

ON THE AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE OVER IDEOLOGY IN LOUIS ALTHUSSER: TOWARDS RANCIÈRE'S RUPTURE *ÉPISTÉMOLOGIQUE*

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This paper provides a discussion of Jacques Rancière's former teacher at École Normale Supérieure (ÉNS), then famous for fashioning Marxism with the philosophical gauge of structuralism, Louis Althusser (1918-1990). Perhaps a brief discussion on the relation between the two would render context to the origins of Rancière's philosophico-political praxis, specifically the humble beginnings of conceptualizing an egalitarian method out of his philosophical rupture with Althusserianism. Meanwhile, to reduce the philosophical enterprise of Althusser into its practical shortcomings and silence during the revolutionary events of May 1968 in France would do an injustice to the magnitude of his contribution to contemporary French political theory and his major revisions in the theoretical direction of the Parti communiste français (PCF). Thus, the following discussions focus on sketching Althusser's theoretical foundations, which possibly clarifies the political decision he has made during May '68: a demand for organization over spontaneous revolutionary activity based on the authority of theoretical practice over the ideological activities—a decision that became the point of departure for Rancière's subversion of both mastery and the structural inequality Althusserianism entail. The whole piece is guided by the following two-fold question—a question, perhaps, akin to Badiou's inquiry: What were the philosophico-political interventions of Louis Althusser, and why did Rancière move away from his direction?

Keywords: epistemological break, science/ideology, symptomatic reading, May 1968

We were all philosophers. We did not read Capital as economists, as historians, or as philologists. We did not pose Capital the question of its economic or historical content, nor of its mere internal 'logic.' We read Capital as philosophers, and therefore posed it a different question.

Louis Althusser et al. (2015, 12; Italics mine)

Althusserianism only put so many ruptures, in theory, to avoid having to put them into political practice.

Fundamentally, Althusserianism is a theory of education, and every theory of education is committed to preserving the power it seeks to bring to light.

Jacques Rancière (2017, 52)

INTRODUCTION: ALTHUSSER AND RANCIÈRE, TEACHER AND STUDENT

Jacques Rancière met Louis Althusser during the former's first year in *École Normale Supérieure* (ENS) where he was enrolled in the arts. By then, Althusser was not yet officially a professor but was considered by the learning environment and by the philosophy department of ENS as a *caïman*¹ whose maverick early writings immediately gained the attention of both the French academia and of the *Parti communiste français* (PCF). Eventually, he was able to secure a teaching post, and the figure of Althusser inspired many students to pursue philosophy—that is to say, the Marxist science—through the scheduled lectures and conversations on certain texts more than any actual lessons happening in school. Rancière's initial philosophical project was mainly influenced by his teacher's intervention in the French intelligentsia: developing the level of critical thought beyond ideology, i.e., *science*. As early as 1961-62, Rancière (2016, 5-8) was already contributing to seminars, doing research on the young Marx, and giving a comprehensive talk on Marx's essay on the theft of dead wood—all of which were done under the guidance and methodology of the structuralist reading of Marxism.

Eventually, in 1964, his contribution to the seminar on Marx's *Capital* was highly praised by Althusser, allowing it to be included in the first and original edition of what would be published as *Reading Capital* (Althusser et al. 1965). One might posit the same question of Alain Badiou in *Pocket Pantheon* (2016, 54): "what, according to Althusser, was philosophy's position within the general getting underway [*appareillage*] of theoretical interventions, within the strategic movement of thought?" Such a question precisely inquires about the primary philosophical position and strategy of Althusser that intervened in the post-Stalinist crisis of revolutionary politics during the early 1960s. Therefore, attempting to answer Badiou's question would specify the lessons and advocacies (as a Marxist scholar) Althusser was giving to his students, which Rancière initially followed without second thoughts prior to May 1968 Revolution in France.

Perhaps to fully grasp Althusser's lessons, a discussion on the main concepts of the so-called "science of Marxism" is necessary in order to trace their origins from his political career as one of the two leading Marxist intellectuals of the PCF (the other one being his rival, the humanist-Marxist Roger Garaudy) during the 1950s-70s. The science of Marxism may be understood briefly through the following four binary concepts of Althusser's philosophico-political intervention: (1) Marx's thought beyond economism and humanism; (2) symptomatic reading and the epistemological break;

(3) relative autonomy and overdetermination; (4) and finally, ideology and the ideological state apparatuses.

RETURN TO MARX HIMSELF: BEYOND ECONOMISM AND HUMANISM

More than sixty years after the original publication of his works, *For Marx* and *Reading Capital*, Althusser's contribution to Marxist theory has always captured the very essence of the slogan "Return to Marx!" in its literal form and content. A return to Marx, for Althusser, is precisely a return to Marx—not to Hegel, Feuerbach, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Kautsky, Trotsky, Bernstein, Luxembourg, Lukács, Gramsci, nor to Mao. Initially reluctant to be part of the PCF, he eventually joined the party only because whatever Althusser said or wrote would inevitably be judged along with the PCF's *programme*. During those time, Marxism was undergoing international crises, significantly because of the Soviet repression in the USSR, the aftermath purging events that followed, and Stalinism in general (including its "wrong directions": on the one hand, the revisionism of Stalin's Marxism tainted by Russian economism, and on the other hand, the de-Stalinization of Marxist theory that Althusser was able to encounter in the French academia). Being aware that the Marxism of the USSR had reduced individual freedom as much as the fascism in Germany did, Althusser sought to analyze the internal and external contradictions and the infidelities that occurred in Marxist philosophy, which led to its pitfall of authoritarianism and totalitarian practices. He was hoping to construct a non-repressive theory for a Socialist state (Kurzweil 1980, 35). This analysis led him to engage in the debate between two mutually exclusive paradigms in Marxist theory. The first is the economic determinism analyzed and exemplified in the works of Russian thinkers such as Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov and Nikolai Bukharin. This version of Marxism provides strong claims on the primacy of the mechanistic and technological determination of the modes of production as what motors the dynamic of a historical process, consequently dismissing the importance of human freedom or subject's effort as the sole causal determinant of history. Russian Marxists were engrossed with Marx's declaration that it is the material conditions of living (or, in Marxist terms, the economic *base*) that determines the social *superstructures* of society from the personal to the political level. Unfortunately, the proponents of this paradigm would eventually experience the downfall of Soviet Marxism along with its theoretical underpinnings—an outcome contrary to their theory's version of absolute determinism. It signaled to the world the dubbing of the century as the "failure of [Soviet] Marxism."

The second is the reaction to the deterministic view, the humanist-historicist Marxism in the academes that inevitably grew outside the USSR. Contrary to determinist Marxism, this humanist-historicist version champions the centrality of human subjectivity as the main determinant of the dialectics of the historical process, rendering the possibility of emancipation and revolutionary social change by way of human effort and struggle (Elliot 2006, 99-166). This version of Marxism started in the French academia when the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* first made a public appearance (and in translation) in 1932, though it was written long

before Marx started to write *Capital* (See Marx 2013). Despite both the *1844 Manuscripts* and *Capital* being considered as main texts of Marxist orthodoxy, readers were able to see their difference in topic and concern, style of writing, structure of discussion, philosophical methodology, and prowess of scientific vocabulary (specifically in *Capital*). It crystallized the distinction between the *1844 Manuscript's* "young Marx," who was a child of the late Enlightenment period and simultaneously influenced by the French utopian socialists such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon during his time, and the "mature Marx" of *Capital*, whose revolutionary science geared the communist party into its theoretical grandeur and authority today. However, the humanist-historicist Marxists would give much more importance to the thought of the young Marx, salvaging Marx from what was abandoned by the rigid determinist reading of the Soviet Marxists. It immediately became the point of departure for French postwar philosophy to do Marxism beyond Stalin, complementing the lectures of the Russian-born Hegelian-Marxist thinker Alexandre Kojève in Paris during the 1940s. Eventually, the humanist-historicist reading of Marx found refuge during the late 1960s in the academic and literary barricades of existentialist phenomenology, particularly in Merleau-Ponty's *Adventures of the Dialectic* (written in 1955) and the later Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (written in 1960), and as well as to the non-phenomenologist Marxist thinkers in the academe such as Henri Lefebvre, Lucien Goldmann, etc.

The humanist-historicist reading of Marx was a political maneuver of de-Stalinizing Marxism in France. Sartre (2004, 38-39) appropriated praxis with an existentialist tone, emphasizing the primacy of human freedom as fully expressed in collective revolutionary action. The human being was enthroned as a central figure that determines the flow of history with his responsibility to the dynamic of social change. Marxism was "saved" through the guidance of the implied humanism within existentialist phenomenology. Moreover, if not existentialism, such a version of Marxism nevertheless complemented the French academe's research interest in Hegel, such that they traced Marx's logic of *Capital* as having the same logic of the dialectic: a concept he inherited from Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians. After all, the young Marx was a Young Hegelian. However, in the same way as Sartre and the rest, the Marxism that returned to "the French Hegel"² persistently emphasized the role of the subject whose consciousness is the historical content of the dialectic's fulfillment.

Hegel, unfortunately, was not Marx. Moreover, Althusser saw through this de-Stalinized humanist-historicist reading of Marx as misguided and simultaneously remained bourgeois. The humanism of young Marx provides no scientific and theoretical instructions concrete enough to discuss and organize the modes of production—which is significant in the economic determination of any class struggle, including the autonomy of the proletarian praxis. Instead, the *1844 Manuscripts* offers a wide philosophical analysis of alienation, focusing rather on the Hegelian claim that a human person is a self-creating being arising out of the dialectic between labor and the natural world (objective spirit) he or she affects and transforms (See Marx 1959). Thus, for Althusser, it was necessary to save Marxism from this form of revisionism that de-potentializes both the revolutionary content and emancipatory impulse. At the same time, he also rejected and condemned the economic determinism of the party

philosophy of the USSR, whose passivity and inaction were grounded on the belief that since the superstructures are being determined by the base (i.e., thinking is determined by economics, or the social is caused by the material), all that was left to do is to "wait" for the revolution of the modes of production to undergo actualizations (Kurzweil 1980, 36). For Althusser, the revolution must be planned instead of waiting for the moment as it becomes impotent in the hands of capitalist oppression. Gregory Elliot (2006, 56) would paradoxically describe this beginning of Althusser's efforts of engaging in Marxism as a "Stalinist de-Stalinization." Indeed, Althusser was conceptualizing Marxist science beyond the practical limits and theoretical infidelities of economic determinism, historicism, and humanism; and yet he wanted to believe that "Marxism is a science"—a contention he found similar to Lenin—arguing for the scientificity of dialectical and historical materialism actualizations (Kurzweil 1980, 37).

ALTHUSSERIAN HERMENEUTICS: WHAT IS CALLED SYMPTOMATIC READING?

The re-reading of Marx in *For Marx* and *Reading Capital* initiated not a political theory of revolutionary action but rather an epistemology of understanding the structures of society, the very logic of social formation, and the dialectics of the modes of production. It was necessary to re-read Marx in order to bring about an investigation of his science and philosophy established in *Capital*. Meanwhile, Althusser (2005, 21-39) considered himself part of the Parisian community, whose existentialism and phenomenology he nonetheless disdained as unscientific, idealist, and counterproductive to his reading of Marx. However, Althusser's reading still did not escape the growing influence of the French intellectual tradition during his time. Despite his frequent denials that he was a structuralist, Althusser "certainly shared preoccupations about unconscious structures with Levi-Strauss, Foucault, and Lacan" (Kurzweil 1980, 39). In *Reading Capital*, he even praised Lacan's "intransigent and lucid" reading of Freud, specifically investigating

what listening, and hence speaking (and keeping silent), *means* (*veut dire*); that the '*meaning*' (*vouloir dire*) of speaking and listening reveals beneath the innocence of speech and hearing the culpable depth of a second, quite different discourse, the discourse of the unconscious. (Althusser et al. 2015, 14)

Discovering that the problematic of the young Marx (whose writings were abundant in utterances that were symptomatic of the ideologies during his time) is different from the mature Marx, Althusser (et al. 2015, 15) argue on this contention that one must move away from the ideological pretensions that have reigned in the *1844 Manuscripts* to the "explicit innocence of a *reading*" of *Capital*.³ He (2001, 135) declares to have used the same direction of theorizing Marx's contribution with that of Lacan's direction to Freud's contribution: both of them thought that Marx and Freud had founded a *science*. By science, however, Althusser derives from Gaston Bachelard's

epistemology and scientific historiography, which signifies the bodies of systematized knowledge that arise from epistemological ruptures with common-sensical knowing.⁴ Edith Kurzweil (1980, 40; Cf. Foucault 1972, 4) provides a precise description of summarizing Bachelard's conceptualization and development of science:

...in the course of the development of a science, epistemological acts and thresholds suspend the continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow development, force it to enter a new time, cut it off from its empirical origin and original motivations, cleanse it of its imaginary complices, and direct historical analysis away from the search for silent beginnings toward the search for a new type of rationality and its various effects.

The consequence of such analyses is that the history of science is not marked by a continuous progress from one scientific paradigm to another. Rather, the history of science is a history of discontinuity between epistemological inconsistencies in a scientific epoch, where a new epoch emerges and innovates by breaking away from the ideological paradigm of its own previous time. Bachelard argued that there were absolute disjunctions between scientific knowledge and what he refers to as *connaissance commune*, or the a-conceptual, unconscious epistemological obstacles for scientific knowledge. The *connaissance commune* could be compared as the ideological, ordinary, or common-sense knowledge that is dogmatic and contrary to the scientific knowledge of a specific historical period. According to Bachelard (and also to Althusser), scientific knowledge is the system of adequate ideas being a criterion of its own theoretical authority, as well as the criterion of non-scientific or ideological inadequate ideas (See Patton 1978, 8-18; Elliot 2006, 77-78). This Bachelardian analysis of scientific progress and Lacan's Freudian reading of symptoms and utterances would influence Althusser in the conceptualization of the symptomatic reading (Fr. *lecture symptomale*) and the notion of the epistemological break (Fr. *rupture épistémologique*), which he devotedly applies in *For Marx*.⁵

What truly marks Althusser's hermeneutic approach is the symptomatic reading of Marx. *For Marx* aimed to examine a variety of problematic in order to grasp what could truly be considered Marx's philosophy (dialectical materialism) and the science of history (historical materialism). Althusser (2005, 32) consistently argues that there are existing differences in theoretical conjunctures and also inconsistencies in the problematic between the young and mature Marx. Before 1845, Marx used the language of the late Enlightenment philosophy and largely Hegelian-Feuerbachian concepts to examine the nature of social reality, human freedom, and the self's alienation—concepts that were either non-essential or entirely absent in the mature texts such as *Capital*. Symptomatic reading meticulously renders these concepts explicit, as argued in *Reading Capital* (Althusser et al. 2015, 31. Modifications mine):

[Althusser] merely proposed a 'symptomatic' reading of the works of Marx and Marxism, one with another, i.e., the progressive and systematic production of a reflection of the problematic on its object such as to make them *visible*, and the illumination, the production of the deepest-lying

problematic which will allow us to *see* what could otherwise only have existed allusively or practically.

The author and texts are products of their own historical period, yet as history progresses, only the author is subject to its changes, either as progressive or regressive. Authors are influenced and could not help but be part of the ideological background that conditions the thought of an historical epoch and its nostalgia in the next. Marx was no exemption, as his early writings did not escape Hegel's idealism and Feuerbach's materialist anthropology prior to 1845. No matter how significant the concepts one might find in Marx's early writings are (to mention the *1844 Manuscripts*), even in today's contemporary problems of capitalist oppression, Althusser's symptomatic reading reveals to us that the thoughts behind these texts are ideological and these concepts used are highly borrowed by Marx from his encounter with the young Hegelians. In other words, if Bachelard was correct in his contentions on how sciences came and moved away from their ideological preoccupations, then the thought of the young Marx is conclusively ideological in general and thus is not Marxist science but only a continuation of Hegel's and Feuerbach's philosophies. Let us take note that Althusser was critical of the matter and content of the *1844 Manuscripts*, but he does not necessarily mean that a symptomatic reading of Marx should entirely disregard the early works (See Elliot 2006, 23).⁶ Instead, Althusser (2005, 35) classifies in *For Marx* the following divisions of Marx's thought:

- 1840-44: the Early Works.
- 1845: the Works of the Break.
- 1845-57: the Transitional Works.
- 1857-83: the Mature Works.

The classification made possible by symptomatic reading claims that the early works focus on a different problematic: the anthropological inversion of Hegelianism through Feuerbach's influences,⁷ without laying down the scientific and economic analysis of determining history. Althusser introduced the epistemological break in 1845 within Marx's thought, specifically when the latter was then disillusioned by the dominant bourgeois ideology because it has emphasized the primacy of the *real* subject and the humanism it implies within Feuerbach's inversion of the Hegelian dialectic. After *German Ideology*, Marx had *matured* and gave up every shred of idealism. The concepts or symptoms that the young Marx started to utter have finally revealed their true scientific terminologies (e.g., alienation was either ignored or no more to be found in the Mature Works, as Marx himself begins to examine the concept of labor in terms of commodities and modes of production).⁸ This notion of an epistemological break between the young Marx and the mature one repudiates the theoretical authority of the former along with those humanist-historicist Marxists who emphasized the centrality of the subject. The emphasis on the examination of the Mature Works had steered the course of Marxism beyond the French Hegel, as the true beginning of the Marxist science was that rupture of the epistemological break from the surrounding ideological problematic (i.e., idealism) towards the analysis of the

economic logic of capitalist formation, which grasps the knowledge of the labor theory of value, surplus value, modes and relations of production. Althusser's reading gained the acceptance of many Marxists who were reluctant to incorporate existentialism and phenomenology into it. It eventually became the dominant theory of what was to be considered the [Marxist] science of the revolutionary process, at least in the intellectual environment in France during the 1960s. In fact, Rancière reminisces in *The Method of Equality* (2016, 8) that conversing about alienation was "a joke" in the ÉNS during his student years. Critics, however, would accuse Althusser's hermeneutics as an instance of Stalinism or of economic determinism by the Russians, and others would think that its theoretical practice is no less different from Lenin's reading of Marx. Is the emphasis on the thought of the mature Marx an instance of economic determinism found in the works of Plekhanov, Bukharin, and even Trotsky? The answer to this question provides a description of the uniqueness of Althusser's Marxism, specifically the label of being structuralist and Spinozist.

OVERDETERMINATION AND RELATIVE AUTONOMY

The accusation of determinism was inevitable to any Marxist who would question the authority and centrality of human freedom and subjectivity. Althusser was not an exemption. The theoretical consequence of symptomatic reading was that the thought of the young Marx is conclusively not the true Marxist science. Althusser (2005, 93) proposes that scientific knowledge can only come to exist in its practice of dispelling the ideological generality by transforming it into scientific generality.⁹ This demystification of ideology will be discussed later. For now, it is necessary to inquire about Althusser's idea of causality within the structural totality as a valid argument against determinist accusations.

Althusser (et al. 2015, 338) thought that when Marx broke with idealism, he began to develop his own science of history not only to examine the nature of political economy but also to understand the modes of production (or in the humanist-historicist Marxism's vocabulary, *human activity*), including the production of scientific knowledge. As modes of production undergo the processes of the rational kernel of dialectics, they transform a new unique material depending on their appropriate unique causal structures. However, in the same way, Spinoza thought of the causal uniqueness of substance through their modes, Althusser argues that in Marx's analyses, modes of production stand in relation to a complex structural totality, functioning without being reducible as the sole cause of another (See Elliot 2006, 136). It recognizes that there may exist other motivational factors that affect the transformation of a specific mode of production, as the complexity of social totality is directed towards the differential development of all parts of the whole structure.¹⁰ In other words, the determination of modes of production is due to the dominance of structures, neither of the economic base nor of the superstructures alone. This theoretical stance distinguished Althusser from economic determinism and their rigidly mechanistic view of historical and social reality. The whole chapter "Contradiction and Overdetermination" in *For Marx* (Althusser 2005, 113) is devoted to fleshing out Althusser's theory of structural causality through the concepts of relative autonomy and overdetermination:

Marx has at least given us the 'two ends of the chain', and has told us to find out what goes one between them: on the one hand, *determination in the last instance by the (economic) mode of production*; on the other, *the relative autonomy of the superstructures and their specific effectivity...* Production is the determinant factor, but only 'in the last instance.'

Overdetermination necessitates us to think of different elements that coexist in the structure of the real social body and the historical present as parts affecting the general structure of the whole. Such a concept "obliges us to define...the *index of effectivity* currently attributable to the element or structure in question in the general structure of the whole"—the index of effectivity being the "more or less 'paradoxical' determination of a given element or structure in the current mechanism of the whole" (Althusser et al., 2015, 254). In the anatomy of the structural whole, the economic base is affected by the different superstructures such as politics, religion, or civil society—superstructures whose independence and relative autonomy from the infrastructure (the economic base) take place in diachrony within a single determination of a socio-historical moment. Simultaneously, these superstructural elements reflect the determination of the total productive process that constitutes the socio-historical moment *in the last instance* as manifested in the mode of production (Althusser 2005, 115-116). The superstructures are relatively autonomous as they function (at most times, contradictory) according to their effectivity and contribution to the organization of the structural totality (Althusser 2005, 99). But they simultaneously reflect their determination by the economic base, not *ipso facto* as their sole determinant factor. We may consider the first EDSA Revolution in the Philippines a relatively definitive example. An essential motivating instrument of its socio-historical reality was the ideology of freedom brought about when Benigno Aquino, Jr. was assassinated on 21 August 1983, leading people to engage in civil disobedience and other practices of dissenting against the rule of martial law. Simultaneously in our religious sector, there was also the involvement of the Church and Catholic Filipinos, and Jaime Cardinal Sin became one of the architects of the People Power Revolution. Meanwhile, in the socio-cultural sector, a growing cultural disdain for the practices of crony capitalism in the national government and abuse of military power in the local governments became more visible and was normatively directed against the Marcos administration. In the sector of the political opposition, there were already existing plans for *coup d'état* by former members and collaborators of the Marcos dictatorship and those influenced by leftist groups. At the same time, in our economic sector, affluence has drastically declined by 7.3 percent and the Philippine peso devaluated by 50 percent in 1984 (see Ang 2015), worsening the poverty level which the Filipino working class is most affected. In an Althusserian glance, one is inclined to think of two mutual realities: (1) that any of those factors from different sectors could independently function as *raison d'être* of events of EDSA I (relative autonomy); (2) yet they too could function in diachrony within the structural whole where all of these sectors play their part as they overdetermine the event's socio-historical reality, and this overdetermination is precisely reflected in the mode of production: when the working

class suddenly stopped working as they joined the revolutionary activities of EDSA I (determination-in-the-last-instance).

Contrary to the view of non-contradictory or simple determination, which the Hegelian-Marxists and the Russian economic determinists adhere to, Althusser's concept of overdetermination (Althusser 2005, 113) claims that dominance does originate neither from the base nor the superstructures alone, but rather originates from the structural whole, which organizes all modes of productions from human labor, scientific knowledge, artistic values, revolutionary action, etc. Moreover, this concept of overdetermination became a source of Althusser's theoretical anti-humanism, given that it disregards the subject as a central figure of the structural totality. The human being is but one of the many sites of contradictions of productive forces. Althusser recognizes the possibility of superstructures persisting even if both the economic base and the mode of production are transformed, explaining the possibility of social reproduction, which he (2005, 232; 2014, 52) introduces in *For Marx* but entirely devotes its discussion in *On the Reproduction of Capital* and his maverick essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus."¹¹ In other words, the economic base never works alone, and the elements of the superstructures always act in combination with others in the instance of social formation (Althusser 2005, 101). How then should we look at the role of superstructures in Marxist science? Such inquiry entails a prominent component of Althusser's structural Marxism: the theorization of ideology, its permanence, and the state apparatuses.

THE FUNCTION OF IDEOLOGY AS A STATE APPARATUSES

From the 1970s to the 80s, Althusser directed his attention to the inquiry: How is it that a social mechanism thrives even more in the midst of crises, and how is it possible for the modes of production to reproduce themselves? The answer is ideology and its workings. When examining Marx's theory of ideology as a 'false consciousness,' Althusser (2005, 231) introduces ideology as a system of representation distinguished from science "in that in it the practico-social function is more important than the theoretical function (function as knowledge)." Thus, even if ideology (considered to possess an inferior function compared to science's theoretical practice) is somewhat comparable to the Nietzschean 'necessary illusions,' it remains to be an indispensable and organic part of every social totality, secreted from human societies as the atmosphere for their historical respiration and life (Althusser 2005, 232). It presupposes how human beings relate with the overdetermined unity of the real conditions of existence, invested into its imaginary relation—meaning, ideology is how one *sees* and *lives* the world, regardless if it is a false conception of it. In the essay "Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation," Althusser (1990, 28-29) distinguished the value of objectivity and magnitude of truth within the Marxist science, and how the inferiority of ideology to science is precisely ideology's objective power for social cohesion:

In class societies, ideology is a representation of the real, but necessarily distorted, because necessarily biased and tendentious—

tendentious because its aim is not to provide men with *objective knowledge* of the social system in which they live but, on the contrary, to give them a mystified representation of this social system in order to keep them in their 'place' in the system of class exploitation. Of course, it would also be necessary to pose the problem of the function of ideology in a classless society—and it would be resolved by showing that the deformation of ideology is socially necessary as a function of the nature of the social whole itself, as a function (to be more precise) of *its determination by its structure*, which renders it—as a social whole—opaque to the individuals who occupy a place in society determined by this structure. The opacity of the social structure necessarily renders *mythic* that representation of the world which is indispensable for social cohesion.

By knowing its mystifying characteristic, ideology is revealed to be the misrepresentation (thus, *imaginary*) of the real conditions of life, where human beings are *subjected* to the mechanisms of the structural whole supported by the superstructures (politics, religion, education, culture, etc.) without them knowing the structural overdetermination of their lives including the knowledge of the true conditions of the modes of production. Ideology exists in all human activities, dominating the relation between man and his experience of the world, consecrating it inasmuch as ideology's *imaginary* materiality becomes indistinguishable from the reality of the world. We learn to adapt to ideology and become part of the machinations of the structural totality even if we become self-conscious of ourselves. Althusser (2001, 117) calls this *interpellation*, where individuals become subjects of/to ideology. In this mechanism of interpellation, the subject[ed] individual misrecognizes (*méconnaissance*) himself or herself as "free, constitutive subjects at the 'centre' of their world" (Elliot 2006, 290; Althusser 2001, 116). This drama produced by ideology blinds the individual, disabling anyone from seeing the real conditions, which are the modes of production. Human beings encounter exploitative and oppressive relations of production, but ideological knowledge paralyzes any forms of disruption to the self-reproducing structural totality (Elliot 2006, 290). In capitalist societies, it becomes the instrument of the ruling class for repression and coercion of the working class, functioning for the benefit of the dominant class ideology. Furthermore, ideology is materialized into one of the two superstructural manifestations of state power: ideological state apparatuses (ISA) (Althusser 2001, 96).¹²

Ideological state apparatuses exist both in public and private institutions and operate by ideology alone, possessing hegemony of the ruling class ideology. Althusser (2001, 96) enumerates in the essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" a variety of ISA such as the church, school, media, culture, political party, legal system, etc. Despite the different ISAs having a different particular autonomous functions, generally, all of them play a significant role: the imbuing of ideology in the lives of the people.¹³ Ideology is born indirectly from how people *see* both society and themselves, including the practices which are the very expression of their *vision* of them. Ideology, through the ISAs, is the universal requirement not only of our social integration as subjects but also of social reproduction. Ideological state

apparatuses autonomously (in the relative sense) reproduce these relations of production between human beings and the workings of the world—thus, maintaining the mode of production which defines them (*in-the-last-instance*) (Althusser 2001, 109–115). Such overdetermination with the interpellation of the human subject becomes the explanation for social cohesion in general as to how do societies continue to be reproduced. An ISA also provides an explanation of the mechanisms of capitalist exploitation and why they seem to never end. This panopticism of ideology gives the impression that we may never truly experience human freedom unless we see that our mode of production becomes part of the overdetermination of structural dominance. It means that as human beings, we are free insofar as our actions contribute to affecting the social totality.

Readers of Althusser would immediately notice that his critique of ideology, particularly on ideology's mystifying characteristic, only applies to those within capitalist and class societies. However, Althusser (2005, 236) argues that given the permanence of ideology even in socialist and communist or classless societies, it is possible that ideology is removed of its mystification and that the ISAs should function in the constant molding of the consciousness of men settled not into the benefit of the ruling class but rather to all humanity.¹⁴ As stated by Althusser (2005, 235),

If, as Marx said, history is a perpetual transformation of men's conditions of existence... then men must be ceaselessly transformed so as to adapt them to these conditions; if this 'adaption' cannot be left to spontaneity but must be constantly assumed, dominated and controlled, it is ideology that his contradiction is lived and its resolution is 'activated'. It is in ideology that the classless society *lives* the inadequacy/adequacy of the relations between it and the world, it is in it and by it that it transforms men's 'consciousness', that is their attitudes and behavior so as to raise them to the level of their tasks and conditions of existence.

Althusser is hopeful about the class struggle outside and within ideology, the latter being which can only be won through science—that is, the Marxist science. Moreover, in the same way as Marx, the theoretical practice should entail the subject's epistemological break from ideologies that are experienced as dominant, exploitative, and bourgeois. By knowing the rational kernel of history (of the logic of the dialectical process and its object, i.e., the mode and relations of production) beneath all forms of mystification, subjects are demystified from their imaginary relation with the world and realize its true workings in understanding the modes of production (Althusser 2001, 93). The epistemological break from the dominant (capitalist) ideology of actually existing symbolic register is the prime emancipatory moment. This rupture in thinking, from ideological mystification to the theoretical realization of scientific objectivity of the structural totality, frees the people from the constraints of oppression.

Moreover, at last, its realization in completion will be none other than revolution. After all, "revolutionaries know that, *in the last instance*, everything depends not on techniques, weapons, etc., but on militants, on their [consciousness],

their devotion and courage" (Althusser 2001, 9). Throughout the end of philosophico-political interventions and his career in the academe, Althusser would always return to this defining characteristic of Marxist science and its philosophy being a revolutionary weapon. Both theory and praxis in the science of Marxism engage in the philosophical fight over the meaning of things, being an essential part of the political struggle. Inasmuch as it is a struggle on the meaning of words "against lying words, against ambiguous words; for correct words," fighting over the "shades of opinions," philosophy is the class struggle in theory (Althusser 2001, 9).

ALTHUSSER'S LESSON: RANCIÈRE'S RUPTURE EPISTÉMOLOGIQUE

Althusser's seminar project on reading Marx's *Capital* was part of his philosophico-political strategy of forming students with the "correct instructions" of reading Marx against the revisionism advanced by the humanist-historicist reading of Marx. Many *normaliens*¹⁵ were encouraged by the scientificity of his Marxist science and its advocacy of the autonomy and authority of theoretical practice over ideological practices. As a young Althusserian in 1964, Rancière joined Althusser's seminar project along with Étienne Balibar and Yves Duroux, who both were then his fellow students of Althusser in their later years at ÉNS. Pierre Macherey, who had already left the ÉNS, returned to take part in the sessions; while Roger Establet, a former philosophy student, followed the seminar from a distance and wrote his contribution that served as a conclusion to the published volumes (Balibar in Althusser et al. 2015, 2-3). Rancière's contribution entitled "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy: From the 1844 Manuscripts to *Capital*" was a demonstration of revealing and fleshing out Althusser's notion of the epistemological break, showing the difference between the ideological consciousness of the young Marx and the scientific theoretical underpinnings of the mature one. Rancière (in Althusser et al., 2015, 97) traces that this epistemological break, though signaled in 1845, had concretized its absolute divorce from the ideology of German idealism and leftist or young Hegelianism in the 1857 *Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, arguing that "the touchstone which distinguishes science from ideology is the theory of abstraction." After all, the economic discourse made use of concepts from critique (e.g., examining the contradicting asymmetry between concrete labor and abstract labor and between use-value and surplus value) and not from abstraction, as the mature Marx avoids the methodological abstraction which the young Marx used in the speculative discourse of alienation (Rancière in Althusser et al. 2015, 81, 89-99, 105). The essay proved to be Althusserian in its theoretical direction. However, this science of Marxism would later be repudiated by Rancière (2017b, 307) after the event that he considered as a challenge to Althusserianism: the series of protests that were known to history as the revolutions of May 1968 in France.¹⁶

The absence of Althusser during the events of May '68 was, in fact, due to illness. Arguably the most productive thing Althusser was able to accomplish in his career during 1968 was the publication of the second edition and abridged "pedagogical" version of *Reading Capital*—one where only Althusser's and Balibar's

individual contributions were included.¹⁷ But this absence was revealed (and still disputed) to be a 'silence,' especially when in a correspondence with the Italian communist journalist Maria Antonietta Macchiocchi (revealed later on through her autobiography), Althusser claims that there was a contradiction between what he was writing and the political situation of France during May '68 (See Elliot 2006, 215). Regardless of a variety of reasons, the event's origins were evidently spontaneous, and the series of revolts was never originally in accordance with the official organic strategy of the PCF. Althusser remained loyal to the PCF's political *programme* during the events of May '68 but went on to demand and identify in detail the very theoretical strategy he established as the true science of Marxism, radicalizing the position of theoretical practice along with the party's official line in the attempts of revising the PCF from within (Elliot 2006, 215). Despite its Leninist tone, Althusser wrote to Macchiocchi (1973, 300) that a communist party "must have a 'mass' revolutionary political line" which unites theory and practice.

Moreover, in a controversial essay devoted to *explaining* May '68 titled "Student Problems," Althusser (1964, 80-111) insists on the importance of political representationalism in revolutions: that a communist party must not stand on equal position with the trade union, i.e., the mass, but must be *in advance of it*.¹⁸ Elliot clarifies that Althusser recognizes the positive importance of May '68 to the political setting of France, but the latter nonetheless denied what was considered the significant political sector that sparked the revolution: the students, inclusive of the French youth (See Elliot 2006, 218). Althusser's essay explained May '68 using the lenses of the Marxist science: he believes that the revolutionary activities of the young French students were, in fact, blind and ideological as they presented symptoms of petit-bourgeois leftism and utopianism. He claims (in line with the PCF) that there exists a discrepancy between the demand of the workers and the dreams of the student, whereas Althusser condemns the latter because the sole reason is that the students are yet to be educated with the instructions from the true science of Marxism, and yet to be equipped with proper theoretical training (See Elliot 2006, 219). In the end, many students, including Rancière, who celebrated the revolutionary events, were disillusioned by the hubris of Althusser's theoreticism.

Rancière (2017a, xxiii) gave his respectful homage to Althusserianism in 1974 when he concretized his *rupture épistémologique* with Althusser in the publication of *Althusser's Lesson* as a response to the latter's work *Reply to John Lewis*.¹⁹ Arguably Rancière's first major work as a post-Althusserian, *Althusser's Lesson* is a polemic against the practical shortcomings of Althusserianism, theoreticism, and representationalist politics during the events of May '68. Rancière's work attempts to audit the effects of Althusser's philosophy brought about in theorizing politics (i.e., revolutionary activity), history (i.e., class struggle), and epistemology (i.e., emancipatory thinking). The former student's criticisms were heavily informed by the disappointments in Althusser's schism between science and ideology: the latter being the imaginary construct of the superstructure that conceals the actually existing constructs of the economic base, while the former being the theoretical practice of the opposite—identifying the actually existing structures veiled by ideology and underpins its social, economic, and historical forms (See James 2012, 114).²⁰ The first

consequence of this deep commitment to science is that politics as a revolutionary activity belongs only to the intellectuals or the 'Marxist scientists' since the knowledge of the masses is limited within the superstructural level of ideology and could not immediately break from its workings. Therefore, the representative position of the intellectuals as a medium between the proletarian movements and emancipation had to be sustained. Moreover, since these Marxist scientists authorize (if not, police) the legitimacy of any forms of revolutionary activity, they can also invalidate any of them if they do not conform strategically, regardless of their contribution to the overall praxes. This policing of the revolutionary movement became a discourse of homogeneity and justification for Althusserianism's articulated disdain against vicissitudes of spontaneity in politics, ultimately confirmed in its initial dismay to the student activism of May '68 (See Rancière 2017a, 44).

This political consequence of Althusserianism also affects the way we look at class struggle in the dynamic of historical progress—that is, if progress truly is science's teleological direction (or if there is anything as such). When a revolutionary movement is initiated spontaneously, Rancière claims that Althusserianism could only value its struggle to be contributive when it is *subordinated* to the general economic class struggle—the discourse of which is instrumental to the PCF and to the economic determinist reading of Marx. "Subordination," Rancière (2017a, 69) claims, "could mean of two things: either the outcome of the May movement depended on the workers [and not the students]... or that the student movement owed its spark, its nature, and its objectives to the general strike, and this, really, would be too Hegelian a history."²¹ This peculiar equation of spontaneous revolutionary activity with an instance of reason's cunning provides a lasting impression about the history of class struggle: All independent revolutionary offensive against the status quo are subsumed to be part of the general emancipatory narrative without taking into account the value of these individual struggles whether they be for class, gender or race. Otherwise, we are to confuse the chronological *order* with the many illusions of progressivism and revisionism by human beings—who were supposedly the true *subject of history* (See Rancière 2017a, 12).

Althusserianism's hostility to spontaneous revolutionary action, i.e., praxes beyond the strategic organization of the PCF, outrightly downplays the epistemological salience of the lived experience (fr. *le vécu*) of struggles by the masses (See Rancière 2017a, 42) in thinking of emancipation. It is the same hostility that renders Althusser's philosophy to be counterproductive in articulating the emancipatory potentials of anyone, despite not directly belonging to (yet supporting) the party. Althusser invalidates the strong connections of fidelity between the intellectualization of revolution (i.e., theory) and the material belongingness which informs it (i.e., praxis) by furthering the gap through the representation of supposedly Marxist scientists. Rancière (2017a, 47) makes it clear that this repression by the authority of theory, which consequently ensures the position of intellectuals, was grounded in the false belief about the human experience and activity: "*false ideas originate in social practices.*"²² In the end, Althusserianism generally meant one thing: it remains to be a mere philosophy of education—the instructions of which preserve the existing order Althusser originally attempted to bring to light (Rancière 2017a, 52).

CONCLUSION: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY

Indeed, Althusser's lesson significantly confirmed its instructions with the *praxis* of PCF during May '68, as the commune's representationalist politics had undermined the potentials of direct minoritarian struggles of many workers' unions and the student body, evaluating all of their political aspirations and efforts as petty if not in conformity with the organized revolutionary process of the time (Rancière 2017a, 122). The PCF emphasized the generalized vision of their emancipatory *programme* (i.e., science) over the particular concerns, experiences, and plight of the students and workers (i.e., ideology). Such perspective only rendered privilege to the figure of the intellectual and underestimated the everyday experiences of the ordinary people who could not directly access the Marxist science. It ultimately preserves the institutional role of the Marxist scientist, creating further a structural inequality: a rigid division of labor in the revolutionary movement.²³ This undermining of the political capacity of the ordinary people inspired Rancière (2017a, 82-110; Cf. Rancière in Deranty and Ross 2010, 205-216) to engage and direct his interests to the archive of labor history. From this epistemological break comes the initial formulations of his philosophy of radical equality, whose hermeneutic humility inquires on the possibility of perceiving the activities of ordinary people, and the basis from which these activities may be deemed whether significant or not, whether political or not (Deranty 2010, 17).²⁴ Rancière's fundamental philosophical presupposition is that '*Everybody thinks!*'—or that thought is always at work in everyone, both in the scientific intellectual and in the ideological masses. Anyone capable of hearing and understanding an order is capable of interacting in order to participate as an equal in the creation of a meaningful life, including the determination of its material conditions (See May 2007, 22). This is why it is always important for Rancière to begin from this egalitarian presupposition in order to see that politics and emancipatory thinking need not be separate from the productive activities and daily experiences of everyone participating in the revolutionary movement. Such belief in the equality of intelligence subverts the discourse of mastery propagated by Althusserianism.

Rancière's epistemological break with Althusser is directed at questioning science's theoretical superiority over ideology and the practical consequence it has portrayed during May '68: namely, the devaluation and cancelation (on the grounds of being ideological) of the practices and experiences of the ordinary people who are not equipped with theory, despite nonetheless that such experiences had proven their magnificence in the revolutionary moments (Rancière 2017a, 121-123).²⁵ It became the point of departure for Rancière's conceptualization of philosophy initiated by the egalitarian assumption: that emancipation could come from anywhere, anytime, and anyone—even from those people who were not expected to. In 1978, four years after the publication of *Althusser's Lesson* and ten years after May 1968, Althusser would officially condemn the PCF for its privileged-driven behavior during May '68's revolutionary events (Elliot 2006, 221-222). However, perhaps, it was already too late.

NOTES

1. Transmetaphorically, "a crocodile;" A senior master at the *École normale supérieure* (See Rancière 2016, 6, footnote 5).

2. Long intellectual narratives on how the origins of the interest in the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel migrated from Germany to France were discussed by Bruce Baugh and Michael Hardt (See Baugh, 2003; Hardt 1993, ix-xv; See also Badiou 2016, 55).

3. Althusser, however, clarifies that "a philosophical reading of *Capital* is quite the opposite of an innocent reading. It is a guilty reading, but not one that absolves its crime on confessing it. On the contrary, it takes responsibility for its crime as a "justified crime" and defends it by proving its necessity." (Althusser et al. 2015, 15)

4. In 1948, Althusser wrote his master's thesis "On Content in the Thought of G.W.F. Hegel" under the supervision of Gaston Bachelard (See Elliot 2006, 71, footnote 62).

5. One should be reminded that Althusser and his students, specifically those acquainted with the seminar on *Reading Capital*, use the notion of epistemological break as an a-historical/non-historical concept. Epistemological break neither signifies a discontinuity of historical epochs nor a border between two differing historiographical thought-images. Rather, epistemological breaks are the discontinuities *within* a historical epoch by the conflicting and inconsistent systems of knowledge-production. This means that these ruptures entail multiple temporalities of thoughts within an event, making it possible for two or more conflicting epistemologies to exist within a single historical epoch. This argument is akin to the construction of the concept of overdetermination in Althusser's philosophy (See Fraser 1976/1977, 446-448; See also Callinicos 1976, 62-63).

6. Norman Geras, in *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend* (2016, 107-108), would clarify this position of Althusser's anti-humanism but affirms nonetheless that historical materialism rests on the idea of human nature by stressing the arbitrariness of such concept conceived by Marx during his lifetime.

7. Indeed, in *For Marx*, Althusser (2005, 37; Modifications mine) argues that "[in] the search for Marxist philosophy and in its definition, it is clear that the Marxist critique of Hegel should not be confused with the Feuerbachian critique of Hegel, even if Marx started in his name."

8. Perhaps, a source of reflection on examining the use of concepts of *alienation* and *modes of production (productive activity)*: an affirmative reading of proletarian identity advocated in emphasizing the mature Marx requires us to recognize what the workers are capable of or their index of effectivity, as signified by the mode of production of their historical belongingness. Unlike in the reading of proletarian identity advocated in emphasizing the young Marx, alienation meant the worker's experience of oppression in the workplace. Althusser provides us a way of reading Marx with a progressive and hopeful perspective on the proletariat by recognizing the role played by their capabilities within the structural totality instead of mere phenomenological suspensions of the workers' experience. Thus, he dismisses any discussions on alienation in *Capital* (See Althusser et al. 2015, 55-58).

9. This argument concerning the scientificity of Marxist science is fully exemplified in Althusser's essays, "Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation" and "Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon" (See Althusser, 1990, 1-42; See also Althusser 2001, 1-10).

10. In three significantly long pieces in *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, Paul Ricœur provides a devoted and meticulous analysis of Althusser's concept of overdetermination, hoping to locate a place for human freedom in the structural totality. Ricœur, though challenging Althusser in the said work, sheds light on the positive aspect of Althusser's concept of ideology, specifically in the "motivational framework" it implicitly constructs, providing an alternative to the rigidly causal analysis of the social order which was championed by their fellow structuralists during the 1950s-70s (See Ricœur 1986, 128).

11. On this note, Althusser (2014, 52) was concerned with the question of a communist society having to dispel all forms of ideology.

12. The other superstructural manifestation of state power is referred to as the repressive state apparatuses (RSA), which resides primarily in the public domain of society, concretely manifested as the police, military, courts, prisons, etc., and which functions primarily by violence (including discipline and physical repression) and secondarily by the ideology (fear, trauma, etc.) they secrete from their daily practices (See Althusser 2001, 97).

13. Elliot (2006, 207; Modifications mine) contends that "[o]perating under the 'commanding unity' of the policies implemental by the political representatives of the ruling class, the RSA ensures its' political conditions' by force. Protected by the RSA, the ISAs play the predominant role, prepondering among them, in capitalist societies, being the education system."

14. See Althusser 2005, 236. Perhaps, the Cultural Revolution in China is an accurate example of it, where the ideological state apparatuses aided in transforming the revolutionary consciousness of the mass.

15. A student of *École Normale Supérieure*.

16. The May 1968 revolution in France was a series of revolts instigated by students of the French academe against the head of the state, President Charles de Gaulle. The working-class reinforced the revolution afterward. After a decade of De Gaulle's authoritarian rule, the political regime failed to address synchronous social crises (e.g., unemployment, unstable services, inequality, and one may also include academic decadence), paralyzing France's social mobility. The oppressive regime led to a social uproar that was never fully organized by the PCF and other "official" revolutionary groups in Paris. According to Kristin Ross, what is surprising about this event is that the revolutions did not arise from the official strategic political programme; instead, *it came out of spontaneity* (See Ross 2002, 2-3, 11).

17. In *The Method of Equality*, Rancière (2016, 11) admits that he could not care less about his contribution not being included in this second edition because he was already distancing himself from Althusser and Althusserianism right before May '68.

18. Nathan Brown defends Althusser's essay, contending that a positive undertaking of the role of instruction in the student's revolutionary movement was to avoid a variety of misguided eclecticisms in the reading of Marx's work, which

prevailed during that time. For Brown, Althusser's efforts aimed precisely at organizing the struggle geared with the correct revolutionary weapon: theoretical practice (See Brown 2011, 18-19).

19. Brown, though critical of Rancière's critique against Althusser, provides a definitive description of Rancière's conclusions in *Althusser's Lesson*. For Rancière, Althusserianism meant "a Kautskyist apology for the division of political labor, an opportunistic affirmation of the academic hierarchy of roles and intellects, a reactionary theoretical orthodoxy" (Brown 2011, 16).

20. Meanwhile, in an essay entitled "On the Theory of Ideology: Althusser's Politics," Rancière draws heavy criticism against the science-ideology opposition, showing that the relation of science with ideology is not one of rupture but rather by articulation. According to Rancière (2017a, 142), "[d]ominant ideology is not the shady Other to Science's pure light; it is, rather, the space where scientific knowledges come to be inscribed, the space where they are articulated to the elements of knowledge constitutive of a social formation." One should realize that only those who possess experiences of oppression can articulate their own plights, even to a different but certain level of theoretical articulation—a science of their own.

21. Modifications mine.

22. Italicizations original.

23. Rancière criticizes Althusserian philosophy by pinpointing its justified excuses for maintaining a specific valorization of the practitioners of science as the only group of people capable of freeing themselves and other people, neglecting the minor emancipatory practices and particular discourses that happen in everyday life. The schism of science-ideology in Althusser's philosophy divides society between those who are oppressed or incapable of enacting the correct revolutionary practice and those practitioners of science capable of leading the ideologically-distorted mass from the delusions of ideological practices. Rancière (2017a, xix-xxiii, 75), contends that "ideology is not posited, at the outset, as the site of struggle. Instead of being related to two antagonists, it is related to a totality, or which it forms a natural element." The lack of struggle and internal contradictions within the establishment of ideological discourses has the effect of naturalizing the oppression and the maintenance of the unequal social order. Ideology merely reproduces the order, disabling the mass within the discourse and normalizing their resistance by reducing it as part of its process.

24. Jean-Philippe Deranty (2010, 17) provides a two-fold description of the aim of Rancière's initial project: on the one hand, "to demonstrate the capacity of the dominated to use the resources of logos, their ability to articulate their own thoughts and feelings on the basis of their specific experiences;" and on the other, "to unveil the boundaries and divisions that are projected from the social into the intellectual realms, and that prevent the dominated from having their discourses count as meaningful and significant." The intensive research in the archive of labor history enabled Rancière to see the daily experiences of the workers in their attempts to emancipate themselves from real poverty.

25. However, Emilio de Ípola (2018, 114, Prologue Endnote 4) argues in *Althusser, the Infinite Farewell*, that even though Rancière definitively distanced

himself both theoretically and politically from Althusserianism, in all of his anti-Althusserian essays "the indelible mark of his mentor remains" nonetheless.

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