostructures or ossified *habitus*.[3] But on the level of personal habits, "leftist" practices can serve to deal with rightist bigotry. A kind of openness to reversibility of perspective should thus be espoused to ensure that one will not be caught up in the undesirable direction of perspective.

Reversal of perspectives, however, cannot be considered as a determined process built into human nature. It is something to be sought for in conjunction with the aspiration for wholeness itself; for one creates a fissure in that aspiration for wholeness when one blocks the way to reversal of perspective. Thus openness to all possibilities of reversal of perspective implies the need for sincerity and respect for others—qualities that build and maintain an ideal setting for the meeting of different perspectives. A relentless self-critique is, therefore, necessary to examine and escape from the fallible vector of ossified practices. More so, everyone needs one another not only for indispensable mutual criticism but also for the process of building up/working out a setting for ideal communication

where the qualities of openness, sincerity, and thoughtfulness are cultivated at the same time (for a more creative and transformative communication).

SIGNIFICANCE OF RICŒUR: PERSPECTIVE IN OTHER AUTHORS

We can highlight the significance of Ricœur's idea of perspective by constrasting it with the views of other philosophers. Ricœur's idea differs from Nietzsche's *perspectivism* (1968). While Nietzsche's position emphasizes the seemingly intractable position of perspective in the "lust for power" or the "will to dominate," Ricœur brings out the ambivalence (fallibility/infallibility) of perspective which may take a variety of forms such as offered by the notions of cognitive, affective, and practical limitations and efforts to go beyond these limits. For example, interpretations of reality may be predetermined by cultural units, like values and norms, that function as "forestructures" of understanding which may or may not help intercultural communication or dialogue.

The Heideggerian "forestructures" of understanding[4] is synthesized in the Gadamerian concept of *prejudice* which may further illustrate the historicality of Ricœur's philosophico-anthropological abstraction of perspective. Gadamer insists on this as the locus of the problem of understanding and interpretation. The challenge of the Enlightenment against prejudices lodged in tradition and authority creates difficulties in finding a place for prejudice in hermeneutics. One cannot, however, perpetuate the meaning of prejudice as domination, authority, and violence. Therefore, Gadamer (1975, 246) insists on rehabilitating the concept of prejudice, which recognizes that "there are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do justice to man's finite, historical mode of being." Etymologically, *praejudicium* is not necessarily negative. It refers to the presuppositions, predispositions, preconceptions, and anticipations that precede judgment. This is the natural condition of being human—to be prejudiced, in the sense of having a "historically effected consciousness" (*Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein*). Thus, we would not classify as negative prejudices those sets of attitudes and beliefs which enable a certain group to lead a meaningful life and possess a sense of identity. Prejudice is not to be opposed to *reason* since it is a component of understanding itself. The idea of pure reason cannot hold since it is not in accord with the very finite historical character of man. It is an error to maintain that there are only unfounded prejudices. In fact, there are legitimate prejudices. This is a significant claim of Gadamer for he gives a place to presuppositions in the hermeneutical task. Since there is no presuppositionless understanding, there can be no presuppositionless interpretation. Gadamer is saying here that the ontological status of prejudice precedes its treatment as a problem in knowledge. This treatment is similar to Ricœur's approach to his analysis of the notion of perspective.

The prejudices of every individual, says Gadamer (1975, 245), constitute the historical reality of his being. Since this could put understanding, interpretation, and action under the rubric of prejudice, every prejudice must be examined for its legitimacy. This means that prejudice [e.g., the ideology (in the positive sense) of a specific tradition] can have a positive or negative value for understanding or relationships. Every prejudice structures the understanding in its openness or

closedness to other beings. Prejudice is the starting point, the perspectival point, which broadens into an expansive horizon. A broadening of horizon is not allowed by those prejudices that prevent expansive movement because of their closed character. It is in their character of being barriers to dialogue that some prejudices may be illegitimate.

The dialogical interplay of prejudices is the condition for the evolution of higher levels of openness and reciprocity. This dialogical interplay expands into a mutual recognition that could unfold a process, a cultivation, of fusion of horizons, which, when taken as a historical task, assures people's reflexive openness to truth.[5]

The attitude of openness, of humble questioning and, ultimately, of accepting one's finitude is fundamental to every interpretative task. This is raised by Gadamer, as well as Ricœur, as a transcendental condition for the very possibility of human communication: reciprocity (see Ingram 1985, 45). Without the ideal human virtues of self-knowledge and respect for others, "dialogue" becomes a mere tool that any bigot can use to legitimize his claim.

Horizon as the "range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point" (Gadamer 1975, 269) naturally requires a ground from where expansion originates—this is provided by every legitimate prejudice.[6] Any form of conversation or dialogue requires this for it cannot avoid the forestructures of understanding, which constitute its historicality.

Negatively, prejudices can contract one's vision and close one's horizon from openness to other beings. Those illegitimate prejudices (like the Klu Klux Klan's beliefs that preempt every form of discussion about equality) are the constant objects of critical hermeneutics. However, they are usually overlooked by a too optimistic regard for a "fusion of two horizons" seen only through the model of harmony (see De Schrijver 1982, 36). Besides, the more tyrannical hidden prejudices have to be brought to the surface so that every text "can be isolated and valued on its own." Yet openness to others speaking to us is also the condition for becoming conscious of our own prejudices historically built into our perspectival nature as human beings.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing study has given a more general view on the nature of perspective as constitutive of humanity. It teaches us that a person's or a nation's or a culture's own terms are the same terms that could also open up to a variety of perspectives. It shows how one must regard the rules and resources of peoples, cultures, and religions as sources of fallible and infallible truths and of fallible and infallible good. Principles of interreligious dialogue or guidelines for interracial peacemaking processes may benefit from this discussion which may serve as background and foreground horizons of understanding and practice.[7]

The failure to recognize the implications of perspective for dialogue and peacemaking processes will confuse a subject's sincere and courageous approximation of the hidden in perspectival limitations for infinite objectivity or truth itself. In fact, when we consider the perspectival limits of, say, practice,

many of the claims to universality and absoluteness are really perspectives "in love with themselves."

NOTES

1. Ricœur (1986, 133) seems to protest against an understanding of finitude that gives it a moral quality: "Our whole preceding analysis tends to rectify this ancient proposition in a precise way: the idea of limitation as such cannot bring us to the threshold of moral evil."

2. Habermas's (1987) notion of human interests as socially concrete subjective and objective interests (technical-instrumental interest predominant in bureaucratic and commercial settings; practical-interpretive interest which characterizes conduct in a life that seeks mutual understanding, and emancipatory interests in struggles for liberation from dependencies and rigid structures) could also enlighten us about our topic.

3. Introduced by Marcel Mauss (see Wikipedia 2011) as "body techniques" (*techniques du corps*) and further developed by Norbert Elias in the 1930s, *habitus* can sometimes be understood as those aspects of culture that are anchored in the body or daily practices of individuals, groups, societies, and nations. It includes the totality of learned habits, bodily skills, styles, tastes, and other nondiscursive knowledges that might be said to "go without saying" for a specific group—in that way it can be said to operate beneath the level of ideology."

Habitus refers to both the social habitus of a certain group of people and the personal habitus of an individual. In general, *habitus* refers to the generalized and habitual schemes of thought, appreciation, and action. It points to the habitual dispositions of a society which every individual would internalize and become part of oneself as a second-nature ability—his or her predispositions or determined typical ways of looking or viewing at things, ways of evaluating taste or values, ways of approaching an event or problem through action, prefigure everything that a group or a person may think, appreciate, or do. Within a simple society a predominantly traditional shared *habitus* still thrive. In urban settings, more disjointed and multiple forms are found where an individual's *habitus* may mirror a complex environment (see Fletcher 1997, Elias 1994, and Bourdieu 1977 and 1984, 170ff.).

4. Composed of the elements of *fore-having, fore-sight,* and *fore-conception*: the "*...something we have in advance*—in a *fore-having* [*Vorhabe*]...; the "*...something we see in advance*—in a *fore-sight* [*Vorsicht*]...; the "*...something we grasp in advance*—in a *fore-conception* [*Vorgriff*]...," which ground all interpretations (Heidegger 1962, 191ff).

5. See Gadamer's (1975, 10-19 and 267-68) treatment of the concepts of *Bildung* and *Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein.*

6. Gadamer (1976, 9) writes:

> It is not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our being. This is a provocative formulation, for I am using it to restore to its rightful place as a positive concept of

> prejudice that was driven out of our linguistic usage by the French and English Enlightenment.... Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply the conditions whereby we experience something—whereby what we encounter says something to us.

7. The "Decalogue for dialogue" (see Swidler 1984) must recognize the need for an ELEVENTH COMMANDMENT, which may be: *Each participant must come to understand that dialogue is intrinsically bound by humanity's movement towards either fallibility or infallibility.* Below are the ten commandments of dialogue:

> FIRST COMMANDMENT: *The primary purpose of dialogue is to learn, that is, to change and grow in the perception and understanding of reality, and then to act accordingly...*
>
> SECOND COMMANDMENT: *Interreligious, interideological dialogue must be a two-sided project—within each religious or ideological community and between religious or ideological communities...*
>
> THIRD COMMANDMENT: *Each participant must come to the dialogue with complete honesty and sincerity...*
>
> FOURTH COMMANDMENT: *In interreligious, interideological dialogue we must not compare our ideals with our partner's practice,* but rather our ideals with our partner's ideals, our practice with our partner's practice...
>
> FIFTH COMMANDMENT: *Each participant must define himself.... Conversely—the one interpreted must be able to recognize herself in the interpretation...*
>
> SIXTH COMMANDMENT: *Each participant must come to the dialogue with no hard-and-fast assumptions as to where the points of disagreement are...*
>
> SEVENTH COMMANDMENT: *Dialogue can take place only between equals....* Both must come to learn from each other...
>
> EIGHTH COMMANDMENT: *Dialogue can take place only on the basis of mutual trust...*
>
> NINTH COMMANDMENT: *Persons entering into interreligious, interideological dialogue must be at least minimally self-critical of both themselves and their own religious or ideological traditions.*
>
> TENTH COMMANDMENT: *Each participant eventually must attempt to experience the partner's religion or ideology "from within"....*

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MEANING AND VALUE OF WORK: A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE

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The thesis that there is a reciprocal relationship between human beings and work—i.e., although man controls work, he may find in it either fulfillment or degradation—has its roots in the Marxist theory of alienation. This paper, therefore, tackles this problem from a Marxist perspective. It examines Marx and Engels's analysis of the history and causes of human alienation by presenting their views on human nature and how work is related to the individual's search for meaning and fulfillment. The two—man and work—cannot be separated, for doing so leads to alienated work *(production alienation) and* alienated worker *(self-alienation). Hence, the problem of employee satisfaction has to be dealt with from the perspective of how employees experience their relation to their work.*

INTRODUCTION

American workers' dissatisfaction at all occupational levels has been reported since the publication of *Work in America* (1972), which is the most comprehensive research on the state of the working conditions in the United States, funded by the Federal Government. William Shaw and Vincent Barry (2010, 493) say that "Studies since the 1970's have cited workers' feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation and self-estrangement or depersonalization." In addition to financial and managerial factors, moral and psychological reasons are also identified as significant factors that influence job satisfaction since work affects the total well-being of employees (see "Amercans' job satisfaction..." 2010). Today, fewer workers consider their jobs interesting. People's value about their work has changed substantially and "[s]ince the mid-1980s, teens have become less likely to see work as a central part of their lives" (Wray-Lake et al. 2009, 1). Devoid of any deep sense of meaning or value, any human activity becomes absurd, insignificant, inauthentic as a life pursuit, or even unbearable. "What gives 21st century work its distinctive flavour is the mixture of material and non-material motives and issues that shape it. There is evidence that what people want from work is to feel useful, fulfilled at least to some degree, to participate in a collective effort" (Overell 2009, 14). Businesses then, must have an interest in the question pertaining to the meaning of work if they want employees who

are productive and satisfied because they find their jobs existentially and humanly fulfilling.

The thesis that there is a reciprocal relationship between people and work—i.e., while man controls work, the latter also shapes and affects him to the extent that he many find in his work either his own fulfillment or degradation—has its roots in Karl Marx's theory of alienation. In the book *Humanism and business*, Aktouf and Holford (2009,113) argues:

> Marx's theory of alienating work is a solid framework from which to start our reflections on the synergies required for real productivity within traditional industry. Restoring a sense of meaning to work, as well as permitting the appropriation-commitment sought by corporate culture and total quality depends on nothing less than putting an end to...alienated work.

In tackling the meaning and value of work from a Marxist perspective, the paper examines Marx and Engels' analysis of the history and causes of human alienation. It presents their views on human nature and how work is related to the individual's search for meaning and fulfillment.

MARXIST VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE

As for many contemporary philosophies, Marxism views human beings as a being-in-the-world. Rather than dealing with human reality abstractly, Marx and Engels (1973, 289) view it in a concrete, scientific, and historical way, "not in any fantastic isolation of abstract definition, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions." The human person is subject to the infinite process of development according to dialectical laws. Marx says that there is no universal nor static nature or essence which is essentially the same and shared by all individual human beings throughout history. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no human essence. What he rejects is its abstract conception as fixed, stable, and ahistorical. The potentiality and perfectibility of human beings do not presuppose any nature that is already constituted.

To view man concretely is to analyze him according to the external factors that circumvent his being as he exists in a particular place and time. One's personality and character are dependent on what kind of environment he lives in and with what kind of people he associates with. Hence, "the essence of the human person is the ensemble of the social relations" (Marx and Engels 1972, 109). Marx (with Engels 1973, 299) elaborates his understanding of human essence in the following way:

> This sum of productive forces, form of capital and social form of intercourse, which every individual and generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what philosophers have conceived as "substance" or "essence" of man.

To say that an individual is an ensemble of social relations means that he or she is a being-in-relation to another being. The person is not an "abstract being squatting in an outside world. Man is the 'world of man', state, society" (Marx 1975, 244).

It is evident that Marx makes a distinction between human nature in general and human nature as historically modified. To illustrate the difference, he says that the need for food and nutrition belong to human nature in general, but the kind of food eaten and the manner in which it is prepared and consumed differ from one culture to another. There are constant drives that belong to our nature in general (e.g., hunger and sex) and there are relative ones that exist only in a certain historical period (e.g., the drive to acquire money). To deal with human nature in general is not to view human beings in abstraction. *Human nature* in general refers to human capabilities and qualities in themselves, as raw potentials to be actualized or perfected. It is that which makes humans recognizable as humans. On the other hand, to analyze human capacities and qualities as realized and perfected in every stage of human history is to view human nature as historically modified. Human nature in general and human nature as historically modified are related but distinct—the latter is the particular or specific expression of the former in a given sociohistorical period.

HUMAN NATURE IN GENERAL

From a general perspective, a human being is first and foremost, a natural being. He or she is a corporeal, living, sensuous, and a passionate organism like plants and animals, but possesses natural and vital powers such as emotions, instincts, desires, impulses, perception, and mental faculty. According to Marx, human consciousness is a product of evolution and an inevitable consequence of the dialectical process. The mind, which is the seat of human consciousness and mental powers, represents the leap or the nodal point in the evolution of life. From the very beginning, human beings are subject to natural laws and there is no way they can be independent from the latter.

A human person can be an objective being in so far as he is a natural being. To be an objective being means to have an object outside of oneself. A "non-objective being is unreal, nonsensical thing—something merely thought of...a creation of abstraction" (Marx and Engels 1972, 116). Nature is the human object, both in thought and action. This is so because, first, human actions are motivated by human needs. But man's needs must be connatural to himself. In other words, he needs a real, corporeal, sensuous object, i.e., a natural object. Hence, only nature can satisfy human needs. Nature is also the object and the source of human labor. "The worker," according to Marx (with Engels 1972, 72), "cannot create anything without nature, without the *sensuous external world.*" Production is a collaboration between humans and nature.

Marx and Engels (1972, 73) say that nature is man's inorganic body. This means that since humans live on nature, they must continuously be in contact with nature in order to survive. Human beings are a part of the natural world; they are dependent on nature, not only for their material needs but

also for their creative needs. Man's relation to nature is both passive and active. As the object of his needs, his relation with it is passive, but as the object of his activity, his relation with it is active. Man is not an enemy of nature or nature an enemy of man.

> [A]t every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly. (Engels 1972, 242)

"But man is not merely a natural being: he is a human natural being. That is to say, he is a being for himself. Therefore, he is a species-being, and has to confirm and manifest himself as such both in his being and in his knowing" (Marx and Engels 1972, 75). The term species-being (*Gattungswesen*) was first developed by Ludwig Feuerbach. It expresses man's consciousness, not only of himself, but also of his oneness with his fellow humans. For Marx, man's species-being is something that he commonly shares with all individuals. His realization of his species-being is made possible by contemplating himself in a humanized world—the world created by his own actions. Man has the capacity to objectify himself freely and consciously and to set himself as an object of his thought. Through his work, man projects his nature. A part of the personality of the worker is manifested or transmitted through his work in such a way as all goods and services resulting from human labor bear a distinctly human imprint. When man produces something to satisfy his basic needs out of the raw materials which nature provides, the product appears not anymore as something distinct from him, but as his creation, his object, and his image. "The object of labor, therefore, is the *objectification of man's species life*: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually but also actively, in reality and therefore he contemplates himself in the world he has created" (Marx and Engels 1972, 76).

Marx defines objectification as the process in which human products become social human objects, relating people to one another. "Our objects in their relation to one another constitute the only intelligent language we use with one another" (Marx 1988, 38). This is made possible by the fact that, as has been mentioned, human personality is incorporated in the products of human labor. By contemplating the human personality embodied in these things, man encounters his fellow humans and realizes his species-being. "In other words, man becomes a real species-being, a real community when together with his fellowmen he can contemplate his works which have become embodied over and against himself in the objective communal world" (Hoeven 1976, 77). Man is a species-being not only because he has self-awareness, but also because he has the capacity to conceptualize others as members of his own species. He can realize not only himself but his fellow humans as well in the objectified world created by his own actions. As a species-being, man transcends his own individuality and becomes a universal being who considers himself as a part of a class possessing a common general nature.

Aside from universality, another characteristic of man as a species-being is his capacity for conscious activity. Because he is an objectifying or object-creating being, man can alter things and conditions according to his own design. He can express himself through a free and conscious act. As a free agent, he has mastery over his life-activities and can fashion his products according to his desire, taste, satisfaction, and needs, unlike animals whose activities are completely determined by their instinct and biological needs.

Finally, humans are also social beings. Man is insufficient to secure all by himself the totality of his needs (physical and nonphysical). Man needs another in order to live and be a fulfilled person. His essence is relational—not simply a personal relation of one individual to another, but a relation of man with his species.

Man's need to objectify himself is a social need per se because it is tied up with the desire to create for others and to feel that his products satisfy another's want. The process of human production is a social endeavor. The full mastery of nature is realized not by one's effort alone, but through cooperation with others. A totally isolated worker is an illusion, something unhistorical and absurd, except in very rare occasions. Thus, human production and human consumption are both social in nature.

HUMAN NATURE AS HISTORICALLY MODIFIED

Human history is the story of man's progressive self-realization. As has been said, human beings are modified by circumstances and distinguished by the existing economic mode. This modification is both in terms of human capabilities and needs. Human needs are insatiable, man desires everything he produces. As forces of production improve man's capacity to produce, it likewise increases his capacity to consume.

The history of man is a never-ending process of development. Marx and Engels think that most societies pass through the same series of historical stages and will arrive at a common "end" which is a classless and a stateless society.[1] In their theoretical orientation as history analysts, Marx and Engels are evolutionists. In fact, Engels (1972, 71) was surprised by the parallels between Marx's theory of history and that of Henry Morgan, the main proponent of historical evolutionism in America. But like Morgan's theory, Marx and Engels cannot readily account for historical variations in different societies. They cannot offer substantial reasons why some societies regressed or even became extinct, while others progressed without passing through identical stages.

Society in Marxist view undergoes a series of transformation from one stage to another. Each stage is characterized by a definite mode of production. A change in the mode of production results in transition of society from one stage to another. One stage supersedes another in such a way as one decays before the commencement of its successor. Every form of society has its own issues of exploitation, alienation, and oppression.

Human history begins with the stage of primitive communism which Marx calls the *gens organization*. At this stage, human society is bound by blood

relationship. "The social structure is, therefore, limited to an extension of the family; patriarchal family, chieftains, below them the members of the tribe" (Marx and Engels 1972, 115). People are still nomadic except in certain areas where there is superabundance of resources. There is no private property and the only important source of production is the land which is never scarce. Everything is shared and appropriation is based on one's needs. Individuals act as proprietors of the land by virtue of their membership to the community. Labor distribution and social classes are organized by means of kinship relation. Aside from agriculture, other means of livelihood are hunting and fishing. At this stage, there is no self-realization in terms of human production. The latter is hampered by the forces of nature and the lack of technological knowledge and instrument. Man is still connected by an umbilical cord to nature and to the tribal community.

The second stage of history is characterized by the appearance of the family, private property, and slavery. During the primitive commune, there is still no sexual prohibition and no real family structure. With the introduction of father-rule and monogamy, the family becomes an organizational unit. Accumulation of private property is due to the invention of different tools for agricultural production. These tools enable some to produce more than what they need. The excess of one's production becomes his private property or wealth. Those who produce more become richer than those who produce less. The appearance of slavery modifies the existing production process and soon becomes its basis, the primary force of production.

> The slave did not sell his labour power to the slave owner, any more than the ox sells its services to the peasant. The slave together with his labour power is sold once and for all to his owner. He is a commodity which can pass from one hand of one owner to that of another. (Marx and Engels 1972, 205)

Slavery becomes the first form of exploitation "peculiar to the ancient world; it is succeeded by serfdom in the middle ages and wage labour in the more recent period. These are the three great forms of servitude characteristic of the three great epochs of civilization" (Engels 1972, 234).

The continuous presence of wars and feuds leads to the accumulation of lands in the hands of a few powerful individuals. "War, formerly waged only in revenge for injuries or to extend territory that had grown too small, is now waged simply for plunder and becomes a regular industry" (Engels 1972, 220). Land becomes abundant while laborers are scarce. Peasants seek protection under the hands of powerful landlords who in return, designate them as permanent cultivators of the land. This dependence becomes hereditary and common everywhere. A new economic mode of production appears to supplant the slavery system which becomes too inefficient and limited.

During the third stage of history, serfs become the direct producing class and the primary economic agents. They are chained to the plot of the land they cultivate. If the landowners sell the land to another individual, they remain in the property and serve their new master. A serf has to produce for himself and for his landlord.

With the increase in population, conquest of new territories, discovery of new sources of wealth, and the development of commerce and industry, production for internal consumption has to be replaced by production-for-trade. By this time, production in large scale is an invaluable resource. To accomplish this, commercial and industrial agriculture has to be introduced, machines have to be utilized. Labor ceases to be a way of life but a source of profit. Exchange of goods becomes widely practiced. Gradually, class polarization develops. Manufactured things and items of all sorts become increasingly in demand. The serfs abandon their self-sufficient production in favor of a more marketable system. They migrate to cities, learn skills, and become artisans. To protect themselves against country lords and regularized their manner of trade, they form closed guilds and association. But the industrial production under the monopoly of these guilds soon no longer suffices for the increasing demands of new markets.

The main purpose of Marx's analysis of history is to trace the emergence of the capitalistic mode of production in the early societies. Capitalism marks the fourth stage of history where class conflict is intensified between the capitalist class who owns the means of production and the proletariat or the wage-earner class.

> The modern worker, the proletariat, is a product of the great industrial revolution, which, particularly during the last hundred years, has totally transformed all modes of production in all civilized countries, first in the industry and afterwards in agriculture too, and as a result of which only two classes remain involved in production: the capitalists who owns the means of production, raw materials, and provisions, and the workers who own neither means of production, nor raw materials, nor provisions, but first have to buy their provisions from the capitalists with their labour. (Marx 1973,134)[2]

The capitalist system has one main feature: it is a commodity-producing system. All commodities require human efforts to produce. A commodity has value only because it is a fruit of the worker's sweat and labor. Human labor is, thus, the common denominator of all kinds of commodities. How is profit or surplus value extracted from commodities? To create surplus value, the capitalist must employ a commodity whose use creates value. Machines and raw materials do not create use-value for such items are constant capital—they add no more value to the product than what they lose in the production process. If surplus value cannot come from nonhuman sources, it can only come from the human work itself. The accumulation of surplus value constitutes the alienation and exploitation of the proletariat. Marx rules out the possibility that wage will increase as the capital increases. Businesses compete with one another in the market, so they have to sell their products as cheaply as possible. To keep the wages low, they will maintain a high rate of unemployment by using machines extensively or hiring children. In addition, to maximize the productive power of the workers, capitalists will resort to a rigid division of labor. Production

process will be divided into specific small tasks entrusted to different people who act either simultaneously or alternately.

HUMAN NATURE ALIENATED

Marx describes several forms of alienation (religious, metaphysical, juridical, political, etc.) but, in whatever usage, the concept conveys one basic meaning: it suggests a separation, a loss, an estrangement or a divorce of what must be united. It is the separation of something which belongs to man, a nonhuman objectification of himself, an estrangement from his own essence. For the purposes of this research, the discussion is limited to economic alienation—the alienation of persons in the process of production.

Hegel (1977, 805) identifies the term alienation with objectification. For him, it is the objectification of the Spirit or the Idea into the external world. The spirit or the Idea is alienated from its productive activity when the world is realized and projected as extrinsic to the Idea. Marx transforms the Hegelian theory and applies it to this own dialectics. He reduces the extension of the term to denote nonhuman objectication. For Marx, a thing is not alienated from man just because it is externalized, but only when it is related to man in an alien and strange way. Another difference between Marx and Hegel is that for the latter, when something is alienated, it is simply given up. For Marx, when something is alienated, whether a product or an activity, it is possessed by someone who should not own it. Every alienation is a form of oppression and exploitation.

Alienation is inherent in every society which practices private ownership of the means of production. That is why "the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of private tribal society, holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between the exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes" (Engels 1964, 5). Alienation, nevertheless, is a reversible process. An alienated being can still be de-alienated. Self-realization in Marxist terms is to set the human being free from the bondage of alienation.

Product alienation

Passive product alienation happens when the product of the worker is made and disposed of without his control. "The product of labour is labour that has solidified itself into an object, made itself into a thing, that objectification of labour" (Marx and Engels 1972, 78). The worker incorporates his being in his produce, the product of labor is made into the human image, it carries an imprint of the human worker. It is but natural that the product should belong to the worker who produces it for it is the objective embodiment of himself and, thus, far from being alien to him. But in a capitalistic society, the product of one's work ceases to be an expression of the workers' personality. The workers have no control over the end and the means of their productive activity, much less over the profit that is derived from it. Instead, they are directed and compelled to suppress all individuality in the process of production through division of labor, work standardization, assembly lines, or brand

imaging. Occupation that is merely mechanical involving little use of mind or cooperative planning does not constitute self-creation. In failing to realize his creative potentials, the worker is also prevented from experiencing the social world as an objectification of his productive activity and, consequently, he feels strange in the world he has created through his own labor. The fruits of human work do not reveal a human person but a dehumanized and an automated social system.

When the product of workers does not only exist as something independent but is also absorbed into capital—those impersonal forces that oppose and oppress the workers themselves—the outcome is active product alienation. This means that as work creates capital by producing surplus value, it continuously reproduces its relation to capital. "[Work] creates capital, i.e., a kind of property that exploits the wage labour, and that cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage labour for fresh exploitation" (Marx and Engels 1964, 82). Human products appear as alien powers which sap not only the human energy but the richness of nature as well. Human beings, plants, animals, and minerals are all transformed by the capitalistic system into commodities, valued for their capacity to produce profit. The more one works, the poorer and less human he or she becomes while the capitalists get richer.

> The laws of political economy express the estrangement of the worker in his object, thus; the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more value he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes, the better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more civilized his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the mightier labour becomes, the duller becomes the worker and the more he becomes nature's bondsman. (Marx and Engels 1972, 73)

Production alienation

The worker is not only alienated from his product but also from the very act of production. In fact, the first type of alienation can only be the effect of this for alien products can only be produced by an alien activity. "How could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but the summary of the activity, of production" (Marx and Engels 1972, 73).

During the time of their work, workers do not belong to themselves but to their employer, i.e., they lose their autonomy as free and rational beings. Their very capacity to work has been sold to the capitalists. Labor time is not anymore a part of their lives but a form of sacrifice.[3] Work is not a means for self-expression but simply a means to make a living. The employer assumes absolute control both in respect to the manner in which the workers discharge their functions or in respect to the end results of their actions. "[E]mployees are reduced to muscular or mental stores of energy who accomplish tasks that are never their own but

always dictated and imposed by bosses, assembly line speed, and corporate goals and strategies" (Aktouf and Holford 2009, 113).

The division of labor causes the worker to be arbitrarily and artificially separated from his capacity for creative activity. The production process has been apportioned in such a way as each employee has only a particular, limiting sphere of activity. Divorced from its essential ends, work ceases to be man's species-activity.

Self alienation

Alienation is an obstacle to human development. This is because human beings have no permanent or fixed essence as pointed out earlier. For this reason, humanization and dehumanization are both possible. Humanization is the process of developing human nature to the fullest while the dehumanization is its opposite—it is the estrangement of man from himself, a distortion of his personality, and a reduction of his nature to a nonhuman level.

In a capitalistic society, ordinary workers are degraded into the animal level because their work ceases to be a conscious and a creative activity. It usually becomes a highly routinized process which requires the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired skills. As they perform the same function repeatedly, many workers lose their capacity to accomplish other tasks, making them dull and stupid. In their work, humans are not anymore self-conscious beings—they are alienated from their species-life (Marx and Engels 1972, 68). As they sell their labor power to the capitalist, workers become a mere merchandise. They are priced and sold in the market, subject to the law of supply and demand, and "exposed to all vicissitudes of competition and to all fluctuations of the market" (Marx and Engels 1964, 68) like any other article of commerce.

According to Istvan Meszaros (1975, 177), Marx "often emphasizes that there are two sides of the same human alienation. Labor is the 'objectless subject' whereas capital is the 'subjectless object'." Capitalists are alienated from their nature as self-conscious and social beings as they become the personification or the embodiment of capital, stripped of all human qualities. They fail to see their employees as fellow humans for many capitalists have identified being with having and in so doing, they are estranged from their species-being. Their only purpose for existence is the maximization of profit.

Social alienation

Social alienation is the logical consequence of individual alienation, for a society composed of alienated members is an alienated society as well.

Man's social nature can only be developed in a society where members live in unity and harmony. But behind the whole structure of capitalistic system stands those who do not work but own everything and those who work but do not own anything. Such society is conflictive. It is divided into those who have and who do not have, the exploiters and the exploited, the capitalists and the proletarians.

"It is not merely a political conflict between two parties standing on the ground of one society, but a conflict between two societies" (Marx 1973, 252).

A capitalistic society is not only a conflictive society but also an egoistic one. Most people are motivated by greed and self-interest. Workers enter the process production having in mind the desire for a higher salary. Businesses invest in the process of production in order to accumulate profit. Relations of people in the workplace are impersonal, business-like, competitive and, at times, hostile or antagonistic (Cf. "At work, no more Mr. Nice Guy..." 2011).

> It is the basic presupposition of private property that man produces only in order to own. The purpose of production is to own. It not only has such a useful purpose, it also has a selfish purpose. Man only produces in order to own something for himself. The object of his production is the objectification of his immediate, selfish need. Man—in his wild, barbaric condition—determines his production by the extent of his immediate need whose content is the immediately produced object itself. (Marx 1988, 36)

MEANING AND VALUE OF WORK

If there is any human activity that can relate man to himself, to nature, and to his own species, it is no other than human work. Marx defines work as the conscious use of his natural faculties which results, directly or indirectly, in the transformation of nature for the purposes of satisfying some form of human need. As a conscious and teleological act, it is always accompanied by reason. Animal activity cannot be considered work.[4] It is only proper for man to work as a self-conscious being. In every phase of human history, work assumes different forms. In the early stages, work simply refers to manual activities like house building, hunting, and agriculture, but as civilization advances and man assumes different ways of living, work becomes more complex. It cannot be considered anymore as an individual activity but a joint effort of so many people. It involves not only the actual production process but also the conceptual, scientific, sociological, and technical preparations as well as postproduction efforts, such as marketing, promotions, delivery, and others. Nonetheless, no matter what proportion of mind, muscle, or will is involved, the meaning and value of work come from the very fact that it is an activity which emanates from the person.

To be human for Marx is not simply to be born with a rational nature. "Man as he sprang originally from nature was only a mere creature of nature, not a man" (Engels 1972, 261). Human nature is a product of human activity, not heredity. "Birth only provides a man with his individual existence and constitutes him in the first instance only as a natural individual" (Marx 1975, 175). To be human means to work, to produce something, to imprint a human image in something that is nonhuman. Through work, man learns to distinguish himself from animals.

> Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion, or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence. (Marx and Engels 1972, 114)

While Marx and Engels accept the Darwinian evolutionary theory of human origin, they criticize Darwin for failing to recognize the role played by work in human evolution. Engels writes that it is by means of work that humans evolved from primates. Man started to work when, from being a tree-dweller ape, he assumed terrestrial residence and began to stand erect. This posture freed his hands from locomotion and enabled him to make use of flints and sticks as tools for food-gathering. This is the first form of human work, when humans tried to accomplish mastery of nature by his planned activity. "Mastery over nature began with the development of the hand with labor, and widened man's horizon at every new advance" (Engels 1972, 253). Aside from the hands, other human organs such as the eyes, tongue, brain, teeth, and ears were developed as humans engaged in various activities for production. The organ of speech evolved due to the human need to communicate in the productive effort. "In short, men in the making arrived at a point where they had something to say to another. The need led to the creation of the organ" (Engels 1972, 231-32). The development of his capacity to speak led to the enlargement of the brain. "Just as the gradual development of speech is inevitably accompanied by a corresponding refinement of the organ of hearing, so that development of the brain as a whole is accompanied by a refinement of all senses" (Engels 1972, 255). In order to fully satisfy his growing needs and efficiently exploit the richness of nature, humans began to associate and collaborate with each other. Because of this, humankind emerged from the condition of primitiveness or barbarity into an organized society. Work is not only instrumental in humanizing nature but in humanizing man, too. It is man's species-activity, i.e., it is not only an activity of man but his self-activity.

> By the combined functioning of hands, speech, organs and brain, not only in each individual but also in society, human beings became capable of executing more and more complicated operations, and were able to set themselves and achieve higher and higher aims. The work of each generation itself became different, more perfect and more diversified. Agriculture was added to hunting and cattle raising; then came spinning, weaving, metalworking, pottery and navigation. Along with trade and industry, art and science finally appeared. Tribes developed into nations and states. Law and politics arose, and with them that fantastic reflection of human things in the human mind—religion. (Engels 1972, 258)

Work is not simply the transformation of matter but the objectification of human nature. It is an extension of human personality, a self-realization of the worker in terms of his faculties, intention, and power. Through work, humans

accomplish their objective or goal. They become aware of their powers and bring them to perfection.

Marx emphasizes not only the personal character of work, but its social character as well. The goods and services which result from the work process are all meant to satisfy human needs. Since one's product is the object of another's need, humans enter into a network of relationship through work. Soon, this work relationship will assume social relationship. Human society is a society of work. "It follows that a certain mode of production or industrial stage is always combined with a certain mode of cooperation, or social stage" (Marx 1975, 277). When humans work, they do not only provide themselves with a means of livelihood. They also participate in the process of transforming society and developing institutions. "Work then not only makes man a man but also a fellowman, a member of human society" (Koren 1967, 32).

CONCLUSION AND SIGNIFICANCE

A human person is truly a *Homo faber* or a working being from the Marxist perspective. Through work, man realizes and confirms his authentic nature. Work acts as the mediator between man and nature, man and the social world, and man and his species. It is work which relates the different components of human life which would otherwise disintegrate on account of tensions and conflicts arising from the concrete circumstances of one's daily living. In Marx's (1988, 38) own words:

> (1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality and its particularity and in the course of the activity I would have enjoyed an individual life; in viewing the object I would have experienced the individual joy of knowing my personality as an objective, sensuously perceptible and indubitable power. (2) In your satisfaction and your use of my product, I would have had the direct and conscious satisfaction that my work satisfied a human need, that its objectified human nature, and that I created an object appropriate to the need of another human being. (3) I would have been the mediator between you and the species and you would have experienced me as a reintegration of your own nature as a necessary part of yourself; I would have been affirmed in your thought as well as your love. (4) In my individual life I would have directly created your life; in my individual activity I would have immediately confirmed and realized my true human and social nature.

From this analysis, work acquires a central reference point both socially and existentially. This means that on the social level, the real solution to many of our social problems can be achieved only by promoting an authentic culture of work where the latter is valued for its own sake, and by giving primary considerations to the welfare of human workers in formulating our laws and economic policies. But more importantly, on an existential level, work holds the key to the fundamental question of the meaning of life. In contemporary terms,

authentic human existence is possible only if human beings work and find fulfillment in it. Part of the Marxist analysis of history is to demonstrate how a specific historical stage of production prevents the full development of the workers' potential or *telos*, thus alienating them not only from one another but even from their own nature. While the subject of Marx's investigation is primarily the factory system of his day, he is more concerned with something that is more fundamental: the unquantifiable human cost of profit-centered economy. In their projection of a future communist society, Marx and Engels present their vision of an authentic de-alienated human existence: Work will cease to be a class attribute, for everyone will work for his or her needs. The division of labor will be based on the individual's natural talent, physical ability, choice or inclination, not something socially mandatory. Monotonous and tiresome jobs will be rotated and distributed to all employees; hence, labor will lose its class character. Through job rotation, workers will be able to develop more skills and become more productive. There will be no need for big salaries to motivate people to work because the latter will be the primary want of life, a real expression of oneself, once the means of production ceases to be individually appropriated.[5] The economy will be cooperatively and centrally planned. Through this, Marx believes that the competition to acquire goods and unemployment in the midst of unexhausted labor force will be avoided. Working hours will be reduced to the shortest term possible. Not bothered by inflation, unemployment, overwork, or inadequate wages, workers will have enough time to rest, recreate, and pursue further training and education to enhance their knowledge and skills. Each one will contribute to the wealth of the nation according to his own ability. Wage system will be abolished and replaced by a more equitable sharing and redistribution of profit. All will be assured of employment, old-age pension, security for illness and injury, and other social benefits.

Unfortunately, Marx and Engels did not present a detailed and systematized socioeconomic program in their writings. They gave no specific guidelines on how the political order should be organized, how production and exchange will take place, or how investment, taxation, and foreign trade will be conducted. The revolutionary measures mentioned at the end of section two of *The communist manifesto* (1964) are not meant to be a sort of blueprint for all societies that have gone through the proletariat revolution. Aside from the reason that Marxism focuses on historical analysis and the critique of the capitalist system, social and economic principles, as the manifesto states, have to be adapted to the prevailing historical conditions. Furthermore, there are human shortcomings and imperfections that may not be eliminated through the socialization of the means of production alone. Some occupations may be socially necessary but may not contribute to full human development or may not satisfy one's expectation of a meaningful employment.

The main significance of the Marxist model, however, is that it demonstrates that work is good not only as a means to an end but, more importantly, as an end in itself, for work is essential in order to live an authentic human existence. As man's self-activity, work is intrinsically related to man and vice versa. "[U]nder this model, the challenge for business ethics is to

articulate the type of work that can foster the full development of human potential" (Shaw and Barry 2010, 465). The corporation has to be a place of partnership and dialogue. It becomes the responsibility of businesses to provide employees with meaningful work and to explore creative ways of business organization and occupational conditions that would make it possible for them to find fulfillment in their working life.

NOTES

1. The future communist society is the end of the capitalist history and at the same time the beginning of a new history when human life is consciously determined by authentic and nonalienated individuals.

> *Communism* [is] the *positive* transcendence of *private property*, or *human self-estrangement*, and therefore [is] the real *appropriation of the human essence* by and for man; communism therefore [is] the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e. human) being—a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development. (Marx and Engels 1972, 84)

2. While the capitalism of today is much different from the capitalist system ushered in by the 19th-century industrial revolution, which Marx and Engels analyzed, few could question the relevance of Marxism in pointing out the defects of capitalism: unbridled competition leading to monopoly, profit-centeredness, consumerism, and neglect of the workers' welfare. Consider the following facts:

> *The assets of the world's top three billionaires are greater than those of the poorest 600 million people on the planet.
>
> *Globally, there are seventy thousand people who possess more than $30 million in financial assets—enough to fill a large sports stadium. Half of the world's 587 billionaires (enough to fill a large disco area) are Americans, whose wealth increased collectively by $500 billion in 2003 alone. They possess the same amount of wealth as the combined gross domestic product of the world's poorest 170 countries.
>
> *More than a third of the world's people (2.8 billion) live on less than two dollars a day.
>
> *1.2 billion people live on less than one dollar a day.
>
> * The average compensation in 2004 for the CEOs of the top 367 U.S. companies was $11.8 million, up from $8.1 million in 2003. On average, CEOs in 2004 made 431 times what a production worker made, up from a 107:1 ratio in 1990 and a 42:1 ratio in 1982.
>
> *CEO pay has increased by 300 percent over the last fifteen years, whereas wages have increased in the same period by only 5 percent (and minimum wage workers have seen their pay fall 6 percent). If wages had kept up with the percentage increase in CEO pay, in 2004

the average pay for production workers would have been $110,136, instead of $27,460.11.

*The top 20 percent of American households control 83 percent of the nation's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent of Americans control only about 17 percent of the nation's wealth.

*A total of 34.6 million Americans in 2002 (12.1 percent of the population) lived below the official poverty line (which is set absurdly low), and 8.5 million of them had jobs. Overall, Black poverty is double that of whites. (D'Amato 2006)

3. "[W]orking hours make time an artificial, saleable product as opposed to the natural time of the seasons, the cycle of day and night, and the biological clock" (Aktouf and Holford 2009, 113).

4. Marx and Engels (1972, 76) remark:

> Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal's product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man confronts his product. An animal forms objects only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object.

5. Here is what Magdoff (2006, 23) says:

> A frequently met objection to the communist vision is the claim that people will work only if driven by an economic motive. Yet this notion is refuted by many of the primitive societies we know about, where non-economic work incentives predominate: social responsibility, tradition, desire for prestige, and pleasure in craftsmanship. Given the record of past changes in people's attitudes to the community and to their work, it is reasonable to assume that human nature will adapt, and adapt with enthusiasm, to a social order based on cooperation, elimination of a rigid division of labor, and the opportunity for a fuller development of the individual.

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STATUS OF AND DIRECTIONS FOR "FILIPINO PHILOSOPHY" IN ZIALCITA, TIMBREZA, QUITO, ABULAD, MABAQUIAO, GRIPALDO, AND CO

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This paper compares and contrasts the taxonomies and periodizations of Filipino philosophy by seven Filipino scholars—Fernando Zialcita, Florentino Timbreza, Emerita Quito, Romualdo Abulad, Napoleon Mabaquiao, Rolando Gripaldo, and Alfredo Co—in order to determine the various philosophical discourses that are present in the country, and in order to pinpoint which of these discourses offer higher developmental potentials for Filipino philosophy. For each taxonomy and periodization, this paper looks into: (1) the period covered, (2) the inclusivity or exclusivity of the classification/configuration, (3) the taxonomizer/periodizer utilized, (4) the implied structure of the classification/configuration, (5) the problematic classes/periods suggested by the classification/configuration, and (6) the promising classes/periods suggested by the classification/configuration. This paper concludes with an attempt to synthesize the thoughts of these seven scholars in a comprehensive taxonomy of Filipino philosophies and to give an overall assessment for each of these philosophies' strengths and weaknesses.

INTRODUCTION

At present—in twenty-first century Philippines—"Is there a Filipino philosophy?" has not only become something that is born out of sheer ignorance of what is going on in the Philippine intellectual landscape, specifically during the past three or four decades, it has also become an insult to the toils of Filipino thinkers who trod the path of philosophizing and sufficiently answered the same question many years ago. The fact is that there are a number of different conceptions of the term *Filipino philosophy*, each containing its own idiosyncratic problems and challenges as well as promising potentials (see Demeterio 2002). Instead of bothering ourselves with such a retrogressive question, we can more profitably invest our time and effort in exploring these Filipino philosophy concepts or forms, and by identifying their respective weaknesses and strengths, we glean

some insights on which should be set aside for lack of developmental potentials and which should be pursued seriously for their brighter developmental promise. In this way, we can shift the philosophical discourse away from the ossified question "Is there a Filipino philosophy?" towards the loftier and more relevant inquiry, "How can we contribute to the further development of these different forms of Filipino philosophy?"

This paper looked into the taxonomies and periodizations of Filipino philosophy forms as laid out by reflective, incisive, and thorough researches undertaken by the following Filipino scholars, who happened to ponder on the modes of existence of Filipino philosophy:

- Fernando Zialcita—an anthropologist, cultural critic, and cultural historian at the Ateneo de Manila University;
- Florentino Timbreza—a retired philosophy professor and university fellow at De La Salle University;
- Emerita Quito—a professor emeritus of philosophy and university fellow at De La Salle University and formerly a professor of philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas;
- Romualdo Abulad—a philosophy professor at the University of San Carlos and formerly at De La Salle University;
- Napoleon Mabaquiao—a philosophy professor at De La Salle University, and formerly at the University of the Philippines-Diliman;
- Rolando Gripaldo—a retired philosophy professor from De La Salle University and the Mindanao State University; and
- Alfredo Co—a philosophy professor and Sinologist at the University of Santo Tomas.

Such a roll of Filipino philosophy scholars does not pretend to be exhaustive and final. But it is arguably comprehensive enough to jumpstart a comparative retrospective discourse along this kind of philosophical research.[1] This paper focuses on the specific works of the aforementioned seven scholars that presented their respective taxonomy or periodization, including carefully selected works that could serve as effective intertexts. In this paper, *taxonomy* is taken to mean as the "synchronic," in the Saussurian sense of the word, classification of philosophical discourses; and *periodization* as the "diachronic" or chronological configuration of the same discourses. For each of the taxonomies/periodizations of these seven intellectuals, this paper looks into: (1) the period covered, (2) the inclusivity or exclusivity of the classification/configuration, (3) the taxonomizer/periodizer utilized, (4) the implied structure of the classification/configuration, (5) the problematic classes/periods suggested by the classification/configuration, and (6) the promising classes/periods suggested by the classification/configuration. For its conclusion, this paper attempts to synthesize the thoughts of these seven scholars in a comprehensive taxonomy of Filipino philosophy forms and make an overall assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of each form.

TAXONOMY OF ZIALCITA

The earliest Filipino scholar who problematized the mode of existence of Filipino philosophy seems to be Fernando Zialcita, who in 1971 wrote the essay "Mga anyo ng pilosopiyang Pilipino" ("Forms of Filipino philosophy").[2] Nicanor Tiongson, a literary and cultural critic, translated this essay into Filipino. It was published in the anthology of the psychological theorist, Virgilio Enriquez (1983), entitled *Mga babasahin sa pilosopiya: Epistemolohiya, lohika, wika at pilosopiya ng Pilipino* (*Readings: Epistemology, logic, language and Filipino philosophy*). Zialcita's synchronic taxonomy covered what appeared to him in the late 1960s and early 1970s as contemporary philosophical activities. His research was exclusivist in the sense that he ignored a number of local discourses that for him should not be part of "Filipino philosophy." The implied structure of his taxonomy is as follows:



Figure 1. Interpretive Construction of Zialcita's Taxonomy of Filipino Philosophy

Since Zialcita presented a two-level taxonomy, he used two sets of taxonomizers. A *taxonomizer* is a category or principle that is utilized by the taxonomer in breaking up a given class into distinct but smaller classes.

First-level taxonomizer: Zialcita's (1983, 318) first-level taxonomizer is the binary "content/method" (see letter a and number 1 in Figure 1) that divides Filipino philosophy into content-based discourses and method-based discourses.

Second-level taxonomizer: For his second taxonomic level, Zialcita did not split further his method-based discourses; but he divided further his content-based discourses, using as his taxonomizer the phenomena that appeared to him in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the main concerns of Filipino philosophy.

In effect he talked about three types or forms of Filipino philosophy, namely:

Filipino philosophy as a method (see number 1 in Figure 1)**:** This is something nonexistent yet, and Zialcita hoped it would emerge from the writings of Filipino philosophers. He (1983, 321) explained: "*...dahil wala pa ni kalahating daang taon ang ating tradisyon sa pilosopiya, hindi pa lumitaw ang pamamaraang ito, ngunit ito'y tiyak na lilinaw gaya ng nangyari sa pintura at sa kultura, sa musika at sa sayaw*" ("...it is because our philosophical tradition

is still less than half-a-century old that such method has not surfaced yet, but it will certainly emerge as what happened to painting and sculpture, to music and dance"). It is something that can be grasped inductively after reading the accumulated writings of serious Filipino philosophers of the future time.

Filipino philosophy as critique of political and economic structures (see number 2 in Figure 1)**:** This is a content-based philosophy that examines political and economic structures of Philippine society and culture. It emerged during the late 19th-century propaganda movement from the critical atmosphere of European Enlightenment and acquired more powerful frameworks from the thoughts of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Mao Zedong during the 1960s. Being Russian-, European-, German-, and Chinese-inspired, many doubted its "Filipinoness." But Zialcita (1983, 323) justified this kind of Filipino philosophy: "*...natural lamang na humiram ang pantas ng mga teorya sa mga dayuhan, tulad ng nangyari sa Pilipinas nitong ilang mga nakaraang dekada. Ngunit kung igagalang niya ang kanyang bayang sinusuri, isang pilosopiyang Pilipino rin ang lilitaw*" ("...it is but natural that a thinker borrows theories from foreigners, like what happened in the Philippines during the past decades. But if he respects the country that he is scrutinizing, then a Filipino philosophy may sprout").

Filipino philosophy as interpretation of Filipino worldview (see number 3 in Figure 1)**:** This is a content-based philosophy that addresses such questions as "Who is the Filipino?", "What is the Filipino worldview?", and "What are the Filipino values?" This kind of philosophy followed the pathway carved earlier by Filipino social scientists and scholars in the humanities who were energized by the nationalism of Claro M. Recto and who discovered the incongruencies between Western theories and local realities. Zialcita explained that this kind of Filipino philosophy is geared towards constructing a discourse that would give the Filipinos self-respect and confidence, would shield them against the imperialistic cultures, and would serve as the basis for expressing themselves as a people. However, due to the anthropological and sociological appearance of its primordial problems, many doubted its philosophic nature. Zialcita was in fact dissatisfied with how this kind of Filipino philosophy was done in his time. He (1983, 324) suggested: "*Sinuri rin niya (pantas) ang pananaw-sa-mundo ng Pilipino upang malaman kung paano ito magamit ng Pilipino upang lalo niyang maipahayag ang kanyang sarili at umunlad sa isang mundong umuunlad*" ("The philosopher also examines the Filipino worldview so that it can be used to fully explain himself and make progress in this progressive world").

Zialcita tended to see all three types as promising pathways in developing Filipino philosophy. Since his taxonomy is exclusivist, it is highly probable that he simply ignored the otherwise developmentally problematic discourses.

TAXONOMY OF TIMBREZA

Two decades from the writing of Zialcita's essay, Florentino Timbreza wrote his reflections on Filipino philosophy. They are contained in the essays: "Pamimilosopiya sa sariling wika: Mga problema at solusyon" ("Philosophizing through one's own language: Problems and solutions") (2008a), "Mga

tagapaghawan ng landas ng pilosopiyang Filipino" ("Pioneers of Filipino philosophy") (2008b), "Pilosopiya bilang tagasuri ng kulturang Pilipino" ("Philosophy as critic of Filipino culture") (2008c), and "Pag-unawa sa pilosopiyang Filipino" ("Understanding Filipino philosophy") (2008d).[3] Similar with what happened to Zialcita, Timbreza's synchronic taxonomy covered what appeared to him from the late 1970s to the late 2000s as contemporary philosophical activities. His research was also exclusivist in the sense that he did not bother about a number of local discourses that for him should not be part of "Filipino philosophy." It is worth noting that among the seven scholars this paper studied, Timbreza was the first to write his analysis in the Filipino language. The implied structure of his taxonomy is as follows:



Figure 2. Interpretive Construction of Timbreza's Taxonomy of Filipino Philosophy

Since Timbreza presented a three-level taxonomy, he used three sets of taxonomizers, which are as follows:

First-level taxonomizer: Timbreza's first-level taxonomizer is the binary "critique/substance" (see letter a and number 1 in Figure 2), that divided Filipino philosophy into critical and substantive discourses.

Second-Level Taxonomizer: For his second taxonomic level, Timbreza did not break further his critical discourses; but he further divided his substantive discourses, using as his taxonomizer the binary "material/method" (see letters b and c in Figure 2).

Third-level taxonomizer: For his third taxonomic level, Timbreza further divided his materials-based discourses, using as his taxonomizer the binary "cultural/philosophical" texts (see numbers 3 and 4 in Figure 2). He also further divided his methods-based discourses, using as his taxonomizer the strategies

that he thought to be effective in hastening the development of Filipino philosophy (see numbers 4, 5, and 6 in Figure 2).

In effect he talked about six types of Filipino philosophy, namely:

Critical Filipino philosophy (see number 1 in Figure 2): This discourse is similar to Zialcita's Filipino philosophy as critique of political and economic structures, although Timbreza defined his critical Filipino philosophy as something broader than the Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist parameters set by Zialcita (see number 2 in Figure 1).

Filipino philosophy as reflections on Philippine texts and culture (see number 2 in Figure 2): This discourse is similar to Zialcita's Filipino philosophy as the interpretation of Filipino worldview (see number 3 in Figure 1). It must be noted that Timbreza is known as one of the foremost specialists in this kind of philosophizing. He constructed his discourses from the oral and written literature of the Filipino people, including myths, legends, epics, songs, folklore, riddles, rituals, folk dances, folk sayings, poetry, and the like; from the writings of Filipino intellectuals, such as Jose Rizal, Apolinario Mabini, Andres Bonifacio, Emilio Jacinto, and Benigno Aquino Sr.; and from his field researches, specifically interviews with the elderly and native Filipinos (Cf. Timbreza 2008d, 5).

Filipino philosophy as study of Filipino philosophical luminaries (see number 3 in Figure 2): Timbreza acknowledged that there are already pioneering individuals who pushed the frontiers of Filipino philosophy. Studying their thoughts would constitute a distinct form of Filipino philosophy. In his essay, "Mga tagapaghawan ng landas ng pilosopiyang Filipino" ("Pioneers of Filipino philosophy") (2008b, 24-33), he enumerated the leading representatives of this group: Ramon Reyes of Ateneo de Manila University, Emerita Quito of De La Salle University, Leonardo Mercado of the Society of the Divine Word, Manuel Dy of Ateneo de Manila University, and Romualdo Abulad of De La Salle University.

Indigenized Filipino philosophy (see number 4 in Figure 2): For Timbreza (2008d, 6), the process of indigenization is one of his three recommended strategies for the hastening of the development of Filipino philosophy. He proposed that there are two modes of indigenization: the exogenous and the indogenous. *Exogenous indigenization* refers to the use of Western and foreign concepts in order to explicate native realities, while *indogenous indigenization* meant the use of native concepts in order to explicate Western or foreign realities.

Intellectualized Filipino philosophy (see number 5 in Figure 2): For Timbreza, the process of intellectualization is his second recommended strategy for the hastening of the development of Filipino philosophy. Intellectualization is an idea that he probably borrowed from the linguists Andrew Gonzalez (1988) and Bonifacio Sibayan (1991) who advocated the intellectualization of the Filipino language, but he (2008d, 6) tweaked it into something that is geared towards the "upliftment, widening, and deepening of philosophical meanings from native thought and worldview through comparison with the great ideas and teachings of the famous teachers and sages of the whole world."

Filipinized philosophy (see number 6 in Figure 2): For Timbreza, the process of Filipinization is his third recommended strategy for the hastening of the

development of Filipino philosophy. This refers to the preferential option among Filipino philosophers to use the Filipino language. He did not only believe that the Filipino language will help Filipino philosophy to develop, because he was more importantly convinced that in view of the breadth and foundationality of philosophy, using the Filipino language in philosophizing would greatly help in the intellectualization of this language (2008a, 39).

Timbreza tended to see all six types of Filipino philosophy as promising pathways in developing Filipino philosophy.

TAXONOMY OF QUITO

The next Filipino scholar who problematized the mode of existence of Filipino philosophy was Emerita Quito (see Demeterio 1998), who in 1983 published the monograph entitled *The state of philosophy in the Philippines*.[4] Her synchronic taxonomy covered what appeared to her in the 1980s as contemporary philosophical activities. Her research was inclusivist in the sense that it encompassed all philosophical discourses in the country. The implied structure of her taxonomy,



Figure 3: Interpretive Construction of Quito's Taxonomy of Filipino Philosophy

the most complex and detailed among the six taxonomies/periodizations studied in this paper, can be gleaned in Figure 3.

Since Quito presented a four-level taxonomy, she used four sets of taxonomizers.

First-level taxonomizer: Her (1983, 9) first-level taxonomizer is the binary "academic/grassroots" (see letters a and b in Figure 3), that divided Filipino philosophy into academic philosophy and grassroots, or popular, philosophy.

Second-level taxonomizers: For her second taxonomic level, Quito further broke up academic philosophy using as her taxonomizer the binary "strict/loose" (see letter c and number 1 in Figure 3) into strict academic philosophy and loose academic philosophy. She (1983, 9-10) also further broke up grassroots or popular philosophy, using as her implied taxonomizer the binary "articulated/unarticulated" (see letter d and number 7 in Figure 4) into unarticulated folk spirit and articulated discourses on the folk spirit.

Third-level taxonomizers: For her third taxonomic level, Quito did not break up further her strict academic philosophy, as well as her unarticulated folk spirit. But she further divided her loose academic philosophy using as her taxonomizer the binary exposition/application (see letter e and number 6 in Figure 3) into expository philosophy and applied philosophy. She also further divided her articulated discourses on folk spirit using as her taxonomizer the main ways of articulately dealing with the folk spirit.

Fourth-level taxonomizer: For her fourth taxonomic level, she did not break further applied philosophy, description of the folk spirit, and appropriation of the folk spirit. But she further divided her expository philosophy using as her taxonomizer the phenomena that appeared to her in the 1980s as the main concerns of this type of Filipino philosophy.

In effect she talked about nine types of Filipino philosophy, namely:

Filipino philosophy in the strict sense (see number 1 in Figure 3)**:** This is something that is yet nonexistent but Quito hoped this would emerge in the near future (Quito 1983, 9-10). The quality and standard of such a body of works would be comparable to how philosophy is usually done and practiced in Western universities.[4]

Filipino philosophy as exposition of scholasticism/thomism (see number 2 in Figure 3)**:** This is an expository discourse on Scholasticism/Thomism that has the University of Santo Tomas as its geographic center (Quito 1983, 9 and 34). Quito (1983, 38) wrote: "This school considers as gospel truth the writings of the Catholic saint (Thomas Aquinas). Hence, there is no originality in this school; no new ideas are forged; Catholic ideas of the Medieval Ages are repeated with more or less depth."

Filipino philosophy as exposition of phenomenology and existentialism (see number 3 in Figure 3)**:** This is an expository discourse on phenomenology and existentialism that has the Ateneo de Manila University as its geographic center (Quito 1983, 34). These philosophical systems were apparently brought home by Filipino professors who studied in Europe and the United States.

Filipino philosophy as exposition of logical analysis (see number 4 in Figure 3)**:** This is an expository discourse on logical analysis that has the University of the Philippines in Diliman as its geographic center (Quito 1983, 34). This philosophical system was brought home by Filipino professors who studied in the United States and the United Kingdom. Quito (1983, 38) stated: this "school reduces all arguments into mathematical language, and rejects all philosophies that cannot be so reduced... It considers philosophy as a precise, scientific discipline

with a quasi-mathematical language. It highly reveres Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, and the Anglo-American school of formal logicians."

Filipino philosophy as exposition of Oriental philosophies (see number 5 in Figure 3): This is an expository discourse on the philosophies of India, China and Japan. Quito mentioned a professor named Benito Reyes of Far Eastern University as probably the earliest proponent of this type of Filipino philosophy (Quito 1983, 34-35).

Filipino philosophy as application of other philosophies (see number 6 in Figure 3): This philosophical discourse goes deeper than sheer exposition of foreign theories in the sense that it seeks to investigate local realities using these foreign theories as its theoretical framework. Quito (1983, 39) explained that the representatives of this kind of Filipino philosophy "believe that philosophy is not totally exempted from a humane utilitarianism that aims to generate happiness among men. Philosophy, for them, should descend from the ivory tower to be able to interact with contemporary problems of war, famine, terrorism, tyranny, etc. They believe that behind every moment—be it political or literary—there is always a philosophical idea to give it impetus and meaning." This broad discourse includes Zialcita's Filipino philosophy as critique of political and economic structures (see number 2 in Figure 1) as well as Timbreza's critical Filipino philosophy (see number 1 in Figure 2).

Filipino philosophy as unarticulated folk spirit (see number 7 in Figure 3): This discourse refers to the worldview of the Filipino people. Quito (1983, 10) elaborated: "This collective mind, this general attitude towards life, this concerted effort to acquire wisdom which is manifest on the popular or grassroots level constitutes the folk spirit (*Volksgeist*) of the Filipino."

Filipino philosophy as description of folk spirit (see number 8 in Figure 3): This philosophical discourse corresponds with Zialcita's Filipino philosophy as the interpretation of Filipino worldview (see number 3 in Figure 1) as well as with Timbreza's Filipino philosophy as reflections on Philippine texts and culture (see number 2 in Figure 2).

Filipino philosophy as the appropriation of folk spirit (see number 9 in Figure 3): If Zialcita defended Filipino philosophy as the description of the Filipino folk spirit or worldview based on nationalistic and political premises, Quito saw an epistemological significance in such an exercise in the sense that a thorough research on the folk spirit and worldview would give the Filipino researchers folk concepts, categories, theories, and methods that they may appropriate and use in formally and academically constructing a manifestation of Filipino philosophy in the strict sense. Quito (1983, 10) said, "[T]he folk spirit of the Filipino...should eventually emerge as the formalized philosophy on the academic level."

In as far as the project of ushering in the emergence of a strong Filipino philosophy, Quito tended to be unsympathetic to the concerns of expository philosophies (numbers 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Figure 3), and even to those of applied philosophy (see number 6 in Figure 2). She expected more from the grassroots (see numbers 7, 8, and 9 in Figure 3). Quito's holy grail of Filipino philosophy is the actualization of Filipino philosophy in the strict sense of the term (see number 1 in Figure 3).

PERIODIZATION AND TAXONOMY OF ABULAD

A year after the publication of Quito's book, Romualdo Abulad published an essay entitled "Options for a Filipino philosophy" (1984) in which he presented an incisive taxonomy using the binary "regressive/progressive" as his main taxonomizer. However, Abulad's more comprehensive schematization of Filipino philosophy is found in his essay entitled "Contemporary Filipino philosophy" of 1988.[5] Abulad's diachronic periodization that simultaneously nestled a taxonomy covered the academic manifestations of philosophical discourses from the Spanish period to what appeared to him in the middle of the 1980s as contemporary. His research may be considered inclusivist, although it is not as inclusive as that of Quito, as seen in the implied structure of his periodization and taxonomy (see Figure 4 below).



Figure 4. Interpretive Construction of Abulad's Periodization and Taxonomy of Filipino Philosophy

As earlier stipulated, this paper took the term *taxonomizer* as "a category or principle that is utilized by the taxonomer in breaking up a given class into distinct but smaller classes" and the term *periodizer* as the historical or chronological marker that is utilized by the historian to separate a temporal expanse into discrete periods or phases. Since Abulad's two-level schema is both a periodization and a taxonomy, he used periodizers for his first-level schematization and taxonomizers for his second-level schematization.

First-level periodizers: Abulad laid out his chronological account of Filipino philosophy using as his periodizers the transplantation of Scholasticism/Thomism into Philippine soil, the arrival of a multitude of more up-to-date philosophical system in the 1960s, the movement to indigenize Filipino philosophy, and the realization that the "Filipinoness" of given discourses need not be problematized by Filipino philosophers (see letters a and b and numbers 1 and 7 in Figure 4). These periodizers gave him his four periods: the first and second colonial phases, and the early and late indigenous phases.

Second-level taxonomizers: He did not further break up his first colonial phase as well as his late indigenous phase. But he further divided his second colonial phase using as his taxonomizer the most salient philosophical trends that he observed from the 1960s to the 1980s (see numbers 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 4). He also divided his late indigenous phase using as his taxonomizer the dominant ways of doing such a philosophical discourse (see numbers 5 and 6 in Figure 4).

In effect he talked about seven types of Filipino philosophy, namely:

First colonial phase of Filipino philosophy (see number 1 in Figure 4)**:** This philosophical discourse corresponds with Quito's Filipino philosophy as exposition of Scholasticism/Thomism (see number 2 in Figure 3), which is characterized by the more than three hundred years of dominance of the Scholastic/Thomistic way of doing philosophy.

Filipino philosophy as discourse on phenomenology and existentialism (see number 2 in Figure 4)**:** This kind of philosophizing also corresponds with Filipino philosophy as the exposition of phenomenology and existentialism mentioned by Quito (see number 3 in Figure 3).

Filipino philosophy as discourse on logicala Analysis (see number 3 in Figure 4)**:** This kind of philosophizing also corresponds with Filipino philosophy as exposition of logical analysis mentioned by Quito (see number 4 in Figure 3).

Filipino philosophy as discourse on other foreign theories (see number 4 in Figure 4)**:** Since phenomenology/existentialism and logical positivism/analytic philosophy are geographically centered at the Ateneo de Manila University and the University of the Philippines in Diliman, respectively, Abulad thought of Filipino philosophy as discourse on other foreign theories as something similar to what was happening at De La Salle University during the 1980s in which all sorts of philosophies, other than Scholasticism/Thomism, were seriously being discussed (Abulad 1988, 54-55).

Filipino philosophy as anthropological philosophy (see number 5 in Figure 4)**:** This philosophical discourse corresponds with Filipino philosophy as interpretation of Filipino worldview of Zialcita (see number 3 in Figure 1), with Filipino philosophy as reflections on Philippine texts/culture of Timbreza (see number 2 in Figure 2), and with Filipino philosophy as description of folk spirit of Quito (see number 8 in Figure 3).

Filipino philosophy as application of foreign theories (see number 6 in Figure 4)**:** This philosophical discourse corresponds with Filipino philosophy as application of other philosophies mentioned by Quito (see number 6 in Figure 3). Abulad cited the applied philosophical writings of Claro Ceniza, Roque Ferriols, and Quito as prime examples of this way of philosophizing (Abulad 1988, 59).

Late indigenous phase of Filipino philosophy (see number 7 in Figure 4)**:** This philosophical discourse is vaguely characterized as the Filipino academicians turning away from the agenda of the early indigenous phase. Abulad (1988, 60) wrote:

> I submit that we are now entering the second phase in the indigenization process of philosophy. Thinkers of this country will just have to keep on doing the thing which they have been called to do, without hardly the need to worry about whether the ideas they are giving birth to are foreign or Filipino. It is left to the future generation to determine whether we actually have produced a meaningful legacy, that is, one which no other nation can claim to be [its] own.

Abulad tended to be unsympathetic towards the concerns of the first colonial stage. He (1988, 54) emphasized: "The students of the early sixties were suffering from what I would call Scholastic suffocation and were beginning to reach out for new modes of thinking." He tends to be sympathetic towards the concerns of the other six modes of Filipino philosophy, and he seemed to base his greatest hope for the further development of Filipino philosophy on its late indigenous phase.

TAXONOMY OF MABAQUIAO

Using the exacting framework of logical analysis, Mabaquiao wrote an article entitled "*Pilosopiyang Pilipino: Isang pagsusuri*" ("Filipino philosophy: An analysis") in 1998 and another one entitled "*Isang paglilinaw sa kahulugan at kairalan ng pilosopiyang Filipino*" ("A clarification of the meaning and existence of Filipino philosophy") in 2012. It is his earlier paper that presents a more comprehensive taxonomy of Filipino philosophy.[6] In trying to pin down the appropriate referents of what for him was a nebulous term *Filipino philosophy,* Mabaquiao generated a number of interrelated and overlapping forms of Filipino philosophies. His taxonomy is exclusivist due to his agenda of eliminating the inappropriate referents of the term "Filipino philosophy." Like Timbreza, Mabaquiao also wrote his analysis using the Filipino language. The implied structure of his taxonomy can be gleaned from Figure 5.

Since Mabaquiao presented a three-level taxonomy, he used three sets of taxonomizers.

First-level taxonomizer: Mabaquiao's first-level taxonomizer is the binary "practical/theoretical" (see letters a and b in Figure 5) that divided Filipino philosophy into practical, or applied, philosophy and theoretical philosophy.

Second-level taxonomizers: One of Mabaquiao's second-level taxonomizers is the binary "political/axiological" that divided his practical philosophy into ideological and ethical philosophies (see letter a and numbers 1 and 2 in Figure 5). The other of his second level taxonomizers is the binary "medium/agent" that divided his theoretical philosophy into Filipino philosophy based on the medium used, and Filipino philosophy based on the agent doing such philosophy (see letters c and d in Figure 5).



Figure 5. Interpretive Construction of Mabaquiao's Taxonomy of Filipino Philosophy

Third-level taxonomizer: Mabaquiao did not further split his ideological, as well as his ethical, Filipino philosophy. But he further divided his medium-based Filipino philosophy into Filipino philosophy using the Filipino language and Filipino philosophy using Filipino concepts and categories by deploying as his taxonomizer the binary "concept/language" (see numbers 3 and 4 in Figure 5). He similarly divided his agent-based Filipino philosophy into Filipino philosophy constructed by a Filipino citizen and Filipino philosophy constructed from the point of view of a Filipino consciousness by deploying as his taxonomizer the binary "citizenship/psychological commitment to the nation" (see numbers 5 and 6 in Figure 5).

In effect he talked about six types of Filipino philosophy, namely:

Ideological Filipino philosophy (see number 1 in Figure 5)**:** Mabaquiao (1998, 207) defined this discourse as "*pananaw, teyorya, o sistema ng mga ideya na may layuning pulitikal: ang palayain ang bansang Pilipinas sa anumang uri ng pagka-alipin o pagka-api*" ("viewpoint, theory, or system of ideas with political intent: to free the Philippine nation from any kind of slavery or oppression"). This discourse corresponds with Zialcita's Filipino philosophy as the critique of political and economic structures (see number 2 in Figure 1) and with Timbreza's critical Filipino philosophy (see number 1 in Figure 2).

Ethical Filipino philosophy (see number 2 in Figure 5)**:** Mabaquiao (1998, 208) delineated the scope of this discourse: "*pumapailalim dito ang mga pagsusuri tungkol sa mga pagpapahalagang pinaniniwalaang likas sa mga Pilipino, tulad ng utang-ng-loob, kapwa, pakikisama, hiya, at kagandahang-loob*" ("under this are studies about the inherent Filipino traits/values like debt of goodwill/

gratitude, being with others, going along with others/getting along well with others, shame, and good inner self"). Such discourse is constructed from an inductive and extractive study of folk sayings and everyday Filipino statements. This discourse is geared towards the formalization and explicitation of the otherwise unexplored Filipino moral, ethical, and axiological mind frame. Mabaquiao's ethical Filipino philosophy is closely related with Zialcita's Filipino philosophy as interpretation of the Filipno worldview, with Timbreza's Filipino philosophy as reflections on Philippine texts and culture, with Quito's Filipino philosophy as a description and an appropriation of the folk spirit, and with Abulad's Filipino philosophy as anthropological philosophy (see number 3 in Figure 1, number 2 in Figure 2, numbers 8 and 9 in Figure 3, and number 5 in Figure 4, respectively).

Philosophy based on Filipino concepts and categories (see number 3 in Figure 5): This form of Filipino philosophy may be self-explanatory, but Mabaquiao qualified that the Filipino concepts and categories used in weaving such a discourse could either be *naturally, uniquely*, or *purely* Filipino. As Mabaquiao (1998, 208) said:

> *Ang pagiging likas ng isang konsepto ay tumutukoy sa natural na pag-usbong ng nasabing konsepto. Ang pagiging natatangi ng isang konsepto naman ay tumutukoy sa kawalan ng katulad ng nasabing konsepto. At ang pagiging puro ay tumutukoy sa kawalan ng impluwensya o pagkakahalo ng nasabing konsepto sa mga konseptong banyaga.* (The naturalness of a concept refers to its natural emergence. The uniqueness of a concept refers to the absence of its equivalent. And purity refers to the lack of foreign influences or admixtures to such a concept.)

Mabaquiao's philosophy based on Filipino concepts and categories is closely related to Timbreza's indigenized Filipino philosophy (see number 4 in Figure 2) and to Quito's envisioned Filipino philosophy as the appropriation of the folk spirit (see number 9 in Figure 3).

Philosophy in the Filipino language (see number 4 in Figure 5): This form of Filipino philosophy may also be self explanatory, but Mabaquiao (1998, 210) exerted some effort in explicitating its theoretical foundation:

> *May kinalaman sa relasyon ng wika at ng identidad ang kamalayan. Sinasabi na malaki ang nagagawa ng wika sa paghubog ng identidad ng isang kamalayan, dahil nakapaloob sa wika ang isang mundo ng tradisyon, o kaya ay ang wika ay isang depositoryo ng kultura.* (Consciousness has something to do with the relation of language and identity. It is said that language plays a great role in forming one's identity because inherent in language is a world of tradition, or because language is a depository of culture.)

This discourse is closely related to Timbreza's Filipinized philosophy (see number 6 in Figure 2).

Philosophy by a Filipino citizen (see number 5 in Figure 5): With this discourse, Mabaquiao proffered that all or any philosophizing that was or were undertaken by a Filipino citizen should be considered as part of the corpus of Filipino philosophy. Mabaquiao (1998, 211) remarked:

> *Kung titingnan natin ang mga tinatawag na Pilosopiyang Griyego, Pilosopiyang Tsino, Pilosopiyang Aleman, Pilosopiyang Ingles, o Pilosopiyang Pranses, mapapansin na ang isang katangiang taglay nilang lahat ay ang pagkamamamayan ng kanilang mga pilosopo ay naayon sa kanilang pambansang identidad ng kanilang pilosopiya.* (If we examine what we call Greek philosophy, Chinese philosophy, German philosophy, British philosophy, or French philosophy, we will notice that the one unique trait common among them is that the nationality of their philosophers is in accord with the national identity of their philosophy.)

Philosophy from the point of view of Filipino consciousness (see number 6 in Figure 5): Closely related with Mabaquiao's Filipino philosophy as philosophy based on Filipino concepts and categories, as well as Filipino philosophy in the Filipino language, is his sixth and last form of Filipino philosophy as something constructed from the point of view of Filipino consciousness (Mabaquiao 1998, 212). Since philosophy is a process or movement of consciousness, a Filipino consciousness, therefore, undertakes a philosophical process even when it does not use Filipino concepts or categories, or does not use the Filipino language, and could still possibly give birth to a Filipino philosophy.

Mabaquiao believed that all or any of these six forms of philosophical discourses could be considered legitimate manifestations of Filipino philosophy.

TAXONOMY OF GRIPALDO

In 2003, Rolando Gripaldo presented the paper "Is there a Filipino philosophy?" (2009c) during the 21st World Congress of Philosophy in Istanbul, Turkey, which he modified into an essay with the same title and published in the book, *The making of a Filipino philosopher and other essays* (2009d). Gripaldo's book contains two other works that are significant in amplifying the ideas in his 2003 essay: "Filipino philosophy: a Western tradition in an Eastern setting" (2009e), which he presented in a philosophy conference in Athens in 2006, and "The making of a Filipino philosopher" (2009f) of 2007.[7] Gripaldo's synchronic taxonomy covered all the manifestations of philosophical discourses in the country, making his research as inclusivist as that of Quito's. The implied structure of his taxonomy is as follows:



Figure 6. Interpretive Construction of Gripaldo's Taxonomy of Filipino Philosophy

Since Gripaldo presented a two-level taxonomy, he used two sets of taxonomizers.

First-level taxonomizer: Gripaldo's first-level taxonomizer is the different senses of the term *Filipino philosophy* (see letters a, b, and c in Figure 6) that divided the same concept into its traditional, cultural, and constitutional senses: (1) Since Gripaldo (see 2009g, 82-83) is trained in the analytic philosophical tradition, he follows part of Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1922, §4.112) view that philosophy is an activity—particularly, an individual person's activity, not a group or a people's activity. This delineates his idea of the traditional sense of philosophy as "the standard sense of historians of philosophy" like in the use of the terms "Greek philosophy," "British philosophy," and so on. To quote him (2009c, 2): "Greek philosophy... came out as an offshoot of the sociocultural/historical experience of the ancient Greeks, and historians of philosophy refer to it by enumerating the [individual] philosophers" and discussing their respective philosophies; (2) Philosophy in the cultural sense is taken as something related to the interpretation of the Filipino worldview of Zialcita, to the reflections on Philippine texts/culture of Timbreza, to the various forms of Filipino philosophy dealing with the folk spirit of Quito, to the anthropological philosophy of Abulad (see number 3 in figure 1; number 2 in figure 2; numbers 7, 8, and 9 in Figure 3; and number 5 in Figure 4, respectively), and the

cultural linguistic philosophy of Leonardo Mercado (see Note 1). (3) Philosophy in the constitutional sense refers to "the combined Filipino [expository] scholarly philosophical writings on Oriental and Western philosophy by Filipinos." Although the subject matter is basically an exposition of a foreign philosophy (Western or Oriental), Gripaldo considers this as "Filipino philosophy" in that the hermeneutical interpretation which goes with the exposition emanates from a Filipino consciousness, using *Filipino* in the nationality sense as defined in the Philippine constitution (2009c). However, of the three senses of Filipino philosophy, Gripaldo considers the first sense as the preferred or "genuine" kind.

Second-level taxonomizers: Gripaldo further broke up Filipino philosophy in the traditional sense, using as his taxonomizer the qualities which he saw as the defining characteristics of such kind of Filipino philosophy (see numbers 1 and 2 in Figure 6). He implicitly broke up Filipino philosophy in the cultural sense, using as his implied taxonomizer the different levels of looking at and dealing with the folk spirit (see numbers 3, 4, and 5 in Figure 6). He likewise broke up Filipino philosophy in the constitutional sense using as his taxonomizer what he (2001, 1-393; 2004, 1-113) saw in many decades as the dominant ways of doing such kind of philosophy (see numbers 6, 7, and 8 in Figure 6).

In effect he talked about eight types of Filipino philosophy, namely:

Filipino philosophy as original and breakthrough writing (see number 1 in Figure 6): This type of Filipino philosophy is something that is comparable with the quality and standards of philosophy as done and practiced in the West. This is similar with Quito's Filipino philosophy in the strict sense (see number 1 in Figure 3), although Gripaldo insisted that such philosophy is already flourishing on Philippine soil and is not merely a desired vision. In some ways, this type of Filipino philosophy is also comparable with Timbreza's Filipino philosophy as reflections on the Filipino philosophical luminaries (see number 3 in Figure 3). In the essay "Filipino philosophy: a Western tradition in an Eastern setting," Gripaldo (2009e, 25-32) identified some representatives of this kind of philosophizing, namely, Embuscado for his dissectionist aesthetics, Bautista for his poetics, Ceniza for his metaphysics, and Gripaldo for his circumstantialist ethics.

Filipino philosophy as politically reactive writing (see number 2 in Figure 6): This type of philosophy corresponds with Zialcita's critique of political and economic structures, with Timbreza's critical philosophy, and with Mabaquiao's ideological philosophy (see number 2 in Figure 1, number 1 in Figure 2, and number 1 in Figure 5, respectively). In some ways, this type of Filipino philosophy is also comparable with Timbreza's Filipino philosophy as reflections on Filipino philosophical luminaries (see number 3 in Figure 3). Gripaldo (2009e, 12-24) cited as examples of this kind of philosophizing Rizal, Bonifacio, Jacinto, Quezon, Laurel, and Constantino.

Filipino philosophy as folk philosophy (see number 3 in Figure 6): This discourse corresponds with Quito's Filipino philosophy as unarticulated folk philosophy (see number 6 in Figure 3). In fact, Gripaldo (2009c) used Quito's terms in referring to this implicit discourse: the Filipino "*diwa*" and the German "*Volksgeist.*"

Filipino philosophy as description of folk philosophy (see number 4 in Figure 6): This philosophical discourse corresponds with Zialcita's Filipino

philosophy as search for Filipino identity and worldview (see number 3 in Figure 1), with Timbreza's Filipino philosophy as reflections on Philippine texts and culture (see number 2 in Figure 2), with Quito's Filipino philosophy as description of folk philosophy (see number 8 in Figure 3), with Abulad's anthropological philosophy (see number 5 in Figure 4), and with Mercado's cultural linguistic philosophy (see note 1). Gripaldo (2009c, 4) identified Mercado and Timbreza as the foremost specialists in this kind of philosophizing.

Filipino philosophy as delving into the presuppositions and implications of folk philosophy (see number 5 in Figure 6): Gripaldo insisted that Filipino philosophers should not stop at mere extractions and descriptions of folk philosophy, otherwise their activity would remain mired in the parameters of sociology and anthropology. He (2009c, 4) asserted: "A distinction must be made between philosophizing by reading/interpreting the spirit of the people or of the times (and offering solutions to its philosophical problems) from philosophizing by extracting the philosophical presuppositions of languages, folktales, folk sayings, etc." This higher-level dealing with the folk philosophy of the Filipinos is closely related with Zialcita's envisioned pathway for the development of Filipino philosophy as the search for Filipino identity and worldview (see number 3 in Figure 1).

Filipino philosophy as expository writing (see number 6 in Figure 6): This philosophical discourse refers to Filipino scholars' textual discussion of any of the Oriental and Western philosophies. Quito (see numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Figure 3) and Abulad (see numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 in figure 4) mentioned something analogous to this type of philosophizing. Similarly, Gripaldo (2009f, 65) is dissatisfied with this level of philosophizing: "...to master a philosopher's philosophy or to master a field of specialization within a discipline is good, but we need to grow either outside or within that philosopher or that specialization."

Filipino philosophy as revisionist writing (see number 7 in Figure 6): Due to his dissatisfaction with Filipino philosophy as expository writing, Gripaldo urged his readers to break away from the shadows of the foreign masters by becoming a revisionist expert of their foreign philosophies. He (2009f, 65) asserted: "Ralph Waldo Emerson...teaches that one should be an independent intellectual because to imitate is suicide. If all that one wants in life is just to become a Kantian, or to mimic Kant, then in effect he or she is an intellectual suicide." He (2009f, 66) then offered some details on how to effect such a breakthrough:

> (1) we can innovate (from Kantian to neo-Kantian), (2) we can reject an old philosophical thought and create a new path to philosophizing, and (3) we can review old philosophical questions and offer a new insight or philosophical reflection.

Filipino philosophy as appropriative writing (see number 8 in Figure 6): This philosophical discourse corresponds with Quito's Filipino philosophy as application of other philosophies (see number 6 in Figure 3) and with Abulad's Filipino philosophy as application of foreign theories (see number 6 in Figure 4).

When successfully fine-tuned with qualitative distinction, this can be elevated to the traditional sense. Gripaldo (2009c, 5) explained:

> Oriental and Western philosophical ideas can be appropriated and modified accordingly to suit the terrain, so to speak, of the local situation. A part of its manifestation is reflected in Filipino East-West comparative philosophical writings aimed at offering a solution to a local/national Filipino philosophical dilemma or problem.

For Gripaldo, the prime specimens of Filipino philosophy are those that belong to the traditional sense of Filipino philosophy. He specifically looked down on Filipino philosophy as folk philosophy (cultural sense) and on Filipino philosophy as mere expository writing (constitutional sense).

PERIODIZATION AND TAXONOMY OF CO

Alfredo Co published his essay "Doing philosophy in the Philippines: Fifty years ago and fifty years from now" (2009a) in 2004. Two years after, he published a more personalized essay, "In the beginning...a petit personal historical narrative



Figure 7. Interpretative Construction of Co's Periodization and Taxonomy of Filipino Philosophy

of the beginning of philosophy in the Philippines" (2009b), that takes the University of Santo Tomas as its point of reference.[8] Like Abulad's schema, Co's also presented a hybrid diachronic periodization and taxonomy that covered all the academic manifestations of philosophy in the country from the Spanish period to what appeared to him in the middle of the 2000s as contemporary. His research

is also as inclusivist as that of Abulad. The implied structure of his periodization/taxonomy can be gleaned in Figure 7 above.

Since Co's two-level schema is both a periodization and a taxonomy, he used a taxonomizer for his first-level schematization and periodizers for his second level. It appears that Co was writing a history of doing philosophy in the Philippines rather than writing a history of Filipino philosophy as what Gripaldo did.[9]

First-level taxonomizer: Co's first-level taxonomizer is the binary "textualized/untextualized" (see letters a and b in Figure 7) that divided Filipino philosophy into textualized and untextualized discourses.

Second-level periodizers: Co laid out his chronological account of Filipino philosophy, using as his periodizers the transplantation of Scholasticism/Thomism into Philippine soil, the arrival of a multitude of more up-to-date philosophical systems in the 1950s, the emergence of the scholarly trend of philosophical writing, the emergency of the trend of problematizing the Filipino identity and worldview, and the rise of the second wave of Filipino scholars which he claimed to have started in the year 1986.

In effect he talked about five types of Filipino philosophy, namely:

Filipino philosophy as untextualized discourse on Iberian scholasticism (see number 1 in Figure 7)**:** From a cursory view, this philosophical discourse might appear similar to the Scholasticism/Thomism mentioned by Quito (see number 2 in Figure 3) as well as to the first colonial phase mentioned by Abulad (see number 1 in Figure 4). It is important to note, however, that Co had a different emphasis from Quito and Abulad. Whereas Co was stressing the untextualized nature of his Iberian Scholasticism, Quito and Abulad were highlighting the expository nature of their analogous discourses. Co (2009a, 52-53) dated this period as stretching from 1611 to 1950.

Filipino philosophy as untextualized discourse on foreign theories (see number 2 in Figure 7)**:** If Abulad dated the arrival of the other foreign theories that challenged the dominance of Scholasticism/Thomism to the 1960s, Co (2009a, 54) dated this same phenomenon to end in the 1950s. Co, moreover, noted an important thing, that when the first batches of Filipino scholars who studied abroad came back to the Philippines, they more or less continued the Iberian Scholasticism's practice of philosophizing in the oral way. Hence, this paper's reconstruction of Co's periodization and taxonomy created a distinction between the untextualized and textualized discourses on foreign theories.

Filipino philosophy as textualized discourse on foreign theories (see number 3 in Figure 7)**:** Co made his point very clear that as the Filipino scholars from abroad returned home, they gradually introduced the more rigorous practice of philosophical research. He (2009a, 55) said:

> ...these Filipino scholars did not only gift the academe with new thoughts from abroad, but they also changed the life-world of philosophy in the country. For, they did not just emerge to become competent philosophy teachers who commanded respect, but most of

them also diligently wrote and animated the philosophical publication in the country.

Filipino philosophy as description of the Filipino mind (see number 4 in Figure 7): For all practical considerations, this philosophical discourse corresponds with Zialcita's Filipino philosophy as interpretation of the Filipino worldview (see number 3 in Figure 1), with Timbreza's Filipino philosophy as reflections on Philippine texts and culture (see number 2 in Figure 2), with Quito's Filipino philosophy as description of the folk spirit (see number 8 in Figure 3), with Abulad's Filipino philosophy as anthropological philosophy (see number 5 of Figure 4), and with Gripaldo's Filipino philosophy as description of folk philosophy (see number 3 in Figure 6). Co (2009a, 56) wrote: "Somewhere along this historical timeline (1950-1985) came the search for indigenous thought with a view to discovering a Filipino philosophy."

Filipino philosophy as second wave of textualized discourse (see number 5 in Figure 7): For unexplained reasons, Co identified the year 1986 as the beginning of the emergence of this philosophical discourse. He (2009a, 60) stated: "A second wave of scholars includes those who finished their Ph.D.s from 1986 onward, and who continued the legacy of the first wave of Filipino philosophers." This paper can only surmise that Co used as his periodizer the end of the repressive Marcos regime and the beginning of a much more liberal academic atmosphere.

Co tended to be unsympathetic to the concerns of Iberian Scholasticism, of the untextualized discourses on foreign theories, and of the description of the Filipino identity and worldview. He (2009a, 58) looked favorably at the first wave of Filipino scholars:

> If there is anything we can call Filipino philosophy, this can only be the product of the hard work of Filipino philosophers and scholars. We seem to have forgotten that Filipino scholars have already made their contribution to philosophy through their publications, which now make a new philosophical landscape in Southeast Asia.

Co placed all his hopes on the second wave of Filipino scholars. He (2009a, 62) addressed them:

> What then is the task of the next fifty years? It has now become your challenge to be equal at least to what the first wave of Filipino scholars have done—you either duplicate what they have accomplished or, better yet, surpass them through an even greater diligence. For we must all be partners in clearing the frontiers of philosophy and pushing it to greater heights.

CONCLUSION

As mentioned at the introductory part of this paper, this study would conclude with a grand synthesis of the taxonomies and periodizations proffered by the

seven Filipino scholars of philosophy and would comment on each form of Filipino philosophy with respect to strengths, weaknesses, and overall assessment. But one cannot construct a comprehensive schema that would subsume all of the seven taxonomies and periodizations by merely superimposing one taxonomy/periodization over the others, nor by connecting one to the others. However, by isolating the taxonomizers/periodizers and by harmonizing the forms of Filipino philosophy mentioned by the seven scholars, there is a possibility of coming up with a grand synthesis.

Zialcita, Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, Mabaquiao, Gripaldo, and Co utilized the following key taxonomizers/periodizers, respectively: (1) method/content, (2) critical/substantive, (3) academic/grassroots, (4) colonial/indigenous, (5) practical/theoretical, (6) traditional/cultural/constitutional, and (7) textualized/untextualized. This paper's grand synthesis utilized Co's textualized/untextualized binary, Quito's academic/grassroots binary, and Zialcita's method/content binary. The seven scholars mentioned a total of forty-four forms: three by Zialcita, six by Timbreza, nine by Quito, seven by Abulad, six by Mabaquiao, eight by Gripaldo, and five by Co. But due to the similarities of some of these forms, their number can be reduced to eighteen, namely: (1) Filipino method, (2) critical philosophy, (3) interpretation of the Filipino worldview, (4) study of Filipino philosophical luminaries, (5) appropriation of the folk spirit, (6) appropriation of foreign theories, (7) philosophizing with the Filipino language, (8) philosophy in the strict sense, (9) Scholasticism, (10) phenomenology/existentialism, (11) logical analysis, (12) foreign philosophies, (13) folk spirit, (14) late indigenous Filipino philosophy, (15) ethical philosophy, (16) determining the presuppositions and implications of the folk spirit, (17) revisionist writing, and (18) second wave of Filipino philosophy.

These eighteen forms of Filipino philosophy can still be reduced by eliminating those forms with unclear referents, specifically the Filipino method of Zialcita, the philosophy in the strict sense of Quito, the late indigenous philosophy of Abulad, and the second wave of Filipino philosophy of Co. This process of elimination leaves us with fourteen forms of Filipino philosophy. But considering that critical Filipino philosophy is both pursued within and outside the academe, this form may be split into academic and nonacademic critical Filipino philosophy; and considering that the exposition of foreign theories is done both orally and textually, this form may also be split into lecture and written exposition of foreign theories. These result in a final count of sixteen forms of Filipino philosophy. Using this paper's preferred taxonomizers—namely, Co's textualized/untextualized binary, Quito's academic/grassroots binary, and Zialcita's method/content binary— such sixteen forms of Filipino philosophy may be schematized in a grand synthesis (see Figure 8).

After creating a comprehensive schema that reasonably subsumed the forms of Filipino philosophy mentioned by the seven scholars, this paper is



Figure 8: Grand Synthesis of the Taxonomies and Periodizations of Zialcita, Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, Mabaquiao, Gripaldo, and Co

left with the task of commenting on the strengths, weaknesses, and overall developmentalpotential of each form. To make such a demanding task more concise, this paper opted to present this as follows:

Form of Filipino Philosophy	Scholarly Bases	Strengths	Weaknesses	Overall Assessment
(1) Grassroots/ folk philosophy	Quito, Gripaldo	Good subject matter for Filipino philosophy	Not strictly philosophical	Should be correctly placed as a promising subject matter for philosophical studies
(2) Lectures on Scholasticism/ Thomism	Quito, Abulad, and Co	Good training ground for philosophy; rich as starting ground for ethics and metaphysics	Its dogmatism a hindrance to philosophical development; its untextualized nature a hindrance to growth of Filipino philosophy	Low developmental potential due to its inherent dogmatism and untextualized nature
(3) Lecture on other foreign systems	Quito, Abulad, and Co	Useful in diluting hegemony of Scholasticism	Expository nature not developmentally promising; its untextualized nature a hindrance to growth of Filipino philosophical corpus	Low developmental usefulness due to its expository level and untextualized nature
(4) Critical philosophy as nanacademic discourse	Zialcita, Quito, Mabaquiao, Timbreza, and Gripaldo	Useful and relevant in the context of Philippine semifeudal, neocolonial, and bureaucratic-capitalist state	Thrived more outside of the academe	High developmental usefulness due to its practical use and opportunity to contextualize critical philosophical frameworks
(5) Logical Analysis	Quito and Abulad	Powerful method in philosophizing based on mostly English original texts	Positivist leaning may stifle other philosophical discourses	High developmental usefulness due to its output-oriented discourse
(6) Hermeneutics, existentialism, and phenomenology	Quito and Abulad	Powerful method in philosophizing; opennes for subjective interpretations; can allow many philosophical discourses to flourish	Based mostly on French and German original texts	High developmental usefulness due to their orientation for application
(7) Critical philosophy as an academic method	Zialcita, Timbreza, Quito, Mabaquiao, and Gripaldo	Useful and relevant in the context of a	Martial-law declaration reduced researches	High developmental usefulness due to practical use and

Form of Filipino Philosophy	Scholarly Bases	Strengths	Weaknesses	Overall Assessment
		semifeudal, semicolonial, neocolonial, and bureaucratic-capitalist state; powerful method in philosophizing	in critical philosophy	opportunity to contextualize critical philosophical framework; enrichable by the Frankfurt School and postmodern thinkers
(8) Appropriation of foreign theories	Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, and Gripaldo	Useful and relevant discourse; creates occasion for intellectual dialogue between foreign philosophical theories and local situation	Few Filipino scholars ventured into this kind of philosophical discourse	High developmental usefulness due to emphasis on contextualization and creative application
(9) Appropriation of folk philosophy	Timbreza, Quito, Mabaquiao, and Gripaldo	Useful and relevant as it would enrich local concepts and theories	Tied to use-of-national language issue; many Filipino scholars uneasy in writingt in Filipino	High developmental usefulness due to use of Filipino concepts and systems of thinking
(10) Philosophizing with use of Filipino language	Timbreza and Mabaquiao	Useful and relevant as it would contextualize philosophizing with Philippine experiences	Tied to use-of-national-language issue; writing in Filipino limits chance to get published in known abstracted journals	High developmental usefulness as it would encourage connecion with local and systems of writing
(11) Textual exposition of foreign philosophical systems	Quito, Abulad, Co, and Gripaldo	Good starting point for appropriating foreign theories; good opportunity for contextually discussing these foreign systems	Most Filipino scholars have access only to English texts; less access to archives of particular philosophers	Moderate developmental usefulness due to its expository level
(12) Revisionist writing	Gripaldo	Discourse can lead to philosophies easily recognized and discussed by the international community	Very few Filipinos ventured into this kind of philosophical studies; most have only access to English texts and no access to archives of particular philosophers	High developmental usefulness due to its emphasis on creative originality that would give birth to new philosophical systems

Form of Filipino philosophy	Scholarly Bases	Strengths	Weakness	Overall Assessment
(13) Interpretation of Filipino worldview	Zialcita, Quito, Timbreza, Co, Abulad, Mabaquiao, and Gripaldo	Many Filipino publications belong to this form of philosophy; many Filiipno scholars are in this philosophical discourse	Many Filipinos fail to understand the sense and direction of this mode of philosophizing	Filipino academicians should be guided by Zialcita's, Quito's, and Gripaldo's thoughts on the sense and direction of this mode of philosophizing; high developmental usefulness
(14) Research on Filipino values and ethics	Mabaquiao	Very useful discourse; can easily attract governmental, religious, and civic organizations	Very few Filipino scholars ventured into this form of philosophizing as this is often subsumed under number (13)	High developmental usefulness due to its practical dimension
(15) Identification of presuppositions and implications of Filipino worldview	Zialcita and Gripaldo	Very useful discoure as it can give functional sense and direction to Filipino philosophy as sheer interpretation of Filipino worldview	Very few Filipino scholars ventured into this form of philosophical discourse	High developmental usefulness; Filipino academicians should be guided by Zialcita's and Gripaldo's thoughts on this mode of philosophizing
(16) Study on Filipino philosophical luminaries	Timbreza and Gripaldo	Popularizes Filipino philosophicl corpus; gives succeeding Filipino scholars a chance to build on his own tradition	Many Filipino scholars question the inclusion or exclusion of Filipino thinkers in this list	High developmental usefulness as it provides younger Filipino scholars the opportunity to connect and build on this tradition of philosophizing

Table 1: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Overall Assessments of the Sixteen Forms of Filipino Philosophy

To conclude, this paper has shown that out of the sixteen forms of Filipino philosophy, one should no longer be referred to as a philosophical discourse, namely, folk/grassroots philosophy; two have low developmental usefulness, namely, the lectures on Scholasticism/Thomism and the lectures on other foreign theories; one has a medium developmental usefulness, namely, the textual expositions on foreign systems; and twelve have high developmental usefulness, namely, (1) critical philosophy as nonacademic discourse, (2) logical analysis as a method, (3)

phenomenology/existentialism/hermeneutics as an academic method, (4) critical philosophy as an academic method, (5) appropriation of foreign theories, (6) appropriation of folk philosophy, (7) philosophizing with the use of the Filipino language, (8) revisionist writing, (9) interpretation of Filipino worldview, (10) research on Filipino values and ethics, (11) identification of presuppositions/ implications of the Filipino worldview, and (12) study on Filipino philosophical luminaries.

Hence, in having rendered obsolete the question "Is there a Filipino philosophy?", Filipino students and younger scholars of philosophy could select which among the twelve highly developmentally useful forms of Filipino philosophy they want to work on. By doing so, their consequent philosophical researches would hopefully contribute to the further enrichment of Filipino philosophy until the question, "Is there a Filipino philosophy?", fades away from the Philippine historical horizon.

NOTES

1. Leonardo Mercado (1976), who without doubt is one of the pioneers of Filipino philosophy, is not included in this comparative study because he tended to insist on a singular form of Filipino philosophy, which is the cultural, anthropological, or ethnophilosophical discourse. Unlike Mercado, many of the pioneering Filipino philosophers discussed the myriad forms of the mode of existence of Filipino philosophy.

2. Unable to retrieve the original English essay, this paper relied on Tiongson's Filipino translation. Zialcita had long ago abandoned the field of philosophy along with his decision to focus on anthropology, cultural studies, heritage conservation/ preservation, and urban regeneration. Hence, this paper opted not to use any of his other writings as intertexts to the aforementioned work.

3. For a thorough discussion on Timbreza's significance in Filipino philosophy, the readers may refer to the author's forthcoming manuscript entitled "Quito, Ceniza, Timbreza, Abulad, Gripaldo, Mabaquiao, and the contributions of De La Salle University to the development of Filipino philosophy" (hereafter QCTAGM). Part II of this work is devoted to Timbreza's philosophizing.

4. Gripaldo disagreed with Quito and wrote two volumes of what he called *Filipino philosophy: Traditional approach* (2009a and 2009b). Except for Cirilo Bautista's and Claro Ceniza's major works, which came out after Quito's book, the rest of the philosophers' works (those of Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, Emilio Jacinto, Manuel L. Quezon, Jose P. Laurel, Renato Constantino, Esquivel Embuscado, Rolando M. Gripaldo) came out earlier. See also Gripaldo's review of Quito's book (1988, 520-22). For a more thorough discussion on Quito's significance in Filipino philosophy, the readers may refer to QCTAGM. Part I of this work is devoted to Quito's and Ceniza's philosophizing.

5. For Abulad's more recent discussion on Filipino philosophy, the readers may refer to his manuscript entitled "Pilosopiyang Pinoy, uso pa ba?" ("Pinoy philosophy, is it still in style?") (2010). Part III of QCTAGM is devoted to him.

6.The first draft of this paper used the 2012 article as the main text for Mabaquiao's taxonomy. After Mabaquiao himself pointed out to the author the existence and significance of the 1998 article, this paper opted to use his earlier paper as the main text for analysis. Part V of QCTAGM is devoted to him.

7. For a more thorough discussion on Gripaldo's significance in Filipino philosophy, the readers may refer to Part V of QCTAGM.

9. For a more comprehensive picture of Co's writings on Filipino philosophy, the readers may refer to the sixth volume of his festschrift *Doing philosophy in the Philippines and other essays* (2009c) that compiles his choice works within this same topic.

10. Gripaldo acknowledged that his history is still incomplete having to skip some past luminaries like Apolinario Mabini and Emilio Aguinaldo, among others, because of the tightness of his research time.

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INDIGENOUS PHILOSOPHY AND THE QUEST FOR INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION[1]

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The signing of the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by over a hundred states is a realization of the importance of the quest of indigenous peoples to direct their present and future existence, together with the knowledge and heritage they have acquired from their ancestors which they constantly mould to survive and thrive in a contemporary world made up of competing interests that are often at odds with their physical, cultural, and spiritual survival. The paper examines some of the interconnected philosophical and legal issues concerning indigenous knowledge and the indigenes' quest to safeguard their knowledge, with indigenous philosophical views given the necessary focus in analyzing these issues. It also traces how these philosophical views inform and are reflected in international documents, including the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

INTRODUCTION

For at least half of the past millennium, indigenous peoples have warred, struggled, capitulated, and died under the rules imposed by colonial powers and nation states. These states did not consider the laws under which these peoples live by. It had been estimated that over twenty eight million indigenous people "have been destroyed either by direct confrontation, disease or the results of social and cultural dislocation" (World Council of Indigenous Peoples 1981). Many of their descendants continue to challenge the legal and moral foundations upon which contemporary States have sought to subjugate or assimilate the indigenous ways of life. They also question the commercial appropriation of the States' dominant groups of certain aspects of indigenous culture and knowledge without the proper attribution, remuneration, and respect accorded to the indigenous sources (Kuruk 1999). The bases for their positions are ultimately grounded on their philosophical views, the most relevant of which are summarized in the succeeding sections.

INDIGENOUS PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS

Relationship with the land

At the core of indigenous beliefs and value systems is the sentient and spiritual affinity with the land. The land is the "unifying force in their lives-social, political, spiritual, cultural, economic-and to separate the people from their land is to deny their peoplehood" (Hoggan 1981). The land is viewed as the mother, provider, protector, comforter, who is "constant, in a changing world, yet changing in regular cycles. She is a storyteller, a listener, a traveller, yet she is still, and when she suffers we all suffer with her... We cannot stand on her with integrity and respect and claim to love the life she gives and allow her to be ravaged" (Hoggan 1981).

This relationship with the land permeates every aspect of indigenous culture. For instance, the Kaytetye People who live in Barrow Creek, situated in the heart of the Northern Territory of Australia, have a series of songs called "Akwelye," which document the travels of their Rain Ancestor in specific places during the ancient time before recorded memory, known as the Dreamtime. These chronicle the relationship of the people with the land (Koch 1997, 38 and 40). The great language diversity that exists between Aboriginal peoples is also considered both the manifestation of an indigenous people's identity with their land and an expression of their differences from other indigenous groups whose lands signify their own ancestors' adventures (World Council of Indigenous Peoples 1981).

Bases of indigenous rights to the land

Indigenes have a "historical continuity" with the land. They are "descendants of the peoples who inhabited the present territory of a country, wholly or partially, at the time when persons of a different culture or ethnic origin arrived there from other parts of the world, overcame them and, by conquest, settlement or other means, reduced them to a non-dominant or colonial situation" (Daes 1995).[2]

This "continuity" is the basis for their assertion of having rights over the land which the dominant peoples did not have in the first place ("Indigenous ideology and philosophy," 1995). They reject the "terra nullius" view which colonisers had used to justify the taking of their lands (Dutfield 1999). Their land rights is not determined by "customary law" as understood "in the legal terms of industrialised people" (Knudtson and Suzuki 1992, 4) but stem from the fact that they are the "First Peoples" who have always been there.

Collective rights

The prior rights that indigenous peoples had over the land are expressions of the collective right they possess as a group. This collective right that is part of their norm system is balanced by the twin principles of respect for the group as an entity of individuals and respect for the individual as part of a group (Daes 1995). This collective right should by no means be confused with the dominant people's concept of collective ownership as "ownership of the state." This latter notion

presupposes the existence of "areas with private land ownership" that can be sold. The indigenous peoples believe that land cannot "be speculated, bought, sold, mortgaged, claimed by one state, surrendered or counter-claimed by a king whose grace and favour men must make their fortunes on this earth" (National Congress of American Indians' Position Paper 1981). They do not subscribe to the Western notion of private "inviolable ownership rights." They consider themselves as stewards of the land. Their notion of land rights is more akin to usufructuary rights that "give prior right for certain households to use the resources of certain localities" (Daes 1995).

These rights are tempered with the responsibility of reasonably distributing the resources so as not to cause overexploitation and its attendant problems. Indigenous peoples have explored a variety of means to achieve this, including migration, efficient hunting equipment, and taboo rules on the utilization of animals (Daes 1995).

Respect for life: environmental ethic

Respect for all life animates indigenous actions with respect to the environment. Indigenous ceremonies reflect and celebrate the bond between humans and all other forms of life. As stated by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (1981), "[w]e did not go out and pick leaves just because we needed tea, nor cut down a tree just for firewood. We first gave tribute and thanks to their beings. Our people respect nature and its relationship to all elements of our universe. Our relationship with our environment is obviously, our whole life."

Rituals for honoring the spirit of a slain animal are a way of bringing people together and regulating their lives. The Wintu hunter meticulously hews his arrow and takes care in killing a deer cleanly, so the animal would not suffer unnecessarily. He honors the deer by using "every part of it, hoofs and marrow and hide and sinew and flex. Waste is abhorrent to him, not because he believes in the intrinsic value of thrift but because the deer had (willingly) died for him" (Knudtson and Suzuki 1992, 102). These practices also have positive effects on the well-being of the community. For example, the Inuits avoided getting trichinosis by establishing a rule of letting a polar bear caught in the winter time lie for 4-5 days (Daes 1995). These customs that inform their ways and means of hunting have served to protect them and conserve the environment in which they thrive.

Indigenous epistemology

Indigenous ecological knowledge had been described as the "culturally and spiritually based way in which indigenous people relate to their ecosystem" (Case study 1999). It is characterized as holistic, intuitive, qualitative, and derived "from cumulative, collective and often spiritual experiences" (Dutfield 1999) of environmental phenomena. Data is gathered by generations of resource users and the knowledge is transmitted through oral tradition. Interconnectedness of beings and the elements is recognized and emphasized. The experiential basis of this knowledge permits a "'science' that is negotiated in the same way that people

negotiate social relations with one another" (Knudtson and Suzuki 1992, 16). This knowledge is utilized to seek, reap, store, and sustain natural resources needed for necessities like shelter, food, and clothing and also to recognize, prevent, or evade personal and communal perils (Huntington 1998, 66). What emerges is an understanding of what the Ojibway would call "minobimatsiiwin" or the "good life" (Case study 1999).

This kind of knowledge has also been termed as "traditional." However, it is not a static and rigid form of knowledge. What is traditional about it is

> ...the way it is acquired and used. In other words, the social process of learning and sharing knowledge, which is unique to each indigenous culture, lies at the very heart of its 'traditionality.' Much of this knowledge is actually quite new, but it has a social meaning, and legal character, entirely unlike the knowledge indigenous peoples acquire from settlers and industrialized societies. (Third meeting 1996, par. 79)

Significance of indigenous cultural and ecological heritage

The awareness of the importance of the cultural and ecological knowledge of indigenous peoples to Western researchers and companies had risen in the past two centuries. Since this knowledge is based on diachronic data, i.e., location specific and cumulative data (Dutfield 1999), the indigenous healers, farmers, and communities who possess it are the best sources of information that is invaluable to anyone doing research on any aspect of the biota where these people live. Their role in ethnobotanical research is explained by one leading authority, whose tremendous respect for the Northwestern Amazon Indians led him to say:

> The accomplishments of the aboriginal people in learning plant properties must be the result of a long and intimate association with, and utter dependence on, their ambient vegetation. This native knowledge warrants careful and critical attention on the part of modern scientific methods. If phytochemists must randomly investigate the constituents of biological effects of 80,000 species of Amazon plants, the task may never be finished. Concentrating first on those species that people have lived and experimented with for millennia offers a short cut to the discovery of new medically or industrially useful compounds. (Schultes and Raffauf 1990; cited in King 1996, 182)

This "intimate association" with nature had furnished the Hanunoo people in the Philippines with the expertise to distinguish between 1,600 different plant species. In the Brazilian Amazon jungles where the Kayapo Indians live, studies show that they rely on "more than 250 different species of plants for their fruit alone, and hundreds more for their roots, nuts, and other edible parts." Indigenous Bolivian healers use some 600 medicinal herbs, and their Southeast Asian counterparts may use up to 6,500 kinds of plants for their medical concoctions. In

India, indigenous medical systems are based "on over 7,000 species of medicinal plants and on 15,000 medicines of herbal formulations in different systems. The Ayurvedic texts refer to 1,400 plants, the Unani texts to 342 [and] the Siddha system to 328" (Knudtson and Suzuki 1992, 12).

About three-quarters of over a hundred plant-derived compounds used in the manufacture of prescription drugs come to the attention of researchers based on initial clues provided by traditional indigenous medical practices (King 1991, 19). Ethnobotanical information supplied by indigenous peoples contributed to the increase of yield of active plants in the US National Cancer Research Institute research program in the search for anti-cancer and anti-AIDS drugs, by as much as 50-100 percent (Elisabetsky 1991, 10).

Genetically diverse "landraces" developed by indigenous farmers have helped farmers in industrialised states. The "genes that protect the US barley crop from yellow dwarf disease were obtained from an Ethiopian landrace" (Kloppenburg Jr. 1991, 15). Some varieties of soybean developed by the University of Illinois used genetic material from Korea which "may (have) save(d) US agriculture $100-500 million in processing costs yearly" (King 1991, 19). The University of Wisconsin also developed a bean that can supply 60% of its own nitrogen needs from breeding material gathered from beans collected from fields of Latin American peasants (King 1991, 19). These bolster the indigenous assertion that "(b)ecause of our extensive knowledge of the land, indigenous nations have given more to food technology than they have received from it in recent years" (World Council of Indigenous Peoples 1981).

Indigenous knowledge vs. Western science

Eurocentric biases and colonial mentality had conspired to devalue indigenous knowledge as inferior to the Western style of science. Scientific knowledge with its emphasis on the scientific method was thought to be objective, rational, analytical, and universal (Shiva, n.d.). Indigenous knowledge, which is rooted in a spiritual understanding of the world, was usually consigned as part of folklore with pejorative connotations (Kuruk 1999). Recent developments in the Western philosophy of science, however, question the validity of the assumptions and theories concerning the scientific method of "knowing" things (Shiva, n.d.). According to Feyerabend (1978, 10), the idea of

> ...a universal and stable rationality is...unrealistic.... Scientists revise their standards, their procedures, their criteria of rationality as they move along and enter new domains of research just as they revise and perhaps entirely replace their theories and their instruments as they move along and enter new domains of research.

Western science and indigenous knowledge have different assumptions and are informed by the different sensibilities of their respective practitioners. Both have different and valid ways of knowing the world. It is, therefore, erroneous to claim that one is correct or is superior over the other. Each is "endowed with an

originality, an internal coherence, and an intellectual integrity that renders it independently beautiful, adaptive, and worthy of respect in its own right. Each aims also to discover some sense of order within the physical universe and conjures up visions of nature that, when seen side by side, can seem strikingly complementary" (Knudtson and Suzuki 1992, 10).[3]

This insight is lost to many people from dominant societies who would readily give credit to Western-trained pharmacists and physicians for their knowledge but would dismiss as "quack" remedies the concoctions prepared by traditional healers like *albularyos*[4] and *curanderos*.[5] The low regard stems from a cultural misunderstanding or ignorance of the process of traditional healing. One author has observed:

> Traditional remedies, although based on natural products, are not found in "nature" as such; they are products of human knowledge. To transform a plant into a medicine, one has to know the correct species, its location, the proper time of collection (some plants are poisonous in certain seasons), the part to be used, how to prepare it (fresh, dried, cut in small pieces, smashed) the solvent to be used (cold, warm or boiling water; alcohol, addition of salt, etc.), the way to prepare it (time and conditions to be left on the solvent), and finally, posology (route of administration, dosage). Needless to say, curers have to diagnose and select the right medicine for the right patients. (Elisabetsky 1991, 10)

It is clear that there is no "witchcraft" involved in this process. Although the healer would invoke his/her gods and the beings that animate the plants, the healer would also rely on his/her experience and practical knowledge handed down by his/her ancestors, about the plant properties and the ingredients that go into the mixture.

The obvious practical scientific value of indigenous knowledge to sectors of dominant societies who profit from such knowledge but deride their holders can be seen from betrayals of healing secrets committed with impunity by these entities. Consider these passages from the foreword of a book on medicinal plants of East Africa:

> Many of the herbal medicine men will not like this book since it may deprive them of their profession once their secrets are revealed. The majority of them were reluctant to show me the drug plants as a whole for this reason. In most cases, I was given the leaves or root of the plant already crushed or picked. But after some persuasion, I was shown the plant on the condition that I would not reveal it to anyone else. (Balick 1996, 162, citing Kokwaro 1976)

While indigenous healers do not have records of their treatment success rate, there is a remarkable conjunction between Western medicine and indigenous medical systems in the use of drugs containing chemical compounds derived from

plants, to treat the same or related ailments (Farnsworth 1988). This is an instance that demonstrates the "complementarity" between Western science and indigenous knowledge.

Some iniquitous consequences

It is beyond cavil that indigenous knowledge and heritage are invaluable and, once lost, are irretrievable. In the agricultural sector alone, it has been estimated that the total revenue that might be gained if developing countries, where most indigenous peoples live, would seek royalties for unimproved genetic material could not be less than US$100 million per year (Reid et al. 1993, 149). It had also been estimated that medicines derived from plants that were originally used by indigenous peoples have an annual world market of US$43 billion, while other natural product markets like the seed industry, insecticides, herbicides, and industrial biotechnological applications exceed such value (Rubin and Fish 1994, 27).

It is an ironic fact that the people who possess this knowledge have the least bargaining power (Cunningham 1991, 4) and cannot capitalize on their knowledge to improve their economic standing. The rate of profit return to the indigenous peoples who assisted the research and discovery of local plants that were used for medicines by pharmaceutical companies had been pegged at a negligible .0001% (Posey 1990, 15). An example of this iniquitous state of things is the utilization by Eli Lilly of the Rosy Periwinkle that was first described by scientists in Madagascar and long used by the Madagascans for its medicinal attributes. This beautiful plant contains more than seventy-five alkaloids, two of which contribute to the compounds that form the drugs vincristine and vinblastine which prevent cancerous cells from dividing 80% of sufferers from Hodgkins' disease, and 99% of those afflicted with acute lymphocytic leukemia experience remission by taking these drugs which are quite expensive (Myers 1983). Annual global sales from these two drugs has been estimated to amount to hundreds of millions of US dollars (King 1991, 19). Yet no money has flowed back to the Madagascans and as one observer noted, it is unlikely that the drugs are made available to the poor indigenous locals who may need it. These reasons constitute disincentives against the preservation of the plant (Reid 1993, 28).

In the early 1980s, a bitter "seed war" escalated between gene-rich developing states where many indigenous peoples live and gene-poor developed countries over the ownership of the genetic resources that entities based in the latter countries have obtained from the former countries for free or for a minimal cost. These entities patented the genes and chemicals obtained from the resources and sold the patented products back to the country where they originated at exorbitant prices. One attempt to resolve this conflict was made by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization which spearheaded the "International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources." It was signed by most developing countries and a handful of developed countries (Reid 1993, 23). But it did not truly advance the cause of the indigenous peoples whose traditional knowledge had already been stolen or undermined by unscrupulous or ignorant scientists, researchers, and companies who cashed in on the worldwide trend for indigenously derived medicines.

Shifts in perception

The recognition for the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples in general had been espoused by human rights groups and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Posey 1991, 29) long before other international agencies have coalesced their support for indigenous causes. In the early 1920s, ILO investigated the forced labour of "native populations" in colonies: "Indigenous and tribal peoples were, by definition, part of this colonial work force, and the same impulse that gave rise in 1930 to the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), led to standards and development work on indigenous and tribal peoples" (Tomei and Swepston 1996). The ILO was also responsible for the adoption of the Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (See Posey 1991, ILO Convention 107). Adopted in 1957 and ratified by 28 countries, it was the first international treaty that gave impetus to the recognition of indigenous issues concerning land and labour conditions as "distinct concerns" (Barsh 1994, 45). It did not touch on the rights of indigenes to their ecological knowledge, but it did recognize their collective and individual rights over the lands which they have traditionally occupied (Part II. Land, Art 11, ILO Convention 107). For almost three decades, it provided the sole international legal framework for indigenous land disputes, despite the fact that indigenes made little use of it (Posey 1991, 29).

With greater political mobilization and raised awareness of their rights, indigenous groups have articulated their concerns in many international and national fora. These sparked debates on their status and freedoms. In 1971, the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution that authorized a study on indigenous peoples' conditions. It was completed in 1983 and contained numerous recommendations and conclusions which supported indigenous demands that included the protection of their culture (Anaya 1994, 43).

Indigenous groups played a major part in the revision of ILO 107, which had been justly criticized for its obsolete "integrationist approach" to indigenes' concerns, the application of which was seen as "detrimental in the modern world" (Tomei and Swepston 1996). The revision led to the adoption of the 1989 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Convention No. 169), which was ratified by at least 10 countries (Tomei and Swepston 1996). Among its notable provisions were the recognition of the collective, cultural, and spiritual relationship of the peoples to the land (Art 13), the grant of resource rights to the land occupied by indigenes (Art 14), including the right to participate in the use, management, and conservation of these resources (Art 15), and the recognition of the importance of traditional activities and consideration of traditional technologies in the maintenance of the indigenes' way of life (Art 23 [1] and [2]).

The association between indigenous rights and the environment was clearly articulated in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Principle 22 states that "[i]ndigenous people and their communities, and

other local communities, have a vital role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development." It also contains the acknowledgment by developed countries of the responsibility "they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command" (Principle 7).

Agenda 21, another instrument adopted during the 1992 Rio Summit, is even more emphatic. It paid homage to the fact that indigenous peoples "have developed over many generations a holistic traditional scientific knowledge of their lands, natural resources and environment" (Chap. 26, 26.1). It recommended that "in view of the interrelationship between the natural environment and its sustainable development and the cultural, social, economic and physical well-being of indigenous people, national and international efforts to implement environmentally sound and sustainable development should recognize, accommodate, promote and strengthen the role of indigenous people and their communities" (Chap. 26, 26.1). To this end, several activities were envisioned for governments to do, including the adoption or strengthening of pertinent policies and/or legal instruments that will protect indigenous intellectual and cultural property and the right to preserve customary and administrative systems and practices (Chap. 26, 26.4 [b]), the incorporation of indigenous values, views, and knowledge in resource management policies and programmes, as well as the provision of technical and financial assistance for capacity-building programmes to support the indigenes' sustainable self-development (Chap. 26, 26.5).

The indigenous peoples' human right to protect their ecological knowledge and heritage as part of their right to self-determination

Philosophical statements and legal positions issued by indigenous peoples have maintained that their right to control the utilization of their knowledge over their resources and heritage is a component of their right to self-determination. The Kari-Oca Declaration (1992/2002) proclaimed the indigenous people's right to their "own cultural identity without interference."[6] The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1993) stated in no uncertain terms that indigenous peoples "have the right to self-determination: and in exercising that right, (they) must be recognized as the exclusive owners of their cultural and intellectual property."[7] This was bolstered by the COICA (Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin) Statement (1994), which declared that "[a]ll aspects of the issue of intellectual property (determination of access to natural resources, control of the knowledge or cultural heritage of peoples, control of the use of their resources and regulation of the terms of exploitation) are aspects of self-determination."[8]

This dimension of indigenous ecological knowledge has been elaborated in the Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, by Erica-Irene Daes (1995), the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission

on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. One of the principles emphasized that in order "[t]o be effective, the protection of indigenous peoples' heritage should be based broadly on the principle of self-determination, which includes the right and the duty of indigenous peoples to develop their own cultures and knowledge systems, and forms of social organization." Part of this heritage includes "all kinds of scientific, agricultural, technical and ecological knowledge, including cultigens, medicines and the rational use of flora and fauna" (Daes 1995, Annex 1, pars. 2 and 12).

Self-determination depends on the control that should be exercised by the indigenes of their heritage. This control extends not only to traditional resources and territories, but also over the means of cultural transmission and education and on research conducted within their territories or on their people. The procurement of their free and informed consent prior to the recording, study, use or display of any aspect of their heritage is a necessary component of their right to control their heritage. To this end, national laws should deny to any person or corporation the right to obtain patent, copyright or any legal protection "for any element of indigenous peoples' heritage without adequate documentation of the free and informed consent of the traditional owners to an arrangement for the sharing of ownership, control, use and benefits." Researchers are obliged to refrain from, among other things, studying an undescribed organism or naturally occurring chemical, without obtaining satisfactory documentation that the specimen was acquired with the consent of traditional owners. The prior consent of traditional owners, who are the sources of information which led to any scientific discovery, must be obtained and their identities revealed when researchers publish the discovery (Daes 1995, Annex 1, pars. 6-7, 9-10, 25-26, 36).

The indigenes' right over their ecological knowledge and heritage which they have fought for as essential to their right to self-determination can be considered as part of their human rights enshrined in either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Although there is some "categorical ambiguity" with respect to the place of indigenous peoples' right over their knowledge and heritage in these two instruments, such is not an insurmountable issue (Coombe 1998). The United Nations is of the view that these rights are interdependent and indivisible (Tomei and Swepston 1996).

The linkage between human rights in general and the environment is set forth in the 1994 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment. It recognized the "severe human rights consequences of environmental harm caused by...international trade and intellectual property regimes" (Draft's preamble) and grants to indigenous peoples "the right to control their lands, territories and natural resources and to maintain their traditional way of life" (Principle 14, pt. II).

PHILIPPINE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT

One of the very few countries that passed a law recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples prior to the 2007 UN Declaration is the Philippines. In 1997,

the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (Republic Act No. 8371) was passed and it expressly recognized the indigenous concept of ownership, which is made the basis for the rights of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or Indigenous Peoples to claim their ancestral domains (Chap. III, sec. 7) and ancestral lands (Chap. III, sec. 8). Under the Act, the indigenes' concept of ownership "sustains the view that ancestral (domains/lands) and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The...concept...generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs'/Ips' private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed" (Chap. III, sec. 5).

The Act created "community intellectual rights" for the ICCs and obliged the State to "preserve, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures as well as the right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious, and spiritual property taken without their free and prior informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs" (Chap. VI, sec. 32). In consonance with this, the ICCs are granted the right "to special measures to control, develop and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations, including human and other genetic resources, seeds, including derivatives of these resources, traditional medicines and health practices, vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals, indigenous knowledge systems and practices, knowledge of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literature, designs, and visual and performing arts" (Chap. VI, sec. 34).

The act's Implementing Rules (National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Administrative Order No. 1, s. 1988, approved on 9 June 1998) fleshed out the guidelines that would protect and promote indigenous knowledge systems and practices. These include the right to regulate the entry of researchers, their agents, representatives or other like entities into the ancestral domains of the ICCs (Rule VI, sec. 15 [a]); researchers must get the free and prior informed consent of the pertinent ICCs to gain access to the indigenous resources and knowledge (Rule IV, pt. III, secs. 5 and 6); researchers must enter into a written agreement with the ICCs involved about the research, which must include the purpose, design and expected outputs of the research (Rule VI, sec. 15 [b]); Indigenous peoples shall be named as sources of the data they provided and used in all writings, publications or journals produced as a result of the research (Rule VI, sec. 15 [c]); copies of research outputs must be provided freely to the ICCs concerned (Rule VI, sec. 15 [d]); and the ICCs are entitled to royalty from any income derived from the research and the publications (Rule VI, sec. 15 [e]). ICCs are allowed, on their own initiative, to do an inventory of biological and genetic resources found inside their domains or lands and they shall retain all the rights pertaining to the dissemination of the information in the inventory. They may use it exclusively or enter into a joint undertaking with any natural or juridical person for the commercial usage of the inventory, provided their co-venturers secure their free and prior informed consent (Rule VI, sec. 17). All of these mechanisms in the law and its IRR, at least in theory and on paper, effectively provide the means by which the rights of indigenous peoples over their lives, their heritage, and their knowledge are protected.

As it stands, however, the concept of FPIC as implemented by the NCIP has been roundly criticized as containing loopholes and the NCIP officials as lackeys of mining industries. The TebTebba Foundation has documented illegal collusions between local officials, commercial companies, and even staff from NCIP which have led to the denial to indigenous communities of their FPIC on matters that involve their ancestral domains and interests (Colchester and Ferrari 2007, 12).

Then, too, the National Cultural Heritage Law (Republic Act 10066), which was approved on 26 March 2010, did not even recognize the great contribution made by indigenous peoples in the creation, evolution, conservation, and protection of cultural tangible and intangible heritage. It merely left the NCIP, as a consultative body, with unnamed "appropriate cultural agency," with the responsibility of "establishing a program and promulgating regulations to assist indigenous people in preserving their particular cultural and historical properties" (Article IV, Sec. 21). The National Commission for Culture and the Arts, which this law made as the lead agency in the protection and conservation of the Philippine cultural heritage, has come up with the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) on 29 March 2012, more than two years after the law was passed, in violation of the law's directive that the IRR shall be promulgated within ninety days after the law became effective (Article XV, Sec. 51). The IRR did not change anything. It merely copied verbatim the original provision of the law (Article IV, Sec. 21) in its Section 24. Without any effective IRR, this law will join the roster of "dead" laws in the Philippines which cannot be enforced because they have no teeth or any mechanism to implement the law's protection for the rights of indigenous peoples over their cultural heritage.

THE 2007 UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

The international instrument that best encapsulates the human rights approach to indigenous peoples rights is the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It was started by the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, established in 1982 for the purpose of formulating standards of protection for indigenes (Iorns 1993). Indigenes participated in the drafting process. In 1993, the text was approved and sent to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which passed and sent it to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The CHR then established the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) in 1995, to facilitate further discussion and consensus among government representatives and indigenous peoples over the draft's provisions (Gray 1999, 355). The OEWG has met several times. The draft was finally adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2007. One of its most controversial provisions is Article 3 which grants the right of self-determination to indigenous peoples. This is the source of other freedoms that involve their political status and economic, social, and cultural development. The simple and clear statement of this right is a recognition of the valid aspiration of indigenes to control their own destiny: "Any more or less could be interpreted as implying a right different from the right of

self-determination enjoyed by other peoples and could thus be seen to discriminate against indigenous peoples" (Iorns 1993).

The 2007 UN Declaration grants indigenes "full ownership, control and protection of their intellectual property which would include the right to special measures to control, develop and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations, including human and other genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora" (Part VI, Art 29). They are also accorded "the right to their traditional medicines and health practices, including the right to the protection of vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals" (Part V, Art 24). This provision apparently ensures the access of indigenes to those valuable medicinal resources that they have relied upon for generations, notwithstanding the fact that some of these resources may be subject to patents held by entities from dominant societies.

In order to maintain the dignity, diversity, and integrity of their traditions and ways of life, indigenes are granted the "right to the conservation, restoration and protection of the total environment and the productive capacity of their lands, territories and resources, as well as assistance for this purpose from States and through international cooperation" (Part VI, Art 28). Crucial to this is the recognition of their "right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual and material relationship with the lands, territories, waters and coastal seas, and other resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard" (Part VI, Art. 25).

Legally, this Declaration is inefficacious. It affords nothing substantial and protects no one. Nonetheless, it has articulated certain standards about the protection of indigenous rights, which are ultimately based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These standards form a moral and philosophical ethic of dealing with indigenous peoples, which States may not find easy to ignore or disregard, especially under the scrutiny of public opinion.

With the Declaration being approved by one hundred forty three states, it is on the path of evolving into an international human rights norm like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Country-specific initiatives can significantly help. The day this happens would be an overdue denouement to centuries of neglect and abuse suffered by indigenous peoples from the arms and laws of dominant societies.

CONCLUSION

In the end, it is up to the indigenous peoples to determine their future and create their destinies. Respect for indigenous ways and heritage is essentially derived from the respect indigenes have for their beliefs and their ways of life. They must continue evolving and protecting their psyche, their cultural and ecological knowledge, by participating in political processes, not for the purpose of assimilating their heritage into the dominant cultures, but by knowing and using the rules of these processes for their own benefit and self-determination.

The 2007 UN Declaration, which is rightfully considered a product of indigenous philosophical and legal perspectives, can pave the way for indigenous

peoples to be empowered and, coupled with their own efforts, to such an extent that they can define the terms of engagement for the securing of their consent and cooperation, be recognized as equals in nation building, and not rely on any government agency or dominant entity to dictate and corrupt the processes of their engagement and their lives.

NOTES

1. This paper is partly funded by the Philippine National Philosophical Research Society.

2. Note by Erica-Irene Daes (1995), chairperson-rapporteur of the Working group on Indigenous Populations, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, on Standard Setting activities.

3. This was a summary of points made by Claude Levi-Strauss (1966).

4. It is a Filipino term for a local healer or shaman.

5. It is the term for a Bolivian healer (see *Bolivia Bulletin* 1987, 26).

6. This was the result of the meeting of 400 indigenous delegates in Kari-Oca, Brazil, held on 25-30 May 1992, a week before the Rio Summit.

7. This was the product of the First International Conference on the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1993).

8. This was the outcome of the Regional meeting hosted by COICA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia on 28-30 September 1994.

9. This was drafted by an international group of human rights and environmental protection experts who met in Geneva, Switzerland, 16 May 1994.

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PATHOLOGY AND CREATIVITY: A SINTHOMATIC READING OF LACAN'S SEMINAR XXIII*

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Jacques Lacan's innovative development of Freudian psychoanalysis entails a differentiation between registers of the "symbolic," "imaginary," and "real," and then an analysis of the way these three registers are held together as three rings of the "Borromean knot." This work is taken a significant step further in his 1975-76 Seminar XXIII, and is sometimes thought to mark the shift to a "later Lacan." The seminar shifts its focus from "symptom"(as a coded message to the Other, repetitively sent even unbeknownst to the subject) to the "sinthome" as a device by which the subject configures and is configured by a little circuit of messages. The Borromean knot is now seen as held together in some circumstances by the "sinthome." In this paper I explore what Lacan has to say about language, the Borromean knot, James Joyce, and God, and then turn to explore the place of symptoms, "sinthomes" and psychoanalysis itself in relation to psychiatry and contemporary culture. This paper is in two parts. In the first I review main lines of argument in Seminar XXIII, and then in the second part I embed Lacan's account in the broader cultural processes in which our clinical work must be read in order to be rewritten.

INTRODUCTION

Jacques Lacan trained as a psychiatrist in Paris and then, after a brief encounter with surrealism, as a psychoanalyst. This meant that he made a radical shift from a medical account of human distress, of what we usually call "madness," to an account which took seriously the role of profoundly irrational unconscious fantasy, and then to ways of giving space for people to speak about that fantasy in analysis. His public seminars emphasised the role of structured language, our sense of meaning as we speak about ourselves to others, and the impossibility to represent the world outside language. These three dimensions of our lives he called the "symbolic," the "imaginary," and the "real." One way of representing the relationship between these dimensions, or "registers" of human life, is to see

them as linked together in a kind of knot, and Lacan used the notion of the "Borromean knot" to show how the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real were like three rings that were intertwined. In one phase of his writing he argued that if these three registers became dislocated, the individual subjects would lose their grasp of how to use language (the symbolic), they would lose their ability to make sense to others (the imaginary), and they would have no way of representing the world outside language (the real). The knot is Borromean when the three rings are linked together in such a way that breaking one of them would lead to the other two drifting apart (and originally, it was designed to signify the way the aristocratic Milanese Borromeo family was tied to the fate of two other local families).

So, in order to avoid this predicament, in order not to fall into incomprehensibility, into madness, each individual subject needed anchoring points to hold the registers in place. These anchoring points Lacan referred to as "points de capiton," using the metaphor of the "button points" in a sofa that holds the surface material and the stuffing together onto the frame. One of the controversial claims Lacan makes here is that key essential "points de capiton," anchoring points or (as he sometimes put it) "master signifiers" are provided by the "Name-of-the-Father." That is, the language that the child must speak outside the relationship with their mother is organised around the authority of their father in their specific family and by men in general in society. Lacan is making an assumption here that society, and so the realm of the symbolic, is necessarily "patriarchal," and of course there are some problems with that assumption. The history of psychoanalysis (and critiques of psychoanalysis, needless to say) has been marked by attempts to find other ways of thinking about symbolic authority outside these terms.

What I want to focus on in this paper is another related issue, which Lacan addresses in his Seminar XXIII delivered in 1975-76. This is the issue of those anchoring points as such, and the assumption that the symbolic, imaginary, and real *must* be held together by such anchoring points. In Lacanese, the key signifier has then been "foreclosed," or ruled out as a possibility in the life of the subject, and they are then assumed to operate not according to normal everyday "neurotic" structure (and for Lacanian psychoanalysis the closest we come to being normal is being neurotic), but according to what is called "psychotic" structure. There are consequences of this resolution of that problem which open up a more flexible and, I believe, progressive way of thinking about whether the "Name-of-the-Father" is really so necessary. The argument in Seminar XXIII is that the individual subject might be able to weave together the three registers with a fourth "knot." Instead of an anchoring point, there is another creative way that people might hold things together and so avoid slipping into madness. This fourth knot is what Lacan calls the "sinthome." It is a word that sounds like "symptom" but evokes other meanings like "saintly man." There are many consequences for how we think about madness, and so Lacan takes forward the questioning of language, reason, and unreason in psychoanalysis to enable us to connect with more radical "anti-psychiatric" approaches to the mad. I will describe the main lines of that argument about the fourth ring in the Borromean knot and the "sinthome" now, and some of the radical consequences.

LANGUAGE, THE BORROMEAN KNOT, JAMES JOYCE, AND GOD

I will briefly review what Lacan says about language, the Borromean knot, Joyce, and God in the seminar. We can begin with the difference between a psychoanalytic position on language and that of Noam Chomsky, a difference Lacan discusses after a short break in the seminar immediately after his return from the United States.

Language

Lacan sets himself against Chomsky, who had just asserted again at their meeting during a conference in Boston the view that "language is itself an organ"—this is Lacan's characterisation (1974-75, 18 November 1975, 40) of what Chomsky had said—"a tool, a tool for gripping, a tool for apprehending." This idea, which turns language into an instrument of a self-conscious tool-user, is, Lacan points out, an idea that is difficult to dislodge, not one that can be easily "refuted." One of the reasons why it is difficult to dislodge is precisely because it is, he says, "the most common idea." There are a number of different issues combined in this response to Chomsky. One is Lacan's quite basic refusal of a conception of the subject as preexisting and then using language, but there is also a repetition of some anti-Cartesian themes from earlier seminars (1961-62, Seminar IX on identification, for example; see Parker 2007), with Chomsky as a handy foil. Chomsky (1979) is a self-professed Cartesian, so he would be as "stupefied" at Lacan's notion of language as Lacan (1974-75, 9 December 1975, 40) reports himself to be at Chomsky's. Then there is the point that Chomsky's Cartesianism chimes with commonsense. Psychoanalysis has to break from commonsense in order to get going in the first place.

Borromean knot

This brings us to the peculiar ways in which symbolic, imaginary, and real are knotted together, and how different forms of writing might function to give some consistency to the subject who would then like to think that they are simply using language as a tool. There is embedded in his discussion of the Borromean knot a characterisation of the three registers (symbolic, imaginary and real), and then the next step is to ask what might hold them together:

> The fundamental character of this utilisation of the knot is to allow there to be illustrated the triplicity that results from a consistency which is only affected from the Imaginary, from a hole as fundamental which emerges in the Symbolic. And on the other hand, of an ex-sistence, written as I write it ex-sistence, which for its part belongs to the Real which is its fundamental character (Lacan 1975-76, 44).

The notion of the imaginary as site of "consistency" and the symbolic as requiring a gap (or what Lacan calls here a "hole") may be familiar to us, but he

then emphasises the point about the "ex-sistence" of the real with an insistence that this real is necessarily implicated in the other two registers.

James Joyce (Lacan 1975-76)

There are different ways of dealing with this interdependence of symbolic, imaginary, and real, of ensuring that the knot which defines them functions, and one way is through writing. This is what draws Lacan to the writing of James Joyce, in which the distinctive interweaving of material from the three registers seem not to be automatically interlinked such that the breaking of one ring will allow the other two to float free (which is the case in the classic Borromean knot). Rather, it seems that it is the strange writing itself that holds the registers together, a fourth term that is circling through them and giving them consistency.

There is an uneasy sliding backward and forward from an attention to writing as a way of thinking about the knot to speculation about Joyce's life, even though Lacan is well aware that it is not possible to answer the question he himself poses, "was Joyce mad?" (10 February 1976, 111). Lacan recalls a preoccupation from his earliest psychiatric work on paranoid psychosis to suggest that there may be a "fourth term" which gives a different kind of consistency to the relations between imaginary, symbolic, and real, and says "it is indeed in this properly speaking that the sinthome consists" (16 December 1975, 64). There are some musings on the fate of Joyce's daughter Lucia, who is "what is called," Lacan says, "a schizophrenic" (17 February 1976, 128). This predicament of the daughter is a further evidence for Lacan that something has gone wrong, that there have been some errors in the twining of the knot, for which the sinthome compensates; "there is an error in the layout of the knot" (17 February 1976, 131), he says, an error which can be dealt with by "repairing with a sinthome" (17 February 1976, 132), which is a "knotted compensation" (17 February 1976, 133), there is "compensation by the sinthome."

Then we arrive at a dramatic step in Lacan's work that makes the sinthome relevant beyond the realm of psychosis, if indeed that is what we are dealing with in the case of Joyce. The mechanism of "foreclosure" that is up to that point specific to psychosis, as far as Lacan is concerned, is now generalised, perhaps to every subject who is subject to the real, which every subject is. Here is how Lacan takes that step in the seminar: "The orientation of the Real, in my territory, forecloses meaning. I am saying that because last evening I was asked the question of whether there were other foreclosures than the one that results from the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father" (9 March 1976, 152).

God (Lacan 1975-76)

There is a key question here which concerns the matter of the "sexual relationship," or rather the lack of sexual relationship, which is compensated for by men and women in different ways. This "lack of sexual relationship," that men and women at some basic level just do not understand each other and that we have to be able to come to terms with that in order to coexist together, is a notion

that Lacan (1975/1998) develops from, among other things, Freud's own musings about the nature of "femininity." The notion of "femininity" and "woman" that Lacan is working with are bound up with different fantasies for men and women about what lies beyond language, and what indeed lies beyond the interlinking of symbolic, imaginary, and real in the Borromean knot which gives each of them, as if they were different kinds of subject, consistency. Lacan argues that there is an "absolute necessity for the human species being that there should be Another of the Other. This is the one generally called God, but which analysis unveils as being quite simply The woman" (9 March 1976, 159). There is a general point then about otherness which is configured in psychoanalytic discourse as "the unconscious":

> The hypothesis of the Unconscious, as Freud [1911] underlines, is something which...cannot hold up except by supposing the Name-of-the-Father. Supposing the Name-of-the-Father, certainly, is God. It is in this that...psychoanalysis, by succeeding, proves that one can moreover do without the Name-of-the-Father...provided one makes use of it. (13 April 1976, 170)

There is also an opening here for thinking of psychoanalysis as but one strategy for doing without the Name-of-the-Father, and one of the lessons of Joyce is that a particular linking of images of femininity and spirituality in his writing as sinthome is a compensation for anything that Lacan (or any other psychoanalyst) might have offered. It should be pointed out that the term "sinthome" as a condensation of a number of distinctive aspects of Joyce's own writing—not only as homonym of "symptom" but also as "saintly man" and as evoking Irish "home rule" (18 November 1975, 24)—might itself be a name for the phenomenon that only applies to Joyce. And then, as at many other points in the seminar, there is a shift from the particular instances Lacan is concerned with to broader questions, with massive implications for psychoanalysis. Just one (to finish this section with) is his comment that "a Catholic is unanalysable" (18 November 1975, 157). Actually, Lacan makes a similar comment elsewhere about the Japanese as being a people for whom psychoanalysis is "neither possible nor necessary," which has provoked some commentary by Japanese Lacanians (Parker 2008).

LOCATING LACAN

Seminar XXIII is retroactively positioned by some Lacanians as the locus of "the later Lacan" (e.g., Voruz and Wolf, 2007) where we shift from interpretation of the "symptom" as coded message to the Other, repetitively sent even unbeknownst to the subject, to the *sinthome* as device by which the subject configures and is configured by a little circuit of messages that would be disrupted and would disintegrate the subject itself were they to be interpreted. The sinthome can be pictured and "written" as a fourth ring that circles its way around the three rings of the Borromean knot holding them together when they have not actually been linked as they should (see Lacan 1964/1973).

The seminar is then viewed as the site of a significant shift in how we conceptualise the subject and of a shift in clinical practice. This, not only for psychotics, to which discussion of sinthome in psychoanalysis is sometimes tied, but for all of those who were once treated as beset by symptoms, all of the ordinary neurotics. That shift is evident not only in the way that "psychotic" becomes a kind of master signifier in psychoanalytic writing after Lacan, as in the motif of "ordinary psychosis" (Klotz 2009), but also in suspicion of interpretation in the clinic as feeding the symptom and as satisfying the interpretative activity of the unconscious instead of questioning it by "cutting" into it (Miller 1999).

Lacan makes the curious comment in the seminar that "the only weapon we have against the *sinthome*" is "equivocation" (1975-76, 18 November 1975, 27). Perhaps this means that a sinthome could be maintained by talking around it, or dislodged by introducing ambiguity into the way it is used, which would also result in an unravelling of the Borromean knot. This would be inadvisable, in the Lacanian canon, in the kind of subject that Lacanians call "psychotic" who only has their sinthome to hold symbolic, imaginary, and real together (e.g., Fink 1997). But the possible role of "equivocation" as the only weapon against the sinthome does raise the intriguing question as to whether a sinthome might also function for other nonpsychotic subjects to stitch things together so that it might actually be productive reflexive work to take a distance from it from time to time.

READING WITH LACAN (1975-76)

I moved very fast through Lacan's specific comments on language, the knot, Joyce, and God, with an eye to some connections among them that enable reflection on the process of theory-construction in psychoanalysis. There are other important elements of this seminar, and there are many different paths through Lacan's work that produce different versions of psychoanalysis for each reader, writer, or analyst. It may even be possible to say that the construction of psychoanalysis from clinical work is the construction of a sinthome that holds together the impossibly contradictory and convoluted relationship between registers of Freudian practice. So what does Lacan say about this process, about how he reads and writes himself?

Lacan points out that he "invented" the real, and that this element is what can make the symbolic and imaginary hold together; "This is something of which I can say that I consider it as being nothing more than my symptom" (13 April 1976, 166). He notes that while it might be possible to claim that the "real" is his own "symptomatic response" to Freud's invention of the unconscious, this does not mean that it is only symptomatic, for to claim that would be, he says, to reduce all invention to the sinthome." It would seem that we are at a point here where Lacan is working at the boundaries of what operates as sinthome for an individual and how it comes to function for a number of subjects for whom it becomes a conceptual device. Remember that, according to Lacan, Joyce's writing is something that has "a hold on everyone" (10 February 1976, 122); we are implicated in it, and it is this characteristic of writing beyond a subject reduced to a particular individual (that is, the Lacanian subject) that makes this conceptual

device into something that is also a cultural device (Santner 1996). For psychoanalysis as a clinical treatment that device is always fantasised as existing in the figure of the analyst. "It is not psychoanalysis that is a sinthome," Lacan notes, "it is the psychoanalyst" (13 April 1976, 170).

SINTHOME AS A CREATIVE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION OF CERTAINTY

I want to move on now to the second part of the paper, to look at how we could read and use Seminar XXIII in the context of the development of psychoanalysis as a clinical practice and as a cultural practice. There is a preoccupation in Seminar XXIII with one of the guiding themes of Lacan's work on psychosis as an alternative to psychiatric diagnosis, that is, "the incapacity to signify one's own existence as a subject in relation to the Other" (Vanheule 2011, 87). It is against this background of continuity in Lacan's approach to psychosis that we should attend to conceptual innovations like the "sinthome" (see Hoens and Pluth 2002). For example, with respect to the question of what is "normal," which the particular lacing together of the Borromean knot attends to in the sinthome, Lacan (1961-62) had already made the point back in Seminar IX that "the neurotic like the pervert, like the psychotic himself, are only faces of the normal structure" (13 June 1962, 11).

The reflexive account that Lacan cues us into in Seminar XXIII (where he speaks of the "real" as his symptomatic response to Freud's invention of the unconscious) is precisely concerned with our capacity as psychoanalysts to signify our own existence in relation to the Other. That entails including ourselves in and setting ourselves against changing cultural configurations of an Other that today also includes psychoanalysis. How we think about creativity today is embedded in psychoanalytic discourse, so how do we think about that psychoanalytically, and is the notion of sinthome any help here?

Certainty then and now

In 1926 Oxford University Press published Geraldine Coster's book *Psychoanalysis for normal people*. The book attracted a review in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* (J. E. 1926) and went into second and third editions with reprints until after the Second World War. The version I have is a 1929 reprint of the second edition. It popularises psychoanalysis for normal people and is designed to be "entertaining enough and brief enough for nurses to read in their rare moments of leisure" (Coster 1929, 7). The bibliography includes a list of forty-two mostly now out-of-print works of creative fiction "embodying new psychological principles" (Coster 1929, 231), and the book is arguing against what Coster (1929, 104-105, 173) sees as "the tradition of the Anglo-Saxon race," for which "display of emotion is effeminate and undignified." She evokes "sexual libido" as "the fundamental cause of every outgoing of the individual toward the object," with a long list of what might call forth such a "thrill of ecstasy"; "a snow-capped mountain peak, a field of bluebells, a sun-lit sea, an exquisite musical phrase, a

poem, a picture—the warm affection you feel for your brother, your school-friend, your gardener, or your dog..." and so on, up to "the devotion of the saint to God."

This last example—the devotion of the saint to God—which punctuates the list is not arbitrary. Earlier on in the book, Coster (1929, 51, 226, and 229) notes that when defining libido, "we ought to realize that we are speaking of what many Christians would call the Holy Spirit," and her final chapter on "sublimation and religion" claims that "many of the greatest analysts have admitted that to facilitate a lofty religious adaptation is the highest goal of analysis." Note that the tone of emphasis and certainty in the "analysts have admitted" of her claim. While happiness of the "ordinary human being" is marred by "the inner conflict for self-mastery" and "the restricted flow of libido which restricts his capacity to act and feel," she (1929, 226 and 229) writes, in Christ "there was no such inner conflict," and so he, Christ, provides a model of sublimation for a "harmony unknown to us." Another of Coster's books (1934) looks to Yoga as an alternative to Western psychology (see Davids 1934), so we could guess that she is searching for something. But I do not want to turn this into a pathobiographical exercise (any more than Lacan should have done when he was tempted to slide from Joyce's writing to the life of the author and his daughter's madness).

The point is that Geraldine Coster was just flexible enough and just steadfast enough putting the right argument at the right place at the right time. Coster was an invited speaker at a 1929 Conference on Mental Health at Central Hall Westminster organised by the Joint Committee of the National Council for Mental Health and the Tavistock Square Clinic, for example, and her talk went down very well (*Journal of Mental Science*, 1930). She was one of many authors of popular texts on psychoanalysis in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s, some of which were avowedly Christian, some more sceptical about any kind of religious faith (Richards 2000). Let us turn to two quite different ways of negotiating certainty and creativity that produce distinctive sinthomatic spaces for reading and writing, the interlinking of symbolic, imaginary, and real. So now we move from Coster's Christian psychoanalysis, certain that it was true, to creative reinventions of subjectivity that our Lacanian psychoanalysis is better suited to engage with.

Each of these practices I will describe is a function of the actually-existing symbolic coordinates of contemporary culture, the specific forms of imaginary communication of this material between subjects in this culture and the specific occluded impossible-to-represent real of that actually-existing symbolic.

The challenge of *Asylum* to psychiatric certainty

The first example comes from an activist current of work that pits itself against medical psychiatry; it finds expression in recent psychiatric "survivor" research (Sweeney et al. 2009) and in *Asylum: The Magazine for Democratic Psychiatry* (www.asylumonline.net). Already we need to interpret phenomena like "democratic psychiatry" in cultural context. In English-speaking cultures, the "anti-psychiatry" movement, of which contemporary "democratic psychiatry" is today's voice, tends to see psychoanalysis as part of psychiatry rather than as an antidote to it, this despite R. D. Laing's and Thomas Szasz's training as

psychoanalysts and some rather odd appeals to psychoanalytic notions in articles in *Asylum Magazine*. But perhaps that ambiguity about the place of psychoanalysis in "democratic psychiatry" is actually an indication that it is not so much another "symptom" of the psychiatric patient's complaint about the mental health system but a creative engagement with the internally contradictory forms of knowledge and notions of underlying predisposing factors that structure psychiatry itself. I would go further and suggest that it is psychiatry that is a "symptom" of an alienating medicalising gaze on disorder held together by a discourse that we could term "psychotic" (and psychiatry sure is haunted by the certainty of its diagnosis of those who are reluctant to be adapted). *Asylum Magazine*, on the other hand, is a response from within the psychiatric system survivor movement that is "sinthomatic." The first-person accounts, stories, poems, cartoons, and dissenting professional articles that comprise the magazine are ways of holding together a life-world that is fractured by, among other things, the psychiatric system.

In *Asylum Magazine* the forms of representation of "madness" are a function of the still-potent psychiatric classification systems that use "psychosis" as a life-sentence label to anchor the "normality" presumed by pharmaceutical companies, symbolic material that is enforced in the imaginary self-understanding of the good patient who has taken on board that diagnosis and turned it into a form of identity, and with an impossible real remainder of organic fault that is itself often produced as iatrogenic product of medication used to stabilise it. The psychiatric discursive practice encodes, as if in some bizarre hieroglyph, the dividing practices, power relations and bodily arrangements of the host society, and it is this practice that is *symptomatic*. It can be decoded, from the standpoint of those subjects to this practice, and that the decoding process necessitates the construction of alternative linkages among the symbolic, imaginary, and real that do then cause anxiety in psychiatrists. Psychiatry cannot grasp what the objection means and it is in a state of suspense over the possible violence such alternative linkages may portend; it is in this light that we should read Lacanian accounts of the "feeling of enigma and tension in the psychotic subject" (Vanheule 2011, 95). It is in this respect that one might refer to psychiatric discourse as psychotic discourse. Lacan cues us into the way that this alternative linkage in *Asylum Magazine* operates as a form of sinthome.

A Lacanian approach to psychosis might well be understood by some of those in the survivor activist movement as complicit with psychiatry, and our use of the term "psychotic" is already, in some ways, problematic, for it carries the weight of psychiatric diagnosis. What Lacan gives us in Seminar XXIII is another way of working with everyday psychosis, which does not search for the underlying fault that the symptom speaks of, but traces the creative engagement of the subject with quite crazy ideas, including psychoanalysis itself. For example, our participation in the survivor movement might attend to the way that "trauma" is now being evoked as explanation for why people hear voices (e.g., Hammersley et al. 2007), which is a caricature-psychoanalytic explanation that then effectively pathologises once again those who hear voices who cannot find the traumatic events which they have supposedly covered over.

LIVING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN CONEY ISLAND

Now I want to fast-forward eighty years from Geraldine Coster's book which was arguing for psychoanalysis as the truth in the 1920s to Zoe Beloff's (2009) exploration of psychoanalytic imagery in *The Coney Island Amateur Psychoanalytic Society and its circle*. In August 1909, while in the United States to lecture at Clark University, Freud visited Coney Island amusement park. Beloff's book describes how Freud's visit inspired a group of enthusiasts for psychoanalysis in Coney Island to build their own psychoanalytic society. It describes their detailed plans to build a "Dreamland" theme park around Freud's ideas, including letters to entrepreneurs and the hostile responses. The book includes a DVD with film-footage by the film-club from 1926 through 1972 associated with the society in which psychoanalytic ideas are put to work.

It is partly because this cultural-psychoanalytic exercise is retroactive, exploring elements of psychoanalytic culture before it was actually implanted in the United States, that it achieves its status as something that it would not be quite accurate to call "symptom." The Coney Island Psychoanalytic Society is not "symptomatic" of psychoanalytic culture or of the particular individual responses of those involved in a world that Freud was attempting to make sense of by "inventing" (as Lacan puts it) the unconscious. Rather, the book weaves together a number of existing symbolic processes—the question of anti-Semitism is a recurring motif in the cultural projects of the circle, for example—imaginary responses to the already-existing symbolic material of Coney Island amusement park, and the real stuff of burgeoning commodification of fantasy that capitalism was inciting and containing. It would be more fruitful, perhaps, to say that these cultural activities are "sinthomatic."

We Lacanians are able to embrace this creative construction of psychoanalytic imaginary precisely because we do not see psychoanalytic phenomena as being "discovered" but as being "invented." Lacan (1991/2007) emphasises the creative work that Freud undertook to "dream" into place the Oedipus complex, for example, and then draws attention to the danger of taking such dreams for reality; the danger of treating the unconscious as something that lies underneath the surface of everyday life or inside the head of each speaking subject. Psychoanalysis is creative work, and Zoe Beloff's Coney Island Amateur Psychoanalytic Society is the very kind of sinthomatic activity that we could participate in. Zoe Beloff's mother, Halla Beloff, a past-president of the British Psychological Society, who in her research career conducted studies of psychoanalytic personality traits, was disappointed (as was I) to discover that Zoe had fabricated the story of the Coney Island Society, including the "amateur films" that are to be found on the DVD that comes with the book. A presentation of the work at the Freud Museum apparently went down like a lead balloon. But that is what you get if you treat psychoanalysis as a search for truth instead of looking at how the subject forges a new relation to the truth of the world they have come to live in.

We can recognise *Asylum Magazine* and Coney Island psychoanalysis as sinthomatic because there is something of those two responses to psychiatry and psychoanalysis that resonates with Lacanian practice. I have drawn attention to

Lacan's reflexive questioning of his own discourse, and the suggestion that our psychoanalysis is not so much symptomatic as sinthomatic. It is easy to slide back into symptom-speak, for example, to treat James Joyce as a psychotic who would really have gone mad if he had not woven symbolic, imaginary, and real together in his own writing. Instead, it is the writing itself which we focus on in a creative sinthomatic reading, in a reading that helps us develop an account of the sinthome and the production of different forms of normality, different "faces of the normal structure." We attend to the specific ways in which normality is produced in different cultural-political institutional contexts.

CONCLUSION

I want to conclude by suggesting that there are at least four different institutional contexts relevant to our work and our discussions about our work. Each context frames, incites, and limits "creativity" which we can then, perhaps, grasp as "symptomatic" or "sinthomatic." These institutional contexts are clearly relevant to the transmission of psychoanalysis, and Lacan (1991, 2007) attends to their effects in the transmission of his own work, as is apparent in his formulation of the "discourse of the university" as one of the four discourses (and in those comments toward the end of Seminar XXIII about the importance of "writing" in his own grasping of the Borromean knot and his own "symptomatic response" to Freud's invention of the unconscious with his invention of the "real").

So, the first frame is that academic apparatus in which we are sometimes trapped in conference format and in journals that mimic the production of scholarly publications. One of the effects of this academic frame is that complaints or rebellious responses tend to look like symptoms; that is, the responses can quite easily be ascribed to the symptom of the individual writer (obsessional, hysteric, and even, in the license given to some forms of anxiety-producing or out-of-frame productions, perverse or psychotic).

A second frame, which borrows from the history of nineteenth-century psychiatric pedagogical practice, is the "case presentation" of the kind that we see in, for example, Lacan's 1976 interview with Mr. Primeau, contemporaneous with Seminar XXIII. This interview (Lacan 1980) appeared in the Schneiderman (1980) book in English, before the recent discussions of "sinthome" in the later Lacan. This case presentation is another kind of creative endeavour, but still delimited by a set of rules which determine what can be said as the symbolic material, a series of assumptions that determine how it will be understood in the register of the imaginary, and the capacity to capture momentarily elements that escape representation, a real that is dependent on the already constituted symbolic and imaginary aspects. It is worth pointing out that Lacan's (1959) celebrated discussion of the young woman who hallucinated a neighbour, saying the word "sow" was also drawn from a psychiatric case presentation, not from an example in a psychoanalytic session. Needless to say, this form of representation is usually rejected by opponents of medical psychiatry, such as those in *Asylum Magazine*, as voyeuristic and pathologising. However, Lacan also works within this form which usually leads the psychiatrist to detect "symptoms" that express pathological processes, and does

something different with these symptoms which we can now read, alongside Seminar XXIII as an orientation to Mr. Primeau's imposed speech as "sinthome."

A third frame is psychoanalysis itself, and it is important to distinguish the psychiatric "case presentation" from the peculiar kind of creative free-associative and interpretative speech to another in the enclosed space of the clinic (Parker 2011). Here speech is produced within limits that the analysand begins to comprehend as they try and fail to free associate, and there are consequences for the direction of the treatment. We would never, even before reading Seminar XXIII, make fixed "diagnosis" that would set the subject along the track of one kind of treatment; subjecting the speech of obsessional or hysteric to equivocation in order to open the unconscious, for example, as opposed to another in which anchoring points were elaborated as part of the delusory system of the psychotic that held the subject in place. To some extent, psychoanalytic practice in the Lacanian tradition has always operated on the assumption that the subject, every subject, could be "psychotic," and Lacan's discussion of the sinthome renews that emphasis on the "sinthomatic" nature of fantasy.

The fourth frame is the talk around psychoanalysis, around the seminars that transmit it, around the psychiatric apparatus it inhabits, and around the clinic itself, and is something I tried to evoke in the work on the delusional fantasy that psychoanalysis was always already present in US American culture in the Coney Island Amateur Psychoanalytic Society. In Seminar XXIV, Lacan (1976-77, 76) comments that "Psychoanalysis is a delusional practice but it's currently the best one we have for giving us the patience to deal with the inconvenient situation of being human." Note the distance we have travelled from Coster's popularisation of psychoanalysis for "normal people." Lacan comes very close to the universe of psychoanalytic discourse that the Coney Island Psychoanalytic Society cues us into. He treats our love of psychoanalysis as a kind of construction that is not really "symptomatic" as such, but instead helps us develop a "sinthomatic" response to the existence of psychoanalysis in contemporary culture, a creative sinthomatic reading of psychoanalysis.

NOTE

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GOD IN WHITEHEAD'S PROCESS METAPHYSICS[1]

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Whitehead's process view of God has inspired many admirers and provoked many critics. This article does not only examine this view of God as generally opposed to traditional theism, but it also explains why a process God is for Whitehead a necessary requirement for the metaphysical nature of the actual world. After discussing God's necessary functions in the world, the paper assesses the significance of Whitehead's process conception of God through a comparison with the traditional theistic view of God.

INTRODUCTION

One of Alfred North Whitehead's major preoccupations in founding process philosophy was to develop a metaphysical scheme in which every element of human experience can be explicated or interpreted. God is one crucial factor in this scheme. But Whitehead was not interested in offering a new proof for God's existence; rather, the need for God necessarily grew out of his metaphysical analysis of things constituting the world (Cobb Jr. and Griffin 1976, 42). This view of God is understood as a dynamic metaphysical process required for there to be any actual world at all. In contrast with Classical theism, Whitehead (1979, 526) writes in *Process and reality* that "undoubtedly, the intuitions of Greek, Hebrew, and Christian thought have alike embodied the notions of a static God condescending to the world."

In process thought, God is actively related to the world, and in most cases this very activity involves great risks; hence, any divine creative influence must be persuasive, and not coercive (Cobb and Griffin 1976, 53). It is the purpose of this paper to examine Whitehead's conception of God's nature and its relation to the world and to explain why he is very critical of the traditional theistic vision of God and its all-controlling power in the world. We shall begin with a brief but relevant account of why a deterministic world requires God; we shall consider thereafter Whitehead's process theism, that is, his dipolar view of God's nature and in how God carries on its function in the world. Finally we shall critically look into the metaphysical and moral significance of Whitehead's conception of

God in comparison with traditional theism which sees God as Absolute, unchanging, and as not really related to the world.

WORLD OF NECESSITY REQUIRES GOD AS METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE OF LIMITATION

According to Whitehead (1948a, 249), Aristotle was the last Western European philosopher of first-rate importance to give an entirely dispassionate metaphysical consideration to the question of God:

> After Aristotle, ethical and religious interests began to influence metaphysical conclusions.... [Aristotle] on the subject of his Prime Mover...has no motive, except to follow his metaphysical train of thought whithersoever it led him. It did not lead him very far towards the production of a God available for religious purposes.

Aristotle's conclusion, however, is not to be toyed with, for as a dispassionate appeal to the idea of God, it "does represent a first step without which no evidence on a narrower experiential basis can be of much avail in shaping the conception" (Whitehead 1948a, 250). Thus, it is pertinent that when we raise the question of God, we should, following Aristotle's example, make intelligible "our ideas of any entity at the base of all actual things" by finding out whether "the general character of things requires that there be such an entity." In other words, for us to talk reasonably about God, we should consider whether there are reasons adequate enough for believing that the world requires that there be such a God.

Whitehead believes there are such reasons; an adequate and coherent account of the world should include some reference to God. He holds the view that there are possibilities and that these possibilities are related to actualities, such that if something is actual, then it is seen as also possible. On this basis, something which is not possible cannot also be the actual thing. For Whitehead (1948a, 250-51), "we conceive actuality as in essential relation to an unfathomable possibility." Of all actual things, we can imagine that it might not have been. The class of things that are the actual things is distinguished by "a unique categorical determination" (Whitehead 1948a, 253) from the class of possibilities. This categorical determination is unique in the sense that it cannot be itself deduced from the class of possible things. An actuality exhibits a limitation or determination through which a particular possibility becomes actualized.

Whitehead (1957, 104) puts forward an argument in *Religion in the making* in defense of his position that the world requires God:

> ...it is not the case that there is an actual world which accidentally happens to exhibit an order of nature. There is an actual world because there is an order in nature. If there were no order, there would be no world. Also since there is a world, we know that there is an order. The

ordering entity is a necessary element in the metaphysical situation presented by the actual world.

In other words, the term "world" as used above refers to a set of entities which are somehow related to each other. An "actual world" implies a set of interrelated actualities. And in so far as the world is a complex kind of actuality, it signifies a complex possibility, or a complex possible order. By reason of being exhibited in the actual world, however, this possible order is indeed an actual order. There is a unique categorical determination whereby whatever is possible is actual. A possible order is in reality, the order of nature. Thus, the fact that there is an actual world, and as a result, an order of nature, indicates the functioning of a principle of limitation. This metaphysical situation might have been otherwise; in that there might not have been any actual order whatsoever. This implies in this situation that there could have been no actual world.

Thus, "the metaphysical situation presented by the actual world" means that some kind of "ordering entity" is functional. This further indicates that since "there is nothing actual which could be actual without some measure of order" (Whitehead 1957, 119), it is absolutely necessary that there should be an order of nature (Whitehead 1948, 108) to explain the presence of an actual world. But to speak of an order of nature functional in the actual metaphysical situation is thus to speak of God. This is why process thought, as Whitehead (1957, 150) conceives his understanding of the nature of God, oscillates between the doctrine of God as "impersonal order of the universe" and the doctrine of God as "the one person creating the universe." If we follow the impersonalistic approach, God can then be referred to as the principle of limitation upon which the world depends. Whereas if we follow the more personalistic approach, then God is seen as an entity who, in transcending the world, acts to impact an order upon the world. In either case, the world is seen as requiring God in that it depends on an order of nature. In a way, this argument is similar to the traditional cosmological argument for the existence of God, for it asserts that God is necessary for there to be any actual world whatever.

Whitehead believes that a thorough metaphysical description and analysis of the actual world can give us an insight into the order of nature upon which the actual world itself depends. According to this metaphysical description in brief, the actual world is a process of concrete finite entities which are essentially unique, complex, and interrelated. Whitehead (1979, passim) calls these as "actual entities" and sometimes refers to them as "actual occasions of experience," or simply as "drops of experience." These actual entities are the building blocks of reality; upon coming into existence, they do not endure but immediately lapse into the past. Each new actual entity is a process of activity, a process of becoming which upon completion of its becoming quickly disappears into the past, not totally lost, but remaining there as now objectively immortal, significant as potentials to influence the coming into existence of future actualities. Each new occasion of experience must take account of the many actual occasions that constitute its given environment. This, it does in some definite way, because without that form of definiteness there will be no new actual occasion. And since it has a past that

is different from that of any other, which can only be an antecedent actual entity given in its environment, it must acquire a new form of definiteness. The past actuality cannot procure such a new form of definiteness as the newly becoming actual entity, because the present becoming actual entity can only accept from the past what the past can impact which can only be *partially duplicated* in the new emergent actual occasion.

Thus, the new form of definiteness can only come from the realm of possibility. But this realm of possibility is purely abstract, thus lacking all relevant agencies to provide selectively for the needs of new actual entities. The metaphysical situation here requires that there be an agency "to mediate between these abstract forms or pure possibilities and the actual world" (Cobb and Griffin 1976, 43). This agency can best be understood as a complete conceptualization or envisagement in the mind of God of all the abstract forms of definiteness in their graded relevance for every new situation in the actual world. In this sense, God can be understood as that crucial factor required of necessity to bring into availability all relevant possibilities in their order of relevance to the needs of the actual world and to lure the actual occasions towards the realization of these new forms of definiteness, for the ongoingness of the world as a whole.

GOD'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

Thus far, we have briefly touched on the main reason for thinking that the world requires God, which centers around the contention that an antecedent principle of limitation is needed to explain the metaphysical order that the world exemplifies. Assuming this view is accepted, we need to clarify the nature and function of God which the world requires. But before looking into God's nature, it is worth noting that one important thing which this God can do is to encompass all possibilities. This encompassing means that no possibility can fall outside the limitations which God provides. "Possibilities" were introduced into Whitehead's metaphysical scheme through the notion of "eternal objects." Eternal objects are mainly abstract entities which function as forms of definiteness characterizing every actual occasion of experience and making them determinate for what they are. These eternal objects are "abstract" rather than "concrete"; they are indeterminate as to how they obtain ingression into definite actual occasions.

There is a limitation upon their abstraction, and this is one reason why the world requires God, since a principle of limitation is needed to provide those possibilities which are relevant to actual occasions. Thus, it follows that for a possibility to be a possibility, at any rate, it must be encompassed by the principle of limitation. There is no possibility not envisaged by the principle of limitation. Whatever is possible must be relevant and, therefore, possible for some actual occasion and subject to the principle of limitation. This state of affairs applies to all possibilities which have been actualized; their very actualization presupposes the function of a principle of limitation. There is an unfathomable wealth of possibilities in the world, many of which have yet to attain actualization. Thus, the principle of limitation covers not only the realized possibilities, but also those whose realizations are yet to occur. All these possibilities and actualities

constitute part of the "complete envisagement of the realm of all eternal objects" or "the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects," which Whitehead (1979, 46 and 70) himself uses as expressions to describe God's metaphysical function of performance in the actual world.

Whitehead (1948a, 154; 1979, 154) also uses similar expressions to refer to the function of the principle of limitation such as "the envisagement of possibilities of value in respect of the synthesis of eternal objects" or of God's "conceptual realization of their possibilities as elements of value in any creature." By exercising this function, God does not actualize *values*. This is because a value involves the physical realization of a prehensive unification[2] of eternal objects. What God does in making available antecedent forms of order is to make available "possibilities of value" or "elements of value" ready for realization in the actual world. Hence, God antecedently makes available, or orders, complex patterns of possibilities in so far as He is the ground of the possible attainment of such values. This function in effect points to what the principle of limitation does in respect of eternal objects. The whole point of the ordering of eternal objects is to make their availability for realization by particular actual occasions possible. God's envisagement of them is therefore not a mere private conceptualization of them in God's mind, but rather a vision of them as possibilities for actualization in the actual world. It is a visualization of how possibilities may become definite actualities. It represents a kind of urge, or a yearning, "after a concrete fact—no particular facts, but after some actuality" (Whitehead 1979, 50). Thus the principle of limitation makes provision for that feature of possibility whereby every possibility, as such, could lay claim to some actuality.

It must be emphasized that the world of actualities is a world of dynamic process, not in any form static. The actual world is a process of actual occasions in which numerous possibilities are yet unactualized or rather are yet to be exemplified. The relevant possibilities are what the principle of limitation makes available *currently* to becoming actual occasions of experience. It is by reason of this function that "each eternal object" has a definite effective relevance to each new creature; otherwise, novelty would be meaningless and perhaps inconceivable.

DIPOLAR VIEW OF THE NATURE OF GOD

One major contribution of Whitehead's (1979, 28) process thought to the idea of God's nature is that God is takento be an "actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space." Whitehead, thus, conceives of God as "part of the whole of reality, just like all other actual occasions of experience; meaning that God generically is not at all different from these other actualities, except that He is, of course, "Primordial in nature. In this respect, whatever is said of actual entities in some way or other is equally applicable also to God." God must not be seen as an example of an exception to all metaphysical principles characterizing all actual entities. God should rather be treated as "their chief exemplification." As an actual entity, God has a dipolar nature comprising His *Primordial* nature and His *Consequent* nature. Accordingly, God when

"viewed as primordial," says Whitehead (1979, 521), "is the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality."

It is this aspect of God's nature which Whitehead (1979, 529) says is the principle of limitation, and the organ through which novelty is achieved in the actual world by His ordered envisagement of the realm of eternal objects. This is the source of the primary lure of God on the world. God's primordial aspect is essential not only for the urge towards the attainment of values compatible with the order of the universe, but also for all realization of novelty in the world. As Whitehead (1979, 377) points out in his *Process and reality*, "apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world and no order in the world." This is part of the secular functions which God performs in the world and it also points to this aspect of God's primordial nature as the ultimate source of creativity and novelty. As such, God's primordial nature is the direct envisagement of all possibilities of good and evil, that is, of possibilities as to how actualities may be definite. Whitehead (1979, 50) sums it up by saying that

> God's primordial nature is abstracted from his commerce with 'particulars', and is therefore devoid of those 'impure' intellectual cogitations which involve propositions. It is God in abstraction, alone with himself. As such it is a mere factor in God, deficient in actuality.

This simply means that God, under the abstraction of his primordial nature, is considered not fully, but deficient in actuality. In that respect, He is not to be ascribed with fullness of feeling, or of consciousness (Whitehead 1979, 522). He is merely thought thinking thought. "He is devoid of physical experience and hence 'bodiless', locked in his conceptual aloneness as the first creature of creativity" (Kraus 1979, 161).

For God to have the fullness of actuality, it requires that he enjoys physical as well as conceptual feelings. And since physical feelings involve prehensions of actual occasions, God can have fullness of actuality only in relation with the world of actual occasions. But this is possible only through his consequent nature. God's primordial nature functions as the principle of limitation, thus creating the conditions for the possibility of finite particularities and through his conceptual valuations, there is order in the relevance of graded eternal objects to the process of creation. Whitehead (1979, 522) writes that "the unity of [God's] conceptual operations is a free creative act, untrammeled by reference to any particular course of things. It is deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact comes to pass." In this respect, it is presupposed by all actual entities in the actual world, "while it merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance of which it is the primordial exemplification." This primordial nature of God is the achievement of a primordial character by creativity.

METAPHYSICAL NATURE OF THE GOD-WORLD RELATION

God's primordial nature, which is absolute, is an abstraction from his complete actuality which has other definite relational aspects. God has also a

consequent nature, which is relative. According to Whitehead (1979, 522), God's conceptual actuality (primordial nature) "at once exemplifies and establishes the categoreal conditions." One categoreal condition exemplified by all actualities, including God, is their having a subjective aim. With respect to God, this condition is exemplified by his primordial nature which corresponds to what in other actualities is their subjective aim. Due largely to his metaphysical function in the world, God's subjective aim is unique. As the principle of limitation, this subjective aim is constituted by the complete conceptual envisagement of all eternal objects laced with the urge toward their realization in the actualities of the world. God, by being the lure for feeling and the eternal urge of desire, establishes his subjective aim as the initial phase of every subjective aim relevant for each actuality. His subjective aim implies his "purpose" in the creative process. Ordinarily, the immediate purpose or aim of any actuality is its self-creation into a novel unity. But the actuality's own being is not wholly an end as such because, by the principle of relativity, no actuality can separate itself from others and from the whole. Yet it exists as a unit in its own right. It upholds value-intensity for itself, but this involves sharing value-intensity with the universe (see Whitehead 1968, 111).

Thus, every actuality has two sides, namely, its individual self and its significance in the universe. This double aspect of value is reflected in its subjective aim, that is, to create a value-intensity for its self-satisfaction and also for others. The subjective aim of each actuality, which is derived from God, also exemplifies God's purpose inherent in the primordial appetition[3] whereby that subjective aim is relevant to that particular actuality. God's purpose in respect of each particular actuality is the attainment of the highest intensity-of-value experience that is possible for it. In other words, his purpose is to maximize the possible actualization of value in that instance. This actualization of value-intensity is not only for the actuality in question, but also for others, including God. That is to say, says Whitehead (1979, 161), God's purpose for each actuality is for its "depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfillment of his own being." Thus, this whole conception predicates the categories of process and relativity as equally applicable to God. This entails that God's actuality is constituted by his process of becoming and this necessitates his physical prehension of the actual world. Accordingly, we meet here the other side of God's own nature, his consequent nature, for God requires the other actualities in as much as they require him, for the fulfillment of his own being. He shares with every new creation, its actual world, and the emergent creature is objectified in God as a novel element in God's objectification of the actual world.

God attains his own satisfaction through the maximum actualization of value-intensity in particular actualities. God's consequent nature is conscious. "It is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his wisdom" (Whitehead 1979, 524). In this respect, God's consequent nature weaves his physical feeling upon his primordial concepts in order for him to become a complete actual entity. To quote Whitehead (1979, 524):

> [God's consequent nature] originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, "everlasting," fully actual, and conscious. His necessary goodness expresses the determination of his consequent nature.

God's primordial nature does not involve consciousness, because his nature in this sense consists of purely conceptual feelings and such feelings are hardly conscious. God in his primordial nature is, therefore, infinite, primary, free, complete, eternal, actuality deficient, and unconscious. But in his consequent nature, he is finite and in the process of becoming, and it is in this sense that he originates "by conceptual experience with his process of completion motivated by consequent, physical experience, initially derived from the temporal world." In this regard, God for Whtiehead (1979, 521 and 524)—with his primordial and consequent nature—is fully actual, conscious, and everlasting.

God prehends every temporal actuality in the world and objectifies them with a completeness necessarily lacking in such prehensions within the temporal world. Thus, in his consequent nature, God prehends every actuality

> ...for what it can be in such a perfected system [including] its sufferings, its sorrows, its failures, its triumphs, its immediacies of joy, [all are] woven by rightness of feeling into the harmony of the universal feeling, which is always immediate, always many, always one, always with novel advance, moving onward and never perishing. (Whitehead 1979, 525)

In this sense, every achievement of value in the temporal world is preserved everlastingly in God's consequent nature. Whitehead (1979, 525), thus, maintains that

> ...the consequent nature of God is his judgment on the world. He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness, which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage.

God's consequent nature extracts from the "wreckage" the positive values while leaving behind the evils of that wreckage. Whitehead (1979, 526) roundly summarizes God's consequent nature by saying that

> ...God's role is not the combat of productive force with productive force, of destructive force with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization. He does not create the world, he saves it: or, more

> accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.

Thus, in God's temporal aspect nothing is allowed to perish. Neither the good nor the evil is lost in the final transformation into concrete beauty. Although God's role is not to fight the occurrence of evil or to change the fact that what might have been was not realized, he does relate—with inexhaustible patience and tender care—these facts to possibilities beyond their absurd facticity. God redeems every situation in that he does not abandon it in complete despair, but seeks to establish the best possible outcome from it. God functions as that factor in the world by reason of which there is always present the possibility of this redemption and the urge toward its realization.

We can summarize this metaphysical nature of the God-World relation by reiterating that God is an actual entity in the process of becoming, "an actuality in process of composition" (Whitehead 1968, 94). God's process of becoming involves both conceptual and physical phases. The conceptual phase—his primordial nature—is "the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects," laced with a conceptual appetition for their realization in ordinary temporal actualities. The physical phase—his consequent nature—"is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe" (Whitehead 1979, 46 and 134) as they come into existence. Thus, insofar as his conceptual nature encompasses all eternal possibilities, so his physical nature encompasses all actualities. The process of becoming which constitutes God's actuality is "founded on" a fusion of his conceptual appetition "with the data received from the world-process" (Whitehead 1968, 94). As Whitehead (1979, 524) puts it in his *Process and reality,* this means "the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts."

God's full "perfected actuality" is the achievement of the multiplicity of ordinary world actualities as integrated in the unity of his own satisfaction. Since God's purpose in the creative advance of the universe is aimed at maximizing the intensity of experience realizable, his perfected actuality will involve the inclusion of all actual occasions with the maximum degree of concreteness relative to the coherence of order in the actual world. Hence, God's perfected actuality is always relative to the realization of the actual occasions making up the temporal world. And just as these temporal actualities are always in the process of concrescence,[4] there is also always a corresponding advance in God's perfected nature. In this respect, God's perfected actuality is always determined, always incomplete, never static, and never perishing.

Again, the principle of relativity, which is applicable to all other actualities, equally applies to God's perfected nature. Thus, the full perfected actuality of God involves physical prehensions of the temporal actualities of the world and their integration into a new superject.[5] In this respect, God's consequent nature is the "coordination of achievement; it is God's superjective nature, the outcome of God's own satisfaction whereby he is a datum for new concrescing actualities." This outcome "is the unified composition which assumes its function as a datum operative in the future historic world" (Whitehead 1968, 94). As a consequence,

God is immanent in the world, thereby adding his realization to that of other actual occasions.

SIGNIFICANCE OF WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPTION OF GOD AS A PERSUASIVE AGENCY

There are many ways by which the significance of Whitehead's conception of God in relation to the world can be understood. One of such ways is to view Whitehead's God as an alternative conception and a remedy to the implicit inadequacies and errors inherent in various notions of God in traditional Christian theism. His conception of the divine helps dissolve some of the tensions and difficulties in the traditional doctrine of God as the Absolute. In this important respect, Whitehead's conception is metaphysically and morally significant in that it conceives of God as a persuasive agency, thereby sidetracking the difficulties attendant to the conception of God as a coercive agency.

The traditional idea of God as the unchanging and passionless Absolute is derived primarily from the Greeks, who upheld that "perfection" implied complete "immutability" or lack of change. Plato in the *Republic* (II, 380-81), has argued that God, by being perfect, cannot be changed either by other things or by Himself. This suggest the idea of God's impassibility which stresses that God must be completely unaffected by any external reality and that God must lack all passions or emotional responses. The idea of God's absoluteness in traditional theism means that God is not really related to the world. These are ideas derived from the Greek heritage and they have created serious tensions when counterposed with other ideas derived from the Hebrew tradition, which posits that God knows and relates with the world. The world is related to God insofar as the relation is constitutive of the world, that is, the world's existence is dependent on God. However, the world's existence is not constitutive of God in that God is not dependent on the world (Cobb and Griffin 1976, 9). God is wholly absolute and entirely independent of the world. The God-World relation is purely external to God. Thus, the idea that God is immutable, absolute, and without passion meant finally that the world contributes nothing to God's being. God's influence upon the world is in no way conditioned by the self-creative activities of the world's actual beings. This idea of God as an immutable absolute being, further suggests God's establishment of an eternal order in the world. In this regard, God is seen as the all-controlling power, the Omnipotent, such that the present order exists only because God wills it so. In that case, obedience to the divine will is seen as a means of complying and preserving the status quo.

Whitehead's view of God repudiates these tensions in traditional theism. In Whitehead's process thought, or what otherwise is called his "philosophy of organism" in the sense that God and the world constitute an organic whole, God's way of relating to the world is not due to his decision (Griffin1976, 279) unlike in Plato's case, for instance, where the God-World relationship is grounded on the divine will. Whitehead (1919, 198) rejects this and insists that "metaphysics requires that the relationships of God to the world should lie beyond the accidents of will and that they be founded upon the necessities of the nature of God and the

nature of the world." The fact that there is an actual world of any kind is not a mere contingent matter, otherwise there would be "no meaning to 'God' apart from 'creativity' and the worldly 'creatures'" (Griffin 1976, 279; Cf. Whitehead 1979, 344). In any actual world, the mutual interdependence of God and the world must be exemplified. None is independent, requiring nothing but itself alone, in order to exist. On the contrary, both require each other as a metaphysical necessity of their nature. Thus, the world cannot fully and adequately be understood unless God is taken into account and conversely. This mutual interdependence of actualities cannot be understood unless we conceive the universe as essentially a process of activity of something actual.

The evolutionary aspect of Whitehead's philosophy of organism sides with Plato's *Timaeus*. This is significant as it rejects the notion of creation out of absolute nothingness, in favour of the emergence of order out of chaos (Whitehead 1979, 146-47). Thus, it is impossible for God to have absolute power in relation to the world. There must be an actual world and every actual world will necessarily contain actualities with power, that is, some power of self-determination as well as some power to effect and influence other creatures. This two-fold power inherent in actualities point to the reasons why God cannot unilaterally effect any state of affairs that is intrinsically possible in the world (Griffin 1976, 279-80). Firstly, God cannot wholly determine the emergence of any temporal actuality mainly because that actuality must necessarily be in part determined by antecedent actualities, which themselves could not have been wholly determined by God. Secondly, the emergent actuality necessarily has some power to self-determination of its own account beyond all the influences of other actualities, which includes God. Whitehead explicitly maintains that all actualities possess some power of self-determination, even in relation to God. Every actual entity is *Causa Sui* (the cause of itself), because every actual entity is an individualization of creativity. Accordingly, Whitehead (1979, 339) states that "all actual entities share with God this character of self-creation. For this reason every actual entity also shares with God the characteristics of transcending all other actual entities, including God."

In his *Adventures of ideas,* Whitehead (1948b, 196) agrees with Plato's idea "that the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency." This, for Whitehead (1948b, 196), is to be considered "as one of the greatest intellectual discoveries in the history of religion." Although Plato fails to articulate and systematically coordinate this doctrine of persuasive agency with his metaphysical theory, Whitehead provides a conceptual framework for understanding God's way of relating to the world in a persuasive way. God's function in the world is simply to lure every actual occasion to the attainment of his creative purpose. In this capacity, God is the initial object of desire, establishing the initial phase of every occasion in the process of becoming actual by providing it with an initial aim. This initial aim is the first phase of the subjective aim of each actual occasion.

Every concrete actuality in its self-creative activity presupposes this persuasive power of God although in some creatures, humans in particular, due to the conscious exercise of their freedom (see Pols 1967), this persuasive lure

or the initial subjective aim may be altered through personal decisions or choices. But this initial subjective aim is a metaphysical presupposition which is the fundamental aim or purpose according to which every concrete actuality is directed. As a fundamental aim that God provides, it is directed towards the attainment of a maximum enjoyment in feeling which accompanies and finds intensification in the achievement of unity and harmony. In human creatures generally, the achievement of this unity is realized through the experience of going towards a harmony that overcomes or unites diverse or contrasting elements in the world or the self. The attraction towards this experience is the divine persuasive lure. What is required in the process towards the attainment of this maximum enjoyment in feeling entails, as we have said, a great deal of the individual's self-conscious exercise of his freedom; in this instance, both the will and reason as well as various feelings, all have their parts to play. Choices and decisions are made between alternative possibilities as to which possibility would lead to this maximum realization of value attainment.

The individual's independent reaction to any one of these alternative possibilities in a given situation will be determined by his dominant personal purpose or subjective aim, which in turn will be directed towards the attainment of value-intensity, according to God's purpose for all his creatures, or it may completely be negative to God's purpose, depending on the quality of the value achieved in that situation. The main emphasis of this metaphysical outlook is that God presents the lure towards the best decisions in each situation that would lead to maximum attainment in value (see Wieman 1928), but human experience in their use of freedom may accept or refuse to accept this divine lure in making their independent decisions.

For Whitehead, the divine lure which is involved in all creative choices is significantly also the lure for moral choices, since morality is itself the aim at that creative transformation of the self towards the attainment of the best in each actual occasion. Thus we can say with Daniel Day Williams (1959, 264), that God's primordial nature is the source of moral obligation, since he is that unique actuality by virtue of which there is a unified structure of possible good in any situation. God functions in the world as the source of the good, the source of the knowledge of the good, and the source of the moral obligation towards the realization of the good by all worldly creatures, particularly humans. Through his persuasive power God gently lures all human creatures in the face of any moral situation towards the actualization of the best in that occasion that will enhance both the value intensity of the future self as well as other individuals. Thus, we can say that in his persuasive relationship with human individuals, God presents them with claims to rightness in things and moral goodness which as calls to duty and obligations are revealed objectively to every human occasion when faced with situations which require moral judgments. The possibility of such claims may be felt as an ideal which the individual ought to realize or may be entertained as that good which might be actualized. Either way, this possibility is felt by the individual as having an intrinsic moral appeal. Although God's persuasive lure of what an individual might actualize in some sense affects that individual, God does not completely determine what that individual eventually actualizes. The efficacy of this possibility depends on the

manner by which the individual exercises his freedom in response to God's persuasive lure. The individual's freedom depends on how he chooses to respond to God's persuasion. On this account the individual is solely responsible for what he in fact chooses to realize.

Thus, in Whitehead's thought, though there are good reasons why every individual ought to conform to what God intends for him, the individual's obedience is not compelled. What God wills is rather seen as a recommendation of a possibility to which the individual may choose to adopt or refuse to conform, since every individual as a moral agent has some measure of freedom and self-determination. In this regard, if an individual decides to conform to God's will, he does so out of his own volition; because he is persuaded that what God intends for him, on that occasion, is indeed the best.

Accordingly, God is also seen as not indeed responsible for the evil in the world, since God in being the provider of the initial conceptual aim of every individual does not determine what the individual in fact claims. God is not a being responsible for every detail of every happening in the world as traditional theism would have it. If God intends what is best for the world, and yet there is evil in it, then evil must be the result of deviation from what God intends for the world. Evil comes as a result of the individual deviating from what God intends for him, which in fact is the best.

CONCLUSION

Whitehead's philosophy of God has been a great contribution to philosophical theism. His doctrine of God has made it clearly evident that he endorses completely the five factors which Charles Hartshorne (with Reese 1976, 282) points out are very crucial and essential to the divine nature, namely: eternity, temporality, consciousness, world knowledge, and world inclusion. Thus, insofar as Whitehead's God is primordial in nature, he is strictly speaking "eternal" in the sense of being immutable and ungenerated. Some critics even would like to assert that this aspect of God's nature is never physically actual but consists only of "bodiless"—"Thought thinking Thought" (Kraus 1979, 160-61), more like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, which as it appears, is the object of desire, which moves everything by mere attraction. In this sense, neither this aspect of Whitehead's God nor of Aristotle's is ever conscious. On the other hand, Whitehead's God has a consequent nature, which in this sense, is ever conscious, very relative and fluid, thus reaching no final completion, such that it is ever in "process" of further creation; accumulating data from worldly creatures and transmuting the same back to creative process. Whitehead explicitly states that God in his consequent nature is always ever conscious and fully actual. God knows the entire actual world and has physical experience of all actual occasions as they occur, God integrates them with his conceptual experience and in this sense, he is fully conscious of itself, which is just what complete and perfect knowledge is all about (Hartshorne 1976, 283), unlike in classical theism , where God is viewed as beyond time and beyond any need of things in the actual world.

Whitehead's philosophy of God (1979, 520) is a great challenge to traditional classical theism as it is particularly opposed to treating God as an "eminent reality" and to giving "God the attributes which belonged exclusively to Caesar." Whitehead vehemently rejects the way other traditional theistic philosophical conceptions of God have treated God in the images of: (1) an imperial ruler, (2) a personification of moral energy, and (3) an ultimate philosophical principle. Whitehead sided with Hume in this matter, in criticizing these three modes of explaining the system of the world. Instead, he sees in the Galilean origin of Christianity another view which does not expressly tally very well with the above three images which traditional theists tried to embrace, that is, "it does not emphasize the ruling Caesar, or the ruthless moralist, or the unmoved mover." Rather,

> It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved; also it is a little oblivious as to morals. It does not look to the future; for it finds its own rewards in the immediate present. (Whitehead 1979, 520-21)

To emphasize this tender vision of God's functioning in the world, Whitehead (1979, 526 and 532) adds: "He does not create the world, he saves it: or more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness." Still yet on a metaphorical note, Whitehead (1979, 532) enthused that "God is the great companion, the fellow-sufferer who understands." Such has been Whitehead's vision of God. This vision has succeeded in endearing his process thought to so many followers, who today are inspired and influenced by him in tackling and finding solutions to religious and theological issues about God (see Thompson 1971).

NOTES

1. A very good book that discusses the admirers and critics of Whitehead can be found in John B. Cobb Jr. and David R. Griffin (1976, esp. 184). The article of Sia (2007, 213-21), a process philosopher who follows Charles Hartshorne (1970) and Whitehead, is also enlightening.

2. As Whitehead (1948, 101-102) uses it, "prehension" involves neither conscious awareness, as would "apprehension" entail, nor a merely static and mechanical link. It is simply the very act of grasping by one actual entity of some aspects of other actualities. Accordingly, "realization," for Whitehead,

> ...is a gathering of things into the unity of a prehension and that what is thereby realized is the prehension and not the things. This unity of a prehension defines itself as a "here" and "now," and the things so gathered into the grasped unity have essential reference to other places

> and other times. The things which are grasped into a realized unity here and now are not the castle, the cloud, and the planet from the standpoint in Space and Time, of the prehensive unification.... It is the perspective of the castle over there from the standpoint of unification here. It is therefore, aspects of the castle, the cloud, and the planet which are grasped into unity here.

3. For Whitehead (1979, 47-48):

> Appetition is at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling combined with the urge towards realization of the datum conceptually prehended. It is immediate matter of fact including in itself a principle of unrest, involving realization of what is not and may be.... All physical experience is accompanied by an appetite for, or against, its continuance: an example is the appetition of self-preservation. Another example is 'thirst' which is an appetite towards a difference—towards something relevant, something largely identical, but something with a definite novelty.

On the other hand, Whitehead (1979, 160-61) uses "Primordial Appetition" to refer to God's purpose in the universe which is seeking intensity of satisfaction and not preservation. Because these are primordial, there is nothing to preserve. In his primordial nature, God is unmoved by love for this or that particular; he is indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty.

4. Whitehead (1979, 21, 26, and 84ff.) defines the "process of concrescent" as a means of "growing-together," that is, as a process of becoming concrete of an actual entity into a new unity, which is accomplished through integrating feelings and prehensions from past actual entities and even from "eternal objects." Any becoming actual entity must grow-together with qualities it appropriated from past actual entities and chosen eternal objects to become some newer actual entity or creature.

5. Whitehead (1979, 29) says that "an actual entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences." Thus, Subject and Superject are inseparable terms with respect to an actual entity. To be a subject is to be a subject of experience emerging out of the growing together of experiences into a novel unity. While to be a superject

> ...is to have reached that fully determinate synthesis...aimed at in the process of subjectification...and to "throw over" or "throw beyond" experience the unity achieved in experience as a fact forever operative in the future under aspects or "objectifications" of that unity. The subject is [therefore] a self-creating creature functioning in regard to its own individuality, having significance and value in itself through its concrescence of prehensions. The superject is the definiteness achieved in the satisfied subject, fully determinate with respect to the process of

its becoming, its future agency and its relation to every item in the universe of facts and the realm of form. (Kraus 1979, 50)

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BOOK REVIEW

Michael Kirwan. *Girard and theology*

New York: T&T Clark, 2009, 165 pp.

The writings of the French-American literary critic Rene Girard cover many areas. Reception of his work is wide and varied in its application—literature, cultural anthropology, psychology, philosophy, and theology. Central to his thought is a theory about how the structure of human civilization is to be understood, that is, the mimetic nature of desire and the scapegoat mechanism. Such a theory, though audacious, is perceived as sweepingly general. No doubt, Girard's work is crafted in an eloquent literary acumen, yet at times, it engenders in his readers moments of quandary about the main thought and how it works in societies, not to mention the fact that it suggestively draws from a wide variety of intellectual interests. This shows that Girard's works are not an easy reading.

Michael Kirwan's book on Rene Girard entitled *Girard and theology* is adept in style that makes it practical and handy. It shows the author's extensive knowledge on Girardian thought, its evolution, and its varied implications as it impinges on theological themes and issues. The work is more than just a parade of Girard's ideas because it took a judicious consideration of both sympathetic and critical reception of Girardian thought. Apparently, Kirwan's book is a successful illustration on how Girard matters to theology.

The author's theological expertise, laced with literary style, proves a powerful medium in sustaining readers' interest. The introductory chapter, "The man in the train," for instance, elicits in the reader the picture of the author communing with Girard, chronicling the passage of Girard to "conversion." It also shows a deep knowledge of the ongoing exchanges among Girard's commentators along various themes in theology such as dramatic theology, theological anthropophany, soteriology, political theology, and biblical theology.

Speaking about Girard's conversion—"a conversion described as an aesthetic one rather than religious"—brought a "new intellectual and spiritual awakening" amidst the skeptical faith of Rene Girard, who says, "My faith was due solely to my fear...God had brought me again to awareness" (2) The memory of his conversion stayed and sustained him ever since.

Girard's literary criticisms turned out to be a catalyst for his encounter with God. Girard found in his chosen novelist a common pattern of religious symbols and concepts that goes beyond merely aesthetic or literary value. The pattern signifies a kind of transformation of life and consciousness—a conversion from inauthentic life to authenticity and truth. Such a pattern can be found in the deathbed scene in Miguel de Cervantes (*Don Quixote*), in the life of Julien

Sorel in Stendhal [Marie-Henri Beyle] (*The red and the black*), and in the struggles of Stephan Trophinovitch in Fyodor Dostoyevsky (*The possessed*). These scenes implied a religious language of repentance and a resurrection from a life of illusion and lies.

Conversion in traditional Christian understanding is usually described as turning away from self-centeredness but, for Girard, this self-centeredness betrays itself in our being to imitate one another as if we in fact live outside ourselves. Conversion for Girard entails not only turning away from oneself, but also achieving a greater intimacy with oneself and a withdrawal from the baneful influence of others—a renunciation, in other words, of mimetic desire.

As to the controversy of what kind of thinker Girard is—whether he is a philosopher or a literary critic—we can definitely say that, strictly speaking, he is not a philosopher, although his thought has been useful to many philosophers. Many of the themes Girard has pursued in his literary criticism, such as the question of difference, are contemporary philosophical themes and problems similarly pursued by Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and others. In other words, the place of Girard in contemporary philosophy is reasonably acknowledged though Girard himself has expressed his preference for literature over philosophy. This means that it is the theme of imitation which is always the object of Girard's research and whether it manifests itself in anthropology, literature, or philosophy does not matter. Girard explains himself, "I am speaking here not of all literary texts, not of literature per se, but of a relatively small group of works which reveals the law of mimetic desire..." Therefore, Girard is a "mimetologist!" (7)

Girard's central theory—the Mimetic theory, which says that we borrow all our desires from others—is argued for in Kirwan's third chapter that serves as a hinge to the other themes in the succeeding chapters. According to Kirwan, Girard offers not just two but three anthropological insights that bind his theory together. The first is the mimetic nature of desire that leads to mimetic rivalry and the second is the scapegoat mechanism that arises from the rivalrous and violent potentials of mimetic desire. The third insight is the Judaeo-Christian revelation that serves as the vehicle of human enlightenment from the two others. The crux of the matter is that human beings are indeed mimetic scapegoaters but, by God's action in Jesus Christ, humans are redeemed.

Girard's three major works—namely, *Deceit, desire and the novel* (1961), *Violence and the sacred* (1972), and *Things hidden since the foundation of the world* (1978)—spell out a tripartite theory that allows us, in Kirwan's view, to follow Girard's thought along three disciplines—literary criticism, cultural anthropology, and biblical theology, respectively. Mimetic desire is the starting point of Girard's theory and he pursues this literarily, not philosophically. He defines *mimesis* as the instinctive tendency of humans to imitate or mimic others whether consciously or unconsciously. From his investigation of the literary works of chosen authors like Cervantes, Stendahl, Dostoevsky, and Proust, Girard concludes that humans learn what to desire by taking other people as models to imitate. Being made to recognize the basic lack in oneself, humans look to others to teach them what to value and what to become. At first, the desire to imitate a

model is harmless but soon, when the one who imitates becomes a threat and a rival, this leads to rivalry and violence.

Mimesis inevitably leads to rivalry among those who desire the same object and conflict ensues. If pursued without restraint, it will soon lead to chaos: violence and counterviolence. Mimetic desire arises from the imitation of another desire. Mimesis is a simple imitation while desire is a simple wanting. Girard connects mimesis and desire and this is for him the foundation of violence in the structure of human desire. The desire that is subject to mimesis is a fundamental one as it forms and defines the total behavior of the human being.

Readers of Girard disagree with this rather sweeping theorizing as though humans can just be swamped by their lower faculties of appetite. Platonic philosophy makes a clear distinction between the two- mimesis to reason and desire to appetite- and argues that the life of reason is the best life to live. Commentators likewise observe that Girard's theory alludes to Thomas Hobbes's "Man is a wolf unto man." Kirwan presents Girard's objection to this observation: Girard objects to the basic pessimism in Hobbesian anthropology and to the idea of social contract as the solution to the warring wolves. Girard cannot see how a group of people at war will at a precise moment decide to stop the war and bury their differences and sign a social contract.

The escalation of mimetic desire could lead to a war of "all against all." Girard calls this as "mimesis crisis." When two people quarrel for the possession of one object, conflict cannot fail to result, says Girard. Violence leads to more violence and the cycle of violence and retribution is only undone by a "scapegoat." The violence caused by mimetic crisis is resolved by a realignment of aggression. The aggression of one against the other is passed on to another—someone who is weaker, isolated, and marginal—the "scapegoat" of violence. This scheme of passing the blame to the weaker individual as a scapegoat is also imitated; hence, the supposed universal warfare becomes a "war of all against one." The innocent victim is held to be the one responsible for the strife. This perception is confirmed when the group expels or destroys the victim, and discovers itself to be at peace once more. The cathartic effect of projecting the group's violence reunites the group and reinforces the impression that they have destroyed the original source of the conflict.

Human societies are constantly threatened by violence arising from rivalry. To resolve this violence, in Girard's view, societies resort to acts of unanimous violence. Kirwan explains that by organizing retributive violence into a united front against a common enemy, whether an external enemy or a member of the community symbolically designated as an enemy, violence itself is transformed into a socially constructive force (25). Girard argues that the victim's death carries an ambivalent significance: the victim is the source of both the original disorder and of its peaceful resolution. A power which is conceived as malevolent and beneficent at the same time may be considered as the classical description of the primitive sacred that is both good and evil. Since the victim's death is seen to have won divine favor, the victim is invested with a divine aura—becomes a god. The community that has been redeemed of its own violence through the blood of the innocent victim now understands itself to have performed a holy and beneficial

action and, thus, this becomes a sacred sacrificial ritual by the community in a controlled and selective fashion to avert the recurrence of violence.

Scapegoating arises from psychosocial propensities in humans as well as in societies. They are so banal that we seldom reflect on their danger to social order and on the important social mechanisms that control them. In the contemporary world, societies oftentimes brush them away and ignore their potential power on human relations, such as its econmic driving force and its dominance in the entertainment industry. For Girard, it is through great literatures that we become aware of them.

Girard explains the origin of religion and its rituals from these two related anthropological insights: mimetic desire and scapegoat mechanism. He says that religion is born when a group, for the first time, discovers in a social situation of internal tension, anxiety, and violence brought about by mimetic crisis, that killing one or more members of the group would bring mysterious calm and discharge of tension, anxiety, and violence for a time. This is the scapegoat or surrogate victim. Fearing that the the social tension, anxiety, and violence would return, early humans seek ritual ways to reenact and resolve the sacrificial crisis in order to channel and contain the violence. Every culture arises, achieves a degree of stability, and incessantly repeats the sacrificial scapegoat to avoid the recurrence of violence in the community.

Critics of Girard consider this as an atheistic theory of religion. Kirwan elucidates that such a comment on Girard's mimetic theory is a misreading of *Violence and the sacred.* It is therefore in the third major work, *Things hidden since the foundation of the world,* that Girard finally speaks more explicitly about the significance of the Gospels for mimetic theory. Furthermore, Kirwan says that the thesis of the scapegoat mechanism is broadened into a theory of human relationships. The attribution of the origin of religion to the "sacred violence" of the scapegoat mechanism is brought about by the heightened mimetic crisis. This violence is now significantly developed in favor of a more positive appraisal of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, which in turn becomes a new *apologia* for the Christian faith. Here lies the third strand in Girard's thought—a turn towards Christian revelation. The Gospels disclose the secret of the mythic camouflage of violence and the way of liberation through a love that refuses violence.

An interesting observation by Kirwan on Girard's style is worth mentioning—the blend of novelistic and religious accounts as unity. Kirwan further says that the mixture of sacred and secular styles in Girard is discomforting since it places the Bible in a privileged position as an epistemological source. Quoting a critic, Kirwan declares "with Girard the Kingdom of God has become scientific!" (28)

After a methodical and judicious accounting of Girard's central thought, Kirwan advances to show his impact to theology. It demonstrates that theologians cannot just ignore the far-reaching implications of Girard for varied aspects and themes of theology. Even when they intend to refuse Girardian thought, they often find themselves rehearsing Girard's insights as they impinge upon theological anthropology, doctrines of salvation (soteriology), political theology, and theologies of religion. Though sympathetic to Girard's thought, Kirwan treatment of these themes is exceptional. The balanced reporting on the Innsbruck research projects

on Girard's mimetic theory, dubbed as "Dramatic Theology," catalyzes a critical and positive response from theologians. The Innsbruck programme hosts the Rene Girard Documentation Centre. Here, theologians are engaged in the study of mimetic theory and its implication to theology.

Two other discussions in this book are worthy of mention. First is the kind of twist Rene Girard's ideas offer to the traditional reading of theological anthropology. Kirwan employs a newly coined term—*anthropophany*—which conveys the message that Girard's mimetic desire and scapegoat mechanism are not only discourses about the nature and origin of human beings and their cultures, but also a startling discovery which is inseparable from a disturbing encounter with the divine. This theological statement directly impacts on the drama of salvation. It is the very scaffolding of the doctrine of salvation. The second notable section is on political theology. The hermeneutics of the political and cultural crisis triggered by the events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath manifests a new wave of interest in Girard's work. The employment of mimetic desire and scapegoating mechanism as framework of analysis reveals the importance of Girard's thought in understanding cultural origins, religion, and violence in the contemporary world.

This book of Michael Kirwan is a good introduction to Rene Girard's thought and theology. It is a good companion as one navigates through the thoughts of Girard, especially if one has qualms about reading his original works. Kirwan's balanced, synthetic, and sympathetic presentation makes *Girard and theology* an easy read.

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BOOK NOTE

Theodore Gracyk. *The philosophy of art: An introduction*

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What is art and what is artistic value? What is the difference between art and aesthetics? Those are two of the questions that arise in the lucidly written work by Professor Gracyk, which he strictly intends as an introduction to a field with which the reader is unfamiliar. The author expects, though, some intellectual skills from that reader, in as far as the book is written for an academic public.

Therefore, perhaps, the author does not only offer a theoretical outline, but also tries to foster a debate, given that philosophy is to be considered as an activity, a "verb" rather than a mere set of statements. This is, perhaps, why each of the nine chapters contains "exercises" for critical reflection, and ends with a list of "issues to think about" and "further resources." Since the order among the chapters is not a matter of "take-it-or-leave-it," as each chapter can be approached as an independent essay, discussions can be started and fuelled by any of them.

For this reason, too, the author does not perfectly hide some of his personal positions or preferences. He also acknowledges his methodical preference for analytic philosophy. Including the continental approach would have risked to offer a much more complicated picture of the topic, according to him. In spite of this option, the work is not restrictive in its method, nor is it purely synchronic in its approach. While focusing on the actual state of the issue, the author also regularly clarifies concepts and theories by referring to the history of art and of philosophy.

The author opens his first chapter with an enquiry into the terminology and its meaning. The term "art" may be the object of a stricter or a wider interpretation. "Art" is mostly limited to "visual art," as found in museums and galleries; in a broad sense, it can also include the so-called performing and literary arts. "Philosophy of art" is essentially the exploration of a conceptual framework, not the judgment of concrete artifacts. It is, in other words, different from "history" or "criticism" or "appreciation" of art. The analysis continues by digging into the assumed relation between art and representation, given that "art" is primarily "visual" in nature Common sense tends to connect both, but not in all situations, as with photography or cinema, the artistic nature of which is not the object of general consensus. In the case of abstract art, the representational function is even totally absent.

Given that the pictorial function is problematic, others have tried to identify the expressive function of art as more fundamental. However, the question immediately arises whether the expression is on the side of the author or on the side of the audience. If it is the author who expresses, how does the audience get

involved? If artistic expression can stir emotions in others, even if they have not experienced the situation that is at the center of the act of self-expression, then this suggests some form of identification with the expressing character. Such can only be possible if the audience believes that the emotion underlying the expression is genuine, not faked. Gracyk presents different theories of expression, including the "infection" hypothesis of Leo Tolstoy, implying that the author's self-expression somewhat "infects" the reader. Another theory is that of R. G. Collingwood, who identifies the need of imagination to catalyze the transformation of a (blurred) emotion in the artist into a (self-)conscious one. The persona-theory states that "expression" does not need to refer to the artist's state-of-mind, but can also be neutral, as in narratives—a theory hard to apply to the visual or performing arts. The arousal-theory refers to the link between emotions and perceptual features that may trigger them, based on certain analogies, like between musical tones and the sound or intonation of a human voice, but without any certainty about the real intentions of the author.

Another chapter focuses on "creativity," for which art is like a laboratory, which would partly justify why art is being widely taught in schools. Creativity is an attitude that is also at the basis of innovation in many other fields, like engineering, computer science, etc. Gracyk points at the relativity of the link between "creativity" and "good art," both from a geographical and a historical point of view. Some cultures do not valorize "creativity" but "adherence to tradition" or "imitation of models" as aesthetic criterion, while even in the West, the classical Greek viewpoint differs from that of the modern period. Plato found art depending on "inspiration," which is rooted in the gods. Artists did not deserve any credit for their work, the source of which was located outside themselves. In the modern time, however, Kant understood art as the work of genius, which is characterized by imagination as well as originality, and conveys ideas through the work of art. Education may just be needed to limit and direct imagination, but does not cause art by its own.

In still another chapter, the author tackles the issue of "faking" art. Common sense suggests that this problem is related to copying, and to the relation between "unicity" and multiplicity in art. Gracyk demonstrates how there are arts (especially those working through concrete physical objects), where the uniqueness of a work is highly valorized, and, therefore, making "faking" a relevant issue, while other arts easily tolerate reproduction, like movies or books, or performing arts, promoting commercialization. The problem of "faking" also evokes that of authenticity. Some theories support the idea that the knowledge of the background (historical, social, geographical, biographical) of an artwork influences audience response and interpretation. The awareness of the existence of these theories incites Gracyk to explore the properties of art, distinguishing between the essential and the accidental ones as far as this is possible. He brings the reader further in touch with issues of "appropriation" of cultural features by other cultures or other historical periods. The reader is treated with reflections on cosmopolitanism and the absence of absolute homogeneity of culture in today's pluralistic world. Modernity has even caused a shift in the meaning of "authenticity," that should be less understood as "inspirational integrity" or uniformity, than as contemporary

relevance. This idea, borrowed from Theodor W. Adorno, emphasizes the primacy of structure over representational force in contemporary avant-garde art.

The nature of art and its very definition continue to haunt the reader as the book proceeds. Gracyk tries a different approach in another chapter, where he offers functionalist, institutional, historical, and cluster-like explanations of the meaning of "art." The question for the meaning of the term "art"—still unknown to classic Greek philosophers—already implies its answer, as art can have many functions (expressing emotions, stimulating new cognitive perspectives on the world, imitating objects, etc.), or is implicitly recognized by society when it is institutionalized (for instance, through its display in a museum). In the end, artworks always are human artifacts—their common minimum requirement. They are subject to aesthetic judgment, an opinion formed about their aesthetic qualities, or how they appear. In the modern period, those qualities became distinguished from the content, for instance, in a poem. Aesthetic judgments are often identified as opinions about beauty and ugliness, but they may also include assessments of things as old-fashioned, "sad," "profound," etc. The question about who makes such judgment leads to still another theme, which is the social diversification of art or its definition in terms of social access. Is art always "fine art," intended for the "higher" or "educated part" of society, or is there really something like "popular art" and "mass art"? The latter could look somewhat like classical fine art, while being designed for the sake of easy understanding, without much effort needed from imagination or the intellect, and available to a large number of people through mass production and delivery systems. However, is such art not so different in nature, catering to so different tastes, that it confirms the social divide rather than to mend or bridge it? Is it even a subcategory of art at all? Or is it affected by excessive negative prejudice, especially from philosophers? Perhaps, one should go as far as Tolstoy and emphasize that popular art is the only "real" art, as it means continuity with everyday life? The next section tackles the issue of the value of art. After distinguishing use-value, exchange-value, and subjective value, Gracyk also mentions the "unique" value of art (both applied to the medium and to the singular artwork), as far as it creates an aesthetic experience in a unique way. After choosing value-empiricism as experience-based approach to the assessment of value in artworks, Gracyk comes up with a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values, as a cognitive tool to clarify the difference between a hammer and a famous statue. Consecutively, this distinction is criticized after referring to Christine Korsgaard, who defines "intrinsic" as "independent of relationships with other objects." Some artworks seem to get their "intrinsic" value exactly from their relation with other beings, like the author.

In his conclusion, the author refers to his intention at the beginning of the book, to offer a set of more or less independent essays. While this may appear as a "smorgasbord," Gracyk defends his choice by alluding to the vibrant and expanding nature of contemporary philosophy of art, which is as varied as the field of philosophy itself, with its many types and fields. Art should be understood as a cluster of related but also differentiated concepts. Given the exposure of many artists to philosophy, and because of the increasing theoretical discourse surrounding culture, any in-depth confrontation with art may also lead to philosophy.

While the author states that art is basically received and recognized through vision, he surprisingly does not offer any pictures throughout the book. The work remains, therefore, theoretical-philosophical in nature. Even as the given descriptions usually suffice to evoke the paintings or pictures, and as pictures would not be helpful with music or cinematographic materials, a number of pictures would have been helpful to support the imaginative function which is required from artists, philosophers, and the audience. The author somewhat laconically advises readers to consult the Internet for pictures instead; it is to be hoped that the book will only be read in areas with steady and high-quality access to the Web!

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BOOK NOTICES

Christopher Cordner, ed. 2011. Philosophy, ethics and a common humanity: Essays in honour of Raimond Gaita. *London-New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780415546386(hbk)/9780203830000(ebk). 239pp. £70.*

Raimond Gaita, a German-born philosophy professor, who spent most of his career in Great Britain and Australia, could have not dreamt of a better present for his 65th birthday than an anthology of philosophical texts, written by fourteen distinguished experts, all of them addressing major topics in which Gaita has shown interest at some time in his career. According to the editor's preface, a book that intends to honor a philosopher should not only report and praise his ideas and themes, but go beyond them, while drawing on them. For these reasons, the reader is treated to a wide range of topics, reflecting Gaita's own unceasing exploration of the identity of philosophy and its boundaries with other forms of writing. The gravity point remains with moral philosophy, most preferred by Gaita, which is expressed among others in his quest for "our common humanity," and his unconditional respect for the "absolute preciousness" of human beings, that was unprecedentedly attacked in the Holocaust. The range of topics further includes the concepts of "goodness" and "respect for others," the relation between philosophy and literature or poetry, the religious dimension in Gaita's thought, Socratic self-knowledge, and more. This book may appeal to all those who are interested in philosophy in a broad sense, as well as to those interested in a deeper knowledge of the work of Gaita. (W. V.)

Kevin B. Anderson and Russell Rockwell, eds. 2012. The Dunayevskaya-Marcuse-Fromm correspondence, 1954-1978. *Dialogue on Hegel, Marx, and Critical Theory. Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth: Lexington Books. ISBN 9780739168363. 270 pp.*

This book presents for the first time the correspondence during the years 1954 to 1978 between the Marxist-Humanist and feminist philosopher Raya Dunayevskaya (1910-87) and two other noted thinkers, the Hegelian Marxist philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) and the psychologist and social critic Erich Fromm (1900-80), both of the latter were members of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. In their introduction, editors Kevin B. Anderson and Russell Rockwell focus on the theoretical and political dialogues in these letters, which cover topics such as dialectical social theory, Marxist economics, socialist humanism, the structure and contradictions of modern capitalism, the history of Marxism and of the Frankfurt School, feminism and revolution, developments in the USSR, Cuba, and China, and the emergence of the New Left of the 1960s. The editors' extensive explanatory notes offer helpful background information, definitions of theoretical

concepts, and source references. Among the thinkers discussed in the correspondence—some of them quite critically—are Karl Marx, G. W. F. Hegel, Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukacs, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, V. I. Lenin, Nikolai Bukharin, Sigmund Freud, Leon Trotsky, Mao Zedong, Daniel Bell, and Seymour Martin Lipset. As a whole, this volume shows the deeply Marxist and humanist concerns of these thinkers, each of whom had a lifelong concern with rethinking Marx and Hegel as the foundation for an analysis of capitalist modernity and its forces of opposition. (Lexington Books, courtesy of the editors)

Peter-Paul Verbeek. 2011. Moralizing technology: Understanding and designing the morality of things. *Chicago-London: Chicago University Press. ISBN 9780226852911(hbk)/9780226852935(pbk). 183pp. $81/$25.*

In eight chapters, drawing on Bruno Latour and others, the Dutch engineer and philosophy professor Peter-Paul Verbeek illustrates how classical ethics is inadequate in fully assessing contemporary ethical issues, as it limits ethical predicates to human subjects. Contemporary culture, in which technology is never far away, requires that objects—like the countless technical tools used in daily life—can equally be invested with moral qualities. The reason is that those objects relate in very different ways to human practices and experiences. The countless new inventions, from water-saving showerheads to smartphones, profoundly interfere with human ethical behavior, acting as its mediator. The question, then, is how technology users can assume their moral responsibilities through their technologically mediated actions. Verbeek states that in remote times, moralists often felt called to react against the dehumanizing "threat" of technology to human society, while contemporary applied ethics (like engineering ethics on issues of risk and safety, or computer ethics on privacy issues) tends to continue this "externalist" approach. Verbeek pleads instead for a kind of *new alliance* that underscores the interwoven character of ethics and technology. Since he acknowledges that most philosophy of technology takes a purely descriptive tone, Verbeek deserves credit for making the "normative" link, as he takes a "postphenomenological" stand, emphasizing the "mediated" nature of contemporary human intentionality. He finally applies his principal insights to the emerging field of ambient intelligence and persuasive technology and calls for the integration of moral reflection in technology development. A timely and welcome reference for all who are interested in alternative ethics, mediation, and (post)phenomenology. (W. V.)

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