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

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Starting with the January 2007 issue of this journal, references by any article to the logical term *proposition*, except in contextual historical citations, will be replaced by the term *constative*. Please see R. Gripaldo's "Meaning, proposition, and speech acts" in *Issues in contemporary Western philosophy,* Islam-West Philosophical Dialogue (2003), edited by Ali Naqi Baqershahi and Roya Khoii and supervised by Seyyed Mohammed Khamenei. Papers read during the World Congress on Mulla Sadra in May 1999. Vol. 6. Tehran: Sadra Islamic Research Institute. Also in 2001. *Φιλοσοφια: International Journal of Philosophy* 30 (1). See his papers, "The rejection of the proposition," delivered in 2008 during the 22nd World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul and "Constatival logic: An essay in the philosophy of logic," published in 2010, *Φιλοσοφια* 39 (1) and in 2011, *Φιλοσοφια* 40 (1), respectively.

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EDITOR'S NOTES

This January 2014 issue contains ten interesting articles which include one in African feminism, one in ethics, one in epistemology, two in in the philosophy of mind, two in political philosophy, one in postmodernism, one book review, and a book note.

In "African feminism: Some critical considerations," Adeolu Oluwseyi Oyekan argues that African feminism is unique in the feminism genre in that peculiar conditions in Africa are quite different from the rest of the world. African feminism is not gender-engendered, but the product of the whole of the peculiar African experience, particularly, in the postcolonial era.

Edwin Etieyibo says in "Themes in Brand Blanshard's coherence theory of truth" that truth is rationally interdependent of concepts, not the same as when a concept corresponds to an objective factual reality. Blanshard's truth is contextual and Etieyibo tries to show that he worries about truth in this sense because the systematization of the progress of the immanent towards the transcendent would require an omniscient amount of uncerstanding of cosmic order, or the overarching of beliefs. In examining Blanshard's five essential themes on the coherent theory of truth, Etieyibo tries to show that though in principle this seems possible, in pactice it does not seem so.

In the "Aporetic role of the *fact of reason* in Kantian moral philosophy," Demet Evenosoglu says that in the *Critique of practical reason*, Kant derived the moral law as an underived *fact of reason.* Since this is not derived from what is ordinarily associated with the empirical knowledge of facts and objective entities. Following David Sussman's arguments, he tries to justify that this abandonment of the moral law from deduction does not undermine its constitutional authority. The moral law operates as an immanent, dynamic, and operatic facticity. He tries to show how this fact enables the moral law from keeping intact the function of *aporia* that structures morality and comes itself into the circle of morality.

Fasiku Gbenga develops a theory in "Towards a neuroidentity theory of qualia" that phenomenal properties attached to mental consciousness, or qualia, seem elusive to any scientific theory. He defends a neuroidentity hypothesis that says that qualia, or neuroqualia, are the same as in some central nervous system's neurochemical interactions. This neuroidentity hypothesis is a possible way to move closer to a scientific theory of consciousness.

In "Turing and computationalism," Napoleon M. Mabaquiao Jr. tries to show that in both the 1936 paper, wherein Turing tries to show that computation or computability applies to mathematical functions and not to the workings of intelligence, and in the 1950 work, where Turing tries to show whether the problem of intelligence can be applicable to computing machines but not necessaily vice versa. Mabaquiao tries to debunk the supposition that these two seminal works, on the basis of the development of computer technology and the discipline of artifical intelligence and cognitive science, do not seem to support the view that Turing subscribes to computationalism theory.

In "Foucault: Rethinking the notions of state and government," Christian Bryan S. Bustamante tries to show that Foucault's philosophy of subjectivation, or the transformation of indivuals into subjects, is anchored on how the State makes use of its specific strategies and practices of power to transform individuals into subjects. Government, says Foucault, aims at achieving for each individual his or her suitable goal or interest, but not necessarily the common end.

Rizalino Noble Malabed argues in "Beyond state and revolution: The politics of contentious multiplicity" that both state and revolution must look into two practices of society, viz., "multiple" and "contentious." To evade, explain away, or assume the state is just as fatal as thinking of the revolution as anti-state because its aftermath is still the creation of another state. While the state can control multiplicity and sublimate contentiousness and the revolution can sublimate multiplicity and direct contentiousness, both try to address the danger of leaving multiplicity being in itself as independently contentious. In this sense, *contentious multiplicity* in itself is a practice of freedom.

Antonio P. Contreras tries to show in "Sexualized bodies of the Filipino: Pleasure and desire as everyday truth and knowledge" that ordinary Filipino narratives about the body exist not in the context of a settled template of silenced debates and repressed desires—thereby validating Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis of the body in late capitalism—but in the explosion of discourse and contestations regarding the intricate articulation between the Filipino ordinary desires and experiences of pleasure and desire, on the one hand, and the popular knowlege and truth, on the other hand.

The book review by Patrick Filter on Jonathan I. Israel's third volume, *Democratic enlightenment: Philosophy, revolution, and human rights 1750-1790,* discusses the new philosophy that Baruch Spinoza tried to circulate as his contribution to modern ideas. The first volume, *Radical enlightenment: Philosophy and the making of modernity 1650-1750,* talks of Spinoza's influence in the Netherlands and later in Europe. His substance monism, which is a deterministic materialism, advocated democratic government and the rejection of revelation. The second volume, *Enlightenment contested: Philosophy, modernity and the emancipation of man 1670-1752*, talks of the moderates (mostly religious deists), who advocated the new way of looking at the natural world to account for divine providence, and of the radicals who scorned of dualistic systems and denounced the works of such thinkers as Hobbes and Spinoza. The last volume—the subject of the review—discusses the pathways from revolutionary ideas to democratic revolutions.

The book note, *The predicament of belief: Science, philosophy, faith,* by Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp philosophically went down to the depth of the conflict between science and faith. Wilfried Vanhoutte tries to show that though hard-line scientists ignore faith in their search for explanations of the natural world, hard-line believers made adjustments by examining such things as miracles and the like.

These thought-provoking papers are here presented for each reader to read, evaluate, disagree, or even enjoy.

Rolando M. Gripaldo
Editor

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AFRICAN FEMINISM: SOME CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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Feminism has continued to advance and open new frontiers, maintaining a dominant status in the genre of issues in the political and academic arena over the last few decades. This growth in status has opened an array of perspectives from which the feminine condition can be more aptly appraised and improved. One such perspective is African feminism. In examining the idea of African feminism, this paper analyses the reasons advanced for its uniqueness. While it concedes that there are peculiar conditions in Africa which raise unique challenges for the feminine gender, it questions the basis for anchoring the idea of African feminism on them. The paper submits that if the peculiarity of experiences is the basis for demarcation, the heterogeneous nature of the continent renders such an idea a non-starter. It further tries to show that the challenges that differentiate the African female from her counterparts elsewhere are not gender-engendered, but are rather products of the totality of the peculiar African experience, especially in the postcolonial era.

INTRODUCTION

Theorizing feminism may appear, at first glance, an easy task to undertake, since it is familiar knowledge that the issues involved revolve around the liberation and empowerment of women. But a critical examination of trends and perspectives in feminist discourses reveals the multidimensional nature of the subject matter that carries differences in orientations. These differences, right at the core of the feminist challenge and the means of resolving them, make a basic difference in the theoretical approach inevitable.

One reason is the shifting epochs in the feminist struggle, partly owing to gains made in the past and the dynamics of a world rapidly changing as a result of advances in science and technology, new ways of doing politics, economic and environmental changes, and the effects of globalization. These rapid changes mean that feminine approaches need to be constantly reviewed in order to meet with contemporary realities. Still, it would seem that the changes that have come along with the epochal shifts have acquired a life of their own, thereby dividing further the lines of differences among feminist scholars.

In this paper, the concern is with African feminism. Over the last couple of years, some black and African scholars have argued for the need to look at the plight of the female folk

in Africa not through the Western lens that pretends to be universal, but from a uniquely African viewpoint in order to adequately mirror the reality of the African woman.

We will proceed by first looking at the nature of feminism as an intellectual and politico-historical movement. Then we shift to the nature of African feminism where we examine the views of some African thinkers on what makes African feminism unique. A summation of these views will follow, after which a critique will be attempted. The paper will call for integration and synergy in a way that recognizes peculiar situations, given the potential damage inherent in separatist intellectual approaches, especially when they are misplaced.

FEMINISM

Feminism refers to the right of women to have political, social, and economic equality with men. It is a discourse that involves various movements, theories, and philosophies (see Speedman 2003), which are concerned with the issue of gender difference, advocacy of equality for women, and campaign for women's rights and interests. The phrase "Women's Liberation" was first used in the United States in 1964, first appeared in print in 1966 (Kathie 1978, 6), and gradually gathered momentum as used in a wide range of orientations and ideologies.

Feminists have divided the movement's history into three "Waves." The first wave refers to a period of feminist activity during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the United Kingdom and the United States. Originally, it focused on the promotion of equal contract and property rights for women and the opposition to chattel marriages and ownership of married women and their children by their husbands. Second-wave feminism refers to a period beginning in the early 1960s and lasting through the late 1980s. It was a continuation of the earlier phase of feminism and was largely concerned with issues like ending women discrimination (Freedman 2003, 4) in various facets of life. Very popular in the second wave is the slogan, "The Personal is Political," coined by activist Carol Hamisch (Alice 1989, 416), a term that saw women's cultural and political inequalities as inextricably linked and that encouraged women to understand aspects of their personal lives as deeply politicized and reflective of sexist power structures. Third-wave feminism began in the early 1990s, due to perceived failures of the second wave and also as a response against initiatives created by the second wave. It seeks to avoid what it views as the second wave's essentialist definitions of femininity which they feel over-emphasize the experiences of upper middle-class white women.

There are various ideologies associated with the feminist movement. For instance, socialist feminism sees women oppression from the Marxist perspective of exploitation, oppression, and labour. They see women as being held down as a result of their unequal standing in both the workplace and the household. Woman oppression is seen as a part of a larger pattern that affects everyone involved in the capitalist system. The disappearance of class oppression is expected to terminate gender oppression (Barbara 1976, 67). This orientation has been criticized as trivializing gender discrimination by subsuming it under the category of class oppression (Connolly et al. 1986, 17).

Liberal feminism asserts the equality of men and women through political and legal reforms. It is an individualistic form of feminism, which focuses on women's ability to show and maintain their equality through their own actions and choices. Liberal feminism uses the personal interactions between men and women as the place from which to transform society. To them, important issues include reproductive and abortion rights, sexual

harassment, voting, education, equal pay for equal work, affordable children and healthcare, and the bringing to fore of sexual and domestic violence against women (Hooks, 1984).

Generally, those who canvass a separate approach to feminism, especially the African variant, fall under two categories. On the one hand are those who see "Western feminism as a calculated attempt to overlook or ignore the plight of black women as a result of their racist inclinations." On the other hand are those who feel that the failure of what is termed Western feminism to capture the challenges of the black woman stems largely from its inability, not unwillingness, to grasp the historical nature of such challenges and the implications there from. Since there exists a plethora of literatures categorizable under both headings, we shall limit ourselves to a few which in our opinion capture the kernel of this separatist project.

One of the scholars who belong to the first category is Bell Hooks. According to her (1998, 312), every womanist movement in America from its earliest origin to the present day has been built on a racist foundation. Though she acknowledged the role of women rights advocates in the abolition of slavery, she is of the opinion that the support was given on the ground of expediency. She (1998, 313) went on:

> When white reformers made synonymous the impact of sexism on their lives, they were not revealing an awareness of or sensitivity to the slave's lot, they were simply appropriating the horror of the slave experience to enhance their own cause.

To further buttress her point, she made a reference to the outrage expressed by white feminists when they were made to grant black men voting rights while leaving white women disenfranchised. To the white feminists, racial hierarchy should have been made the criterion for voting rights instead of sexual hierarchy. A white women rights advocate, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, seems to have driven the point home when she (see Hooks 1998, 313) protested:

> If Saxon men have legislated this for their own mothers, wives and daughters, what can we hope for in the hands of Chinese, Indians and Africans...I protest against the enfranchisement of another man of any race or clime until the daughters of Jefferson, Hammock and Adams are crowned with their rights.

Stanton's disgust stems from what she sees as the oddity of a black man being enfranchised ahead of a white woman. If a white woman in her estimation occupies a superior position in the social ladder to a black man by virtue of her skin, she cannot possibly see a black woman as her equal.

Hooks went further to cite other instances of white women's discrimination against their female counterparts in the areas of education, employment, etc. Although Hook did not reach a separatist conclusion in spite of her misgivings, Black feminists like Elizabeth Spelman (1995) are of the view that the reality of the black woman's burden, which comprises of dealing with sexism and racism, is not merely additive. In other words, the struggle for gender equality is not one to be merely added up with the challenges of racism which equally confronts the black woman (see Spelman 1995). Added together, the black woman's experience assumes a complex dimension which additive analysis does not adequately describe. To say, therefore, that black women suffer the same fate as those of white women on the one hand and black men on the other is to trivialize a fundamental difference.

> An additive analysis treats the oppression of a black woman in a sexist and racist society as if it were a further burden than her oppression in a sexist but non-racist. When, in fact it is a different burden..."the effect of multiple oppression is not merely arithmetic." (Hooks 1998, 356)

The problem with this type of argument in spite of the many truths it asserts is that in articulating the broad and diverse nature of the challenges of the black woman, it seeks a remedy to it under the narrow theme of feminism and narrower still, black feminism. In spite of efforts at integration, racial prejudice cannot be said to be a thing of the past in Western society, a situation which makes the argument of Hooks and Spelman relevant. In repudiating additive analysis however, this way of articulating black feminism pretends that the black woman experiences racism in a way that the black man does not, while suffering sexual prejudice in a manner the white woman does not, thus isolated in her struggle. To this end, the remedy to her situation lies in alienating herself in the process of liberation. This method can hardly be productive. The gender-neutral nature of racism makes it a general problem to which all blacks must continue to seek an end. It is surprising that Spelman did not see the logic in putting an end to a more general problem as an equal partner in the quest to abolish sexism. This in itself is not a denial of the fact that she bears a double burden. To isolate the black woman from every group that has one challenge on the other in common with her hardly does any credit to her cause. It is this realization that made Hooks (1998, 330) to conclude:

> If women want a feminist resolution...then we must assume responsibility for drawing women together in political solidarity. That means we must assume responsibility for all the forces that divide women. Racism is one such force .

Without first seeking an end to racism, bridging the gap between whites (of whatever sex) and blacks (male or female), such a struggle is likely to remain an exercise in futility. A pointer to this is that whereas a few gains have been made over the last few years as a result of efforts to integrate, latent forms of racism have ensured that there is still a gulf between black and white females in the same way it obtains with the male. Whereas feminism has gained marginally by having more women in offices, corporate and political, many black women are still on the lower rung of the ladder serving as nannies and home cleaners for more white females who have made it into offices. Spelman seems to be saying that though the black woman is united in plight with her white counterpart on gender issues, the latter remains a foe on racial grounds. And if gender discrimination is not restricted to white men alone, it follows that the black man, though united in his racial plight with the black woman, becomes a foe on gender grounds. This approach multiplies the struggle of the black woman while reducing her capacity to make allies. Efforts at bridging the sexual gap must, therefore, be preceded by closing the racial gap. It is worth saying also that, in fighting racism, the black woman does so on the basis of her race, not gender. It is not hers alone to fight. Racism, both in intent and effect, portends grave consequences not only to the black woman but also to the black man.

There are those who, as earlier alluded to, crave a different way of theorizing black feminism owing to what they consider the inability of Western feminist scholars to understand neither the differences in the historical and cultural meaning of concepts nor the large difference in experiences.

More particularly, two positions reflective of this line of thought present interesting arguments deserving attention. The first is that of Nkiru Nzegwu (2004). Her thesis is that the metaphysical conceptions of gender affect theoretical analysis and erode the cultural specificity and historicity of societies. Using the Igbo society as an instance, she decried the attempt to universalize certain characteristics of the female gender in a manner that ignores differences in conceptual categories. Her work, basically a critique of Martha Nussbaum's (1995) thesis of emotional universality of the female gender, proceeded with two basic arguments meant to show how the Igbos construe femininity, as distinct from the purported attempt to subsume non-Western conceptions under the Western, and the subsequent reference to such as universally true of the female gender.

The first argument rejects the definition of women as the negative image of men. Patriarchy according to her is propelled by a masculine ideology which sees the woman as inferior irrespective of status or social class. Under the cultural logic of the Onitsha (Igbo) society, however, *nwanyi*, the singular of *umunwanyi*, meaning "offsprings who are female," do not accommodate the idea of patriarchy. The reason for this, according to her, is that gender identity in its flexibility is tied to social roles irrespective of sex. Igbo females, therefore, owing to their multiple social roles do not have a single gender identity. This blurring of the sexual divide does not mean that gender cannot be physiologically differentiated. To this end, a female in Western thought can be equated with an *agbala* in Igbo thought. The idea of an *agbala* unlike that of the woman in Western feminist thought, however, tends to be devoid of rigidly defined social roles.

The lineage system is another means through which the flexibility of identity is demonstrated. *Umuada* (lineage daughters) are different from *okpala* (lineage sons) and *inyemedi* (lineage wives). The *umuada*, however, differs from the *inyemedi*. While the former, by privilege of lineage is seen as a husband, the latter is viewed as a wife. As daughters of a lineage, the *umuada* is expected to perform duties appertaining to that of a husband in her relation with the *Inyemedi* who are equally expected to play the role of wives. On this basis, the *okpala* have as much rights over the *inyemedi* as do the *umuada*, thereby creating no room for any form of discrimination. The *inyemedi* are submissive to them equally. Interestingly, a member of the *umuada* in one lineage could become an *inyemedi* elsewhere by getting married into another lineage. This then confers a dual role on her, for as she earns respect from the *inyemedi* in her own clan, she shows the same both to the *okpala* and *umuada* of the lineage into which she is married. She is, thus, construed socially as both a husband and a wife owing to her shifting identities.

Nkiru's argument regarding the status of the *nwanyi* and the *agbala* did not tell us much, for unlike the second argument, she fails to concretely back up her definitions of those terms with cultural practices capable of validating them. We shall, therefore, not dissipate much effort on it. On the second argument, it is worthy of note that Nkiru acknowledges that wives (*umuada*, that is) are expected to be subordinate. Thus, while the *okpala* enjoys a dominant social status that is rigid, an *umuada* is launched into a role which oscillates between domination and subordination. This picture no doubt highlights the difference in the conception of marriage between the West and an African society. Yet, it leaves a few holes unplugged. The idea that the female switch identities, unlike the male, cannot but have an assumption (or a series of them) underlying it if we are to avoid the conclusion that the practice is irrational and devoid of any logical basis. Nkiru comfortably ignored the need to highlight these assumptions. Still, the task of hazarding a guess becomes

very simple in this matter. The Igbos consider wives to be inferior to their husbands, and the reverence demanded of the wife is such that it must extend to every member of the husband's lineage irrespective of gender. The only way a woman can avoid the subordinate role, it would seem, is to eschew marriage altogether.

Further still, the idea that the female must be the subordinate in a marriage can only rest on prior assumptions which are suggestive of the fact that the male is superior to the female. Marriage then becomes one out of many possible means through which male dominance is accepted by such a society. That a female cannot feel dominant or equal until the masculinization of her gender as husband in her lineage should have been enough to show Nkiru that whereas patriarchy may take many forms, it exists structurally within the logic of Igbo society, if her account of it is correct. The main attempt of Nkiru in this work is to establish first and foremost the fact of differences in conceptual frameworks across cultures. Secondly, but more importantly, is the attempt to eliminate altogether the idea of female subordination in Igbo culture, strengthening therefore the clamour for autonomous African feminism. That she succeeded in the first task, if her description of the practices of the Igbos is right, is beyond doubt. The same cannot be said, however, regarding the second.

Ademola Fayemi (2009) traveled a path slightly distinct from that of Nkiru, though they arrived eventually at the same terminal. What constitutes the need for African feminism in his own thought is characterized by contemporary existential challenges of the African woman from which her Western counterpart is insulated. This approach differs from Nkiru's demarcation hinged on the tradition of the Igbo society.

Fayemi (2009, 205) argued the idea of African ethico-feminism which, he says, "identifies with the broad goal of African feminism as construed by earlier scholars—to construct models and paradigm of actions of a realistic world where African women would be viewed and treated first and foremost as humans rather than sexual beings. Yet, his own feminism seeks a distinction not only from "Western" feminism which "fosters dichotomy, individualism and competition between the two sexes," but also from brands of African feminism which "emphasizes the uniqueness of African women in terms of racial and class prejudices." This hybrid ideology is said to be rooted in the notion of African ethics characterized by communalism and theistic deontology.

One way in which Fayemi thinks this idea can be useful is in the area of prostitution and female trafficking in Africa. No doubt, being concerned about such a worrying phenomenon comes auspiciously if one considers the negative impacts of the ugly trend. Driven by the debilitating level of poverty and want all over the continent, Africans, male and female, have become enamoured with the idea of fleeing abroad in search of the proverbial Golden Fleece. And while members of both sexes are exposed to no little dangers by this adventure, the female folk suffers more not only as a result of the tortuous route to the intended destination but also owing to the dehumanizing manner in which they are made to earn their living. Many of them are made to work as prostitutes not on their own terms but those of the traffickers'. In the quest to make maximum return before a trafficked female gets deported or infected by a sexually related ailment, the trafficker subjects her to highly debasing sex sessions, sometimes with more men she can cope with ordinarily, or even in worse cases, with animals. Fayemi's concern can on this ground be said to be timely.

For him, it would seem that the issue is African, on the one hand, owing to the rate at which trafficking occurs, and feminist, on the other, due to the peculiarly debasing experience partly described above. One may add to the first the realizations that females in other parts

of the world do not get trafficked as their African counterparts are known to be. The question however is, does this provide a basis for African feminism?

At the risk of sounding repetitive, trafficking is a serious problem in Africa today. Besides the creation of a negative image for the continent, it is a source of serious concern bordering on issues like security, health, rehabilitation, etc. Still, one is left wondering whether in addressing the issue, female trafficking can be singled out of the general problem of human trafficking. While one may wish to restate the peculiar challenges faced by females being trafficked, nothing suggests that they suffer degradation as a result of sexual discrimination. Even if the number of females being annually trafficked is discriminately higher than of males, it will say nothing about gender than the high number of males taken during the slave trade. During that period, the requirements of Western plantations justified the logic of trafficking more men, able-bodied, than women. In this age of industrial and technological advancement, where leisure, tourism, and pleasure have become a vibrant industry on its own, explanation of female trafficking must be properly situated where it belongs—in the economic factor. Poverty is what makes it logical for traffickers to focus on Africa and not Europe for females to traffic. A shift in the economic mode of production equally explains the shift from the male to the female. Female trafficking is, therefore, not sensitive to gender unless it translates to economic gain. It is possible to imagine a time when African men would be in high demand not as plantation workers but as providers of sexual pleasure to independent, pleasure loving Western women who are not desirous of living with the budging demand of marriage. If such happens, it is most likely that human traffickers, motivated primarily by pecuniary gains, would be in search for more men across Africa. In any case, so many children are still being trafficked out of Africa for domestic servitude in the West. This is why Fayemi's concern, though well placed, falls outside the exclusive realm of feminist discourse.

It can also be said that trafficking goes beyond the African continent. After all, trafficking across the Mexican-American border has been an issue at the front-burner for both countries. Mexicans are surely not Africans, though they share the same plight. Like in Africa though, human trafficking in Mexico is not defined by gender. Still, one may concede that irrespective of the factors motivating the traffic in women, feminists have a right of concern. What cannot be asserted further with much vigour though, is that only African feminists understand either the factors or suffering associated with trafficking in persons, women especially.

Fayemi needed also to have explained how a hybrid theory of this nature intends to combine deontology with pragmatism. Deontological theories are by nature absolute, while pragmatism is rather episodic. The difficulty of explanation seems to have informed the abandonment of further clarification. His (2009, 206) theory takes a pragmatic bend to the extent that it seeks to address feminist issues "that are of special concern to the African experience." The notion of a theistic deontology is also unclear. Suppose it is granted that there exist a sense in which moral absolutism can be established by appealing to its religious source, such that religion in this sense becomes synonymous with morality as a way of avoiding the trappings of external justification, one would still be left wondering whether the plurality of religions and gods in African thoughts permit such generalizations.

PROSPECTS OF AFRICAN FEMINISM

Given the fact that many African feminist theories seeking autonomy from what is considered as Western definition and domination have failed so far to clearly articulate

reasons for such a division, can one then safely say that the call for African feminism is unjustified? Not quite. The pattern of intellectual evolution and development forbids one from making such a declarative foreclosure. It is enough to say for now that present attempts have not provided sufficient grounds for its emergence.

Beyond all that has earlier been said, African feminism in many cases is riddled with an internal illogicality. A movement which seeks to deny the universality of female experiences seeks constantly to do so by claiming the same for all African females when historical and cultural facts suggest otherwise. In the words of Kwame Appiah (1992, ix), "for all sorts and conditions of men and women...at each level, Africa is various." To purge itself of the universality charge, therefore, African feminism may have to severe itself not only from the Western, but may also need to break itself into pieces and fragments in order to be fairly representative of the plurality of cultures and societies within Africa itself. This fragmentation could alternatively take an intellectual turn, such that categorization is not according to peculiar cultural experiences but thematic orientation. An instance of efforts in this direction is the work of Susan Arndt (2002). Having embarked on an overview of different African feminist theories—such as Molara Ogundipe-Leslie's *stiwanism*, Catherine Acholonu's *motherism*, Obioma Nnaemeka's *negrofeminism*, and Mary Kolawole's and Chikwenye Ogunyemi's versions of *womanism*—Arndt tried to highlight not only the differences and similarities between these theories shared with Western feminist concepts, but also with African-American feminism.

Noting that African feminism concerns itself with issues beyond the grasp of Western feminism and African-American feminism, Arndt (2002, 85) divided it into three different categories which are reformist, transformative, and radical. *Reformist* feminist texts criticize individual traditional and modern conventions that discriminate against women. They present alternatives that improve women's situations, convinced that change can be effected within existing structures. *Transformative* feminist texts offer a scathing critique of patriarchy. Men's behavior is portrayed as a group phenomenon. Women's role, consciously or otherwise in the perpetuation of gender discrimination, is also highlighted. Both men's and women's reproduction of discriminatory structures is seen as surmountable. *Radical* feminism on its part argues that men (as a social group) inevitably and in principle discriminate against, oppress, and mistreat women. One notable distinguishing factor of the radical variant from the reformist and transformative theory is its pessimism about the possibility of change. Arndt's classification eschews the path of cultural peculiarity followed by Nzegwu by seeking to align under the same thematic class, theories of varying cultural origin that are similar in method or focus.

One should not find it tempting to argue that the acknowledgement of differences even within Africa is enough ground to revalidate the argument of differences on the basis that such differences are likely to be more pronounced when we compare African societies with Western societies. The essence of this paper is not to deny particularity. Neither does it seek to glorify or denounce universality. Rather, it seeks to emphasize that in the absence of sufficiently justifiable grounds for polarization, issues of common interest which in themselves merely reflect the universal aspects of our humanism (whether as Africans or Westerners) require the concerted efforts of all. When such challenges are collectively tackled and subdued, not only will we all benefit from accruable gains, the process of such cooperation would have aided better understanding and appreciation of challenging particularities, making them easier to be tackled. The attempt by all means to separate as it were, the feminist struggle in Africa from the global, without enough warrants, portend a

series of dangers, chief among which is the blurring of the points of convergence among societies which are in many cases more important than the often misplaced and misconceived variances. A possible counter-argument could, of course, be that what constitutes a challenge in African societies differ from the Western understanding of the term, especially for specific cases. What the proponents need to show, however, is that such differences are fundamental, to such an extent that they leave no room for the recognition of mutual challenges or shared aspirations.

Dealing with issues that are, or ought to be, of global concern to feminists comprehensively is outside the scope of this paper. Tentatively though, one can refer to one or two that should be of interest to all feminists across the world. One is the issue of sexual assault. In Nigeria, for instance, there is an increasing level of rape cases reported in the media. In many of these cases, it is more appalling that the victims are minors and in some cases infants! Reasons adduced range from mental problems to superstitious belief that such a practice endows the culprit with either wealth or power. For other reasons, rape cases in India have been attracting global attention in the wake of the outrage now trailing them. Feminists across cultures can collaborate in an effort not only to identify the factors motivating these crimes but also in drawing more attention to them even as efforts are made to find solutions. In some societies where rape is common, it is not unusual to hear arguments extenuating the act or blaming the victim outright. This suggests certain cultural attitudes and practices that are not tenable in a decent and civilized society. Enlightened members of such societies, feminists in particular, may play a vital role in bringing about the desired attitudinal change, especially when prosecution and punishment seem to get entangled in technicalities that make conviction difficult. When victims cannot get justice, it encourages those who indulge in the practice, while future victims are discouraged to report abuse. In this vein, it may be more helpful to look for preventive measures as opposed to merely seeking punishment.

One may also consider the plight of women either as captives or refugees in conflict areas. At first glance, the tempting question may be why feminists should get especially interested when men and children are also often refugees when conflicts break out. The question, it must be said, is not illegitimate. After all, we have said something similar about human trafficking. The difference here, which we consider crucial, is that we envisage an engagement that is not ensconced in the particularity of Fayemi's argument. Cases of abuse in conflict areas like Sudan and Syria have shown that war crimes are not peculiar to any race or culture. In both cases mentioned, the plight of women fleeing for survival has been horrific to say the least. While some are reportedly raped serially, others are forced to labour in service of those who have control over their territories. Abuses are numerous and inexhaustive, but it is equally possible to focus on how women and children in war zones can be protected, not as Africans or Middle-Easterners but as a vulnerable class of people under a conflict situation. Getting justice for women who are victims of crime conflicts and, more importantly, putting in place protective measures that take into account their vulnerability are areas worthy of exploring.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to examine the issue of African feminism and the challenges it faces as a prospect. In acknowledging the illuminating efforts of scholars sympathetic to

this trend, it has highlighted those issues considered to vitiate rather than strengthen their position. The submission is that African feminism may not be impossible in the sense presently envisaged, though it may equally not be necessary. For the present, the paper advocates a focus of efforts on those issues of universal feminist importance. The African feminist would achieve more by insisting on a universal characterization in place of a super-imposed Western definition instead of withdrawing into the shell of culture and categories of definition that hardly help her cause. Such engagement recognizes, and insist on the recognition of, the multi-dimensional nature of the feminist challenge in a manner that harnesses all available resources for the emancipation of the female gender from all inhibitions—whether natural or man-made, global or local.

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THEMES IN BRAND BLANSHARD'S COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

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In this paper I examine five essential themes in Brand Blanshard's coherence theory of truth. Blanshard defines truth in terms of the rational or the interdependence of concepts, where concepts determine objects of experience rather than merely conform to them. On this view, truth is contextual and is the approximation of thought to reality or the systemization of the two ends—the immanent and transcendent. I raised some worries for this account of truth, foremost of which is the worry that it commits us to a deep-seated skepticism, both theoretical and practical. In order to be able to tell when the immanent end is achieved and if it is making progress towards the transcendent end (i.e., when the ultimate systematization is realized), we require an omniscient standpoint of cosmic order or overarching system of beliefs. While this seems possible in principle it is not so in practice.

INTRODUCTION

The coherence theory of truth is an account of how we arrive at truth claims. It holds that the truth of any true statement is defined by its coherence with some specified set or system of propositions.[1] One problem that confronts this account of truth is the "Ontological Problem." The problem states that there is no reason to suppose that a coherent system of propositions is either a true set of proposition, or that the propositions in the specified system are even about the world. In his work on thought and reality, *The nature of thought*, Brand Blanshard (1939) provides one of the most crisp and comprehensive account of absolute idealism (see Lynch 2001, 99) or "rational idealism."[2] In this work, Blanshard proposes a version of the coherence theory of truth[3] as a response to this problem.

Blanshard's solution to this problem is to argue that thought (mind or idea) has two ends—immanent and transcendent—and that the two are essentially the same. That is, he defines both justification and truth in terms of coherency, or a coherent set of belief system, such that as one maximizes the coherence of one's belief system one maximizes truth. Jennifer Faust (1998, 923-47) has argued that Blanshard's response fails to resolve the problem because he fails to show that (a) "there is such a thing as the 'limit' coherent set which constitutes reality, and that (b) as we revise a belief set in favor of coherence, we get closer and closer to approximation to reality, and thus increase the truth content of that set."

My aim in this paper is quite modest. I shall be raising some worries for Blanshard's coherence theory of truth. My motivation is to show what the larger implications are of accepting and defending Blanshard's version of coherentism, implications that may have a bearing on the "Ontological Problem" and Blanshard's solution to it.

This is how I will proceed. In the first five parts, I shall discuss five essential themes in Blanshard's account of truth: mutual entailment, immanence-transcendence, degrees of truth, quantitative truth, and contextualism. Following each theme, I will raise and examine some worries for Blanshard's theory in general and each theme in particular. In the last part, I shall briefly examine how and why I think that Blanshard's view leads both to theoretical and practical skepticism. My thesis is that Blanshard's theory prevents us from laying substantive claims to *true* beliefs (propositions or knowledge). Blanshard (1939, II, 264) takes truth to be contextual and "the approximation of thought to reality, where thought is essentially purposive, i.e. "on its way home." But we lack a vantage point ("God's eye view" or an omniscient standpoint of cosmic order) that is necessary to determine the completeness or systematization of our beliefs. Because we lack this standpoint we are not in a position to evaluate the genuineness or truth condition of our beliefs. Owing to our lack of this standpoint we are not able to lay any substantive claim to true beliefs.

THEME OF MUTUAL ENTAILMENT

Blanshard takes a fully coherent system to go beyond mere consistency, mutual explanatoriness, and completeness. He takes coherence to be mutual entailment: a notion of entailment that is somewhat symmetrical. For Blanshard, a fully coherent system of knowledge would be one where no proposition is arbitrary. That is, "every proposition would be entailed by the others jointly and even singly" in such a way that "no proposition would stand outside the system." The integration Blanshard (1939, II, 265-66) says, "Would be so complete that no part could be seen for what it was without seeing its relation to the whole, and the whole itself could be understood only through the contribution of every part."

By mutual entailment, Blanshard seems to mean that **A** entails **B** if and only if given **A**, **B** must be true, and vice versa. Since the notion of mutual entailment that Blanshard appeals to is symmetrical, it means that any inference within the system or parts of the system would be somewhat reflexive. In other words, **A** can be inferred from **B** the same way **B** can be inferred from **A**. On this view, a coherent system would be one where there is holistic support for all the parts, as well as a complete integration of the system, such that each part of the system is not only entailed by the other parts of the system but each part can be inferred from either the whole system or any other part of the system.

Some worries for mutual entailment: redundancy-circularity and conservatism

To say that **A** entails **B** if and only if given **A**, **B** *must* be true, and vice versa is to make some members of the belief system redundant. For example, that **A** entails **B** means that **B** is a redundant member of the belief set since **B** already is explained by **A** (by it being entailed by **A**). Furthermore, to say that **A** entails **B** if and only if given **A**, **B** must be true is to be involved in circularity. Let us consider as an example the truth preserving nature of **A** and **B**. For **A** to be true **B** has to be true, and for **B** to be true **A** has to be true. This is

because **A** only coheres with **B** because **B** entails **A**, while **B** coheres with **A** because **A** entails **B**.

Blanshard might respond to the charge of circularity in a number of ways. He could deny outrightly that **A** and **B** are truth preserving. Or he can accept their truth preserving nature but deny that this leads to circularity. Clearly both approaches effectively explain away the problematic, but then they create some further worries.

The first approach dissipates the problem of circularity. But it seems to do so at the price of stripping coherency or any coherent system of its truth-value. And one may wonder if it is a price that Blanshard is willing to pay since he needs to maintain the truth-value of the coherent system in order to argue that the more truth-value one's belief set has is the more coherent it is and the more thought incorporates reality within itself.

Like the first approach, the second approach dodges the problem of circularity. Given that coherence takes truth to be the coherence of members of a system (A and B taken together) rather than the truth of A and B considered in isolation Blanshard can reasonably argue that it is illegitimate to infer the truth of a part of the system by reference to another part. We can define the truth of a system in virtue of the *coherence* of its parts but not in terms of its individual parts. But this approach fares no better for it introduces another difficulty: the problem of the first "datum' or "fact" of entailment. Let us assume that in a system of beliefs, we have five items of belief A-E. In the coherence account, the truth of each belief is guaranteed by its cohering with the other four beliefs or it being entailed by them. The problem then is how to account for the first belief that make up the belief system A-E. In Blanshard's account, since we cannot spell out the truth of any belief independently of the system we can neither tell which is the first belief in the system nor specify the truth-value of any *a priori* or independent of belief system A-E.

Blanshard addresses the difficulty by grounding the first "datum" of entailment on F. H. Bradley's "unconditional perceptual judgments." In "Reply to Nicholas Rescher," Blanshard (1980, 597) notes: "We have no hesitation in attaching some presumption of truth to the perceptual judgments of ordinary life.... One has to start somewhere...." I think he is mistaken to anchor the first "datum" on Bradley's unconditional perceptual judgments.[4] His appeal to competing truth-candidates or *prima facie* true propositions as the first "datum" of entailment contradicts his claim that coherence is both the nature and test of truth (see Blanshard 1939, II, 272-79 and 1980, 594-98). To ground the first "datum" of entailment on *prima facie* true propositions is to begin with some family of propositions or perceptual judgments, truth-values that are not given by coherence. In which case, Blanshard has to abandon coherence as the nature of truth, and take it only as the test of truth, as a selection procedure to screen off among competing truth-candidates those to be accepted into our overall scheme and belief system.

Another worry for entailment is the charge of conservatism, a charge that Blanshard (1939, II, 279-86) tries to meet in his book. The charge states as follows: We are to accept whatever agrees with the body of received belief, and reject whatever disagrees. But the great advances in human knowledge have been precisely those in which the yoke of conservatism was rejected; the mind broke loose from orthodoxy, set up claims that ran counter to it, and, in spite of opposition or derision, made them good. Scientific progress, like political evolution, has sometimes come through revolutions. But how can progress other than the most trivial sort occur if it is determined *a priori* that nothing can be true which does not accord with what is already established.

Blanshard's (1939, II, 284-86) response to this objection is to claim that it confuses the nature and kinds of beliefs, and how people come to hold them. According to Blanshard, there are two types of beliefs: first-order beliefs by which he means "beliefs about any objects of direct experience such as tables and chairs," and second-order beliefs or meta-beliefs, which are beliefs about the first-order beliefs. So my belief that snow is white is a first order belief, while my belief about the belief that snow is white is a meta-belief. In any belief system beliefs include both first- and second-order beliefs, and the existence of both sets of beliefs, Blanshard claims, makes the reversibility of first-order beliefs possible. This, he argues, explains why the second-order beliefs are accommodated in the belief system when they conflict with the first-order beliefs. So, when the second-order beliefs conflict with the first-order beliefs we have reasons to accept the former if they (1) call into question the latter (or require the revision of some or most of our first-order beliefs) , and (2) the second-order beliefs are important beliefs made with care and accuracy.

Although the reply is intuitively forceful it is not clear particularly why we should accept the meta-beliefs given that they do not cohere with our present system of beliefs or first-order beliefs, which presumably where made with care and accuracy. What Blanshard's reply seems to suggest is that we constantly evaluate first-order beliefs by meta-beliefs. But in the account of coherence, there does not seem to be any *good* reason why this questioning should lead to the jettisoning of existing first-order beliefs and acceptance of second-order beliefs. If my first-order beliefs about water includes the following: that it is H_20, falls from the sky, boils, vaporizes, and freezes at certain temperature, is drinkable, has a certain odor, there is no reason on Blanshard's account of coherence why we should consider the meta-belief that water is, say, not drinkable but poisonous. Blanshard could argue, however, that the reason for the acceptance of the meta-belief ("water is poisonous") is because it coheres better with first-order beliefs. But this is not convincing. The fact of coherence of this new belief would be after the fact, which still leaves us with the puzzle of why we are not stopping short of the first-order beliefs.[5]

THEME OF IMMANENCE-TRANSCENDENCE

Blanshard (1939, II, 262) follows Hegel in taking thought to have two ends: the immanent and the transcendent. In its immanent nature, thought "seeks fulfillment in a special kind of satisfaction of systematic vision," and it is transcendent when it "seeks fulfillment in its object." Like Hegel, Blanshard argues that truth and thinking are ultimately one. And given that both ends are essentially one, the real is, in the end ultimately rational.[6] On the view of the relation of thought to object, "the immanent end is achieved" as long as progress is made "toward the transcendent end."

One way to think of this relation of thought and object, according to Blanshard (1939, I, 494), is to think of the relation between potential to actual or thought as a kind of "a half-way house on the road to reality." Conceiving of the relation this way, Blanshard suggests, solves the paradox of knowledge (the "Ontological Problem") that was raised in *Meno*: "*If thought can be sense as a stage on the way to its transcendent end or object, as that end itself in the course of becoming actual, the paradox of knowledge is in principle solved.*" What does Blanshard mean by the idea that the transcendent end is achieved when thought becomes one with its object? One view [and which is defended by Thomas E. Hill (1961), A. C. Ewing (1944, 75-85), and Theodore M. Greene (1940, 686-95)]

is that he means numerical identity of thought and object. That is, the goal of thought is to become numerically one or completely identical with its object. On this view, the more and more thought becomes specific or identical with its object ontologically the more it becomes concrete and material.

Richard Creel (1971, 361-70) has argued that this view is mistaken and that Blanshard does not mean numerical identity but conceptual identity. Creel seems right if we pay particular attention to the example of the sapling and the oak that Blanshard uses to illustrate the relation between potentiality to actuality. The sapling and the oak are the same tree in one sense and yet in another sense are not the same. The claim is that for Blanshard (1939, I, 494) thought becomes one with its object in the sense that it is *both* the same as its object *and* different. That is, thought is "the same because it *is* the object *in posse*" and it is "different because that object, which is its end, is as yet incompletely realized."

Two worries for immanence-transcendence

The first worry is that we have no way of knowing whether the transcendent is coherent like thought. On the immanence-transcendence account, thought is purposive in the sense that the immanent is making progress towards the transcendent. But in order for us to conceive of this possibility the transcendent must be coherent like the immanent. But how can we know this? To illustrate this worry let us consider the logical law of excluded middle, "either **A** or not **A**," or "either **A** is true or **A** is not true" ("Either Iran has nuclear weapons or Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons"). Blanshard's argument is that in thought we cannot think or believe both propositions to be true given that they are both contradictory. To flesh out the details of this argument, Blanshard considers four possible ways in which logical laws can correspond to the actual world:[7]

1. Logical laws are descriptive of our thought process, i.e., as laws of thought.
2. Logical laws are normative.
3. Logical laws are linguistic shorthand.
4. Logical laws correspond to the actual world.

Clearly, given the immanent-transcendent condition of the coherence theory, Blanshard thinks it is reasonable to accept option 4 and reject options 1-3. Blanshard rejects both 1 and 2 on the ground of inadequacy and contradiction. He throws out 3 because, he thinks, it conflicts with commonsense (see footnote for reasons for rejection of options 1-3).[8] What is the ground for the acceptance of the fourth option? One answer is that the rejection of 1-3 provides us ground for thinking 4 is correct. But then in what sense do logical laws tell "us something about the actual structure of things"? Simply this: whenever it is that we apprehend logical laws "we know something about the nature of things" (see Blandshard 1962, x, 5-6). And given that logical laws have implications for reality we have reason to think that the immanent is progressing towards the transcendent. It is not clear though if the fourth option fares any better than the other three. For one, the human mind can extend far beyond the real and actual. I am thinking of specific cases where the human mind conjures entities (like unicorns and dragons that do not exist in reality). It does not seem that in these cases thought or its contents are complementary of nature.

Blanshard (1980, 591-92) seems to recognize the force of this line of thinking in his reply to the objections raised by Nicholas Rescher. In his reply, Blanshard claims that the view that nature is as coherent as our thought is a natural postulate which we ought to accept in order to make sense of our multi-faceted experiences and desire of striving to understand the world. If it is a postulate it means it cannot be demonstrated. Since it is not a proof its necessity has to be practical and contingent. If it is practical, for all we know, it may be an illusion to say that thought imitates nature and that the immanent is making progress towards the transcendent.

Now to a related worry. I will only introduce it here since I say more about it in part six. The worry is that even if we grant the argument that nature is coherent we can never tell when the immanent meets with the transcendent since we do not have a "God's eye view" of coherent nature.

THEME OF DEGREES OF TRUTH

The theme of degrees of truth for which the diagram below represents emerges naturally from the view that truth is thought on its way home, or the approximation of thought to reality or, as Blanshard (1980, 591-92) says, the measure of the "distance thought has traveled, under guidance of its ultimate object with its ultimate end." Blanshard holds that in any experience as a whole and at any particular time, the degree of truth is "the degree of system [truth] has achieved." And the evaluation of the "degree of truth of a particular proposition" is a twofold step. First, it is judged by its coherence with experience as a whole, and ultimately by "its coherence with that further whole, all-comprehensive" system. Thought comes home to rest when there is coherence on both fronts.



In the diagram we have two extremes, perfect truth and perfect falsity. Between these extremes is the open region or what Blanshard (1939, II, 304) calls "untouched limits of perfect truth and perfect falsity." Within the middle region we have different degrees of truth as thought moves to and fro. The movement of thought within this region, fluctuating in "acuteness and steep" is truth in varying degrees. A judgment is true in the degree to which it oscillates between the untouched limits, particularly as its "content could [be maintained] in the light of a completed system of knowledge." It is "false in the *degree* to which its appearance there would require its transformation."

One worry for degrees of truth

One obvious worry is this: this view requires us to either abandon traditional logic or to revise it. It means, for example, that the law of bivalence (either A is true or A is false) or the

law of excluded middle (either A is true or A is not true) do not hold. Blanshard (1939, II, 329) himself makes this point, "Thus we not only admit but maintain that the law of excluded middle cannot be accepted without reservation." Consider an example of the law of excluded middle: Iran has nuclear weapons or Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons. On the account of the degrees of truth both the affirmation and the negation are *true*, for they both fall within the "untouched limits." Furthermore, the rejection of the laws of logic seems to be contrary to Blanshard's argument that coherent nature is suggested to us by coherent thought or logical laws, which the latter mimics.

THEME OF QUANTITATIVE TRUTH

In his analysis on the degrees of truth Blanshard distinguishes between two senses of degree. The first is the "mosaic sense." Truth in this sense means that in every judgment there exists more than one component, a kind of assortment of judgment or things asserted. And when one denies a judgment as true or false what one does is to reject one or some of the components of the judgment. Let us consider the judgment "That is Colonel Bailey yonder," one that Blanshard (1939, II, 305) himself discusses. The judgment involves several components: he is a person (not a dummy), he is Bailey (not someone else), a Colonel (not a Major), a military man, an American officer. Now in denying the judgment, "That is Colonel Bailey yonder" all, some or one of these components may be the object of the denial, i.e. he is not a person, but a military tailor's dummy, not a Colonel but a Captain, not a military man but a member of the band, etc. Now, according to Blanshard, if the denial involves one or some of the components, say that rather than the man yonder being Colonel Bailey he is Colonel Carter it would be inaccurate to say that the judgment is totally false. In Blanshard's view, the different components of the judgment about Colonel Bailey are not strictly linked. Hence, some of them may be false without obviously involving the rest. He (1939, II, 305-306) writes:

> [The] judgment is only partially false, since falsity attaches to one only of the five components, while the others are true. Similarly we can say of any other judgment that the more of its components are true, the *more true* it is, and the more of its components are false the *more false* it is.

The second sense of the degree of truth is the "approximative sense." Degree of truth in this sense is a limit that can be approached with a varying degree of nearness, and in some cases attained. Blanshard illustrates the approximative degree of truth with the example of a middle-western runner who sets an indoor record of four minutes, four seconds and four-tenths seconds. Supposing three people are disputing what the record is.

> First Person: The record is 4:4:0.
> Second Person: No one can run a mile under seven minutes.
> Third Person: The record is 4:4:4.

According to Blanshard (1939, II, 306, 310), although both the first and the second are wrong, since the second person made a mistake of nearly three minutes and the first less than a second, the second person "was *more wrong*." The degree of truth that Blanshard

appeals to is different from both senses. His account straddles between the mosaic and approximative and he calls it "quantitative truth," by which he means "not simply nearer the truth but also containing more truth." On this account, truth is like a relation of seed to flower, or between a sapling and an oak.

One worry for quantitative truth

It seems contrary to commonsense to say that if the first person was more wrong than the second person her judgment that "No one can run a mile under seven minutes" is not false. The puzzle with this reasoning is that no matter how wrong anyone's beliefs or judgments are they can never be false. If I were to say that Caesar Augustus died 1 January 1515 BC rather than 17 August 14 CE (which is the date he actually died), given that the judgment contains some truth (A Caesar or emperor, a Roman emperor, an emperor called Augustus and not Marcus Aurelius, his death) it is not false but only that it is more wrong or contains less truth compared to the other judgment (Caesar Augustus died 1 January 14 CE).

Or take the example that Ewing uses and which Blanshard (1939, II, 325-28) discusses. Suppose I say "I am in Australia now" whereas in fact I am in Canada. Blanshard denies that this judgment is entirely false since it is not really different from the judgment we make about $2+2=4$. According to him, both judgments involve "partial understanding of the terms of the relations," yet we affirm the truth of the latter while at the same time acknowledging that we can partly be wrong. Insofar as we do this with arithmetical judgments, we have no reason, Blanshard claims, not to assert the truth of the former while acknowledging at the same time that the judgment is not exhaustive.

It is difficult to see why the former judgment is not false, or why indeed it qualifies as partial truth, given that what it asserts is a relation between an individual and a country, and not just that there is the individual, a country, and perhaps the intention to go to Australia. Let us illustrate this with a different example. Suppose two women are disputing who the Prime Minister of Canada between 2003 and 2006 was. In a game of three rounds to decide which of them is right they are asked to write down a description of the Prime Minister.

Round 1: *Write down the initials of the Prime Minister of Canada between 2003 and 2006.*
First woman: The Prime Minister's initials are P.M.
Second woman: The Prime Minister's initials are P.M.
Round 2: *From the initials write down the Prime Minister's full names.*
First woman: The Prime Minister's full names are Paul Martin.
Second woman: The Prime Minister's full names are Patricia Mendelssohn.
Round 3: *Write down the sex and race of the Prime Minister.*
First woman: The Prime Minister is male and Caucasian.
Second woman: The Prime Minister is female and Jewish.

Given that the name of the Prime Minister of Canada between 2003 and 2006 is Paul Martin both women are "right" to say his initials are P.M. (first round). But we would want to say that in the second and third rounds whereas the first woman is right the second woman is not. What is the truth-value of the judgment of both women? Given the account of Blanshard,

the first woman's judgment contains more truth, so more right but the second woman's judgment contains less truth so more wrong, but her judgment is not false only that it is more wrong, since it contains components that are true (e.g., P.M. as the initials of the Prime Minister, what is being described is a person, the person is a Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister is that of Canada not Britain). This seems false. For it means that presumably all judgments are true in some sense no matter what they assert.

THEME OF CONTEXTUALISM

Blanshard (1939, II, 313) takes the truth involved in judgments as always contextual. He says, "what is asserted takes its very nature from the system, [and] to discuss its truth in abstraction from the system is idle." To claim, for example, that the concept of a stomach is a body organ responsible for digestion in a living organism is to define it relative to the bodily system. Thus it is meaningless and vacuous to define it strictly within its own limits and without reference to other parts of the body. Or to use a different example. To say that a lion is a predator makes sense within the twin context of phenotypic and ecological properties. The phenotypic properties such as possessing sharp claws, being fast, etc. specify an internal context, while the lion's ecological niche, i.e. being in a certain environment, (predator-prey environment) specifies the external context. To be a predator, it is not enough that the lion possesses such and such phenotypic properties; it has also to live in a predator-prey environment, an environment that it can prey on. If it were to live in an environment that consists only of lions and dinosaurs it would become a prey and not a predator. The same, Blanshard reasons, applies to the alphabets **a**, **b**, **c**, etc., or numbers **1**, **2**, **3**, etc., or colors **blue**, **red**, **yellow**, etc., which are defined within a system or color spectrum. Thus it is empty to attempt to conceive of, say, **8** not as a number or outside the number system, or trying to conceive of the color **blue** stripped "in our thought from all the colors in the spectrum to which it is related by likeness and difference, all the shades within its own range."[9]

One worry for contextualism

A disturbing thought that contextualism forces us to accept is that propositions in mathematics are not axiomatically true but only conditionally true. Following Ewing and Joachim, Blanshard (1939, II, 319-25) does make this claim in a number of places in *The nature of thought*. He says, for example in one place: "Now it seems to me obvious that...to claim an absolute finality even for the propositions of arithmetic is unwarranted." Joachim puts the point this way: the "judgment '2 + 3 = 6' is no more false as such, and in itself, than a road is wrong *per se* and without reference to the object of the traveler." Therefore for 2 + 3 = 6 to be false, and 3 + 3 = 6 to be true it has to be specified within a wider or overarching system, and since we cannot claim to know the whole system of nature, 3 + 3 = 6 would only be conditionally true in respect to the system of mathematics, the same reason that 2 + 3 = 6 would be false. However, we cannot claim that 3 + 3 = 6 is an absolute truth and 2 + 3 = 6 is an absolute false given our ignorance of the wider system of nature.

One possible response to this view is this: we can appeal to the pragmatic value of mathematical and logical propositions as truth defining. That is to say that we are justified to take mathematical propositions as unconditionally true given our experience of their

pragmatic values. Blanshard, however, blocks this pragmatic-value/truth move by invoking the fact of omniscience. The fact of omniscience discounts conflating pragmatic value with absolute or unconditional truth. Pragmatic value, he claims, does not make mathematical propositions true unconditionally, the same way that scientific theories are not made true unconditionally because of pragmatism.

SKEPTICISM AND BLANSHARD'S THEORY OF TRUTH

If contextualism is true and if we are right about the other themes that we have discussed thus far, in particular the themes of mutual entailment, immanence-transcendence, and degrees of truth, then it seems that we are not justified to lay claims to any *genuine* beliefs. In *The nature of truth*, Blanshard (1939, II, 269-71) says that while his view of truth in theory upholds skepticism that is a mainspring of progress it is not skeptical in practice. He goes on to claim that if his coherence theory is relativistic, it is so "without countenancing despair." It is my contention, however, that although his theory is a species of theoretical skepticism it is also a form of practical skepticism.[10] It is both theoretical and practical not just because it denies genuine beliefs in some domain, i.e., mathematics and logic, but because it requires us to take a standpoint that is not accessible to us.

It is germane to note that as a species of theoretical skepticism Blanshard's account of truth shares some similarities with Locke's account of knowledge. Both views embody total skepticism in the sense that they are motivated by a kind of compete vision—"discovery of necessary connection," for Locke and "ultimate systemization," for Blanshard. Locke (1700, 166) summarizes his form of skepticism in a long passage in *An essay concerning human u*Freedman, Estelle B. 2003. No turning back: the history of feminism and the future of women. New York: Ballantine Books.

nderstanding:

> I have here instanced in the corpuscularian Hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligent Explication of the Qualities of Bodies; and I fear the Weakness of human Understanding is scare able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary Connexion, and *coexistence,* of the Powers, which are to be observed and united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that whichever Hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine,) our knowledge concerning corporeal Substances, will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made to see, what Qualities and Power of Bodies have a *necessary connexion or Repugnancy,* one with another; which in the present State of Philosophy, I think, we know but a very small degree: And I doubt, whether with those Faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I say not particular Experience) in this part much farther.[11]

Although the bulk of Locke's project in the *Essays* focuses on his schema for the acquisition of knowledge as well as the limitations of our cognitive faculties, he takes his notion of ideas and ideas acquisition to ground experimental science and mechanistic

corpuscularianism. Locke's skepticism requires that we withhold beliefs in experimental science and mechanistic corpuscularianism or be circumspect about claims to genuine beliefs in these disciplines. Blanshard's skepticism is no different from Locke's insofar as it requires us to withhold beliefs of mathematical and logical propositions.

But Blanshard's account is also skeptical in a practical sense. Blanshard takes coherence as the test and nature of truth, but we cannot stand outside coherence to check our coherent system of beliefs or as Faust (1998, 939) puts it we have no way of knowing from our vantage point whether any given proposition and the negation of it "is included in that ultimate systematization." That is, we can never know when the immanent meets with the transcendent given that we lack the standpoint of omniscience from which to survey an absolute overarching system of nature and from which to evaluate the genuineness of beliefs. Thus it may be argued that Blanshard's account of truth is skeptical both in theory and in practice.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have discussed five themes (mutual entailment, immanence-transcendence, degrees of truth, quantitative truth, and contextualism) in Blanshard's coherence theory of truth. On this account of truth, beliefs mutually entail others in a system of belief, truth comes in varying degrees, and judgments are contextual. A judgment or belief about something is superior to another if it contains more truth. Thought in its very essence seeks to embody an end and the end is transcendental. The truth of a system of thought is judged by how far it succeeds in representing the end which thought seeks to embody. And when two systems conflict, one is chosen over the other based on the criterion of how well the system coherently includes everything that is real and possible.

I raised a number of worries for this account of truth. First, the account of truth requires us to abandon or revise propositions in mathematics and logic. Propositions in mathematics and laws of logic are conditional truths, so that although a mathematical or logical proposition may be "more" true in the context of a system of mathematics or logic it might not be in a wider system of nature. Second, it is not clear on the account of truth how we are able to tell when the immanent meets the transcendent. Finally, the theory commits us to both theoretical and practical skepticism because we do not have an omniscient standpoint of the cosmic order that is necessary to evaluate *genuine* beliefs.

NOTES

1. Some of the early versions of the coherence theory which were connected with idealism are associated with Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Fichte, Georg Hegel, H. H. Joachim, and F. H. Bradley. For a discussion of some of these versions see Ralph Walker (1989). It is important to note that Rolando Gripaldo (2001, 2003; 2008; 2010; and 2011) has rejected the term "proposition" and replaced it with the term "constative."

2. The use of the phrase "rational idealism" to describe Blanshard's account of thought and reality underlines his attempt to bridge the gulf between scientific psychology and the demands of logic and epistemology (see Reck 1964, 11, 111-47).

3. One should note that Blanshard's coherence account share some important features with the accounts of truth presented by Kant and Hegel, both of whom also appeal to the rational in cashing out truth and meaning. Although the rational is essential in their accounts

of truth both Kant and Hegel conceive of the relationship between truth and meaning differently. While Hegel collapses truth and meaning, Kant keeps them separate. However, insofar as Blanshard conceives of truth as thought approximating reality, his coherence theory of truth draws on Kant and Hegel.

4. Bradley's (1914, 202-18) truth propositions are facts not known to be true but possibly and presumptively true, and which are given by memory and sense, etc.

5. This objection is a version of the "Plurality Objection," the problem of adjudicating between two mutually inconsistent hypotheses or systems. See Jennifer Faust (1998, 936-41) for a discussion of this objection in connection with Blanshard's account of truth.

6. In *Reason and analysis*, Blanshard (1962, iii, 43-44; 1980, 592) notes the influence that Hegel's concept of reason has had on many idealists, over the years, particularly in the area of coherence theories of truth. An especially important aspect of this influence is the view that the real, just like the rational, is coherent, consistent, and interdependent throughout. Some of the key features of the immanent and transcendent view that Blanshard borrows from Hegel and Bradley, and which are central to idealists' notion of coherentism, include: (1) the absence of inconsistencies in nature or the cosmic order, (2) the existence of the logical interdependence of facts and events, and (3) the correspondence of logical laws or laws of thought to the actual world.

7. There are other options other than the four that Blanshard discusses. For example, one can argue that "logical thought conveys or expresses some emotional desire." On this view, logical thought does not reveal the actual structure of things but merely expresses a human desire, say, the desire to think logically (for its own sake).

8. Blanshard rejects option 1 on the ground that its acceptance commits us to accept as true both disjuncts of the statement (Iran has nuclear weapons or Iran does not have nuclear weapons). Both disjuncts cannot hold in reality since both cannot be true in thought. Therefore, *simpliciter* logical laws are not merely description of thought; they describe the thought process as well as the actual world. The reason for the rejection of option 2 is that it is an incomplete account of thought processes. This option takes logical laws to be normative, that is as some sort of imperative commanding us to think logically. Blanshard's point is that even if we accept that the laws command us to think in certain ways there is no reason why we should obey them if not that our refusal contradicts reality. That is, the imperative to think logically is suggestive of the logical nature of reality. Blanshard rejects option 3 on the ground that it clashes with commonsense. Logical laws, he claims, are not just rules or symbols for the use of words and sentences, for if this were so we would not be able to give an account of why we adopt certain logical laws or rules over others. Logical laws, he argues, are accepted because they have implications for reality.

9. A more forceful example that Blanshard (1939, II, 316-18) discusses is that of arithmetical definition of a factor or multiple. With integers like **a**, **b**, **c** we can construct a statement like **a x b = c: a** is then defined as a factor of **c**, and **c** as a multiple of **a** whenever the relation expressed in the statement **a x b = c** exists. Thus, to think of any object, or more specifically, a judgment involving truth is, in Blanshard's view, to think of it in its relations to what is beyond it or, more appropriately, within a system or context.

10. Skepticism is generally defined as the denial that there is any knowledge or justification. Skepticism can be partial or total. It is partial when the denial is limited to particular fields (i.e. religious, metaphysics) and it is total if it is not limited to particular

fields. Skepticism can be theoretical, when it denies that there is any knowledge of a certain kind. This can be moderate and partial, that is, when it denies that there are any certain super knowledge at all, including logic and mathematics, etc. There is also practical skepticism, which is the withholding of both belief and disbelief. In practical skepticism, the withholding of belief and disbelief may be taken to hold in actuality, although not necessarily in principle. As well, practical skepticism requires a comprehensive standpoint from which to judge our system of beliefs or evaluate true beliefs.

11. Locke's (1700) view here seems to be echoed later on by Hume who took empiricism to its logical conclusion. In his criticism of causality, Hume denies that we have knowledge of necessary connections between ground and consequent or cause and effect, and that all we do in reality is to import a set of prior habits into our judgment of necessary connections. Hume's ascription of our knowledge of causality to psychologistic quirks or habits casts doubt on induction and has practical implications for knowledge in general and scientific investigation in particular.

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APORETIC ROLE OF THE *FACT OF REASON* IN KANTIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

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In the Critique of practical reason, *Kant invokes the moral law as an underived* fact of reason. *The aim of this article is to explore the highly debated role of the* fact of reason *and the nature of this fact, which apparently defies the senses of factuality commonly associated with empirical facts and objective entities. Following David Sussman's interpretation, I argue that the fact of reason not only marks the abandonment of deduction of the moral law but illustrates that the failure to ground the moral law does* not *undermine its unconditional authority. Therefore, I claim that rather than signifying a methodological maneuver to get out of the circle that Kant admits to be entrapped, it operates as an* immanent, dynamic *and an* aporetic *facticity. This perspective allows seeing its heuristic function for keeping intact the* aporia *that structures morality and offers a way of coming into the circle of morality.*

INTRODUCTION

In the last section of the *Foundations for the metaphysics of morals* (*Fmm*), Immanuel Kant (1997, 63-82) is preoccupied with vindicating the unconditional authority of the moral law by appeal to a conceptually prior sense of freedom. Nevertheless, towards the end of the book, he admits the failure of his attempt and confesses to be entrapped in a circle: *There is no sense of freedom that does not already presuppose moral commitments*. The failure to establish the ground of the authority of the moral law is apparently a surprising ending for an inquiry whose title suggests an inquiry of foundations. Consequently, in the *Critique of practical reason* (*Cprr*), Kant (1993) adopts a different strategy. Rather than searching the ground for the unconditional authority of the moral law in the idea of freedom, the authority of the moral law is established as *Faktum*. Kant invokes the moral law as an underived fact of reason [*das Faktum der Vernunft*], which marks the abandonment of the deduction of the moral law. As the *a priori* consciousness of the moral law, the *fact of reason* serves as the basis for the deduction of freedom. In Kant's (1993, 47-48) words, the deduction of the moral law is "vainly sought"; the fact of reason is "firmly established by itself." The reversal of the order of justification in the two arguments has been a matter of controversy among Kantian scholars. While some, like Karl Ameriks (1981), argue that the fact of reason marks Kant's abandonment of his strategy in *Fmm;* others, like Henry Allison (1986, 1990), maintain that the two arguments are consistently continuous.

Against this background, the major goal of the present study is to discuss the role of the fact of reason and to explore the nature of this fact, which apparently defies the sense of factuality that are commonly associated with objective empirical facts and entities. Following David Sussman's recent interpretation that Kant's notorious circle is not viciously so, I argue that the fact of reason not only marks the abandonment of deduction of the moral law but also illustrates that the failure to ground the moral law does *not* undermine its unconditional authority. Therefore, rather than signifying a methodological maneuver or a pragmatic tool to get out of the circle that Kant admits to be entrapped at the end of the *Fmm*, the fact of reason operates as the demonstration of coming into the circle in the right way. This interpretation provides the opportunity to explore it as an *immanent*, *dynamic*, and—what I propose to call—an *aporetic* facticity. I argue that as an *aporetic* fact, the fact of reason highlights the *aporia* that structures morality: *We have no access to the objective ground of the moral law yet we are bound by its unconditional authority.* Through this *aporetic* fact, we are imported into the heart of the human predicament confronting its limitation just in the moment of the indubitable disclosure of freedom.

My argument is planned in the following way: First, I reconstruct Kant's argument in the last section of the *Fmm* with a view to disclosing the nature of circularity in which Kant claims to be entrapped. In view of the internal tensions of Kant's argument and the perplexity that they seem to have caused for him, the aim of this reconstruction will be to answer the following question: In what sense and to what extent does the notion of the "fact of reason" as the *a priori* consciousness of the moral law might constitute as a response to the concerns expressed at the end of the *Fmm*? Scholars have interpreted the nature of this response differently and their interpretations have respectively led to different accounts of the role and the content of the fact of reason. In the second section, I turn to two major accounts of the fact of reason that, to a significant extent pervades, the literature. The first one is represented by Ameriks (1981, 53-79), where the fact of reason is regarded as a moral insight based on intellectual intuition. According to this understanding, the fact of reason marks Kant's turn to rational intuitionism and to dogmatism which in turn precludes his practical philosophy from the critical project. The other one is Allison's (1986, 393-425) interpretation, which argues that in order to establish the fact of reason Kant has undertaken a transcendental deduction similar to that in *Critique of pure reason* (*Cpr*), which serves to derive the categories. After critically evaluating these accounts, I argue that despite their different orientations, they both erroneously take the circularity of the attempt to ground the jurisdiction of morality as a mere theoretical impasse that somehow needs to be resolved, which prevents them from seeing its heuristic function for keeping intact the *aporia* that structures morality and from exploring the different dimensions of facticity. In arguing for this, I follow David Sussman's (2003, 71-74) view that the suggested circle is not vicious and extend his views to the claim that rather than serving to escape the circle, the fact of reason—as an *aporetic* fact—offers a way of coming into the circle of morality.

ARGUMENT LEADING TO THE CIRCLE OF MORALITY

In Section II of *Fmm*, Kant concludes that the autonomy of the will is connected to the concept of morality. He (1997, §445) reminds us that so far, he has been engaged in a conceptual analysis, which leaves intact the possibility that morality is chimerical. In other words, the conceptual analysis that has been undertaken up until that point is by no means

capable of constituting a *proof* for the reality of morality according to Kant. As is known, the fundamental principle of morality for Kant is the categorical imperative which implies acting in accordance with the law of an autonomous will. The will—determined by interests, inclinations, desires or the hoped-for-effects of action— cannot be the basis of morality. For Kant, the moral worth of an act lies "nowhere else than the principle of the will irrespective of the ends which can be realized by the action" (1997, §400) Hence, following Kant's remark about the incapability to *prove* the reality of morality, one might reasonably expect him to carry out a demonstration of how the categorical imperative is possible. However, Kant goes on to claim that an examination of the synthetic use of practical reason is required and the subsequent section provides the principal features of such an examination. Following the problematization of objective reality and the *a priori* necessity of the categorical imperative as well as of the autonomy as the principle of morality in Section III, Kant confesses to be enclosed in a circle. Let us now turn to Kant's argument and illustrate the steps that have led to the circle.

Positive freedom is said to follow from negative freedom as the property of a will of a rational being. Will as a kind of causality and the lawfulness that the concept of causality implies, Kant argues, rule out the possibility that this freedom can be lawless. Kant's example in Sec. 1 of *Fmm* (§402) clarifies that morality consist in acting according to the concept of action and highlights the moral force of this point by appealing to our common moral experience: Should I make a promise with the intention not to keep it or not? The concept of promising requires the intention to keep the promise, which is inherently lawful. What would be lawless in this case is looking at the possible consequences of the action as the basis to break the promise.[1] Under the principle of autonomy, the will constitutes itself as the principle of action, that is, action as regulated activity. This means that if freedom of the will is presupposed, the principle of morality immediately follows. Yet assuring the universality and the necessity of the principle of morality requires a further step. Insofar as morality serves *universally* for rational beings, Kant (1997, §448), in his next step, aims to demonstrate that freedom is the property of the will of *all* rational beings: "Now I affirm that we must necessarily grant that every rational being, who has a will also has the idea of freedom and that it acts only under this idea." This must be the case insofar as we cannot conceive of reason consciously complying with determinations from outside rather than its own power of judgment. Hence, in order for the will of a rational being to be *its own*, "reason must regard itself as the author of its principles." This reveals the practical as the context through which reason comes to its own—the source of judgment of an ethical subject, and to be the subject that it is, it must be immanent to reason.

In the next section, Kant claims to have reduced the concept of morality to the idea of freedom. Nonetheless this will still designate a hypothetical level where freedom must be presupposed *if* we would think of a being as rational and conscious of its causality. What must further be demonstrated is that *we* categorically conceive reason not only as free from impulses but as self-legislative; in other words, the present task is to demonstrate that *we* are the kind of being that determines itself to action. This seems to be what Kant (1997, §445) has in mind when he declares that what has been left unanswered is "proving freedom to be actual in ourselves."[2]

Proving the actuality of freedom requires encountering a key question that leads to the circle in which Kant admits to be entrapped: How can the actuality of freedom in ourselves be interrogated without first acknowledging that we have an average understanding of it?

Unless the objective reality and the practical necessity of the moral law are acknowledged, Kant (1997, §449) tells us, "we have only presupposed the moral law, the principle of the autonomy of the will in the idea of freedom, as if we could not prove its reality and objective necessity by itself." In the section titled "Of the interest attaching to the ideas of morality," Kant (1997, §450) declares:

> We must openly confess that there is a kind of circle here from which it seems there is no escape. We assume that we are free in the order of efficient causes so that we can conceive ourselves as subject to moral laws in the order of ends. And we think ourselves subject to these laws because we have ascribed freedom of the will to ourselves. This is circular because freedom and self-legislation are both autonomy.

To the extent that they are circular, they cannot be used to ground each other. Confronted with this circularity, we might propose two ways of preventing the argument from begging the question. The first would be to argue for an independent ground for autonomy, which does not appeal to the authority of the moral law in the first place. In this way, autonomy might be claimed to provide an independent starting point for the argument. The second way to avoid circularity would be to claim that the authority of the moral law on us must be explained in terms of a nonmoral sense of freedom. The circularity in question can be overcome only if one of these two ways can be demonstrated to be the case. The crux of the matter for each of these cases is to demonstrate the authority of the moral law without falling back to moral terms which in turn amounts to providing an independent starting point for the argument. But can there be an independent starting point for this argument that does not presuppose any commitment to moral concerns?

Kant takes neither of the paths proposed above. The questions which continuously preoccupy him (1997, §450) throughout the final section of *Fmm* illustrate his incessant perplexity: "Why should I, as a rational being, and why should all other beings endowed with reason, subject ourselves to the moral law?" In this vein, he (1997, §461) reiterates that "an explanation of how and why the universality of the maxim as law (and hence morality) interests us is completely impossible for us men." Or again "we could give no answer to anyone who asked us why the universal validity of our maxim as a law had to be the restricting condition of our action. We could not tell on what is based the worth that we ascribe to actions of this kind." These questions are apparently ways of formulating the question of the authority of the moral law. The specter of these provocative questions appears to haunt him (1997, §463) until the very end of the book:

> We do not indeed comprehend the unconditional practical necessity of the moral imperative; yet we do comprehend its incomprehensibility, which is all that can fairly be demanded of a philosophy which in its principles strives to reach the boundary of human reason.

Kant nowhere clarifies what he means by the enigmatic remark about "comprehending incomprehensibility." However, according to this passage, the incomprehensibility pertaining to the authority of the moral law that Kant suggests to be in a sense comprehensible, delineates the boundary of human reason; hence it plays a substantial role in Kant's critical

project. As it will get clearer in the following sections, my argument presumes that these provocative questions and comments do not merely designate a theoretical impasse on the part of Kant. The perplexity these questions cause seems to go beyond the mere expression of theoretical difficulties involved in the deduction of the moral law. One is tempted to say that it is almost as if Kant speaks to the reader as a participant in a moral quest and compels her to confront the fact that the difficulties involved in grounding the authority of the moral law are of a different order than questions of theoretical inconsistency or a logical fallacy. Given the perplexity these questions apparently cause for Kant, in what sense is the fact of reason a response to the question of the authority of the moral law and the interest that reason takes in it?

Cprr opens up with the doctrine of the fact of reason, which, Kant tells us, follows from the insight that any attempt to deduce the supreme principle of morality through theoretical speculation or from empirical data is bound to fail. Yet this failure is not presented as a theoretical weakness; on the contrary, the moral law is presented as a kind of *factum.* Kant formulates this "fact of reason" in different ways—"the *a priori* consciousness of the moral law," "the moral law itself," or the "consciousness of freedom."[3] In Kant's words, the deduction of the moral law is "vainly sought"; the fact of reason is self-evident. Moreover, the *a priori* consciousness of the moral law, which is addressed by Kant (1993, §47-48) as the "sole fact of reason," serves as the principle of deduction for freedom:

> [T]he moral law is given, as an apodictically certain fact, as it were, of pure reason, a fact of which we are *a priori* conscious, even if it be granted that no example could be found in which it has been followed exactly. Thus the objective reality of the moral law can be proved through no deduction, through no exertion of the theoretical, speculative, or empirically supported reason; and, even if one were willing to renounce its apodictic certainty, it could not be confirmed by any experience and thus proved a posteriori. Nevertheless, it is firmly established of itself.

Let's now turn to two major interpretations of the fact of reason, which map out the scope of the debate concerning the relationship between *Fmm* and *Cprr*. I do not intend to claim that these exhaust the number of interpretations; yet—to a significant extent—they map out its scope: on the one hand, there is the interpretation that the apodictically certain fact of reason manifesting itself in immediacy implies some kind of intellectual intuition, while, on the other hand, the fact at stake is regarded as being backed up by a transcendental deduction that discloses it as a necessary condition for moral experience.

"FACT OF REASON": A RATIONAL INTUITION OR A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION?

As I formerly mentioned, Kant's theoretical gesture from *Fmm* to the *Cprr* and the corresponding role of the fact of reason as well as its content have been a matter of debate among Kantian scholars. Commentators such as Ameriks (1981, 53-79) argue that by positing the unconditional authority of the moral law as a fact, Kant adopts a kind of rational intuitionism and that this strategy is a deviation from his critical project. In his recent work, Sussman (2003, 55) clarifies Ameriks's interpretation:

> Ameriks contends that having realized that the strategy suggested in *Groundwork III* fails to escape its circle, Kant simply makes morality a special exception to the justificatory requirements of the critical philosophy, and "acknowledged that his practical philosophy was 'dogmatic' and that only his theoretical philosophy was to be called critical." On this view, the fact that we stand under obligation (or are free, autonomous, etc.) is just a kind of deliverance of pure reason as a kind of perceptive faculty, which gives us the fact in a way that can be neither questioned, justified, or further articulated.

According to this interpretation, Kant's recourse to the fact of reason illustrates his appeal to a kind of intellectual intuition, a moral insight that designates the transcendent employment of reason. However, this interpretation runs against Kant's (1993, 31) frequent claim that the consciousness of freedom cannot form the basis of the authority of the moral law and that "intellectual intuition would be required, which certainly *cannot be assumed here*" (italics mine). Besides defying Kant's frequent and subtle remarks about the impossibility of intellectual intuition for finite beings, I maintain that Ameriks's account brings with it a multiplicity of problems that do not only concern Kant's practical philosophy but also the critical project as a whole. Although Kant does take theoretical and practical reason to be distinct, this by no means implies that without a proper critique of practical reason, the critical project as a whole can stand unimpaired. The critique of practical reason does not solely serve to give substance to freedom that speculative reason had to assume and it definitely does not merely serve to provide *ad hoc* solutions to the problems that could not be solved by the theoretical employment of reason. So if we are to take seriously—and I think we should—Kant's (1993, 128) comments about the relationship between theoretical and practical reason as well as his fundamental remark about the primacy of the practical over the theoretical, we can see that the consequences of proposing intellectual intuition as the ground of the moral law go beyond the confines of the practical realm and run the risk of jeopardizing the critical project as a whole. Given the substantial role of practical reason that Kant declares in an indubitable fashion, I maintain that it is more plausible to explore the implications of the notion of the "fact of reason" for our conception of critique and the possibilities that an evolving understanding of "critique" might open up for discerning the sense of justification relevant and adequate for the authority of the moral law, rather than taking it as a reason to wholly expel the practical perspective from the critical enterprise.

Even though some of Kant's formulations of the fact of reason expounding its self-evident manifestation might tempt one to interpret it as some kind of rational intuition, Sussman (2003, 56) reminds us:

> ...[this gives] no basis for Kant's claim that it would have to be "the *sole* fact of pure practical reason" [*Cprr*, 5:31, my emphasis]. If reason serves to give us some kind of direct access to the transcendent, even if only in practical matters, then there seems to be in principle no limit to the number of distinct "facts" it could hand down.

Moreover, a rational intuition fails to account for the apodictic certainty that Kant (1993, 55) attributes to the fact of reason: "If the fact of reason is something we immediately

'see' in this way, it seems as if we could just as well have not seen it, or seen something else in its stead." So far, I have argued against the view that the fact of reason represents a turn to some kind of rational intuitionism in Kant's practical philosophy. However, my criticism does not aim to endorse the contrary view that the fact of reason admits of a deduction. One defender of this view is Allison (1990), who argues that the fact of reason receives some kind of transcendental deduction similar to the one employed by Kant for establishing the categories in the first *Critique* (the *Cpr*).[4] Just as a transcendental deduction was necessary to show the objective validity of the pure concepts of the understanding in the *Cpr*, the argument goes, a transcendental deduction similarly establishes the objective validity of the fact of reason in the *Cprr*. It is argued that a transcendental deduction is employed to show that the authority of the moral law is a precondition for the moral experience of being under the compulsion to act against our interests and desires, which is manifested through respect. "Respect" first appears in a dense footnote in *Fmm* (1997, §401) and then it occupies a central role in *Cprr* where Kant (1993, 74) writes: "Therefore, respect for the moral law is a feeling that is brought about by an intellectual basis, and this feeling is the only one that we cognize completely *a priori* and the necessity of which we can have insight into." This sense of being under some kind of obligation to act against our interests, desires, etc., even under the threat of death cannot be grounded on any empirical basis. Given that we *do* have this sense of compulsion which is manifested in respect, the argument goes, we must be bound by the authority of the moral law. Hence, just like the deduction in the first *Critique* that takes off from the objective experience of the world, the deduction in *Cprr* takes the phenomenology of moral experience as its starting point and then proceeds to deduce the objective reality of the authority of moral law as its necessary condition, which in turn serves as the basis of the objective reality of freedom. Right before introducing the notion of the "fact of reason," Kant gives the example of a man who is threatened with death unless he makes a false deposition against an honorable man. This example demonstrates that the sense of compulsion to act against all interests and desires is available even under the threat of death and appeals to a kind of awareness that is available to us as an ineliminable dimension of moral experience. Kant's point is that even though we cannot in advance know his decision, we can without hesitation admit that choosing to be truthful at the expense of his own life is a real possiblitlity. In Kant's (1933, 31) eloquent workds, "he judges therefore that he can do something becasue he knows that he ought and he recognizes that he is free—a fact which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him." Hence, this forceful example serves as the starting point for those who argue that the fact of reason is endorsed by a transcendental deduction.

In critically assessing this account, we must reconsider what a transcendental deduction of the moral law would amount to after all. The deduction of the moral law would primarily amount to the knowledge of the conditions of the possibility of causality of reason under the law of freedom. Secondly, it would require demonstrating that the moral law *necessarily* applies to experience. However, given Kant's argument that freedom is not conceivable in the register of the sensible which operates under the law of natural causality, it appears that such an account would destabilize freedom at the outset. Further reflection reveals that the deduction of the moral law would be improper yet for another reason—namely, the crucial distinction between legality and morality. In *Cpr*, transcendental deduction was necessary to show the objective validity of the pure concepts of the understanding. The point not to be dismissed at this point is Kant's (2003, §120) remark that the

transcendental deduction was about the *legality* of the categories. In other words, it was a question of *juris* rather than one of *facti*, and only the former demanded a deduction to be settled with certainty. Insofar as a transcendental deduction discerns *juris*, the transcendental deduction of the moral law would reveal its legality, yet would in any case remain silent about the question of *facti,* which concerns how the *a priori* consciousness of the moral law is acquired—namely, the ground of the unconditional jurisdiction.

So far, I have critically evaluated two major interpretations of the fact of reason. So what kind of response are they to the suggested circularity? The circle of morality demanded that we see ourselves as already under the unconditional jurisdiction of the moral law without appealing to any prior moral commitments. This involves discerning the practical domain and justifying morality by appeal to nonmoral terms. Given the two interpretations of the fact of reason, the question of what kind of response they provide to the circle of morality becomes a pressing question. According to Ameriks's interpretation, the fact of reason can hardly be regarded as an attempt to escape the circle. On the contrary, Ameriks suggests that the circle is left unresolved and that a completely different strategy is adopted in the second *Critique* (the Cprr). Ameriks (1981, 66) maintains that

> This [the positive sense of freedom] can be asserted only as a consequence of the "*a priori* fact" that we see the moral law as binding. In effect no strict deduction, let alone a non-circular one, of the moral law (i.e., of the validity in general of morality as opposed to the best formulation of its supreme principle) is offered, and no non-moral proof of freedom is given. (Thus Kant uses the term "fact" here precisely as a contrast to what is a mere consequence of a proof). Instead of a solution to the earlier charge of a circularity in the deduction, the original project of a deduction is in effect given up. Only freedom (now called "the keystone of the whole architectonic of the system of pure reason") is argued for, and this on the basis of the ultimately un-argued-for premise of the validity of morality.

In this sense, the circle of morality is taken to mean a theoretical impasse—a "vicious circle"—and the fact of reason is simply an *ad hoc* methodological maneuver to get around the deadlock. Ameriks (1981, 66) goes on:

> Before, the assertion of our freedom seemed to be based on the assertion of morality, which in turn rested on an appeal to freedom. Now instead of the last step, which does involve a circular grounding, no step at all and so no theoretical grounding is offered. In the place of ambitious but understandable attempts at a strict deduction, Kant has fallen back into the invocation of an alleged *a priori* fact of practical reason.

Few lines after this remark, Ameriks notes that some major commentators like Lewis Beck (1960, 190) has not been willing to accept Kant's enormous strategic change and instead argue that Kant has effectively handled the problem of the vicious circle. On the contrary, Ameriks (1981, 66) *rightly* comments that Kant "cannot offer anything in the way of a solution to the difficulties that originally came under the heading of the problem of a circle." According to Ameriks, even though Kant had formerly believed that a deduction

could have been achieved, in the course of his argument he came to recognize its impossibility and admitted that a deduction was not tenable. As he (1981, 67) remarks:

> ...Kant made such a point about a deduction only because (as before) he thought one could be easily provided; that meanwhile he discovered that *the* way he believed in was not a tenable or appropriate one for him; that thus out of necessity he had to renounce the attempt metaphysically to ground freedom or morality.

Hence, Ameriks's argument upholds that the circularity designates a theoretical impasse, a failure on the part of Kant and that he was pushed to adopt a radically different strategy out of necessity which in turn led to the formulation of the notion of "fact of reason." This line of thinking supposes the unlikely view that Kant initially thinks he can provide a deduction of morality, or vice versa, and then discovers in the midst of trying, that he cannot do so. Besides being unjustified, this view excludes the possibility that Kant was tryng to show something quite different rather than confronting the consequences of his failed attempts.

Unlike Ameriks, Allison does not see Kant's strategy in the second *Critique* as a rupture from his former views in the *Fmm*. He appears to regard them as continuous attempts and accordingly interprets the fact of reason as admitting of a transcendental deduction. Leaving aside the formerly discussed problems that ascribing a transcendental deduction for the jurisdiction of the moral law might give rise to the kind of response that Allison's interpretation provides to the circle of morality is hardly ever clear. Sussman (2003, 60) draws attention precisely to this point:

> The problem with this sort of argument is not that it is unsound, but that it would not fail to make any progress against the circle or the worries it engenders. The difficulty is that there can be no non-tendentious way to characterize the phenomenology of moral experience. If we take it as it seems, then we really do recognize obligations, experience respect for law, and act from duty—all of which implies the validity of the moral law...If there is a question about the authority of morality in the first place, this strategy merely begs it, by characterizing our experience in ways that we are only entitled to once we assume that authority.

Despite their different interpretations, both Ameriks and Allison tend to treat the problem of circularity as a theoretical impasse that needs to be somehow resolved. The nature of this notorious circularity and the significance it might have for Kantian moral philosophy is not widely explored among commentators—some like Paton even claim that the circle is a "side issue" (Ameriks 1981, 66). Sussman is one of the first to bring up the import of the problem of circularity for Kantian moral philosophy. Sussman criticizes some interpretations not just for reproducing or deplacing the circle without exploring its implications but also for failing to show that the circle is not viciously so. Unlike the common interpretations of the fact of reason that pervades the literature, Sussman's (2003, 68-69) account aims to demonstrate that the circularity in question does not undermine the authority of the moral law.

> If Kant cannot bring us out of the circle, he should show us why there is nothing wrong with remaining there, why such circularity does not serve as a breeding ground for moral skepticism. In the next chapter, I will argue that the "Fact of Reason" does involve just this sort of argument to show that the circularity in question does not undermine the authority of morality...For part of what the Fact will show is that there is no coherent standpoint within the practical from which the authority of morality can be called into question, nor could any truly external standpoint be relevant to such questions of authority.

This cuts across a question that I take to be fundamental for disclosing the content of this facticity: Can we say that Kant achieves in breaking the circle or—to risk a Heideggerian formulation—should we say that he instead professes to come into the circle in the right way through the fact of reason?[5] Following Sussman's insight that the circularity is not vicious, in the next section, I will further explore the nature of this facticity and argue that the fact of reason stands as—what we might call—an *aporetic* fact functioning as a way of entering into the circle of morality and keeping intact the *aporia* that discerns the human predicament.

FACT OF REASON AS AN *APORETIC* FACT

The concept of the "fact of reason" introduces a genuine conception of facticity operative in Kantian critical philosophy, which refers neither to the facts of nature nor the "moral facts" of the moral realist. Its objective reality is immune to proof, yet it cannot be "argued away." The fact of reason as "the *a priori* consciousness of the moral law" neither plays the role of an empirical (psychological) fact, a bedrock intuition that pragmatically functions to get around the deadlocks nor implies the discovery of something that exists "out there." I propose that we must understand this facticity in two interrelated aspects: fact of reason as *immanent* and fact of reason as *dynamic*. These two aspects allow us to equally establish it as an *aporetic* fact that unfolds the human predicament in terms of the *aporia* that structures morality.

In the first chapter of the Analytic in *the Cprr*, Kant (1993, 31) declares that the fact of reason is the *sole* fact of pure reason: "In order to regard this law without any misinterpretation as given, one must note that it [the moral law] is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason, which by it proclaims itself as the originating law..." The sole fact of pure reason issues from its pure practical use—a fact can never arise from its theoretical employment. The fact of reason is a matter of immanence in the sense of issuing necessarily and not arbitrarily from the very nature of pure practical reason. It is as if pure reason could show itself to be practical *only at work*.[7] As Kant (1993. 41) maintains,"It is a fact wherein pure reason shows itself actually to be practical." One might say that the question of the objective reality of pure reason lends itself to the demonstration of pure reason as practical. The immanence of the fact of reason unfolds the pure practical reason. Unlike the theoretical employment of pure reason, the fact of reason does not transcend its legitimate sphere—on the contrary, it discerns and is constitutive of the practical sphere itself. As Kant (1993, 16) contends:

> If it is proved that there is pure [practical] reason, its use is alone immanent;

> the empirically conditioned use, which lays claim to absolute rule, is on the contrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands and commands that go quite beyond its sphere—precisely the opposite relation from what could be said of pure reason in its speculative use.

This is evidently different from, and even the reverse of, the operation of pure theoretical reason where the ideas of pure reason acquire only a regulative function. In the opening lines of the second *Critique*, Kant draws attention to the fact that the title of the present book is not the *Critique of pure practical reason* as one might expect in relation to the first *Critique*. This, he adds, is the case insofar as pure practical reason is in no need of a critique. In its practical employment, what needs to be criticized in the pure practical reason is its being empirically conditioned. The pure employment of practical reason is in no need of a critique to establish its legitimacy. Sussman (2003, 77) remarks:

> The pure practical use of reason, in contrast to the pure theoretical, could neither be given nor stand in need of a critique; for in its apparently constitutive role, no proper questions about its legitimacy and proper scope can be raised. In the practical domain, the relevance of sensibility appears to be conditioned by the Ideas...of reason, rather than the reverse, as was the case in the preceding *Critique*.

The terms of immanence are analogously rendered to a dynamic understanding of fact, which implies its performative dimension. Unlike its theoretical employment, where reason has no role to play in the constitution of the objects of the natural realm, the practical realm is constituted by pure practical reason, which it in turn judges. In practical context, pure practical reason determines the horizon of the meaning of practical judgments. Sussman's (2003, 79) succinct words illuminate the fact of reason as a *dynamic* fact that cannot be grounded on anything other than its own activity:

> Unlike its predecessor, the second *Critique* concerns a use of reason that apparently is giving itself its own objects, and hence is limited only by conditions immanent to the activity of reasoning itself. Practice does not concern a realm that already has a well-defined sense before pure reason comes on the scene; it does not concern an independent realm of desire and volition that reason then takes charge of and disciplines into shape. Rather, Kant seems to think that we cannot even make sense of practical concerns such as desire, volition, or action (essential aspects, I take it, of the *Willengesinnung)* except insofar as they already make reference to the justificatory ideals of pure reason (i.e., bear a relation to "the supreme principle of freedom," the moral law).

Fact of reason as dynamic and immanent facticity then highlights two important points. The first is that a demand for theoretical justification is irrelevant for the authority of the moral law. In other words, theoretical concerns are "external questions" that cannot challenge the moral law's unconditional authority. The second one is that there is no coherent standpoint within the practical perspective from which one might consistently dispute the unconditional authority. This is the case insofar as the conceptual space for practical matters

is opened up to a being that conceives itself as already bound by the authority of the moral law (Sussman 2003, 109). This implies that once we ask for a justification of the moral law, it means that there is no support independent of and prior to morality that might serve to convince us of its authority. This is exactly the sense in which the fact at stake discerns the horizon of pure practical reason. Discussions about practical reasons acquire meaning as *practical* concerns only within the horizon discerned by the fact of reason. Pure practical reason furnishes the realm of meaning through the moral law—i.e., the realm of meaning for human action opened up only through the authority of the moral law. According to Sussman (1993, 104), "The authority of morality must be the default assumption of the practical perspective. As such a default, morality does not need any positive justification. Instead, it possesses something of the right of the first occupant." Given Sussman's comment, one is tempted to draw a parallel with Donald Davidson's (2005, 20) comment in order to highlight the distinctive status of this facticity:

> For the most part, the concepts philosophers single out for attention, like truth, knowledge, belief, action, cause, the good and the right, are the most elementary concepts we have, concepts without which (I am inclined to say) we would have no concepts at all. Why then should we expect to be able to reduce these concepts definitionally to other concepts that are simpler, clearer, and more basic? We should accept the fact that what makes these concepts so important must also foreclose on the possibility of finding a foundation for them that reaches deeper into bedrock.

In this sense, the impossibility of providing a foundation is not a sign of theoretical weakness but it marks the distinctive status of the *a priori* consciousness of the moral law: while it admits of no justification, this does not hamper its unconditional authority. In view of Sussman's discussion that the circle of morality is not vicious, I have argued that formulating the *a priori* consciousness of the law as a *dynamic, immanent* fact shows that it does not serve as an independent starting point for the argument about the unconditional authority of the moral law. More precisely, it highlights the fact that there is *no* such independent starting point for the argument. It is exactly in this sense that I propose to understand the fact of reason as showing us the way to come into the circle in the right way rather than as an attempt to resolve it.

CONCLUSION

My discussion about the immanent as well as the dynamic performative aspects of the fact of reason aims to provide insight into its role with respect to the question of justification and the kind of response it constitutes to the charge of circularity. However, I maintain that Sussman's discussion that the circle is not vicious should not mitigate the import of *incomprehensibility* built into this *factum*. In other words, we must not mistakenly take the *a priori* consciousness of unconditional jurisdiction as an *unproblematic* given. The fact of reason does not simply stand there as an "ontic" manifestation of or attestation to an already existing law.[6] It discloses the abyss of what I call the boundary question: "why should I subject myself to the moral law?" I uphold the view that taking the circle as a theoretical impasse that needs to be resolved misleads one to overlook the significance of

this circularity for unfolding the perplexity that the need of a search for ground, on the one hand, and its impossibility, on the other hand, give rise to. The difficulty involved in grounding the authority of the moral law and the bewilderment that thereby emerges are of a different order than the problems a theoretical inconsistency would imply. The perplexity illustrates the human predicament as configured in the ineliminable tension unfolded in the fact of reason. In this perplexity, what is at stake is not simply a theoretical inconsistency or a logical fallacy but the sense of self available to us. The *aporetic* fact of reason does not decrease the impact of perplexity caused by the absence of a ground; on the contrary, it operates to keep it the impact alive. This is the kind of perplexity that Kant tries to convey through the examples that appeal to common moral experience. He (1993, 31) tells us that a man will give up his passions if threatened with death since the desire for preserving his life would be greater. However, it would be possible for the same man to overcome his love of life if he is threatened with death unless he betrays an innocent person. The awareness of this real possibility to act out from duty even at the expense of sacrificing one's life implies that morality hinges on something more important than biological existence. The example of the man who recognizes the duty to tell the truth and sacrifice his life rather than betray an innocent person demonstrates that the aporia of the "ought," which admits of no justification, marks a fundamental comportment of human existence. Hence the aporia unfolded through the fact of reason throws all the ordinary "ontic" concerns into disarray and marks the moment of freedom.

To conclude, this *aporetic* facticity marks the confrontation with our limitation—yet rather than marking an impasse or a limitation, it designates openness, an unending undertaking in human life, where nothing less than our *vitality* is at stake. The moral stance does not designate a stance among others, but a stance without which "human conduct would be thus changed into mere mechanism in which, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but there would be *no life* in the figures" (Kant 1993, 148). In moral action, we orient ourselves towards what we can neither theoretically know nor prove—yet it is only with this step, which must be taken without falling back onto anything and with no formerly acknowledged promise, that a space of meaning and a sense of self opens themselves up. Through this *aporetic* fact, we are imported into the heart of the human predicament as confronted with its limitation just in the moment of the indubitable disclosure of freedom under the jurisdiction of the moral law.

NOTES

1. One might object that what Kant offers does not convincingly rule out that freedom of the will can be lawless. Here, the alleged concept of causality no longer operates as a concept of the understanding but functions at the level of reason, which in Kant's words "elevates above understanding." Therefore, using the argument of the lawfulness of causality as a concept of the understanding that is applicable to the manifold of intuition in order to conclude that the causality of reason must as well be lawful does not seem to hold. Although in the first *Critique,* Kant had acknowledged the unique status of dynamical concepts by stating their ability to perform a transcendental synthesis, still the above argument requires further assumptions. Kant does not offer any argument for the view that free will cannot be lawless; instead, he accentuates the moral force of this point by providing examples such as promise-keeping that appeals to common moral awareness

and merely states that admitting free will as lawless is an absurdity. Allison (1986, 400) calls our attention to the fact that this claim places Kant squarely within the metaphysical tradition that rejects the "liberty of indifference" and this rejection is a constant in his thought. Its most clear expression is in *Fmm:* "Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his Idea of laws—and only so he has a will."

2. Without this, eradicating the purported suspicion that morality might be a figment of the imagination is still intact. The only way to do away with the possibility that the concept of duty is empty is to show the conditions of the possibility of the categorical imperative, which implies showing that the moral law applies to us. In Kantian words, this means a transcendental deduction of morality. Therefore, the question that will expunge the possibility that morality is a figment of the imagination lends itself to the demonstration that the moral law necessarily applies to us. As far as the last section of the *Fmm* is concerned, for Kant this seems to be the only adequate answer to the moral skeptic.

3. John Rawls (2000, 260) critically evaluates the different formulations of the notion of "fact of reason." He concludes that the fact of reason cannot be the moral law itself since the latter "as an idea of reason is only an idea, and as such may lack, as the ideas of immortality and of God may, objective reality and so not apply to anything" And it cannot be the consciousness of freedom, because for this we would need an intellectual intuition which we evidently lack.

4. Henrich Dieter (1994) similarly argues that the fact of reason is backed up by a transcendental deduction.

5. Heidegger (1962, 27) problematizes the circularity of the inquiry of *Sein* through *Dasein*:

> Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it—all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of *Being* for those particular entities for which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity—the inquirer—transparent in his own Being...Is there not however a manifest circularity in such an undertaking? If we must first define an entity in its Being, and if we want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but going on in a circle? Formal objections such as "circular reasoning," which can easily be cited at any time in the study of first principles, are always sterile when one is considering concrete ways of investigating.

6. From a personal communication with Gucsal Pusar.

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TOWARDS A NEUROIDENTITY THEORY OF QUALIA

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Arguments against the plausibility of a scientific theory of consciousness are hinged on the ground that attached to mental consciousness are phenomenal properties, also known as qualia, which are not amenable to any scientific theory. This paper develops and defends a neuroidentity hypothesis that purports to show that qualia, which are identified as neuroqualia, are the same as some neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system. The neuroidentity hypothesis is offered as a possible way of moving closer to a probable scientific theory of consciousness.

INTRODUCTION

A plausible scientific theory of consciousness has been denied on the ground that attached to consciousness are qualia which are not amenable to any scientific theory. What is missing in the previous efforts, in neurophilosophy, to offer an empirical account for qualia is that no genuine paradigm of research on consciousness has been developed from the findings of researches and results of experiments in neuroscience. This paper attempts to fill this gap by exploring the findings and results of researches and experiments in neuroscience in order to establish the neural nature of qualia. The result is the neuroidentity hypothesis in which qualia are shown to be identical with neuroqualia, thus suggesting a possible way of building a scientific theory of consciousness. The paper is divided into three major sections. The first section explicates the link between neuroscience and neurophilosophy, the second builds the neuroidentity hypothesis with neurochemicals and other neural properties and processes in the central nervous system, and the third and concluding part poposes that neuroqualia should be understood as different from the subjective qualitative properties of mental states, thus suggesting a ground for a plausible theory of consciousness.

NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROPHILOSOPHY

Neuroscience is the study of the nervous system, including the brain, the spinal cord, and the networks of neurons throughout the body. Through their research, neuroscientists describe the human brain and how it functions; determine how the nervous system develops, matures, and maintains itself through life; and find ways to prevent or cure many neurological and psychiatric disorders. Moreover, neuroscientists study genes and other molecules

that serve as the basis for the nervous system, individual neurons, and ensembles of neurons that make up the human systems and behaviour. Neurophilosophy is the philosophical interpretation and application of neuroscientific concepts, findings, and results of research and experiments in neuroscience in addressing traditional philosophical questions (Bickle et. al. 2010). According to Georg Northoff (2004, 92), the term "neurophilosophy" is often used either implicitly or explicitly to characterize the investigation of philosophical theories and positions in relation to neuroscientific hypotheses in the attempt to proffer solutions to some problems in philosophy. Although the exact methodological principles and systematic rules for neurophilosophy remain to be clarified (Northoff 2004, 91-127), it lays emphasis on the relevance and importance of the empirical facts about the brain—what it is and how it works—as resources needed in resolving some fundamental problems or questions in the Philosophy of Mind. Thus, for example, the neurophilosophers focus exclusively on ways in which the "new knowledge" about the brain and its properties emerging from neuroscience illuminates philosophical debates about the nature of consciousness and its relation to physical mechanisms. J. Prinz (2007) and Owen Flanagan (2009) had, in separate articles, addressed questions, such as "What is the neural basis of moral cognition?"or "What is the neural basis of happiness?" and provided examples of neurophilosophy, where answers to these questions are constrained by the discoveries in neuroscience. Neurophilosophy is already breaking new grounds in philosophical research. For instance, there are branches of neurophilosophy such as neuroepistemology (Churchland 2004, 42-50) and neuroethics (Levy 2008, 1-5), which are emerging contemporary discourse in the Philosophy of Mind. This is in confirmation of Ned Block's (2003, 1328) opinion that neurophilosophy aims "to show that discoveries in cognitive science and neuroscience allow for 'progress where progress was deemed impossible' on the 'big problems' of philosophy."

A common mistake in neurophilosophy is that most of the hypotheses on, and explanations of, consciousness are directed at consciousness as functions, processes, reports, or outcomes of some complex neurobiological entities or properties. As Chalmers (1996, xi-xvi) pointed out, problems associated with the conception of consciousness as functions or processes of the human brain were referred to as the easy problems of consciousness. They are "easy problems" because there are mechanisms and principles of developing hypotheses, theories, etc., for understanding consciousness in this regard. What is difficult, or a "hard problem," to use Chalmers's description, is the need to offer a neurophilosophical account or explanation of qualia, which are phenomenal properties of consciousness. Chalmers thinks that neurophilosophy cannot address the hard problem.

However, in this paper, efforts shall be made to use neurophilosophy to address the hard problem. What is missing in all the previous efforts of using neurophilosophy to account for qualia is that no genuine paradigm of research on qualia is developed from the findings of the researches and experimental results in neuroscience. In building the neuroidentity hypothesis, this paper attempts to fill this gap by exploring the findings and results of researches and experiments in neuroscience in order to establish the neural nature of qualia. This hypothesis would be another effort in neurophilosophy to advance possible physicalist ontology of qualia. The initiative to build the

neuroidentity hypothesis is encouraged by the assertion advanced by Alan I. Leshner (2009, 5), that

> ...the neurosciences are at a critical point where scientific knowledge is beginning to provide a much clearer glimpse into the underpinnings of *who we are. Neuroscience has introduced new possibilities for understanding what makes us human—our mind, our selves.* The ability to look into the brain of living, awake and behaving individuals and *watch our minds in action* is just one example of the new tools now available that could tell us a tremendous amount about our humanity and perceived individuality. This progress could be quite threatening to people's long-held values or beliefs about themselves.

The import of this development is that neurophilosophical researches aimed at building a scientific theory of qualia are increasingly moving towards new possibilities provided by specific accounts of the neural properties and processes in the central nervous system.

The closest finding on the activities of sensory neurons towards explaining qualia was, according to Vittorio Gallese (2005, 37), due to Ralph Adolphs and his team who found out that "the integrity of the sensory-motor-system appears to be critical for the recognition of emotions displayed by others, because the sensory-motor system appears to support the reconstruction of 'what it would feel like to be in a particular emotion' (the quale of a particular emotion) by means of stimulation of other related body state." Thus, one way to move forward in the scientific research of qualia is to be able to identify the exact sensory neuron and the body state stimulated that results in reconstructing the qualia of a third person. This, if achieved, would show that the qualia are, after all, explainable through the activities of some neurons in the central nervous system; and thus, confirms the possibility of building a neuroscientific theory of consciousness. The next section is an attempt to demonstrate the possibility of achieving this feat through the development of a neuroidentity hypothesis.

DEVELOPING A NEUROIDENTITY HYPOTHESIS

The neurons communicate at synapses in a process called synaptic transmission. The axons of neurons branch at their ends and at the end of each branch is a tiny swelling, which is called a terminal button. The place where the button of one neuron adjoins the dendrites of other neurons is called a synapse (Roediger et al. 1988, 43). The synapse consists of the two neurons, one of which is sending information to the other. The sending neuron is known as the pre-synaptic neuron (i.e., before the synapse) while the receiving neuron is known as the post-synaptic neuron (i.e., after the synapse). Neurons are cells specialized to conduct electrochemical impulses called nerve impulses or action potentials. Communication between neurons is a chemical process. Communication of information within the neuron takes place in two stages. The first is resting potential and second is action potential. This can also be explained differently. The resting and action potentials are the situations where the internal region of the neuron contains negative charge and the outside contain a positive one. It is the neuron's membrane that ensures that the division of the neuron into two separate regions by regulating the concentration of chemical substances inside and outside of the cell—inside the cell, the membrane ensures a high concentration of negatively charged

proteins, and also a high concentration of positively charged chemical substance outside the cell. As a result of these different concentrations of ions and proteins, electrostatic pressure builds between the inside and the outside. The negatively charged ions and proteins inside the cell attract the positive ions outside, and the cell is poised for action (Roediger et al. 1998, 40-41).

A change in the ability of the membrane to maintain concentrations of negatively charged ions in the cell and positively charged ions outside the cell disturbs the balance of the resting potential; this process results in what is called neuron firing or cell firing. When an action potential reaches a synapse, the pores in the cell membrane are opened thereby allowing an influx of positively charged calcium atoms into the pre-synaptic terminal. This causes a particular kind of neurotransmitter to be released into a small gap between the two cells, known as the synaptic cleft. The neurotransmitter diffuses across the synaptic cleft and interacts with receptors (some specialized proteins) that are embedded in the post-synaptic membrane. The neurotransmitter released by a particular neuron at the synaptic cleft and the kind of receptor involved determine whether the neuron will fire or not. The effect of the neurotransmitter on the postsynaptic membrane (of the subsequent neuron) will depend on the kind of the neurotransmitter, the nature of the postsynaptic receptors, and on whether or not the post-synaptic ion channels are voltage-gated or chemically-gated. The receptors are ion channels that allow certain types of ions (charged atoms) to pass through a pore within their structure (West 1985, 50). For example, researchers had been able to use a particular kind of neurotransmitter, dopamine, to explain the activation of some receptors. This process is explained by Richard E. Wilcox et al. (1998, 4):

> ...the dopamine is protected from degradation within the presynaptic terminal by storage in membranous vesicles. The dopamine remains within the vesicles until an action potential arrives at the terminal and induces a voltage-dependent calcium ion entry that induces transmitter release (stimulus-secretion coupling). As a result of calcium entry, the vesicular contents (including dopamine and several proteins) are extruded into the immediately adjacent synaptic cleft. Within the cleft, dopamine diffuses to stimulate dopamine receptors. These receptors may be on the nerve terminal (axon terminal autoreceptors, named so because they respond to the neuron's own transmitter) or on the nondopaminergic target cell (post-synaptic heteroceptors, named so because these neurons do not secrete dopamine). Similarly, dopamine release from the dendrites or cell body can stimulate another class of impulse-flow-regulating receptors (dendritic or somal autoreceptors, respectively).

Dopamine has been found to concentrate in neurons in an area of the brain called the substantia nigra and in the midbrain tegmentum. Some of these neurons project to the forebrain where, given behavioral evidence, they are thought to play some role in mood regulation (Churchland 1986, 78).

The mechanism of action of the neurotransmitter on the post-synaptic neuron is that it is bound to a receptor on the post-synaptic membrane, and sets-off a sequence of events that releases another chemical inside the post-synaptic neuron. Neuroscientists assert that this activity explains the varieties of raw feel (qualia) which accompany the mental experiences of an organism. This identity of qualia with the interactions of neurotransmitters and the

receptors is what I would like to call neuroqualia. Each neuroquale is dependent on the particular neurochemical interaction (i.e., the kind of neurotransmitter that is released and the particular kind of receptor) that is activated in the central nervous system.

The hypothesis that a particular quale of a mental experience is a specific interaction of a particular neurotransmitter and a receptor in the synaptic cleft is supported by the findings and results of a number of research and experiments conducted by neuroscientists. Let us take a few examples: Using the psychophysical and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) devices, some neuroscientists studied individual differences in pain sensitivity (Robert et. al. 2003, 8538-42). Seventeen individuals underwent the same painful stimulation using five 30-s-duration epochs of 49°C stimulation interleaved with 30-s-duration epochs of 35°C stimulation. By virtue of the result of this experiment, we can say, as a matter of hypothesis, that the cerebral cortical regions of the brain such as the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), primary somatosensory cortex (SI), and prefrontal cortex (PFC) exhibited more frequent and more robust activation in individuals who were highly sensitive to pain compared to individuals who were insensitive to pain. It was also discovered that although all these three regions exhibit responses that are related to pain intensity, each region may make a differential contribution to various aspects of the conscious experience of pain. The result of the experiment, in the main, showed that each subject that underwent the mental experience of pain had a distinct subjective conscious experience of pain peculiar to her, despite the fact that all the subjects were exposed to the same mental experience of pain. In another experiment, the neural basis of *what it is like to be anxious* is the activities of some neurochemicals in the nervous system of the human body. The hypothesis developed by some neuroscientists is that the feel of anxiety is a function of some neural connections and disturbances in the cerebral cortex, especially the limbic system. Specifically, it was discovered that the disturbances in the cerebral cortex result from the release of some neurotransmitters such as norepinephrine, GABA, and serotonin, and the feel of anxiety is the function of the activities of these neurotransmitters mixed with some receptors in the central nervous system of an anxious person. The evidence for this is that drugs that affect or limit the activities of the identified neurotransmitters are efficacious in the treatment of several anxiety disorders (Brawman-Mintzer et al. 1997, 16-25).

The anomalousness in the neuroqualia hypothesis is that, when a neurotransmitter is deposited in the synaptic cleft, there are a number of potential receptors waiting to be activated and each receptor so activated is a token of neurochemical interaction which is the same as a particular raw feel—a neuroquale. The implication of this is that, given the principle of anomalous monism, the neurotransmitter must just activate a receptor, there is no necessity which receptor is activated. It is difficult to predict the kind of receptor that is activated by the neurotransmitter, and if, as the neuroidentity hypothesis suggests, this neurochemical interaction is a neuroquale of a mental state, it follows that it is impossible to predict the quale that accompanies a particular mental experience. In other words, the main thrust of the neuroidentity hypothesis is that when a neurotransmitter is deposited in the synaptic cleft, there are a number of potential receptors waiting to be activated; and each receptor so activated throws off a different kind of qualia. Given the fact that there is no conclusive knowledge on the number of neurotransmitters, the receptors, and the interaction between them, it is difficult to identify the particular neurotransmitter and the receptor that is identified with a particular quale.

Though purported to be a shortcoming, the attraction of the neuroidentity hypothesis is its anomalousness. It is this that explains the subjective, private, elusive, and indescribable character of neuroqualia. This is because there is no rule that guides the capability and activities of a particular neurotransmitter released into the synaptic cleft, and there is no rule governing the kind of receptor, and the capability and activity of the receptor so activated by the neurotransmitter. So, if these neurochemical interactions are neuroqualia, then neuroqualia is identical with unpredictable properties of mental experience in the person who possesses the experience. The neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system are also private to the individual; no amount of descriptions of the interactive processes in a third person language can replicate the same neurochemical interaction in a third person. If these neurochemical interactions are neuroqualia, then neuroqualia are subjective, private, and elusive for third-party description. This is the neuroidentity hypothesis.

If the neuroidentity hypothesis is to advance a scientific theory of neuroqualia, it is important that we are able to identify the character and capability of a particular neurotransmitter, specify the exact receptor that it would activate in the synaptic cleft, and, consequently, point out the specific neuroquale that would be ignited once a particular neural interaction takes place in the central nervous system of a person. Unfortunately, it has been said that the hope of achieving these specifications is slim but not impossible (Churchland 1986, 78). Hence, granted that it is possible, in the future, to be specific about the neurochemical interaction that is identified as a neuroquale, what is next is to decide whether a neuroquale is the same as a quale in the dualist's conception of a quale.

NEUROQUALIA AS QUALIA: A DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE

It is germane to decide whether neuroqualia, the interaction between a particular neurotransmitter and an identified receptor, fits the description of qualia as the dualist conceives of it. For, if the neuroquale is different from the dualist's quale, the arguments between them would be about different things and there would be no real disagreement. One way to do this is to argue that since the interactions of the neurochemicals (neurotransmitters and receptors) are peculiar to their owners, then neuroqualia would also be subjective to their owners. This explains the subjectivity of neuroqualia, which is also an essential characteristic of qualia. There is the need to establish that "subjectivity" as an essential characteristic of qualia also characterizes neuroqualia.

One agreed characteristic of qualia is that they are perspectivally or essentially subjective. This is so in the sense that the feature of pain—the what it is like to feel pain—implies that there is a subject that feels the pain and that, for that subject, there is what it is like to feel pain. Tye (1999, 708) puts it differently by saying:

> Knowing what it is like to feel pain requires one to have a certain experiential point of view or perspective, namely the one conferred upon one by being the subject of the pain. This is why a person born without the capacity to feel pain and kept alive in a very carefully controlled environment could never come to know what it is like to experience pain.

This shows that the capacity to feel pain is prior to having what it is like to feel pain. In Norman Malcolm's (1988,148) understanding of Thomas Nagel, to possess the capacity to feel pain seems to require the presence of an experiential point of view. This point of view, as seen in the neuroidentity hypothesis, is explained by the neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system of the person that feels the pain. The argument is that since it is because a person is undergoing an experience of pain that she has a relevant perspective or point of view of the pain, and to undergo an experience of pain is explained by the neurochemical interactions going on in one's central nervous system, the point of view is explained by the neurochemical interactions going on in the central nervous system.

Moreover, since the neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system are strictly experienced by the person that has them, the subjectivity of what it is like to feel pain is implicitly explained by the subjectivity of the neurochemical interaction in the central nervous system. Moreover, if neuroqualia are identical with the neurochemical interactions, then neuroqualia also share perspectival subjectivity as qualia did. The fact that the neurochemical interaction in each individual is distinct, and is peculiar to the being in whose body the interaction takes place, suggests that the neurochemical interaction in each individual is also distinctively subjective to the owner. If, given the neuroidentity hypothesis, neuroqualia are neurochemical interactions, and neurochemical interactions are subjective to the owner, then neuroqualia are subjectively owned by the person in whom the neurochemical interactions take place.

Nagel has argued that the subjective character of qualia does not necessarily imply that the phenomenal experience is comprehensible only from one point of view. As he (1997, 522) said:

> I am not adverting here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is to a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which the phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view—to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak.

If Nagel is right, then Malcolm (1998, 149) is correct to infer that "by virtue of being human it is possible for me to grasp the point of view of another human being; but not the point of view of a member of some very different species, such as a bat or a reptile."

The notion of subjectivity involved in the character of qualia suggests that given human comprehensive understanding of the neurobiological organs and neurochemical properties that explain the mental experience of a human being, the subjective character of the mental experience could be objectively explained. This is what is being demonstrated through the neuroidentity hypothesis, which explains neuroqualia as the neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system of human beings. Also, the hypothesis that neuroqualia are the same as the neurochemical interactions in the human brain fits well by R.W. Sperry's (1965, 8) speculation that:

> What is central is that unique patterning of cerebral excitation (i.e., the neurochemical interactions and processes in the neurobiological entities such as the central nervous system) that produces pain instead of something else. It is the over-all functional property of this pain pattern that is critical in the causal sequence of brain affairs.... It is this over-all pattern effect in brain dynamic that is the pain quality of inner experience.

For Sperry, the neurochemical interactions and processes are fundamental in the explanation of qualia, the conscious quality of mental experiences. The neuroidentity hypothesis outlined in this paper provides a conceptual backing for this position.

CONCLUSION

In proposing a neuroidentity hypothesis, according to which a neuroquale is the same as a particular neurochemical interaction in the central nervous system, this paper does not intend to provide an exact scientific theory of consciousness. It, however, attempts to hypothesize on how to utilize the interactions among neurochemicals in the central nervous system to show that qualia, the phenomenal properties of conscious mental states, are susceptible to scientific explanation. Possible problems with the neuroidentity hypothesis, and the idea of neuroqualia, as conceptualized here could be envisaged. One of such problems is that since there are numerous kinds of neurotransmitters and billions of receptors and subtypes of receptors, and given that there is no strict mechanism or principle guiding the activation of a particular receptor by a particular neurotransmitter, it follows that it is difficult to categorically identify a specific neurochemical interaction to be identified with a neuroquale. For example, it is possible that a particular combination of neurotransmitter and an activated receptor is identical with two different kinds of neuroqualia as, for instance, the release of dopamine in the cerebral cortex has a high affinity for D_1-receptors (subtypes of dopamine receptor) and this neurochemical interaction (between dopamine and D_1-receptors) is identified with the feel of arousal and mood in humans. But, it is possible that this same neurochemical interaction (between dopamine and D_1-receptors) is identified with another kind of feel, say depression. Moreover, a particular type of receptor is, in a different region of the brain, capable of interacting with some other neurotransmitters, and when this happens, diverse raw feels, different from what is already identified with the receptor, are produced. In other words, based on the distribution of D_2-receptors (subtype of dopamine receptor) on another area of the brain, the same dopamine produces effects different from what have been previously associated with it as, for example, when dopamine is bound to the D_2-receptor in the cerebral cortex, such interaction is identified as the feel of arousal, mood; when the same neurochemicals interact in the limbic system of a human being, such a being has the feel of stereotypic behaviour; when dopamine and D_2-receptor interact in the corpus striatum, in the ventral hypothalamus, and in the anterior pituitary, distinct sensual feels are recorded. Also, it is possible that a particular feel or neuroquale can be traced to the interaction of different neurotransmitters and receptors in the synaptic cleft. For example, the conscious experience of being nauseous and feeling like vomiting is explainable through the presence of D_2-receptors (subtype of dopamine receptor) in the chemoreceptor trigger zone (an area of the medulla) when bound to dopamine. The same feelings are recorded when 5-HT (5-Hydroxytryptamine) bound to 5-HT_3-receptors found

chiefly in the area postrema (a region of the medulla) (Rang et. al. 2007, 476-82). This indeterminacy in the affinity between neurotransmitters and receptors, the neurochemical interaction identified as neuroqualia, is a problem for the neuroidentity hypothesis as a possible scientific theory of qualia.

A more enduring problem for the neuroidentity hypothesis is that there is the need to establish a kind of necessary connection between the interaction among the neurochemicals in the synaptic cleft and the quality of conscious experience, which is referred to as a neuroquale. Upon what basis is the claim that a particular neurochemical interaction is the same as a neuroquale? Moreover, researches in nervous systems and consciousness have shown that there is a great deal of neural activities that occur without any phenomenal consciousness at all. Examples are the neural activities that go on in the brains of comatose people. So, some neural interactions are, and some are not, constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. In view of this, the neuroidentity fails to assert that, in all possible worlds, the neurochemical interaction in the central nervous system is the same as neuroqualia. This problem recapitulates the dualist position of separating phenomenal consciousness or qualia, even neuroqualia, from the neurochemical interactions in the nervous system. Given this distinction, we are back to the initial problem: Why is the secretion of a particular neurotransmitter by a particular neuron and the activation of a particular receptor the same as a particular quale? Given a neural activity in the synaptic cleft, there exist some neuroqualia. The question is—"Why is this so?"

Notwithstanding the problems raised above, the neuroidentity hypothesis is noble because it invites a more critical examination of the essential properties of the neural chemicals that interact in the central nervous system. The hypothesis has asserted that a quale is the same as the interaction of some neurotransmitters and receptors in some regions of the nervous system. The problem is that we do not, at present, possess a complete knowledge of all the essential properties of neurotransmitters and receptors; and so, we cannot ascertain what makes the interaction of some neurochemicals the same as a particular phenomenon identified as a neuroquale. So, it could be argued that the more information we have about the neurochemicals and neurointeractions in the central nervous system of a conscious being, the more we move closer to being specific about the particular neurochemicals that are activated when a human being has a particular neuroquale. This possible advancement in neuroscientific knowledge would give credence to the physicalist assertion that the occurrence of neuroqualia is not a myth and that it is not a phenomenon that is beyond scientific explanation.

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TURING AND COMPUTATIONALISM

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Due to his significant role in the development of computer technology and the discipline of artificial intelligence, Alan Turing has supposedly subscribed to the theory of mind that has been greatly inspired by the power of the said technology which has eventually become the dominant framework for current researches in artificial intelligence and cognitive science, namely, computationalism *or the* computational theory of mind. *In this essay, I challenge this supposition. In particular, I will try to show that there is no evidence in Turing's two seminal works that supports such a supposition. His 1936 paper is all about the notion of* computation *or* computability *as it applies to mathematical functions and not to the nature or workings of intelligence. On the other hand, while his 1950 work is about intelligence, it is, however, particularly concerned with the problem of whether intelligence can be attributed to computing machines and not of whether computationality can be attributed to human intelligence or to intelligence in general.*

INTRODUCTION

As Alan Turing [1912-1954] played a significant role in the development of computer technology and the discipline of artificial intelligence (henceforth AI), it is natural to suppose that he subscribed to the theory of mind that has been greatly inspired by the power of the said technology and that has eventually become the dominant framework for current researches in AI and cognitive science, namely *computationalism* or the *computational theory of mind*. Such a supposition can be gleaned, for instance, from the following remark by Herbert Simon—a pioneer of AI and a vigorous promoter and staunch defender of computationalism—in his essay "Machine as mind" (1995, 676):

> The materials of thought are symbols—patterns, which can be replicated in a great variety of materials (including neurons and chips), thereby enabling physical symbol systems fashioned of these materials to think. Turing was perhaps the first to have this insight in clear form, forty years ago.

Simon clearly speaks here of the standard view of *classical computationalism* that human thinking is a kind of computing defined as a process of symbol manipulation, which, according to him, was pioneered by Turing.

This supposition can likewise be gleaned from the arguments of some critics of computationalism, in particular the anti-computationalist arguments of John Searle and Roger Penrose. Searle's Chinese Room argument (1980, 417-57) is a classic anti-computationalist argument that basically disputes the alleged computationalist conclusions drawn from the Turing test (referring to the imitation game introduced by Turing in his 1950 paper). Searle, in gist, argues that passing the Turing test is not a guarantee that a computing machine, which passes such as test, is "genuinely" intelligent—which, in Searle's light, means that the machine is aware of what the symbols it manipulates represent in the world (see Mabaquiao 2012, 65-67; 2008, 229-30 for an elaboration of this argument).

For his part, Penrose claims that no machine can ever simulate human intelligence and thus pass, even in principle, the Turing test. Penrose (1994, 64-65) bases his claim on Kurt Gödel's *incompleteness theorem*, which, in general, states that any formal system is bound to contain some propositions whose truth is not derivable from the rules of the system. Penrose, following Lucas (1961), infers from this theorem that the human mind is not a formal system and as such can never be a computer. For unlike computers, humans can transcend the rules of a formal system to recognize the truth of statements not derivable from the system. Given this, it would then be impossible for a formal system such as the computer to simulate the human mind. Speaking of the computationalist view as "*A*," Searle's as "*B*," and his own as "*C*," Penrose (1994, 14-15) distinguishes these views as follows:

> The acceptance of this kind of argument, which basically is what is referred to as a Turing test, is in essence what distinguishes *A* from *B*. According to *A*, any computer-controlled robot which, after sustained questioning, convincingly behaves as though it possesses consciousness, must be considered actually to be conscious—whereas according to *B*, a robot could perfectly well behave exactly as a conscious person might behave without itself actually possessing any of this mental quality. Both *A* and *B* would allow that a computer-controlled robot could convincingly behave as a conscious person does, but viewpoint *C*, on the other hand, would not even admit that a fully effective simulation of a conscious person could ever be achieved merely by a computer-controlled robot.

Accordingly, while Searle disputes the sufficiency of the Turing test as a basis for attributing (genuine) intelligence to a computing machine, Penrose disputes the conceivability of a computing machine passing such a test (see Mabaquiao 2011, 77-80; 2012, 170-72). Nonetheless, Penrose, like Searle, focuses on the Turing test in making a case against computationalism. And this only proves that both Searle and Penrose acknowledge the supposed critical role of the Turing test in establishing the view of computationalism.

In this essay, I challenge the supposition that Turing supports or advances the view of computationalism. In particular, I will show that there is no evidence in Turing's two seminal works—"On computable numbers with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem" (1936) and "Computing machinery and intelligence" (1950)—that supports such a supposition. While his 1936 paper is all about the notion of *computation* or *computability* as it applies to mathematical functions and not to the nature of intelligence, his 1950 work—though about intelligence—is, however, particularly concerned with the problem of whether intelligence can be attributed to computing machines and not of whether computationality can be

attributed to human intelligence or to intelligence in general. I divide my discussion into three. I introduce in the first the central theses of computationalism. I discuss in the second Turing's investigation of the meaning of computation. I tackle in the third Turing's analysis of the legitimacy of attributing intelligence to computing machines.

COMPUTATIONALISM: THE CENTRAL THESES

In their joint article, "Foundations of cognitive science," Herbert Simon and Craig Kaplan (1990, 2) define cognitive science as "the study of intelligence and its computational processes in humans (and animals), in computers, and in the abstract." This definition identifies the levels on which a computationalist investigation of the nature of intelligence is to be carried out, namely on the *abstract, human* (and animal), and *machine* levels. Based on these levels, we can accordingly divide the central claims of computationalism into *a general thesis*, which concerns the abstract level of intelligence, and *two subtheses*, which concern the human and machine levels of intelligence.

The general thesis claims that thinking or cognition is a type of computational process or, as Zenon Pylyshyn (1990, 51) puts it, *a species of computing*. Cognition, here defined abstractly, does not exclusively pertain to the intelligence of a particular type of entities for it can in principle be instantiated by the intelligence of various types of entities. We can refer to this general thesis more specifically as the *thesis of cognitive computationality*. Now as the two *subtheses* concern the human and machine instantiations of this general thesis, we can respectively call them the *thesis of human computationality* and the *thesis of machine intelligence*. The thesis of human computationality claims that *human cognition* is a computational process; whereas the thesis of machine intelligence claims that machines capable of computationally simulating human cognitive processes are themselves intelligent. As the machines capable of doing this simulation are computers, the thesis of machine intelligence can thus be simplified as the claim that computers are intelligent.

While computationalism considers humans and machines as entities in which the general thesis of computationalism are instantiated, it must be noted that the same thesis can in principle be instantiated in any other conceivable type of entities that can be considered intelligent, examples of which are animals and aliens or extraterrestrials. For if it is true that cognition is a species of computing on the abstract level, then any conceivable entity that can be considered intelligent must be an entity whose intelligence is a species of computing. The general thesis thus guarantees that the intelligence of humans and machines are of the same kind, that is, of the same computational kind.

The difference between human intelligence and machine intelligence is here regarded simply as a matter of degree or, more specifically, as a difference in degree of complexity or sophistication. This means that the intelligence of humans is seen simply as a more complex or sophisticated type of intelligence than the one allegedly possessed by computers. Being so, the possible gap between human intelligence and machine intelligence is a contingent matter and thus in principle can be bridged. Furthermore, it is even conceivable that in the future machine intelligence will be able to surpass human intelligence [see Chalmers's (2010) paper on singularity]. We are here, of course, referring not to the speed and accuracy by which humans and machines process information—for in these departments modern digital computers obviously outdo humans—but to the other aspects of intelligence where machines are still too slow compared to humans. Some of these aspects are identified in the

following remarks by James McClelland, David Rumelhart, and Geoffrey Hinton (1995, 305) in their joint article, "The appeal of parallel distributed processing":

> What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker and more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive tasks. People are far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.

Computationalism has also been called *strong AI*. This is due to the distinction made by Searle (1980) between *strong AI* and *weak AI*. According to Searle, weak AI is the view that makes the neutral (and philosophically uncontroversial) claim that the computer is a powerful tool for understanding how the mind works, while strong AI is the view that makes the bold (and philosophically controversial) claim that the human mind is a kind of computer or, more specifically, a kind of computer program implemented or run by the brain hardware. Strong AI thus looks at the mind-brain relation as a type of software-hardware relation, which is popularly put as "the mind is to software as the brain is to hardware." Roger Schank and Peter Childers (1984, 43), two of strong AI's staunch defenders, put straightforwardly in their book, *The cognitive computer*, the thesis of strong AI as follows: "Our cognitive apparatus has two main components: the actual brain itself (the hardware, really) and the knowledge or information it contains (the software)."

Not only is computationalism the dominant framework in current AI researches pertaining to the construction of intelligent machines, it is likewise the dominant framework in current researches in the emergent discipline whose main project is to naturalize the mind or to assimilate it into the scientific worldview, namely, *cognitive science*. Jay Freidenberg and Gordon Silverman (2006, 2) define cognitive science as "the scientific interdisciplinary study of the mind." It is scientific in that its primary methodology is the scientific method and it is interdisciplinary in that it draws from the findings of a number of different disciplines whose common interest is the study of the mind. These disciplines are comprised of philosophy, artificial intelligence, linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology (see Gardner 1985, 6-7). But though it aims to be interdisciplinary in its approach, cognitive science, in its very framework, remains to be computational. Freidenberg and Silverman (2006, 2-3) explain:

> In order to really understand what cognitive science is all about we need to know what its theoretical perspective on the mind is. This perspective centers on the idea of computation, which may alternatively be called information processing. Cognitive scientists view the mind as an information processor.

Speaking of how cognitive scientists understand the nature of the mind, Gardner (1985, 6) basically makes the same point:

> ...there is the faith that central to any understanding of the human mind is the electronic computer. Not only are computers indispensable for carrying out

studies of various sorts, but, more crucially, the computer also serves as the most viable model of how the human mind functions.

Consequently, this limits what cognitive science draws from the findings of the other disciplines—only to those that will help advance the computational conception of the mind.

NATURE OF COMPUTATION

There are two key concepts in the theses of computationalism, namely *computation* and *intelligence*. To fully understand the claims of computationalism, one needs a good grasp of what these two concepts mean, or, better yet, how these concepts are understood within the perspective of computationalism. Incidentally, these are also the two concepts that preoccupied Turing in his two seminal works—the 1936 and 1950 papers—and his investigations in this regard have apparently laid the grounds from which computationalism developed. Be that as it may, it is, however, a different thing to say that Turing endorses or supports the view of computationalism.

In his 1936 paper, "On computable numbers with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem," Turing clarifies the notion of *computation* or *computability* as a way of responding to a foundational problem in mathematics posed by the great mathematician David Hilbert. Hilbert's problem, which has come to be known as the *decision problem*, asks whether there is an effective or mechanical procedure by means of which we can determine whether or not any given mathematical problem is solvable (or whether any given mathematical function is computable). Turing's ingenious strategy is to clarify the concept of computation not in the context of "human computers" (i.e., humans doing computations) but in the context of "computing machines" (i.e., machines doing computations). In this way, the scientifically intractable psychological considerations—mainly referring to the subjective qualities of conscious states—are put aside; and thus the investigation becomes a purely objective and mechanical undertaking.

In the course of specifying the basic features that a machine must have, as well as the basic operations that it must be capable of performing, in order to perform computations and thus be regarded as computing, Turing conceives of an abstract computing machine which has come to be known as the *Turing machine*. The Turing machine specifies the basic features of any possible computing machine; and for this reason, it serves as the theoretical forerunner of the modern digital computer. It becomes, as it were, the blueprint for constructing actual computers. Consequently, with his concept of the Turing machine, Turing then defines computation or computability in terms of the actions of a Turing machine. Accordingly, a computation is whatever can be implemented in a Turing machine; and, corollary to this, a mathematical function is computable (or a mathematical problem is solvable) if such a function can be implemented in a Turing machine. This way of defining computation and computability has eventually come to be known as the *Church-Turing Thesis,* after the logician Alonzo Church (1937, 42-43) has recognized the superior intelligibility of the Turing machine as a scheme for defining computability over other similar schemes. Such other schemes included Church's own, namely the *lambda calculus,* while another was Emil Post's (see Penrose 1994, 20-21). And the said result of the schemes was a negative response to Hilbert's problem: that there is no effective or mechanical procedure by which one can determine the computability of any given mathematical function. Furthermore, Turing's scheme, presumably

because of its superior intelligibility, also became the basis of the ordinary conception of computation as an "effective procedure" or as a finite set of step-by-step procedures to arrive at a desired result (see Tim Crane 1995, 88).

Now, in light of the Church-Turing Thesis, to say that thinking is a species of computing is to say that thinking is an operation of a Turing machine, for anything that is a species of computing is an operation of a Turing machine. This was the basis of Putnam when he remarked, in the course of advancing his *machine functionalism*, which was a precursor of computationalism (see Mabaquiao 2012, 32-35)—that "human minds are instantiations of Turing machines" (see Putnam 1991, 199-200). Saying that human minds are instantiations of Turing machines is, of course, just another way of saying that human minds are computers. But all this would follow only if we grant, at the beginning, that thinking is indeed a species of computing. But Turing's 1936 paper has nothing to say about the nature of thinking. What will follow from Turing's ideas in this paper is that whenever we perform computations what we do are explainable in terms of the operations of a Turing machine, and not that whenever we think we perform computations. In the case of humans, computing, of course, is a kind of thinking, but this does not imply that computing is all there is to human thinking. We can say, in this regard, that computing is a species of thinking, but not the other way around—that thinking is a species of computing.

In sum, Turing's 1936 paper, in the course of answering Hilbert's foundational question about mathematics, clarified the meaning of computation (and computability) and in the process contributed to the development of the computer. Turing's clarification of the concept of computation, however, was never intended by Turing to describe the nature or essence of human thinking and to advance the view that thinking is a species of computing. The claim that the human mind is an instantiation of a Turing machine already grants such a view.

ATTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE

In his 1950 paper, Turing tackles another problem still related to computing but this time on the question of whether computing machines can be considered intelligent. And the manner by which he tackles this problem, through an imitation game now famously known as the *Turing test,* paves the way for the development of AI as a discipline (as a branch of computer science that studies the nature of intelligence with the objective of constructing intelligent machines). It is said that some early AI programs, such as Joseph Weizenbaum's ELIZA created in 1966 and Kenneth Colby's PARRY created in 1972, were made with the objective of passing the Turing test. If Turing's 1936 paper is a landmark in the history of digital computers and computer science, his 1950 paper is a landmark in the history of AI. As Herbert Simon and Craig Kaplan (1990, 2) write: "Since at least 1950 [we might take Turing's (1950) essay as a convenient starting point] that branch of computer science called 'artificial intelligence' has been studying the intelligence exhibited by machines" (see also French 2000, 215-16).

The question in his 1950 paper is whether computing machines is intelligent, and not whether human intelligence or intelligence in general is computational. But could a test for machine intelligence not also serve as a test for the computationality of intelligence? To properly deal with this question, we need to examine Turing's conception of intelligence as assumed in his test and how such a conception of intelligence correlates with the

computationalist's own conception. But first let us examine our commonsense notions of intelligence.

Two views on the nature of intelligence

We normally believe that human intelligence has both functional and conscious aspects. Its functional aspect generally consists in the ability to perform certain functions or to carry out certain tasks, which include answering questions, following rules, and solving problems. It is in light of this aspect that we say, for instance, that a student is intelligent in the area of mathematics if he or she can actually solve mathematical problems or perform mathematical operations. Its conscious aspect, on the other hand, generally consists in the experience of certain mental states and processes, such as understanding and reasoning, as one performs certain functions or carries out certain tasks. And it is in light of this aspect that we say, for instance, that someone who gives the correct answer to a certain problem but does not understand how such an answer is arrived at is not really intelligent or does not really perform an intelligent action.

The kind of intelligence assumed in computationalism, however, is a general one in that it concerns both humans and machines. What is said to be a species of computing is intelligence not just as it is possessed by humans but as it can possibly be possessed by machines as well. The question that arises here is whether intelligence, understood in this sense, should also be construed as having both functional and conscious features. Machines can obviously share the functional aspect of human intelligence; it is, however, quite contentious whether they can also share the conscious aspect of human intelligence. Be that as it may, the fundamentality of the conscious aspect of intelligence is here put into question. And, consequently, the question that we need to contend with is: *Is functionality sufficient to define the nature of intelligence?*

I shall call the affirmative reply to this question the *purely functional view,* while the negative reply the *conscious view*. The purely functional view thus states that functionality is adequate to explain the nature of intelligence, while the conscious view states otherwise. For the purely functional view, an entity is intelligent if it has the required functionality, regardless of whether or not such an entity is conscious; but for the conscious view, such an entity can only be intelligent if, in addition to having the required functionality, it is also conscious. The "conscious view" should not be confused with what can be called the "purely conscious view." The purely conscious view states that consciousness adequately defines the nature of intelligence, but the conscious view only asserts that consciousness is as fundamental as functionality in defining the nature of intelligence. The purely conscious view can be attributed to the idealists (who regard reality as fundamentally mental or spiritual) and substance dualists (who regard mental reality as independent of physical reality). While this view may have been influential in the past, it is, however, no longer in contention in contemporary philosophy of mind where the main motivation is the naturalization of the mind. Consequently, we shall limit our discussion to the purely functional and conscious views.

Most of the strong advocates of the purely functional view are AI scientists who subscribe to computationalism. AI pioneers Simon and Newell, for instance, clearly assume this view in their *physical symbol system hypothesis*, which regards intelligence only in terms of action and behavior. In their award-winning essay,

"Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols and search," they (1976, 116) explain that "[a] physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action," and by "general intelligent action," they "indicate the same scope of intelligence as we see in human action: that in any real situation behavior appropriate to the ends of the system and adaptive to the demands of the environment can occur, within some limits of speed and complexity." Simon (1989, 1-2), along with another fellow AI scientist, Kaplan, in another essay, "Foundations of cognitive science," further states that "people are behaving intelligently when they choose courses of action that are relevant to achieving their goals, when they reply coherently and appropriately to questions that are put to them, when they solve problems of lesser or greater difficulty, or when they create or design something useful or beautiful or novel..." It is, however, Roger Schank and Peter Childers (1984, 51), in their book *The cognitive computer*, who may have provided the most direct expression of the purely functional view; thus: "When we ask *What is intelligence?* we are really only asking *What does an entity, human or machine, have to do or say for us to call it intelligent?*"

On the other hand, most proponents of the conscious view are critics of computationalism, such as Penrose and Searle. Perhaps the clearest expressions of the conscious view come from the highly accomplished mathematician and physicist Penrose. In his book, *The emperor's new mind: Concerning computers, minds, and the laws of physics*, Penrose (1989, 525-26) writes:

> There is also the question of what one means by the term 'intelligence'. This, after all, is what the AI people are concerned with, rather than the perhaps more nebulous issue of 'consciousness'.... In my own way of looking at things, the question of intelligence is a subsidiary one to that of consciousness. I do not think that I would believe that true intelligence could be actually present unless accompanied by consciousness.

In his other book, *Shadows of the mind: A search for the missing science of consciousness*, Penrose (1994, 38-39) argues that one cannot talk of intelligence and not talk of consciousness at the same time. For according to Penrose, if "(a) 'intelligence' *requires* 'understanding' and (b) 'understanding' *requires* 'awareness'," then intelligence requires awareness. Thus, for Penrose, to say that something can be intelligent without being conscious in some way is to misuse the word "intelligence" or to deviate from its original meaning.

Searle generally shares with Penrose's view of intelligence. Searle, however, is more specific in explaining that there is only understanding, and hence intelligence, if there is awareness of what our mental states represent in the world. The intentionality or directedness of our mental states (the cognitive or intentional ones) necessarily requires awareness of the objects or states of affairs that these mental states are about. Searle (1980) thus contends in his Chinese Room argument that machines can never be genuinely intelligent since they can never have an awareness of what the symbols that they manipulate refer to in the world. These machines individuate and manipulate these symbols simply on the basis of their syntax and not of their semantics as well.

Intelligence and the Turing test

Turing begins his 1950 paper by exploring how the question "Can machines think?" can best be dealt with. One usual strategy is to define the key terms involved in the question, namely "machine" and "think." But as definitions should reflect the various ordinary usages of the terms being defined, this strategy will just turn the question ("Can machines think?") as something that is answerable via a statistical survey, which Turing finds absurd. Turing then proposes a strategy where the original formulation of the question is to be replaced with one that is closely related to the original formulation but which avoids its possible ambiguities. Turing's proposed reformulation of the question involves what he calls an "imitation game," which we now know as the Turing test. The test basically determines whether a machine can successfully imitate the intelligent behavior of a human to deserve the attribution of intelligence. The main idea is that if the human is regarded as intelligent in virtue of his or her behavior, then a machine exhibiting the same behavior should, by force of consistency, be regarded as intelligent as well.

One simplified version of this test is as follows. Imagine a human interrogator communicating with two respondents: one is human while the other is a machine. A wall physically separates the interrogator and the two respondents; and the interrogator communicates with the respondents only through text messages using computers. Let us say that there are two computer terminals, one for each respondent; and the interrogator, though he knows that he is communicating with a human and a machine, does not know in which terminal he is communicating with the human and with the machine. According to the test, if after a series of questions and answers the interrogator could not tell solely on the basis of the respondents' answers which of these respondents is the human and which is the machine, the machine is said to have passed the test, and is consequently considered to be intelligent.

Is Turing through his test proposing a definition of intelligence? A widely held view is that he is, and the type of definition he is proposing is an *operational* one wherein intelligence is defined in terms of performing certain tasks or activities—which is nothing but what we have called the purely functional view of intelligence. Robert French (2000, 116), for instance, in his article "The Turing test: The first 50 years," writes that one of the seminal contributions of Turing was that "he provided an elegant operational definition of thinking that, in many ways, set the entire field of artificial intelligence (AI) in motion." Some scholars, however, dispute this view. Preeminent Turing scholar Jack Copeland (2000, 522), for instance, writes: "Twenty-five years later, the lesson has still not been learned that there is no definition to be found in Turing's paper of 1950. Commentator after commentator states that Turing's intention was to offer a definition of 'thinking' or 'intelligence'."

Copeland and others who share his view make a valid point here. There is a big difference between saying that functionality is the basis for intelligence attribution and saying that functionality is all there is to intelligence. There is in fact no logical inconsistency in holding that functionality is the only basis for intelligence attribution while maintaining that consciousness is also essential for intelligence. Turing is just concerned with intelligence attribution; he is not after a definition of intelligence. This is in fact clearly expressed by Turing (1950, 433) himself at the very beginning of his 1950 essay:

> I propose to consider the question, 'Can machines think?' This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think"...Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words.

Based on these remarks, Turing will simply be contradicting himself if he intends his replacement of the said question by another one as a way of offering a certain definition of intelligence. But is it not the case that the attribution of intelligence somehow presupposes a certain definition of intelligence? Yes, but the specification of such a definition is not necessary to settle the issue of whether intelligence can legitimately be attributed to machines. The point can perhaps be simply put as follows: *Regardless of what we really or ultimately mean by intelligence there are undoubtedly some concrete ways by means of which we attribute intelligence to our fellow humans.* The activity of answering questions must surely be one of these ways. What Turing simply does is to make this particular activity, with some modifications, as a test to determine whether intelligence can be legitimately attributed to machines.

Turing's reply (1950, 445-47) to the Argument from Consciousness further sheds light on this point—that he is not after a definition of intelligence. The argument maintains that intelligence can be attributed to machines only if machines can have conscious states such as emotions and sensations. Turing's reply is that we have no way of knowing whether machines are conscious or not when exhibiting intelligent behaviors, but this is no different from the fact that we also have no way of knowing whether other persons have conscious states when exhibiting intelligent behaviors. Turing further notes that if consciousness will be used as the criterion for intelligence attribution the result is the absurd position of *solipsism* (the view that only I, the speaker, have conscious states and thus the only intelligent being in the world). Turing, however, qualifies that he does not deny the mysteries about consciousness; what he rather thinks is that such mysteries have nothing to do with the attribution of intelligence to machines. Turing (1950, 447) continues:

> This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of our test. According to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking.... In short then, I think that most of those who support the argument from consciousness could be persuaded to abandon it rather than be forced into the solipsist position. They will then probably be willing to accept our test. I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to localise it. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question with which we are concerned in this paper.

Now, if Turing were concerned with defining intelligence he would have acknowledged the need to deal with the nature, or mystery, of consciousness whose reality he obviously does not deny. As Turing is not offering any definition of intelligence, it is safe to conclude that it does not really matter to him whether intelligence is defined in purely functional terms or in terms of consciousness as well. The most that can be said here is that his test advances a *functional criterion for intelligence attribution,* which does not necessarily imply or assume a purely functional definition of intelligence.

Furthermore, the Turing test, on closer inspection, is not a test for intelligence exclusive to computing machines. And if so, the computational nature of the machine that passes the test has nothing to do with the attribution of intelligence to it. This point is actually emphasized by Turing himself when he replies to one of the objections that he tackles in his 1950 paper, namely, the Argument from Continuity in the Nervous System. According to this objection, since the nervous system is not a discrete system while the computer is, then there cannot be a computer simulation of the nervous system. To this objection Turing (1950, 451) replies: "It is true that a discrete-state machine must be different from a continuous machine. But if we adhere to the conditions of the imitation game, the interrogator will not be able to take any advantage of this difference." Simply, the point of Turing is that the said objection is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Turing drives the point home when he clarifies that the computational nature of the computer is irrelevant to the attribution of intelligence to it since it is possible to conceive of another machine (e.g., the "differential analyser") that works differently from a computer but can likewise pass the test. Turing (1950, 451-52) writes:

> The situation can be made clearer if we consider some other simpler continuous machine. A differential analyser will do very well. (A differential analyser is a certain kind of machine not of the discrete-state type used for some kinds of calculation.).... It would not be possible for a digital computer to predict exactly what answers the differential analyser would give to a problem, but it would be quite capable of giving the right sort of answer.... Under these circumstances it would be very difficult for the interrogator to distinguish the differential analyser from the digital computer.

Finally, some scholars (see Whitby 1996, and Ford and Hayes 2002) have pointed out that while the Turing test did provide the impetus for researches in AI, such a test is no longer relevant and will even be an obstacle to the future development of AI. More particularly, while the project of constructing machine intelligence did start out by pursuing machine imitation of human intelligence, such a project, according to these scholars, would have to transcend, if not abandon, such a pursuit if it were to make real progress. The analogy used was mechanical flight: the construction of flying machines was inspired by bird flight and started out by imitating how birds fly (like the flapping of wings), but real progress came when some early designers of these machines (the Wright brothers) started thinking of how machines would be able to fly without imitating how birds fly.

I think this is a very important insight and it indirectly supports our own thoughts about the Turing test. Based on the given analogy, what will make this test irrelevant and an obstacle to the AI project will be the requirement that for machines to be truly intelligent they should be intelligent in *exactly* the same way that humans are intelligent. But the Turing test has no such requirement. As we have shown, it is enough for Turing that machines imitate the functionality of human intelligence to deserve the ascription of intelligence. And how such functionality is made possible by some inner processes, be they of the conscious, computational, or noncomputational type, is simply irrelevant for such an ascription. The Turing test that these scholars talk about can only refer, therefore, to a certain conception of this test which we have precisely put into question: that this test endorses a certain theory of mind (or definition of intelligence) which some scholars have taken to be that of computationalism.

CONCLUSION

Being widely regarded as the father of computer technology, Turing's contributions to the development of this technology are well placed. It is, however, contentious whether Turing subscribed to the theory of mind inspired by this technology—computationalism. I have shown that while Turing greatly contributed to the clarification of the two key concepts that define the theses of computationalism, namely, the concepts of *computation* and *intelligence*, his investigations on these concepts were neither intended to establish nor did they support the view that regards thinking as a species of computing.

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FOUCAULT: RETHINKING THE NOTIONS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

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This paper explores the political thought of Michel Foucault, which is anchored on his philosophy of subjectivation or the transformation of individuals into subjects. It presents his ideas of the State from the point of view of specific strategies and practices of power used in the transformation of individuals into subjects. It also presents his analysis of government as an organization that looks after the achievement of individual's goals and interests. The goal of government is not to achieve the common good but to realize the suitable end of each individual.

INTRODUCTION

This paper describes the political philosophy of Michel Foucault. Behind his discourses on madness, asylum, clinic, clinical gaze, prison, panopticon, and sexuality, are ideas about the modern State and government. He presents the State and the government in a different light by focusing on the techniques of power rather than on the grand narratives of sovereignty and welfare. His political philosophy does not speak of justice, peace, order, natural rights, and development. It does not deal with the essential components of the State; rather, it describes and analyzes how the State and the government transform individuals into the kind of subjects that the State or society wants them to be. It is a political philosophy that is focused on the technologies of individual transformation into subject. This paper is divided into three parts. The first two parts are about Foucault's discourses of State and institution which is based on the ideas of individualization and the plurality of the State. The third part is about Foucault's discourses on a government that cares after the welfare of every individual. The last part is a discussion about the influence of Christianity's pastoral power to the notion of modern government as an institution that seeks and looks after the welfare of the people.

FOUCAULT'S MICROPOLITICS

Foucault (1994a, 131) views the State as one that individualizes, and not only that totalizes, for it looks after the needs and welfare of each individual. The State is a combination of totalization procedures and structures and the political structures of individualization techniques. That is why, for Foucault (1994b, 181-82), the State exercises an individualizing

power that refers to the different techniques of power, "oriented toward individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way." In his study of the State and politics, Foucault focuses on the different technologies, which he calls as *technologies of the self* or *technologies of individuals*. According to him (1988b, 18), there are four types of technologies: (1) technologies of production, (2) technologies of sign systems, (3) technologies of power, and (4) technologies of the self. The first type is used in the production, transformation, and manipulation of things while the second type refers to the use of signs, meanings, symbols, or signification. In the technologies of power, strategies and techniques are used in order to determine the conduct of individuals and for them to submit to certain ends or goals while in the technologies of the self, liberty is given to people to pursue things based on their own means, but limited by certain prescriptions or norms that guide thoughts, conduct, and way of being. His analysis is centered on the technologies of power and technologies of the self. He (1988b, 19) is very much interested in the "interaction between oneself and others and in the technologies of individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon himself, in the technology of self." Such is the reason why Foucault's analysis of the State, and even his political philosophy, is not focused on the State as a structure and on the different institutions related to the State, known as state apparatuses. He is rather interested on analyzing the different individualizing techniques used and implemented by the State and its institutions in the transformation of individuals into subjects, the different techniques and strategies used as modes of subjectivation. Foucault's political philosophy does not answer the questions, "What is a State?" and "Why is there a State?" It answers the questions, "How does the State exercise power?" and "What are its effects?" In other words, he focused on studying and analyzing the specific strategies used in the exercise of power and how effective these strategies are. The understanding of these different strategies used for the transformation of individuals into subjects, or what Foucault calls as "subjectivation," is essential in the understanding of Foucault's micro-political philosophy.

FOUCAULT'S ANALYSIS OF THE STATE AND INSTITUTIONS

Foucault (1991a, 54-55) claims that he is a pluralist. He explains that as a pluralist, he problematizes the individualization of discourses and analyzes the linguistic system to which these discourses belong, and the "identity of the subject which holds them together." He further explains that he describes not the discourses in totality or in universality, but the "divergence, the distances, the oppositions, the differences, the relations of its various scientific discourses." This is also true in his analysis of the State. He looks at the State from a different point of view. He explains it not from the point of view of the sovereign, the source of power in the State, but from the point of view of practices and strategies of power. Furthermore, he does not analyze the State from the point of view of institutions, but looks at it as an interplay of the different practices and strategies of power by various institutions and groups. He (2007,116) moves "outside of the institution." He does not analyze the State from the point of view of institutions, but from the point of view of technologies of power.[2] He looks at the institutions from the external point of view of strategies and tactics, not from the internal point of view of function. He analyzes not the roles, functions, and purposes of institutions, but the strategies and tactics used by institutions in the exercise of power. These technologies of power cannot be implemented without the detailed and

specific strategies and tactics. Foucault looks at how the institutions use and implement the technologies of power by studying the minute details of the strategies and tactics employed.

Foucault's political analysis beyond institutions does not mean that he makes institutions irrelevant. In one of his published interviews entitled *Questions of methods* he (1991b, 74-75) states that he is interested more on the "how" rather than on the "what." For example, in his study of the prison, he asks the question, "How does one punish?" rather than the question, "What is punishment?" and "Why is there punishment?" This is also true in his studies of madness and clinic, he also asks the question, "How are the divisions between the sane and insane, normal and abnormal, healthy and sick are operated?" Since Foucault focused on asking the question "how," he is more interested in studying and understanding practices and the conditions or circumstances that make these practices acceptable at a given period. These practices are not just governed by institutions; rather, they have their own "specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and reason." Foucault calls it as "regime of practices," and these practices refer to the "places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect." He further explains that "regime of practices" also means the analysis of "programmes of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of 'jurisdiction') and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of 'veridiction')." Foucault's "regime of practices" is not only limited in the institutions. These practices can be found and are being employed by other domains in the State that are outside the boundaries of institutions or State apparatuses.

In his book *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*, Foucault (1995, 211) speaks of the de-institutionalization of disciplinary mechanisms. He describes it as the emergence of the said mechanisms from the closed fortresses to the "free" state. He further explains that the "massive and compact disciplines are broken down into flexible methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted." These flexible methods of control are supplemented by methods of surveillance that are external to the institutions. Because of the emergence of mechanisms in the free state or outside the boundaries of institutions, such as the flexible methods of control and external methods of surveillance, a "whole margin of lateral controls" is created. There is a swarming of disciplinary mechanisms that come from different domains. Foucault illustrates this in his analysis of the Christian School's method of control and surveillance. He (1995, 211) states:

> Thus the Christian School must not simply train docile children; it must also make it possible to supervise the parents, to gain information as to their way of life, their resources, their piety, their morals. The school tends to constitute minute social observations that penetrate even to the adults and exercise regular supervision over them: the bad behaviour of the child, or his absence, is a legitimate pretext...for one to go and question the neighbours, especially if there is any reason to believe that the family will not tell the truth; one can then go and question the parents themselves, to find out whether they know their catechism and the prayers, whether they are determined to root out the vices of their children, how many beds there are in the house and what the sleeping arrangements are; the visit may end with the giving of alms, the present of a religious picture, or the provision of additional beds....

Methods of control and surveillance in the Christian School are performed by those outside the institution such as the parents. These methods are implemented with the aid of specific techniques and strategies like questioning the parents on whether or not they know catechism and prayers, whether or not they know how to determine the roots of vices, if they know the number of beds and bed arrangement, the presence of religious images in the house, and whether or not they practice good works. These specific techniques and strategies used by the Christian School are means to ensure learning and training of pupils or students outside the School. These are employed and implemented outside the boundaries of the School and later they became practices not only of the School but also of the parents. They would be adopted by the parents to monitor and control their children.

Foucault (1995, 212) illustrates another example in order to point out his meaning of "de-institutionalized":

> Religious groups and charity organizations had long played this role of 'disciplining' the population.... One has only to cite by way of example the regulations for the charity associations in the Paris parishes. The territory to be covered was divided into quarters and cantons and the members of the associations divided themselves up along the same lines. These members had to visit their respective areas regularly...They will also have to make individual visits to the poor; and the information to be obtained is laid down in regulations: the instability of the lodging, knowledge of prayers, attendance at the sacraments, knowledge of trade, morality...; lastly, 'one must learn by skilful questioning in what way they behave at home. Whether there is peace between them and their neighbours, whether they are careful to bring up their children in the fear of God...whether they do not have their older children of different sexes sleeping together and with them, whether they do not allow licentiousness and cajolery in their families, especially in their older daughters. If one has any doubts as to whether they are married, one must ask to see their marriage certificate.

This example of Foucault about "de-institutionalized" disciplining of the population points out several ideas. First, "de-institutionalized" refers to the methods of surveillance and control practiced by groups that are not considered as an "institution." The writer hypothesizes that Foucault have in mind the "institution" as State apparatus; an "institution" that is legal as it was created by the Sovereign in order to carry out its orders and implements its laws. Second, Foucault differentiates religious groups and charity organizations to political and legal institutions. These are involved in the disciplining of the population, but they are not considered as institutions, for these are not legal and political in nature and not the usual suspect in the wielding of power, of disciplinary power in particular. Thirdly, the disciplining of the population can be done in different ways and in a subtle manner. In the practices of the parishes in the above mentioned quotation, for example, given at face value are religious practices that will bring salvation to the souls of the parishioners; but from a deeper perspective, they are disciplinary techniques and strategies beneficial not only to the religious group or organization but also to the State and to the society as a whole. The meaning of "de-institutionalized," therefore, may also refer to the utilization of strategies and techniques that are outside the boundaries of a legal and legitimate institution of the State. Further, it means the utilization of various and other kinds of strategies and techniques

used outside the institutions to achieve a particular goal such as having a disciplined population. As an emphasis, the idea of "de-institutionalized" does not eliminate the role of the institutions. Rather, it points out the fact that institutions alone cannot achieve their goals, for that matter discipline, without the aid of specific strategies and techniques outside the institution.

In his earlier work, which is an archaeological study of the birth of the clinic, Foucault also discusses how medicine is used as a technology of power. The medical and clinical practices are examples of "de-institutionalization," and an exercise of power outside the institution. Medicine does not only diagnose and cure illnesses; it is also involved in the disciplining and regulation of the society as a whole and of people's activities in particular.[3] For example, it supervises the location of mines and cemeteries and the running of abattoirs and dye works; it controls the sale of bread, wine, and meat; and it prohibits unhealthy houses. Medicine also formulates a set of healthy regulations that include proper feeding and dressing, how to avoid illnesses, and how to prevent or cure diseases. Medicine does not only regulate healthy behaviour and disseminate information about health, it also gathers information about the various domains related to medicine. It also prescribes the measures to be taken in cases related to public health. It supervises the works of the doctor. Foucault (1994b, 26) concludes that medicine does not only diagnose and cure, but it also provides information, supervision, and constraint, and these are activities that are not medical but are the exercise of the power of the police.

For Foucault (1994b, 33-34), the first task of medicine was political, because medical practice was linked to the destinies of the State. One of the objectives of political power at the dawn of the modern period was the health and physical well-being of the population (Foucault 1977, 169-71). The primary concern during that time was how to raise the level of health of the social body by teaching different individuals on how to have healthy bodies. The idea was, according to Foucault, "the duty of each and the objective of all." That was the imperative of health which shows that health was the responsibility of every individual and at the same time the duty of the State. It was the duty of the State to ensure that its population is healthy in order to have a strong social body. Foucault explains that the State wanted to have a healthy social body because of the "preservation, upkeep, and conservation of the labour force." He further explains that the population needs to be co-ordinated and integrated into the apparatus of production, and it also needs to be controlled with the use of "finer and more adequate power mechanisms." Medicine was used not only to ensure a healthy labor force, but also as a means of surveillance, analysis, intervention, and modification over the population. The population needs to be studied and analyzed, because its biological traits are relevant factors for economic management. Information about biological traits will be used as a form of subjectivation or intervention, for the population to become useful to the State and to the economy.

Because of this political objective, medicine was not only confined in the study of how illnesses were acquired and how these can be cured. It also studied man—both the rich and the poor. Medicine's study of man resulted to the definition of a healthy man, the model man, and to a knowledge about the natural and social man. Medicine, says Foucault (1994b, 33-34), became an expert on man; and such expertise made medicine useful to the State, for it provides information to the legislators and advice to the citizens as to the regulation of man's heart and body. He (1977, 177) states, "the doctor becomes the great advisor and expert, if not in the art of government, at least in that of observing, correcting and improving

the social body and maintaining it in a permanent state of health." It provides man with value of health which is essential not only for his survival and that of the State. Medicine preaches a new gospel—the gospel of health which is the new source of happiness and the gospel that brings new salvation—salvation from illnesses and from early death. This new gospel, which is responsible for the regulation and disciplining of man, is very important for the State to become politically healthy and economically wealthy. Foucault (1994b, 29, 35) further explains that medicine's fundamental act during the eighteenth century was to draw up a map of pathological world by situating the symptoms within a disease and situating a disease within a particular ensemble or group of diseases. In the nineteenth century, medicine's role was more related to normality than to healthy in the sense that it formulated concepts and interventions in relation to the "standard functioning and organic structure, and physiological knowledge." In the words of Foucault, medicine in this century focused on studying the regular functioning of the organism and understands "where it had deviated, what it was disturbed by, and how it could be brought back into normal working order." In this century, medicine defines not only the healthy man but also the normal man, which is based on the physiological and pathological. The definition of the normal man, which now becomes the basis of the definition of the healthy man, becomes a new norm that guides man's regulation and disciplining in relation to the objectives of the State.

Because of its emphasis on normality, medicine introduced what Foucault (1977, 172-76) calls as "noso-politics." It implements specific techniques in order to ensure a healthy and normal population. These techniques involved the medicalization of the family and the control of the urban space, and both have one goal: To ensure a healthy and normal population that will be beneficial to the State in general and to the economy in particular. In the first strategy, the immunization and vaccination of the child was given emphasis. They created a system of medical care around the child for him to become healthy and normal from childhood. However, the moral responsibility and partly the economic costs to implement this system were placed on the shoulders of the parents. It was the duty of the parents to submit their babies to immunization and vaccination for them to become healthy and normal, and later on for them to become assets to the State and of the economy. According to Foucault (1977, 174):

> The medical politics outlined in the eighteenth century in all European countries has as its first effect the organization of the family, or rather the family—children complex, as the first and most important instance for the medicalisation of individuals. The family is assigned a linking role between general objectives regarding the good health of the social body and individuals' desire or need for care.

Medical politics is a reflection of the family as an instrument of the State in achieving a general goal of having a healthy social body by taking care of children's health. Family, therefore, was medicalized not only for the sake of the individuals but also for the interest of the State.

Aside from the medicalization of the family, the urban space was also regulated and controlled, because this "space constitutes the most dangerous environment for population" (Foucault 1977, 175). Medicine identifies the spaces that are possible breeding grounds of diseases and, therefore, are threats to the population. Examples of these are ships, prisons,

harbour installations, dormitories, and even hospitals. These spaces need to be regulated to maintain cleanliness and hygiene and to prevent the breeding and spreading of diseases. Medicine did not only serve the sick or promised cure, it also assumed an important place in the administrative system and machinery of power by regulating public spaces.

Based on the foregoing discussion about medicine, the State used techniques and practices that are not essentially political and legal in order to achieve its political and economic goals.[4] It used medical knowledge and techniques in order to improve, regulate, and control the population for a stronger political State and for a wealthy and stable economy. Medical knowledge and techniques are not political in the real sense; rather, they are politicalized by the State. The State dominates and controls the behaviour and activities of people not only through legal and legitimate means, but also through a clearly and well-defined political technique.

In his later work, the first volume of the *History of sexuality*, Foucault (1990, 37) discussed how sexuality was constituted. It was constituted because of the idea that sexuality must be economically useful and politically conservative. During the seventeenth century there was a prohibition to discuss sex and sexuality. In the eighteenth century, this limitation was lifted due to political and economic reasons. According to Foucault (1990, 23), toward the beginning of the eighteenth century, an economic, political, technical incitement to talk about sex emerged. Individuals were not only incited to discourse about sex and sexuality, sex also became a police matter, and it was something that must be administered and regulated through useful and public discourses.

Foucault (1990, 23) continues his explanation that in the eighteenth century there was an innovation in the techniques of power and that was the emergence of population. Population became an economic and political problem, and at the heart of this economic and political problem was sex. Government realized that the future and fortune of the State and of the society were not only tied to the size and moral values of the citizens, to marriage and family, but also to the manner in which individuals made use of sex. That is why sexual conduct and activities became an object of analysis and intervention. Government started to analyze the "birth rate, the age of marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and frequency of sexual relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile, the effects of unmarried life or of the prohibitions, the impact of contraceptive practices." Sex, in other words, became a public issue and a public problem. It was the interest of the State not only to know and understand sexual activities but also to teach individuals on how to control the use of sex. They wanted to transform the sexual conduct of individuals or couples from a conjugal act to a concerted economic and political behaviour. This implies that sexual conduct, or sex, is not simply a private affair but a public concern that has impact to the economy and to politics.

How sexuality was constituted, regulated, and controlled? First, medicine played an important role in the constitution of sex.[5] A medicine of sex, which is separate to the medicine of the body, was created. This medicine of sex "isolated a sexual instinct capable of presenting constitutive anomalies, acquired derivations, infirmities, or pathological processes" (Foucault 1990, 117). This means that sex can also be a cause of social, political, and economic problems, for it can facilitate the spread of diseases. It may manifest an abnormal behaviour that can be a liability to the State or to the economy and to politics. Because of these, medicine placed sex under "biological responsibility," for sex has a positive role of generating new species, but it may also play a negative role of transmitting diseases

or create other diseases that may afflict the future generation. In this line, sex becomes a source of human capital, of new species, of future generation and at the same time it may be a source of physical and moral diseases that can gradually destroy the population and the society as a whole. Due to its impending negative effects in society, sex must be controlled and regulated. The medical and political projects of the State are to manage marriages, births, and life expectancies as well as fertility.[6] To further control and regulate sex, technologies were formulated, and Foucault cites the medicine of perversion and the programs of eugenics[7] as two essential technologies of sex.

Psychiatry also played an important role in the constitution of sex particularly in determining abnormality as manifested in sexual activities. As cited by Foucault (1990, 118), psychiatry played an important role in the surveillance of dangerous or endangered children. They are those who are engaged in the activity of pleasure such as masturbation. Through the family or the parents, psychiatry monitors the sexual activities of the young to determine whether they are normal or abnormal. Once they are caught by their parents performing the activity of pleasure or masturbation, they must confess the specific details about their activity—why they have done it—to the specialist or to the psychiatrist alone, not to an ordinary doctor, and not even to their parents.

Aside from medicine and psychiatry, sex was constituted within the family. The family became an "agency of control and a point of sexual saturation" (Foucault 1990, 120). As such, family space was transformed into a space of continual surveillance. Foucault (1999, 245-46) describes it as:

> The ideal situation...is the child alone with her doll or his drum. It is ideal but unrealizable...Children must be watched over when they are washing, going to bed, getting up, and while they sleep...The child's body must be the object of their permanent attention. This is the adult's primary concern. Parents must read their child's body like a blazon or as the field of possible sings of masturbation. If the child has a pale complexion, if his face is wane, if his eyelids are bluish or purplish, if he has a certain languid look and has a tired or listless air about him when he leaves his bed, the reason is clear: masturbation. If it is difficult to get him out of bed in the morning: masturbation...Parents must also organize a series of traps that will enable them to catch the child at the very moment he is committing what is not so much a fault as the cause of all his illnesses....

Foucault is referring here to masturbation as one of the sexual activities considered to be a possible source of illnesses or abnormalities. Masturbation was also suspected as an illness in itself. Hence, the family was tasked not by the State alone but also by medicine to look closely into their children's sexual activities, to monitor them by looking into the physical signs of engagement in masturbation. The family monitors the sexual activities of their children with the aid of medicine as an external agency of control. Once caught, children must be open to the intervention of medicine and, at this point, parental control is subordinate to the agency of medicine. The parents need the advice of the experts in case they caught their children doing the act or in case they noticed any signs of masturbation. They need the power of medicine to put an end to such kind of activity. In this sense, a relationship between medicine and sexuality was created in the family. According to Foucault (1999, 253):

> ...by calling upon the doctor and by receiving, accepting, and when necessary applying remedies he prescribed, the family linked sexuality with a medicine that previously had in practice related to sexuality only in a very distant and indirect way. The family itself became an agent of the medicalization of sexuality within its own space.

The family constitutes the sexual activities of their children by monitoring them and by allowing the power and knowledge of medicine to play an essential role in understanding and solving problems related to sexuality. To solve the problem of sexuality, the use of medical discourses and the intervention of medical experts play a critical role in the constitution of the child's sexuality, together with the unending surveillance and control of the parents. It is complied with the moral responsibility of the parents to monitor the behaviour of their children as well as to seek the aide of the medical experts in the field of sexuality. The family, therefore, with the aid of medical power and knowledge becomes a tool for normalization as far as sexuality is concerned. Their sexuality is determined. The family becomes a space of rectification to such abnormality assisted by the experts.

The discussions on Foucault's discourses on discipline, medicine, and sexuality showed that different strategies and tactics were used in the exercise of power outside the institutions. Furthermore, the discussions in one way or another mentioned the different forms of subjectivation that are utilized in transforming an individual into a disciplined and regulated subject as defined by the State. This notion of individual subjectivation is important in the understanding of Foucault's notion of government.

FOUCAULT ON GOVERNMENT

There are, for Foucault, specific techniques of power exercised in the State and in society that focused on the subjectivation of an individual person. They are deployed on the individual person to discipline them, to regulate their health, or to constitute their sexuality. Individuals are subjected to these techniques of discipline, regulation, and constitution for political and economic purposes. They need to be subjectivated in accordance with the goals of the State. These different techniques of formation and construction of individuals are deployed in the larger domain of society. They can be found in the different fields of society, not only in the political and legal institutions.

Foucault defines and explains the government in terms of the subjectivation of individuals.[8] According to Foucault (2007, 96), the government is the "right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end." The "things" that government arranged, or is concerned about, are the citizens of the State. The right disposal of things refers to the arrangement of things "through which one can achieve certain ends (Tadros 1998, 92). They arranged men in their relationships with one another in order to achieve concrete economic and political goals. The government in general defines who are the political leaders and servants tasked to look after the welfare of the public. On the other hand, it also defines who are the citizens or constituents and their general responsibility of submitting to the leaders. The government creates public organizations and corporations in order to implement the provisions of the constitution and achieve its principles. In relation to this, the government defines who shall occupy the different positions in the

said corporations and organizations; and these men and women shall perform specific tasks and duties in order to realize the spirit of the provisions and principles in the constitution. Men and women in the State as well as in the society are organized also by the government according to their social and economic classes based on the construction of their educational attainment, income, and property. These are only examples on how the government arranges individuals in the State and in society. This arrangement is designed in order to achieve the goals of the State.

However, Foucault's meaning of "arrangement" of men is very specific, more specific than the example given above. He (2007, 96) mentions about men's "complex involvement with things like wealth, resources, means of subsistence...the territory with their specific borders, qualities, climate, dryness, fertility...." This means that the government arranges men, or segregates them as normal or abnormal, healthy or sick, sane or insane, male or female in relation to the production of more wealth and maximization of resources so that the State and society will become richer or economically strong. This arrangement is done also for the State and for society to survive vis-a-vis their relationship with other States. Furthermore, men are also arranged based on the traits of the territory such as climate and fertility of land. The arrangement based on the traits of the territory means that men are organized so as to adapt to the environment and to utilize effectively and efficiently the natural resources. They are also organized based on the specific border and rooted on the interest of the State and the society to protect itself against external threats or security. In short, the State organized men to achieve its general economic and political goals. Economic refers to the utilization and maximization of the resources of the State while political refers to the interest of the State to protect itself against external enemies.

However, the arrangement of men is not only based on economic and political goals and interests. It is arranged for cultural reasons as well. Men are arranged in relation to "custom, habits, ways of acting and thinking" (Foucault 2007, 96). Men are segregated in society not only on the basis of their income but also on their traditions, beliefs, and values. They are segregated on the basis of their ways of acting and thinking. Acting refers to their behaviour such as those of the mad and the sane or the criminal and the law abider or the heterosexual and the homosexual. Thinking refers to their knowledge and truth claim. In society there are people who are condemned because their beliefs, values, and worldviews are different to the rest. Foucault calls this as the subjugation of knowledge and truth where the ideas and practices of people who are different to the mainstream society are branded as false, because it is different to the accepted and established truth and knowledge.

Lastly, Foucault (2007, 96) points out, that men are arranged not only in terms of economic, political, and cultural reasons, but also in terms of how they will respond to threats to life such as in accidents, misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death. The are also arranged in terms of their survival and longevity of life. This is to be able to respond to natural, and even to man-made, phenomena that threaten man's life and existence. In other words, the government organizes and arranges men to protect life. The protection of life is one of the common ends of each individual; it is to the interest of the State and the government to protect the lives of individuals, because the former's survival rests on the latter's survival.

Furthermore, Foucault (2007, 99) maintains that one essential task of the government is to introduce the economy into political practice. As such, the government is not only about the exercise of the power of the State for the welfare or benefit of the people,[9] or it does not only create and implement laws; it also manages the economic resources of the

State and strategizes on how the State can become wealthy. In making use of the available resources of the State for the benefit of all, the government does not only exercise political power, but it also exercises economic control and regulation by seeing to it that wealth is equally distributed to all. However, by controling resources and wealth, the government also controls the economic and social conduct of each inhabitant. The government sees to it that people have harmonious relationship with one another, that no conflict arises among them, and that they behave in accordance with the goals and objectives of the State. The application of economic practice in the regulation of the people can be seen in the government's act of arranging people and individuals.

The government for Foucault (2007, 99-101) does not pursue general goals for the good of the many. The government ensures that every individual achieves his own specific goals. It facilitates as well the realization of the ends of individuals, and individuals' ends are plural and specific. He does not agree with the idea of the "common good" but on the idea of a "suitable end," that is, the suitable end of each individual. The State should know the needs and ends of every individual. Hence, wisdom is required of the one who governs. This wisdom is not the wisdom of tradition or the wisdom of laws, justice, and equity, but the wisdom of having knowledge of the State and its different elements, dimensions, and the factors of its strength. This knowledge is provided for by statistics, which literally means the science of the State that provides sufficient knowledge and information about the inhabitants of the State. The art of government is also the art of weaving these different statistical information to have a full grasp of the situation of the State and to utilize this information in the decision-making of government leaders. According to Foucault (2007, 100-101), there should be "this search for an art of government with mercantilism and cameralism, which are efforts to rationalize the exercise of power, precisely in terms of the knowledge acquired through statistics, and also, at the same time, a doctrine, or rather a set of doctrinal principles concerning how to increase the power and wealth of the State." Since the primary goal of the government is to pursue specific goals, the art of government treats individuals not as "bearer of rights," and the sovereign treats them as subjects and as members of the household that need to be taken cared of individually (Tierney 2004, 276).

PASTORAL POWER AND MODERN GOVERNMENT

Foucault does not dwell more on the political and legal notions of government.[10] He sees government in a different perspective. He explains that prior to the political re-definition of government in the sixteenth century,[11] it has a very wide semantic domain: (1) it "refers to movement in space, material subsistence, diet, the care given to an individual and health," (2) it also refers to the "exercise of command, of a constant, zealous, active, and always benevolent prescriptive activity," (3) it also refers to the "control one may exercise over oneself and others, over someone's body, soul and behaviour," (4) and, lastly, it refers to an "intercourse, to a circular process or process of exchange between one individual and another" (Foucault 2007, 122). Based on this wide semantic of government, Foucault views government as government of individuals.[12] It is the management of individual lives by regulating, controlling, and manipulating their thinking to conform to the ends of the State. The idea that modern government is a government that manages individual lives originated from the Christian era, the pastoral type of power or the practice of the spiritual direction of soul.

Foucault emphasizes the influence of the pastoral power of the Church to the art of modern government. He reconceptualised government not as the governing of territory but as the governing of men.[13] Based on the idea of the pastoral power, the shepherd as the leader of the flock does not exercise power over territory but over the flock composed of multiplicity of people moving from one place to another. Therefore, Foucault (2007, 125) postulates that the shepherd's pastoral power is essentially exercised over a multiplicity of people in movement. Government, therefore, in line with the idea of pastoral power, is primarily concerned with the different needs of every member as beneficial to the whole State and society.

Since pastoral power is essentially exercised over the people, it is fundamentally a beneficent power (Foucault 2007, 126). Power has several meanings and it is exercised in different ways. It is exercised by defeating enemies, achieving victories, and realizing goals. Power means wealth, knowledge, information, control, or manipulation. Power is also beneficent, which means that power, like the power of the shepherd over his flock, exercises something good to the people in order for the people to be good and to do good. Pastoral power is exercised by the Church over its flock, because the Church wants its people to be saved. Salvation, therefore, is the primary goal of the exercise of pastoral power; the end of such kind of power. To be saved, people have to do good and be good; it is the responsibility of the shepherd to teach them how to do good. In this sense, pastoral power is a power of care. It cares for the salvation of the people, for the deliverance of people from evil, for the alleviation of people from pain and suffering brought about by evil deeds. In this light, it is also the responsibility of the government to provide people education, shelter, and employment so as to free them from the evils of ignorance, of poverty, and of misery. The government must care also for the people by looking after their welfare. The government, like the shepherd who keeps on watching his flock, must always be aware of the problems, needs, and desires of the people. The government should not only be knowledgeable of the traits of the territory, like the captain of the ship who is mindful of the sea, but must be knowledgeable of its people—and their aspirations. This is the wisdom of governance. In the beneficent trait of the pastoral power, Foucault emphasizes the characteristic of power to exercise goodness (Foucault 2007, 128). The negative traits of power as exercise of terror or force, and the notion of power that brings fear and makes men tremble, disappear. Power can also be exercised in a manner where people will feel comfortable and being cared for.

Lastly, pastoral power does not bring goodness and care to the people alone; it also has the power to individualize. It is true that the shepherd takes care of each individual member of his flock. The shepherd leaves the many, just to look after a single one member of the flock who has gone astray. The shepherd, when it is required of him, must also sacrifice himself for the goodness of his flock. This is the paradox of the individualizing authority of pastoral power. In line with this thinking, the government must also be willing to sacrifice its leaders for the good of the many; but the big question is, can the government sacrifice the many just to look after a single member of society? Though this individualizing power of the shepherd is paradoxical, still the wisdom of this power is that the government must care for every individual member of society.

To summarize, pastoral power emphasizes the governing and caring of every individual,[14] and not the governing of the whole. It also emphasizes the idea that power exercises goodness, not fear, violence, and terror. The shepherd exercises goodness to every member of the flock for them to exercise goodness and to be freed from evils, suffering, miseries, and damnation.

Pastoral power is different from political power. The politician does not concern himself with each individual member of the population, and does not perform tasks for the alleviation of suffering and realization of goodness and salvation. Foucault describes the politician as a weaver. He (2007, 145) explains:

> ...the art of politics is like the art of the weaver; it is not concerned with everything overall, as the shepherd is supposed to be concerned with the whole flock. Politics, like the art of the weaver, can only develop on the basis of and with the help of certain auxiliary or preparatory actions.

Politics is very different from pastoral power because the politician is concerned with things from the general perspective. The politician cannot perform things without the assistance of others; he is more of an overseer than a caretaker. He sees to it that the different areas of the State are working well with each other for the benefit of the whole. Synergy is the goal of the politician. For Foucault (2007, 146) the essence of political action is binding different elements together. They are bound together not just as different elements in the State but also as contrasting ideas and groups. The leader must work on putting these differences into a component whole to benefit the greater interest of the State. Though pastoral power is different from political power, the two can be reconciled and can be used effectively for a better art of government. The combination of the two will result into a government that looks after each individual concern of the society while at the same time weaving together the contrasting sectors and ideas in the State for the benefit of the whole. It is a government that cares for the welfare of each and of the whole.

Pastoral power became more complicated when it was used by Christianity.[15] The simple picture of pastoral power became more complicated when implemented in Christianity because it gave rise to "dense, complicated, and closely woven institutional network" (Foucault 2007, 164). The exercise of the power of care and beneficence is now done through the different network of institutions established and owned by the Church. The relationship between the shepherd and his flock is no longer personal but institutionalized. The shepherd takes care of every member of his flock through the complicated process and procedures of the institution. Foucault (2007, 165) further explains that pastoral power in the context of Christianity gave rise to the "art of conducting, directing, leading, guiding, taking in hand, and manipulating men, an art of monitoring them and urging them on step by step, an art with the function of taking charge of men collectively and individually throughout their life and at every moment of their existence." He is referring to the different techniques used by Church groups or institutions in order to regulate and intervene in the lives of their members in the name of care, goodness, and salvation. He hypothesizes that Church groups also used these techniques in order to gather knowledge and information about their members which later on will be used as bases for the formulation and implementation of Church regulations and norms in the name of morality and salvation.[16]

Because of the pastoral mandate of the Church and its mandate to care for the souls of every man, the Church built charity institutions and hospitals, which Foucault (1988, 42-43, 62-63) labels as houses of confinements, and organized religious congregations to propagate such mission of the Church. And it is very clear in the objectives of these houses of confinement that the existence of this kind of institutions is not only to care for the souls, but also to guide, lead, and direct the behaviour of people. This is implied in the

words of St. Vincent de Paul (see Foucault 2007, 62), who was responsible for reorganizing Saint-Lazare, one of the houses of confinement for the poor:

> The principal end for which such persons have been removed here, out of the storms of the great world, and introduced into this solitude as pensioners, is entirely to keep them from the slavery of sin, from being eternally damned, and to give them means to rejoice in a perfect contentment in this world and in the next; they will do all they can to worship, in this world, Divine Providence.... Experience convinces us only too unhappily that the source of the misrule triumphant today among the young lies entirely in the lack of instruction and of obedience in spiritual matters, since they much prefer to follow their evil inclinations than the holy inspiration of God and the charitable advice of their parents.

It is evident in these words of St. Vincent de Paul that the intention in the creation of charity institutions is to save the poor people, who were labelled as mad, from sin. Henceforth, it is for the salvation and goodness of the poor. It is a means, an institutional means, to care for people whose poverty and misery are seen as occasions to commit sin.[16] So they are housed for them to be removed from the miseries of life brought about by poverty and madness, and for them to experience eternal bliss in heaven by rectifying their behaviour inside the institution. Such is an example on how pastoral power and shepherding became complicated in the context of Christianity; it is tied up with the network of institutions tasked by the Church to provide care and dispense grace in order for people to be saved.

Foucault (1988a, 167) further explains that the pastorate in the context of Christianity is connected to three elements, which makes it more complicated. These are (1) salvation, (2) law, and (3) truth, that is to say, that the pastor or the shepherd guides the people to salvation, prescribes laws to be followed, and preaches the truth. In salvation, there are different principles involved. Firstly, it involves the principle of distribution which means that salvation is assured to all members of the Church or community, and it also means that the pastor must also care for the salvation of each individual member of the community as he assured the salvation of all. The principle of distribution means, in short, the salvation of the whole and the salvation of each. Secondly, it includes the principle of exhaustive and instantaneous transfer. This means that the good deeds of the sheep are also the good deeds of the pastor while the evil doings of the sheep are also the evil doings of the pastor. In other words, the merits and faults of the sheep are transferred to the pastor. Since the pastor is responsible for each, then, he must also accept the merits and faults of the sheep. Every single member is his moral duty as he is personally responsible for each one in the community. The third principle involved is the sacrificial reversal. Under this principle, the pastor must sacrifice himself or his soul for the salvation of his sheep. It is also in sacrificing himself that he will gain his own salvation. The last principle is the principle of alternate correspondence which means that the weaknesses of the pastor contribute to the salvation of his flock. The pastor must not hide his sinfulness, spiritual and moral weaknesses, for these can contribute to the process of renewal of the sheep and can be an instrument for his salvation.

The Christian pastorate has an indirect relationship to law. The pastor is not a man of law rather he is a man who takes care of each soul and particularly the sick ones. He does not implement laws for his members to be saved. He is responsible for the salvation of each

by implementing the power of care, not the power of law. That is why the pastor is not a judge or an implementer of laws. His duty can be compared to that of a doctor who cures the sick; he cures the sick soul. However, he is indirectly related to law, because he is bound to obedience. Obedience, according to Foucault (1988a, 175-80), has three meanings in the Christian sense. The first is the relationship of submission of one individual to another. The pastor, unlike the political leaders, submits himself not to the constitution, set of laws, peace and order but to another person, that is, his superior—the pope, the cardinal, the bishop or abbot, or the prior. The pastor submits himself to someone because he provides guidance and direction to the pastor not only because of his power and authority, but also because he is someone. Secondly, this relationship between the pastor and his superior is not yet finalized. This means that this submission is only a means to arrive at an end—a particular goal or objective. The pastor submits himself or obeys his superior in order to arrive at the state of obedience. In arriving at this state, he renounces his own will and accepts the will of his superior which is interpreted as the will of God. That is why submission does not only lead to the state of obedience, but also to the state of humility. This state of humility does not only mean accepting one's sinfulness, but above all it means accepting the will of another, the superior, by putting aside or renouncing one's own will. The pastor places himself, his future, and even his fate, in the hands of the superior. This submission and obedience of the pastor include one's whole self, one's ego, and one's own will; it is total and absolute. However, Foucault (1988a, 179) also stresses the idea that the superior commands not for the sake of commanding but for the sake of obeying the command of another superior. The bishop, for example, commands over the pastors, because he is obeying the command of another higher than him and that is the pope; in other words, he must obey and command. That is why the Christian pastorate is a "field of generalized obedience, strongly individualized in each of its manifestations, always instantaneous and limited, and such that even the points where there is mastery are still effects of obedience." Lastly, the Christian pastorate is related to truth, because he preaches or teaches people about directions of daily living. His teachings about these directions are based on his direct observation and supervision of the day-to-day life of the members of his flock.

Foucault (1988a, 181) says that this observation is very important for the pastor "to form a never-ending knowledge of the behaviour and conduct of the members of the flock he supervises." Secondly, the pastor is related to truth because he provides spiritual direction. The pastor should not only teach the truth, but also directs the conscience of each member of his flock. For the pastor to direct properly the conscience of each member, the latter must confess to the pastor the ideas and thoughts that he has in mind, and all actions that he has committed in private or in public that bother his conscience. In short, the pastor is related to truth, because he provides moral and spiritual guidance to the members of his flock. His guidance do not only emanate from observations and confessions, but also from the truth that he knows and preaches.

The pastoral power in the context of Christianity manifests an exercise of power. It is not only about its relationship to salvation, law, and truth, but it is also about the economy of faults and merits, the relationship of obedience, and the preaching of truth (together with the acceptance of what he is preaching as true). These three require specific techniques of power such as investigation, self-examination, and the examination or observation of others so that one will apply and observe the economy of faults and merits, the relationship of obedience, and the acceptance of truth. All of these require the production of truth based

on observation and examination in order for one to accept that he has committed faults and to gain merits by defining to him that his act is indeed evil or good. The production of truth as well is needed for one to accept in oneself that he must renounce his very self, his own will, and obey and follow his superior. Lastly, the production of truth is essential for one to accept that what one preaches is true.

Foucault (1988a, 184) concludes that this pastoral power provides a mode of individualization characterized by analytical identification, subjection, and subjectivation. Pastoral power individualizes, because each member identifies his action as good or evil based on the economy of faults and merits. His actions are also identified with the direction and example provided for by the pastor. It individualizes because the pastor is subjected to obedience. This is not simple obedience like the obedience to law and order. This is an obedience which requires complete surrender of oneself to the superior by renouncing one's will and liberty and accepting the will of the superior. Lastly, it individualizes because each member must accept the truth of the pastor as the one and only true moral and spiritual doctrine that guide and regulate one's action and behaviour. The acceptance of moral and spiritual doctrine as the true and legitimate guide in one's action and behaviour is essential in governing as well. This means that thought, first, has a material effect on government and, secondly, it is an integral aspect of action because when one speaks and behaves, he does so in relation to thought (Simons 1995, 55). And one's thought is always guided by a doctrine that he accepts as true.

That is why, Foucault (2007, 184) concludes that pastoral power and, in particular, the different procedures of individualization that are attached to it, are a prelude to modern notions of government and governmentality, because such procedures establish certain types of relationships between the pastor and his flock, the pastor and his superior, and the pastor and truth. Secondly, pastoral power constitutes a specific subject—that it wants to be based on its own truth. It is also evident that, based on these principles, pastoral power and care are preludes to modern government.[17] One can see how subjectivation works in the context of pastoral power, and how power regulates and disciplines the body through the economy of faults and merits, obedience, and the acceptance of truth. These are evident in the modern art of government, when the government constitutes an individual subject by defining faults and merits or behaviours that are or are not acceptable, when it is involved in obedience, that is, obedience to persons of authority mandated by the law and the constitution, and when it is also involved in the preaching and acceptance of truth by formulating and propagating knowledge about the population and society supported by science and statistics. Furthermore, the government also uses the techniques of examination and observation in order to formulate guidelines for one's conduct in private and public affairs.

SIGNIFICANCE OF FOUCAULT'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

Foucault's political thought provides a different aspect of State and government. The State is a pluralized entity that involves both the legal and the nonlegal institutions and organizations. The State and the legal and nonlegal institutions formulate and implement laws, policies, standards, and norms that will be followed by individual citizens for the achievement of political and ecnomic goals. Hence, the State does not only refer to the political and legal institutions, such as the government and its agencies, but it also includes the social institutions such as the church, the school, and the family. These institutions are

different in their nature and character, but they share in the regulation and discipline of behavior. The State is not only political, but social as well; for it utilizes both political and social means in the regulation and discipline of behavior.

For example, a teenager to become a productive citizen in the future needs to be formed and educated. His/her formation and education is not only the function of his/her family and school. The State through its legal institutions must also provide support in the formation and education by crafting and implementing policies and programs. It must provide the educational framework that will guide the schools in the education of the young; a framework that is based on the needs of the economy and industries. Educational assistance to families who do not have sufficient means to support education must also be provided. The crafting of a program for the young who are out-of-school so that they will be transformed into becoming productive members of society is another area where government can support families. On the other hand, the government can implement policies and programs on values formation of the young. But its success will also depend on the cooperation of families, schools, and churches. These three institutions must also provide support to the government in values formation.

Harmony in the State is essential. It means that the various political and social institutions must be in accord on the business of regulation and discipline. Without this, the State is in disarray and the consequence of it, is the failure to achieve political and economic goals. Any State, like the Philippines, has political and economic goals. From the point of view of political scientists and policy experts, these political and economic goals cannot be achieved without concrete policies and programs. All agencies of the State and of the government must implement such policies and programs for the achievement of political and economic goals. Foucault's political thought sees these policies and programs not only as laws and decrees to be implemented by agencies. These policies and programs are also techniques of discipline and regulation that will alter people's thinking and behavior for them to contribute to the achievement of political and economic goals. For these policies and programs to be effectively implemented, they must sink into the consciousness of individuals and gradually alter their thinking and behavior.

Foucault does not only present a pluralistic notion of the State but also a notion of government that individualizes. Government, for Foucault, looks after the needs of each and every individual. It should not work for the common welfare, for there is nothing as such. The needs of individuals vary and differ. It must care for individual's needs and interest. Government's constituents are plural in terms of their needs, interests, and backgrounds. This plurality must be taken into consideration by the government in its formulation of policies and programs. Government's policy action and program implementation must be able to address the varying needs and interests and the different cultural backgrounds of the constituents.

Foucault's notion of government emanates from the point of the view of individual subjects, not from the point of view of the institution. The government as an important agency of the State in the regulation and discipline of individuals must be conscious of the plurality of needs and interests. Its business is not the common welfare, but to care for each and every individual's welfare. Knowledge of the people's needs and interests is essential for the government. Before it crafts policies and programs, it must be knowledgeable first of the needs and interests of the people. The government, therefore, must not only listen; it must also know what is going on with its constituents.

Foucault's notion of government adds meaning to governance. Governance is not only a partnership with other sectors in the society. It is also a meaningful partnership and interaction between the government and its constituents. The government, therefore, must create participatory mechanisms, for it to have a meaningful interaction with its constituents; so that, it will be knowledgeable of their needs, problems, and interests. Policies and programs will effectively address people's needs and problems if participatory mechanisms are in place. The direct involvement of people in the planning of programs is also very important for the government to provide different forms of services that will address people's problems and needs.

The government has a two-tier responsibility: to address the different needs and interests of the public and to harmonize these differences toward the achievement of the State's political and economic goals. Addressing the different needs and interests of the public must lead to the realization of the higher political and economic goals. This political thought is a combination of the notion of care and politics. The government cares for the people by looking after their individual needs while at the same time harmonizing them to achieve the State's political and economic goals. The act of harmonizing different interests as well as people with different needs is an act of politics. The government and its officials must be aware of this two-tier responsibility. These two complement each other and, thus, should not be seen as separate entities.

CONCLUSION

Foucault's political philosophy does not focus on the legal and the institutional. It brings to light the technologies and strategies utilized by the State and the government to regulate and discipline the people. It is a political thought that focuses on the techniques used in the implementation of disciplinary and regulatory power and on the application of such power to the human body for the achievement of political and economic goals.

Foucault's philosophical ideas of State and government are founded on his philosophy of subjectivation or the transformation of individuals into subjects. Hence, his analysis of State is focused on regulatory and disciplinary strategies and techniques that transformed individuals into subjects needed by the State and by society. These regulatory and disciplinary strategies are implemented not only by legal institutions but also by nonlegal institutions. The exercise of regulatory and disciplinary techniques and strategies are not limited within the legal institutions. Hence, the State is not only a legal and political entity; it is also a social and nonlegal entity. It is an entity where the political and social converge in the discipline, regulation, and transformation of individuals.

Government, for Foucault, is an agency that looks after the welfare of each and every individual. He does not agree with the idea of the common welfare, for needs and interests vary and differ; and the government must look after each of them. Government, for Foucault, is a management of individual lives. It is a government of men. Foucault emphasizes the influence of the notion of pastoral care to the modern notion of government. In pastoral care, the pastor looks after the welfare and salvation of each and every member of his flock. He listens to them individually and guides them personally, so that they will live a life worthy of salvation. The government, like the pastor, looks after the welfare of the people. This welfare, though, is not spiritual but material and secular. Like the pastor, the government must look after the needs and concerns of each and every individual

citizen. "Welfare" is not common to all, but it varies and differs to each and every individual member of the State and of society.

This paper describes Foucault's political philosophy. It is based on his ideas scattered in his major works and essays. In Foucault's political philosophy, one can realize that the State and government are involved in the process of subjectivation, the transformation of individuals to become productive and useful members of the State. The idea that State and government individualize and care after the welfare of each and every individual means that it is concerned primarily with individual members, the important resource of the State. The State and government are involved in the process of construction and reconstruction of individuals using disciplinary and regulatory technologies. In this process, the State and government employ not only political and legal institutions, but social institutions as well like the church and the family. It also employs medical institutions like hospitals and asylums. A negative interpretation leads to the conclusion that subjects are unfree and just manipulated by the State and government; but, on the other hand, a positive interpretation leads to the conclusion that individuals are transformed by the State and government into productive and useful members. Foucault does not make any judgment on this; rather, he provides only philosophical and historical analyses of the "creation" of the modern man involving the State and its institutions. Based on his analyses, one can conclude that the modern man is not indeed free; and he is not free from the shackles of his modern institutions. The modern world that brags about freedom, independence, and the autonomy of the human subject is not free at all. It created institutions, mechanisms, and processes to ensure that individuals' compliance. It created a "built-in panopticon" in individuals by constructing their consciousness for them to think, act, and behave accordingly.

The State and government exercise an enormous effort of political power to ensure that institutions work toward one common goal—the subjectivation of individuals. They wield political power to achieve a common result of constructed individuals who think and act differently but have one common objective—the achievement of State goals. Through political power, the State and government unified the consciousness of individuals, a consciousness that is grounded on the goals of the State. This unification is the result of the continuous process of construction and reconstruction not only by legal institutions but also by nonlegal ones such as the family, church, and school. It is supported by *knowledges* provided by the modern sciences such as medicine, psychiatry, and psychology. The State and government cannot exercise its police and political powers without the support of social institutions and *knowledges* of the social and medical sciences. In Foucault's political philosophy, *knowledges* of the sciences and social institutions play an essential role in the wielding of power. Foucault's political philosophy is centered on how institutions exercise power to construct, or to discipline and regulate, individuals. He analyzes the State and government from below, from the point of view of the (legal and nonlegal) institutions' exercise of power to transform individuals into valuable subjects of the State.

NOTES

1. Foucault's analysis of the State is related to his pluralistic ideas. In the field of political science (see Smith 2006, 21-34), pluralism is explained epistemologically as an "opposition to monism and the view that there can be a single unified and universal body of knowledge." It is also explained as a rejection of Hegelian idealism wherein there is one

absolute idea. Political scientists postulate that pluralism is based on the philosophical idea that knowledge is socially constructed and no single person or institution has a monopoly of it. Politically speaking, there is no group that monopolize the State; social movements and civil society groups share in the control of the State. Foucault's pluralistic and deinstitutionalized ideas of the State can also be explained in this context—that he does not agree on the single holder of power and the universal and absolutist perspective of knowledge and truth. He does not also agree with the theory that only legal institutions have a monopoly of the State. Different social movements and groups in the State exercise power and authority and they produce their own knowledges and truths.

2. In other works, Foucault (1996, 347) defines technologies of power as "government of individuals, the government of souls, the government of the self by the self, the government of families, the government of children, and so on." This definition implies that the technologies of power are applied on individual bodies for them to be disciplined and regulated. Since it is applied on individual bodies, technologies of power are "micro-physics." Its object of exercising power is the (human) body for it sees the body as docile and an organism that can be transformed for political and economic use.

3. Gerald Turkel (1990, 175) explains that medicine in the late eighteenth century was greatly involved in the gathering of health statistics from clinics. These data are transformed into facts and are used as basis for the formation of policies that would regulate nutrition, sexuality, the workplace, housing, and other public places. Edith Kurzweil (1997, 402) has the same interpretation of the role of medicine in eighteenth-century society. The doctors gathered knowledge about health and disease as a response to social needs and the doctors had a plural role because they were involved in social reform and advocated medical power.

4. Foucault (1972, 162-63) explains that

> ...medical ideas of organic solidarity, functional cohesion, tissular communication—and the abandonment of the classificatory principle of diseases in favour of an analysis of bodily interactions—might correspond...to a political practice that is discovering, beneath still feudal stratifications, relations of a functional type, economic connexions, a society whose dependences and reciprocities were to provide, in the form of society, the analogon of life.... [When industrial capitalism was] beginning to recalculate its manpower requirements, disease (and health) took a social dimension: the maintenance of health, cure, public assistance for the poor and sick, the search for pathological causes and sites, became a collective responsibility that must be assumed by the state.

Based on these explanations of Foucault, medicine took a very important role, which is not only medical in nature but economic and social as well, because of the demands on manpower by the new economic order.

5. Foucault discusses how seventeenth-century medicine constituted masturbation. He (1999, 238-39) states that masturbation was defined by medicine as total illness because the masturbator is characterized by "exhaustion, loss of substance, an inert, diaphanous, and dull body, a constant discharge, a disgusting oozing from within the body, the infection of those around him and the consequent impossibility of their approaching him, polymorphous symptoms." Masturbation was also defined as a possible cause of any kind of illness, such as madness and delirious hypochondria. These medical discourses on

masturbation shaped society's view on masturbation as an abnormal behaviour, following the medieval notion of masturbation as evil and immoral. This specific example shows us how medicine constituted sexuality.

6. Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang (1989, 25) cites the policies of China on marriage, childbirth, and divorce as biopower techniques and as a form of regulating sexuality. These policies are implemented in order to increase the organization of population and welfare for the sake of increased force and productivity. She further explains that the one-child policy does not only regulate sexuality but it also expands the field of vision of the government, or what Foucault calls as surveillance. She (1989, 33) says:

> Through the one-child policy the searching gaze of power expands its filed of vision: Doctors, nurses, and representatives of planned-birth committees, labour unions, and women's federations participate in the monitoring of women's bodies, their menstrual cycles, their sexual conducts, their use of contraception, and their relationships with husbands, parents, and in-laws. In the process, what is controlled is not merely the size of population, but also the body of the mother, and the sexual, reproductive, and familial practices of the population.

The study of L. A. Richey (2004, 59) also defines the "productive and liberating power of contraceptives" within the notion of biopower. The author argues that contraceptives function as biopower because it is a technology of sex that links the individual body with the body politic and body economic. The author further argues that contraceptive as biopower transforms the feminine body into a modern body politic/economic. Yang and Richey's study supports Foucault's argument that sexuality is constituted, regulated, and disciplined by the State for economic and political purposes.

7. Dario Padovan (2003, 478-79) explains that eugenics "sought to improve the social body and to relieve it of the economic and social burdens of future disease and degeneracy by acting upon the reproductive capacities of individuals in the present." He further explains that its objective is to "maximise the fitness of the population and it concentrates on reproduction." Eugenics does not seek to improve the social body but also to identify "that which must live and that which must die." In the process of relieving the economy of burdens, it seeks to eliminates those who will pose future problems to the economy and society. Hence, the technologies of sex of Foucault does not only identify the normal and the abnormal, the acceptable and the unacceptable, the moral and the immoral, but also those who will live and those who will die. In his published lectures at the College de France, Foucault (2003, 239-40, 42-43) acknowledges the presence of this technology as the "State control of the biological." He further explains that this new technology is addressed to a multiplicity of men as global mass that is "affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness and so on."

8. The discipline of political science defines government as " the set of institutions that makes and enforces collective public decisions for a society" (see Rand Dyck 2006, 12). Foucault does not define government in the context of institutions and collective public decisions but he views it from the perspective of individual subjectivation. That government is responsible for the transformation of individuals into subjects needed by the State.

9. Based on Tadros's argument (1998), one of the targets of modern society is the relationship between the wealth of the nation and the size (and quality) of the population;

and government is the method through which the aim of relating wealth and population will be achieved. This context is one of the reasons why the central issue in modern government is the introduction of economics in political practice.

10. Foucault (Dyck 2006, 7) analyzes government not from the points of view of the political and the legal. Political analysis of government is focused on government actions in terms of policies and programs that address public issues and problems. It involves studying different interests struggling for dominance in the process of decision making in order to arrive at a policy or program that will resolve a particular issue or problem. On the other hand, the legal analysis of government is centered on legal arrangements such as the separation of powers in the three co-equal branches of government and the relationship of the different levels of government, i.e., local and national. The relationships of these branches and levels of government and the exercise of power by the authorities therein are given emphasis in the legal perspective of government (see Schmidt 2006, 99).

11. Foucault (1972, 232) states that in his study of the discourses of exclusion he starts with ancient Greek philosophers, i.e., the Sophists, Socratics, and Platonists; next, he analyzes new forms of discourses and knowledge in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and, lastly, he examines the discourses in the nineteenth century and in the era of modern science. It is in this context that Foucault explains exclusion from the ancient Greeks to modern times as marked by the rise of medical science.

12. Mitchell Dean (1999, 73) explains that the original idea of government as the governing of individuals is the first phase in the developmental trajectory of government. After this phase, government was defined as the conduct of men in relation to things and later on as government of systems and processes. Dean further explains that this notion of government as government of individuals means that the government as bureaucracy must ensure the "wise and proper distribution of humans and things, and their relations and movement, within the territorial confines of the kingdom or state."

13. Foucault is echoing in this idea the historical fact that religion played an important role in the establishment of ancient States and governments. Based on the essay of Colin Hay and Michael Lister (2006, 5-6), religious authority played an important role in the institutionalization of government and the State. It needed religion and its sacred objects and artifacts in its despotic and coercive exercise of power over the people.

14. Dean (1999, 74) points out that the theory of government based on the pastoral power of Christian Churches, Catholic and Protestants alike, is the source of the theory of welfare of individuals and populations. The government should not only govern but should also care for each and every individual; and care is manifested in the welfare provided for the government to the citizens. Dean explains that welfare is the secularization, or the modern version, of the spiritual and pastoral care of Churches during the Medieval period.

15. Based on the book of Thomas Oden (1983, 186), pastoral power became complicated because it was redefined as a performance of an office or a ministry and, in particular, an office or ministry of conversation. This ministry is given the charge of caring for souls and it is one of the most demanding Christian ministries. The pastor should have a one-on-one meeting with persons who are in need of interpersonal, moral, and spiritual guidance.

16. According to Oden (1983, 187), the care of souls means the "care of the inner life of persons, the mending and nurturing of this personal center of affect and willing." The care of souls seeks to "address the inner wellspring of personal decision making with wisdom, prudence, and love. Oden further explains that to be given such kind of care means

that the shepherd is accountable for "the inner life through the crises of emotional conflict, and interpersonal pain toward growth in responsiveness." Based on this explanation of the care of souls, the pastor exercises a different kind of power over an individual member of his flock. This kind of power is manifested in the access of the pastor to the inner life of the person, where he gets vital information about the person's inner self. Furthermore, that power is also manifested on the guidance provided for by the pastor, which the individual takes as a part of his decision making. The pastor, therefore, exercises a different kind of power over his flock. That exercise of power can be described as subtle, positive, and productive.

17. Based on Seward Hiltner's article (2000, 27-48), the operations and functions of the church in pastoral theology are always seen from the shepherding perspective. This perspective means "regarding experience and theology from the vantage point of the practice of pastoral care." The establishment of charity institutions and the confinement of the poor and the mad should also be seen from the perspective of shepherding or pastoral care. It is beyond doubt that pastoral care is the primary intention of the Church when she founded this kind of organizations. However, Foucault argues that we cannot deny that this kind of organizations also exercises power over the people by reforming and rehabilitating them. The act of confinement itself is already an exercise of power; and the submission of people to confinement is a clear evidence of how such kind of power was effectively utilized over individuals. We cannot likewise deny the fact that this type of organizations contributed to the segregation of the mad from the normal.

18. The researcher would like to stress that he is referring here to the influence of pastoral power to the modern notion of government and, in particular, to the government that emerged from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. In other words, this does not mean that pastoral power or pastoral care of the Catholic and Protestant Churches influenced the notion of government in general, but only the government of the modern era. To be more specific, the pastoral care of the Christian Churches influenced the notion of welfare of modern governments.

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BEYOND STATE AND REVOLUTION: THE POLITICS OF CONTENTIOUS MULTIPLICITY

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The theory practiced as resistance must come to grips with the state and with revolution. To evade, explain away, or assume the state is fatal. And to think of revolution only as anti-state is as dangerous. After all, the revolution's aftermath is revealed by history to be just another state. I argue that the danger posed by both state and revolution can be countered by the multiple in society that becomes contentious—or a contentious multiplicity. The multiple and the contentious are practices that pervade society. The state's objective is to control multiplicity and sublimate contentiousness. The revolutionary strategy is to sublimate multiplicity and direct contentiousness. But multiplicity is dangerous when it is independently contentious. And contentiousness indicates a dialectical process of challenging state power wherein the process itself is privileged over any synthesis. Contentious multiplicity is a practice of freedom.

Life is wholly fugitive and temporary, but also wholly palpitating with reality and individuality, sensibility, sufferings, joys, aspirations, needs, and passions...

Abstraction being [science's] very nature, it can well enough conceive the principle of real and living individuals, but it can have no dealing with real and living individuals; it concerns itself with individuals in general....

What I preach then, to a certain extent, is the *revolt of life against* science, or rather against *the government of science*....

—Mikhail Bakunin (1970, 58-59)

"This is subversion...this is subversion of a very high order. There is multiplicity of tones, characters, courses of structured if divergent flow. We have played the game right, we are real subversives. I am pleased to impart this knowledge to all of you."

—The bandit Buhawi in Yuson (1996,72-73)

I argue that multiplicity that is contentious is a danger to both the state and to the revolution that is on the verge of becoming a state or that sees itself as counter-state. Yet the multiple and the contentious are practices that pervade society, which is both the object and resource of states and revolutions. The state's objective is to control multiplicity and sublimate contentiousness. The revolutionary strategy is to sublimate multiplicity and direct contentiousness. Contentious multiplicity challenges and erodes the effective practices of hegemonic power and, as such, is a weapon against the state. But contentious multiplicity is dangerous through and through and can become the enemy of the revolution that becomes the state. Multiplicity is not diversity, which is a concept and practice already captured and inscribed within the framework of liberal multiculturalism—resource for both state and contemporary capitalism (see Zizek 2006). I interpret multiplicity as the many resources for the practices of individual and community life within and without the state. In fact, most of multiplicity cannot easily be ordered or inscribed in the state's logic or representations. Multiplicity becomes dangerous in times of revolution, when it is contentious. Meanwhile, contentiousness indicates a dialectical process of challenging state power in which the process itself is privileged over the synthesis. Contentious multiplicity is a practice of freedom.

I see two general tendencies in political theory in which the state as practice of hegemonic power is deprecated. First, liberals assert that the state is only an administrative contraption that ensures a procedure of justice that makes possible the private and individual pursuit of the good life. Here, theorists like John Rawls (1993) imagine a stable society of equal and free citizens who live individual lives based on "incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines." Some liberals also argue for a larger state that provides social welfare in order to assure citizens equal opportunity to pursue their versions of the good life. In any case, the minimal or the social welfare state does away with the ancient democratic distinctions between the public/private and between good/mere (that is, political/economic) life. To Aristotle, for example, the good life is precisely the object of the public realm. Mere life, meanwhile, is properly private (I use *mere life* in the way Aristotle and Hannah Arendt use the phrase). Aristotle (1958, 5) differentiates mere life—"that stage, still short of full self-sufficiency"—from the good life—"therefore fully self-sufficient." Mere life is associated with the satisfaction of daily needs, the reproduction of the physical self. Aristotle sees the Greek *polis* as arising or growing from it—it being necessary for the material reproduction of the city—but not existing because of it. Aristotle admits that there must be some kind of good in the simple act of living, for people are willing to endure great amounts of suffering to cling to life. Thus, mere life must have in it "a sort of healthy happiness and a natural quality of pleasure" (Aristotle 1958, 111). Taking her cue from the politics of ancient Greeks, Arendt (1998) asserts the same with her strict distinction between the private, the realm of the human activities of labouring and working, and the public, where the necessarily political human activity of action takes place. In Arendt (1998, 4-5, 7) mere life is the human condition for labour. It is human needs and wants in accordance with the natural cycle of nature. It is temporary and is never permanent or long lasting. To Arendt (1998, 96-97, 119), mere life is something to be transcended in the quest for human becoming. Mere life and its means, labour, endanger both work and action because its privileging in contemporary mass society has reduced work to working for life (or making a living) and *has all* but banished action from the public realm. Instead,

what were traditionally public—the determination and living of the good life—are designated as individual choices that are properly pursued in the private realm. This appears to be the case in most liberal societies. Contra Arendt, however, what I view as perilous for society is neither the invasion of the public by the private nor the limiting of what is properly public to the private but, rather, the conflation of public/private and the designation of this conflation as the proper realm of the state.

Second, postmodernists elide the state by interpreting the state practice of power as mostly negative and by locating their critique and resistance on the diffused manifestations of power and power relations in society. Michel Foucault (1984a) for example, dismisses the state as mere codification of the power networks operating in society expressed negatively, that is, expressed as repressions, prohibitions, and proscriptions. Thus, the state practice of power is limited and parasitic on the diffused manifestation of power relations in society. The relevance of this view is its indication of how we are productive of the networks of power present in society and, consequently, complicit in the practice of power by the state. Pro-Foucault, I agree that we are productive of the networks of power diffused in society on which the state is dependent. Indeed, the order of the state rests more and more on the individualising powers of societal-state institutions that commit us to an ever increasing number of authorities that is as extensive as our ever multiplying identities. But this is always coupled with the totalising power of the state that is becoming more dependent on its coercive apparatuses as the recent trend of minimizing states (through measures of austerity in response to crises) have shown, that is, what the trends of *governance* and austerity illustrate is that the state (as government and state institutions) has become lean and mean. (This is already obvious in the Global South as they lead the way in the implementation *of structural adjustments*.) Meanwhile, this lean and mean state endeavours to reproduce itself as the only determining order, together with its societally diffused individualising powers, just as before. But Foucault (1978-81) also lectured on state rationality and its implications on state practices of power. One way to reconcile this state-dismissing Foucault with the earlier version that deemed the state important is to understand that what he dismisses are the *government* and *state institutions* that are usually referred to by "state." It is certainly the case that state rationality or *governmentality* pervades civil society. Also, there is really no longer any distinction between state and civil society in the instances when we mean *order* when we say "state."

Nevertheless. I argue that the state is more than what Rawls and Foucault assert it to be. The liberal democratic state, for example, does not equate the private and individual determination of the good life to the unlimited practice of possible private lives in society. There is a limit to the pluralism that liberal society can tolerate, even in the supposed confines of the private realm. This limitation is founded on Rawls's concept of reasonable pluralism. Here, the possibility of consensus is not accidental but rather systematically manufactured by the liberal democratic order.

Perhaps an extended discussion of Foucault will clarify this further. In this interpretation, the state is asserted to be more than just an apparatus of procedures or a codification of powers expressed as prohibitions. In this interpretation, the state conflates the distinctions of the public/private and good life/mere life. The private does not invade the public. The public is not delimited into the private. But rather, the state becomes determinant of a conflated public/private space and, as such, of the good and

mere life. This assertion is better formulated as: The state is a practice of power that administers the good life as mere life.

FOUCAULT ON POWER, STATE, AND REVOLUTION

Power is operating continuously everywhere; if politics is about power then we are continuously engaged in it. Stating this may seem unhelpful but it highlights Foucault's (1984a, 2-65) conception of power as going beyond the limits of the state. These powers are more important than the state itself. The state then is *a* mere superstructure of prohibitions dependent on the workings of divergent and multiple powers below it.

Underscoring the state, it is helpful in describing the powers that permeate society. According to Foucault (1990, 7), to talk about the state is to talk about power in terms of a sovereign and of sovereignty. This means understanding power essentially as repressive. This conception of power mostly confounds and misleads. Applied to sexuality, for example, power as state repression has the insidious effect of bringing "into existence concepts which the fear of ridicule or the bitterness of history prevent most of us from putting side by side: revolution and happiness; or revolution and a different body, one that is newer and more beautiful; or indeed, revolution and pleasure." Foucault (1984a, 64) asserts that revolution is just "a different type of codification of the same [power] relations" as that codified by the state. While Foucault also implies that there are as many kinds of revolutions as there are possible subversive codifications of diffused power, revolutions only differ with the state in the type or arrangement of the concentrated powers which, to the state, is subversive and illegal. Also, the affirmation of power as repression suggests that sexuality is silenced, thus, allowing us to mistake the mere fact of speaking about it as transgression—a supposed practice of freedom (Foucault 1990, 3-13).

In fact, Foucault asserts that since the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was a "discursive explosion," an "institutional incitement to speak" regarding sex, starting with the Counter-Reformation rules of sacramental confession, which demanded detailed talk about sex in connection to passion and thought. The mind became a battleground for the suppression of passions and the cultivation of self-control and purity. The discovery of population, the revelation that there is such a thing as child sexuality and the study of perverts in the succeeding centuries multiplied the already diverse discourses on sexuality. The type of power brought to bear on the body and on the sex in these discourses, according to Foucault (1990, 17-49), is different. The state is homogenizing, distant, abstracting, excluding, and boundary-setting. The power that Foucault (1990, 47) identifies is multiplying, intimate, specifying, including, and line-of-penetration setting.

Indeed, most power is positive or productive. However, I argue against Foucault that state power operates within the same three axes of positive power that he identifies. First, the state objectifies: individuals and peoples are transformed into population, voters, statistics, and citizens with political affiliations. They become objects of state knowledge. Second, the state normalizes: the state, for example, produces the citizen as law-abiding individual—a standard of normal behaviour on which basis individuals within the state govern themselves. Third, the state produces what Foucault calls

"practices of the self": nationalism (or patriotism), for example, becomes an ethic by which individuals constitute themselves as citizens, as subjects within the state.

Foucault commits here the Marxist error of interpreting the state as mere superstructure and, thus, resistance to it must then be diverted elsewhere *to something* more fundamental. In Foucault, this leads to a depreciation of the state and a rejection of revolution. To Marxists, this leads to an underestimation of the state either as an opponent of revolution or as what must be taken over in the struggle. This is the fatality inherent in the evasion of the state. I want to clarify that, like Foucault, I do not see revolution as herald to the end of political struggle. But, unlike Foucault, I see in the waging of revolution manifestations or models of the exemplary political struggle. I refer here to the multiplicity that becomes contentious during revolution. I suggest that contentious multiplicity can effectively counter state power and is potentially transformative of the diffused power relations in society on which the state relies.

THE STATE IN THREE MOVEMENTS

Antonio Gramsci (1971, 12-13, 257-64)) identifies two interdependent methods in which domination and hegemony are achieved: force and consent. Coercion and consent are practices of the state not only to produce and consolidate its powers but also to order a society that validates its authority. Coercion is directed to elements in society that the state considers undesirable, to individuals or groups that do not "consent either actively or passively," and as such must be proscribed by law. The object is control or banishment. Consent, meanwhile, is sought by the state (or the dominant social group that controls the state) for what it lays down as law, policy, or course of action. This can be done by political socialization through state institutions and/or by some accommodation of the demands of civil societal resistance. The object of consent is consensus in support for the powers of the state. The dynamics of coercion and consent is productive of civil society: ordered, manageable, and materially productive. The same kind of society that states plan and seek to engineer in James Scott's (1998) account of the grand projects and schemes of exemplar states in quests to improve the human condition in spite of humans.

Thus, state hegemony arises from the practice of power that proscribes and prescribes—a practice of power that produces the normal, obedient individual as citizen and categorizes the deviant and non-consenting into objects of specific state apparatuses. This requires, as earlier asserted, a state that is administrative of the good life as mere life. I claim that this state practice of power is manifest in Thomas Hobbes's (1991) absolutist state, in Rawl's political liberalism, and in Giorgio Agamben's (1995) state of exception.

The Hobbesian absolute state is the outcome of the surrender by the multitude of their capacity to will and to judge in exchange for a secure community that allows them to pursue the physical reproduction of life. The state of nature is precisely a state of war, according to Hobbes, because of the multitude wills and judgements that must contend with each other. According to Hobbes (1991, 13-14, 16-19, 38-39, and 45), the trouble with will and judgement are the passions and other human capacities that underpin them. The will, on the one hand, is the enactment of human passions. The problem is that passions encounter other passions in a manner that is always disastrous.

Judgement, on the other hand, is derived from sense perception, memory, and imagination that, to Hobbes, are always fallible. Yet, an individual judgement encounters other judgements as if it is the only truth. And *Truth* is usually intolerant of other truths. In the natural state of a multitude of wills and judgements, clashes between these multiple wills and judgements are inevitable. In the state of nature, where "men live without common Power to keep them all in awe," one can imagine the calamity of such clashing multitude of wills and judgements. Hobbes (1991, 88), himself, imagined a "Warre; and such warre, as is of every man, against every man."

Hobbes (1991, 89) paints a catastrophic picture of the state of nature, which is also a state of war:

> In such a condition, there is no place for Industry... no Culture...no commodious Building...no Instruments of moving and removing...no Knowledge of the face of the Earth... no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

But Hobbes (1991, 88-89) himself asserts that war does not consist only of continuous battle or fighting but also of the mere disposition to battle or fight. And the time spent in between these actual fighting—peace—is also part of the condition of war. One can accept without contradiction then that the acts of fighting also do not entirely result to killings, and that the articulation of wills and judgements is done in ways other than fighting. Hobbes, for example, asserts that speech is an ability of man even within the state of nature. He also asserts that men can group together for security purposes in cases of bodily weakness. Hobbes, moreover, never denied the existence of the family in the state of nature, or even of groupings based on kinship. As such one can speculate without contradiction, the *existence* of communities in the natural state. One can then interpret Hobbes's depiction of the state of nature to mean the absence of a *hegemonic* or overarching industry, culture, knowledge, art, etc. For do not science, reason, and knowledge arise from passions, from perceptions of the world, from their articulation in speech, from the enactment of passions through will, from the finality of discourse expressed in judgement as Hobbes asserted in the early chapters of the *Leviathan*? The problem, of course, is that they are a multiplicity in the state of nature. But multiplicity is not an absence. Thus, the reading of Hobbes's description of the state of nature as an absence of culture, etc., is not entirely correct. Although the state of nature is certainly an absence of one industry, one culture, one knowledge, one art, etc., it is, however, the presence of multiple industries, cultures, knowledges, arts, etc. The problem is that Hobbes interprets this multiplicity as inevitably leading to war.

For Hobbes (1991, 120, 148, and 214), man's reason and the particular passion of man identified as "Feare of Death" impel the human multitude in the state of nature towards peace. A covenant made with each other constitutes the Sovereign for whom, the surrender of the multitude's capacities, "strengthened him to use as his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given but left to him, and to him onely; and excepting... as entire, [the] condition of meer Nature, and of warre of every one against his neighbour." And thus the multitude enters the commonwealth

and become a people. A people determined by the legislations of the Sovereign, who has the sole capacity to do so in the commonwealth, in return for protection, preservation, and security: "[So] that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly...," so that they may enjoy a limited liberty "such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like," so that they may enjoy life. But what kind of life? Mere life? But what of the good life? In the *Leviathan,* the good life as political life becomes the domain of the Sovereign in relation to other sovereigns. The state practice of politics directed towards the subjects in the commonwealth becomes a politics of managing mere life, its variations seen as the only tolerable versions of the good life. Here, the public/private are conflated into the politics of mere life that the absolute state protects and administers.

It is helpful to note at this point Carl Schmitt's (1996) assertion that the state's monopoly of the political is dispersed and appropriated by "indirect powers" (groups, parties, and movements) that quarrel amongst themselves in the parliament. This is a different interpretation of the public/private conflation, that is, a result of the appropriation of the rightly state monopolized political by the many organized interests in liberal democratic society. What I argue as conflation here arises from the state's practice of domestic politics that must deal with the imperatives of mere/biological life. However, as the state/sovereign is also outside of the commonwealth and in the state of nature (with other states), it can do politics that, in Schmitt's scheme, chooses the enemy and fights it. Also, the state can identify particular members of the commonwealth as enemies and eliminate them. But Schmitt's point remains valid.

My claim can be explained by a discussion of Agamben's state of exception. Schmitt's apprehensions, I think, can be explained away by a discussion of Rawls's political liberalism.

The liberal democratic society is a plural and well-ordered society. This claim seems to bring together two distinct, even contradictory, concepts. Arendt (1998, 8 and 220), for example, sees plurality as calamitous. Plurality is a natural human condition in the sense that "nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live." And plurality as the premise of human action gives rise to its calamities—the unpredictability of its outcomes, the irreversibility of its processes, "the haphazardness and moral irresponsibility in a plurality of agents." Properly speaking, plurality erodes order.

Rawls (1993, 50) in *Political Liberalism* resolves this contradiction through a reasonable plurality of doctrines of the good life advanced by reasonable persons. Reasonable persons are "not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept." Reasonable plurality implies an effective management of society that limits plurality to the reasonable and harmless. Such practice of power is accomplished through the political conception of justice or "justice as fairness." This political justice, herein asserted to be the practice of power of liberal democratic states, determines and organizes what in society can be considered as public or private. Rawls asserts that political justice is legitimized through citizens' endorsement but I add the claim that it also produces the citizens that endorse it.

The question that Rawls tries to resolve involves stability: how can a society of reasonable pluralism be stable over time? The question, however, already contains its answer—it is stable over time because it admits only the reasonable. This is achieved in two ways: first, by limiting comprehensive doctrines of the good life in the private realm and allowing only their aspects that can constitute the common conception of justice in the public; and second, by proscribing the unreasonable and producing the reasonable in society. Rawls's (1993, 11, 18, 29-35, 39) conception of the person is important here. The person is defined as "someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating member of society." This political identity of the person as citizen does not change notwithstanding changes in the comprehensive doctrine that s/he subscribes to and advocates. This in turn is necessary as the overlapping consensus constituted from the common denominator among reasonable comprehensive doctrines is endorsed by citizens "as giving the content of their judgements on [political, social, and economic] institutions."

The reasoning becomes circular when one realizes that the citizen, to Rawls, is in turn produced by the political conception of justice. The circularity, however, is resolved when the political conception of justice is interpreted as a practice of state power. Rawls (1993, 71) claims that when publicized, the "political conception of justice assumes a wide role as part of public culture" that educates the citizens about "a way of regarding themselves that otherwise they would most likely never be able to entertain." To practice the political conception of justice to the full extent is to "realize a social world within which the ideal citizenship can be learned and may elicit an effective desire to be that kind of person." Thus, the liberal state produces the reasonable citizen that ensures the reasonableness of privately practised comprehensive doctrines of the good life. And what of the unreasonable in society? Rawls accepts the fact that there will be unreasonable doctrines about the good life and suggests that they be contained so that they will not undermine the unity and stability of society. In a footnote, Rawls (1993, 64:fn. 19) asserts: "That there are doctrines that reject one or more democratic freedoms is itself a permanent fact of life, or seems so. This gives us the practical task of containing them—like war and disease—so that they do not overrun political justice."

Schmitt's doubts about the liberal democratic state are appeased by Rawls' political liberalism. The political is not captured by indirect powers that see each other as enemies but, rather, as reasonable interests whose more contentious parts or versions are designated as private or proscribed. This is achieved through the making of the normal cooperative citizen and the containment of the unreasonable.

Meanwhile, Agamben (1995) extends Foucault's contention that mere/biological life is modern politics' definitive object by claiming that it has always been so. This is already asserted above in the discussion on Hobbes. But Agamben, again, goes further —the sovereign's practice of politics is not only the management of mere life but also decides its existential status. Here, Agamben appropriates Schmitt's definition (quoted in Agamben 1995, 11) of the sovereign as "he who decides on the state of exception." The exception refers to what is taken outside, and not simply excluded (Agamben 1995: 18). But the exception validates the rule and the rule allows for the exception. This inclusive exclusion, says Agamben (195, 19),

> ...is the fundamental localization, which does not limit itself to distinguishing what is inside from what is outside but instead traces a threshold (the state of exception) between the two, on the basis of which outside and inside, the normal situation and chaos, enter into those complex topological relations that make the validity of the juridical order possible.

Agamben (1995. 83) asserts that "*[this] sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and a sacred life—that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life that has been captured in this sphere.*"

The sovereign determines who or what is taken outside to this threshold, this zone of indistinction, where law is suspended and the power of the sovereign is at its apex. For mere life, to be taken outside is to put its existence into question, to reduce it further into bare life... into the *homo sacer*. This life is both within and without the legal order; its death is tolerated by law that neither proscribes nor authorizes it (Agamben 1995, 84-85). The sovereign occupies this same threshold of law and non-law. (This is the same assertion made earlier in Hobbes that the Sovereign is inside the commonwealth in relation to subjects and outside it, within the state of nature in relation to other sovereigns, at the same time.) It is this double character of the sovereign that endows it with the capacity to suspend the law for the homo sacer.

Yet this condition is not without purpose. Like the imagined other to which in contradistinction the self coheres, the homo sacer serves as the other to which political life is differentiated and cohered. The homo sacer affirms the politics of administering mere life within the conflated public/private realm. Also, the sovereign state creates the appearance that the managed mere life is transcendent of the animal or biological life by designating a life that is lower, whose existence is always in question. But if commonwealth politics is mere administering, the politics of the state of exception is more intimate and authentic—recalling Arendt's politics as "appearance" (albeit in a sinister guise), and Schmitt's "identifying and fighting the enemy" (also Hobbes's state of nature). As such, "from the point of view of sovereignty *only bare life is authentically political*" (Agamben 1995, 106).

Agamben (15, 154-59) identifies refugees, death row convicts, and the inmates of concentration camps as exemplars of the *homines sacres*. These lives are already of ambivalent legal status and, as such, they serve as human guinea pigs in state sanctioned scientific experiments. In the case of the death row and concentration camp inmates, they are on the threshold of life and death: "Precisely because they were lacking almost all the rights and expectations, that we customarily attribute to human existence, and yet were still biologically alive, they came to be situated in a limit zone between life and death, inside and outside, in which they were no longer anything but bare life" (Agamben 1995: 159). These lives can thus be the objects of scientific and medical experiments without violation of the juridical order but also in affirmation of it. The experiments conducted on these lives become the prototype for state projects that result to obedient, controlled, and healthy citizens.

Agamben's is a bleaker view of the state. The assertion is that the state of exception is always a present threat in society, that in this threat the state's negative and productive powers merge in a technique over life and death. Such a view puts urgency in the task of resisting the state. But emphasizing the state's negative power prompts resistance

that focuses on limiting or taking over the state's coercive power. In liberalism, this is because freedom is interpreted as negative liberty. Marxists, meanwhile, consider that the potential for the taking over of the state in favour of the masses justifies its coercive power. The answer to the state is not just limiting state power. Already, many traditional state powers have been diffused into civil society (which participates in turn in the production and reproduction of the state as an order). Neither is revolution that seeks to be another state the answer.

REVOLUTION AND ITS "TREASURES"

An important point raised in the previous discussion of the state is that it thrives in a conflation of public/private, and its practice of politics is precisely the determination of this realm. The conflation is achieved through the designation of mere life as *the* object of politics and the designation of the good life as *a* private pursuit. In Agamben, this is extended by the affirmation of such conflation of mere life with the life of the *homo sacer*. Another important point raised in the previous section is that the practice of negative and positive state power is directed towards the management, control, or eradication of dangerous and unreasonable multiplicity. Indeed, multiplicity is precisely dangerous and unreasonable when it is contentious. These two points intersect: The designation of mere life as object of politics and the designation of good life as a private matter are undertaken by the state to sublimate the dangers of multiplicity or to eliminate its danger altogether.

I suggest that the answer to this state practice of power is partly to be found in revolution. There are, in revolution, models of political struggle that can be used as resources and weapons against state power and order. I refer to moments of the revolution where contentious multiplicity is practised. Revolution itself is not privileged but rather its ability to cohere, at specific moments of its waging, the multiplicity present in society into a contentiousness.

Here, it is helpful to recall two relevant assertions in Arendt's *On revolution* (1963). First, revolution—as an appropriation of the political by individuals acting together—is an exemplar of political action. Second, there are, in the revolutionary tradition, "treasures" lost or swept aside when the revolution is finally won. Arendt criticizes Marxist and liberal interpretations of the French and American revolutions. Against Marxists, she challenges the claim that the French revolution was driven by the social objective of overcoming poverty and exclusion. Against liberals, she challenges the interpretation that the main objective of the revolutions was the establishment of a limited procedural state that ensures individual liberty. Rather, these revolutions demonstrated the exercise of fundamental political capacities in the quest to establish concrete public spaces of freedom. But this was fleeting. The French and American revolutions eventually failed to guarantee these public spaces of freedom. Arendt (1963, 234-51) insists on a fuller appreciation of these "lost treasures" of alternative polities of participation and action.

The idea that the French revolution was driven by the social objective of emancipating the multitude from the squalor and deprivations of poverty has its origins in the American continent, which overturned the European assumption of scarcity with the American experience of plenty. But according to Arendt (1963, 15), this interpretation

comes from a faulty reading of the American experience. The plenitude, or at least the perception that "the laborious in America were poor but not miserable" (Arendt 1963, 63), is a condition that is already enjoyed by the colonies and is prior to the American revolution. Arendt does not deny that the social objective is part of the motivations of the French revolution, to the detriment of the revolutionary spirit. But she claims that emancipation from poverty is not something that can be delivered by a revolution properly conceived as political action. This can also be said for the violent demands for a "happiness" (Arendt 1963, 245), perverted from its originally public character into a private pursuit. What the eighteenth century Americans called "public happiness" can be equated to the French "public freedom," and the difference of terms indicate that what was a passion in France was an experience in America (Arendt 1963, 115). The eventual changes in American governance, which came to value the private pursuit of happiness (as private welfare) as enabled by laws and norms, do not reflect the revolutionary spirit that motivated the American Revolution. Public happiness is the actual practice of freedom, of being involved and finding pleasure in the conduct of public business (Arendt 1963, 124-25).

This is precisely what revolution is all about, according to Arendt. It is liberation from oppression that "aims at least at the constitution of freedom." It entails "a sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic" (Arendt 1963, 28). However, there are contradictions in revolution that defeats this revolutionary spirit. To the extent that the most important event in every revolution is the act of foundation, revolutionaries find themselves confronting the contradiction of stability—required in the founding of a new body politic—and the spirit of the new (Arendt 1963, 225). This is manifested in a perplexity that seems unsolvable: "If foundation was the aim and the end of revolution, then the revolutionary spirit was not merely the spirit of beginning something new but of starting something permanent and enduring; lasting institution, embodying this spirit and encouraging it to new achievements, would be self-defeating" (Arendt 1963, 235). Indeed, the histories of the American and French revolutions have shown that this "all pervasive preoccupation with permanence, with 'a perpetual state' ...secure for... 'posterity'" (Arendt 1963, 232) is tantamount to the revolutionary spirit being delimited as the privilege of revolutionaries who become founders, and has all but eliminated the alternative polities present in revolution. Arendt is referring here to the American townships and town-hall meetings, and the French sections (of the 1st Paris Commune), councils, clubs and societies. These are political spaces for the practice of freedom, "'the school of the people' in political matters," a place to "'instruct, to enlighten fellow citizens on the true principles of the constitution, and spread the light without which the constitution will not be able to survive'" (Emerson and Robespierre quoted in Arendt 1963, 238, 242).

In the American revolution, Arendt claims that the Founding Fathers did not grasp the importance of townships and, as such, failed to incorporate them into the federal constitution. In fact, there was even antagonism to the wider and more inclusive conception of political freedom so that its practice among ordinary people is then transformed and limited to suffrage: "[A]ll power is derived from the people; they possess it only on the days of their elections. After this, it is the property of their rulers" [Constitutional delegate Benjamin Rush quoted by Arendt (1963, 239)]. The effect of

this is that the "age-old distinction between ruler and ruled which the Revolution had set out to abolish through the establishment of a republic has asserted itself again; once more the people are not admitted to the public realm, once more the business of government has become the privilege of the few...." (Arendt 1963, 240). Thus the townships that enabled the American revolution (in the sense that the decision to wage the revolution was made in these polities, which then sent representatives to the convention that finalized it) were overtaken and overwhelmed by the foundation of an encompassing but exclusionary federal government.

The experiences of the French sections and societies, meanwhile, were quicker and more violent exclusions. Initially praised by revolutionary leaders, such as Robespierre and St.-Just, they became the objects of take over and persecution when these same leaders came into power. The commune sections were transformed into "organs of government and instruments of terror," noncooperating societies meanwhile were abolished and their members arrested (Arendt 1963, 246-47). What Arendt lauds as the beginnings of political arrangements that make people into "participators of government" became "'the great popular Society of the whole French people,' one and indivisible" which "alas, in contrast to the small popular societies of artisans or neighbours, could never be assembled in one place, since no 'room would hold all'; it could only exist in the form of representation... [as] centralized, indivisible power of the French nation" (Arendt 1963, 243). The small power structures and self-government of the commune sections and societies were threats to the centralized state that the revolution was founding and building. According to Arendt (1963, 249), they were crushed because they were "competitors for public power."

Arendt's analysis of revolution privileges the public over the private and puts importance on the clear distinction between the two. This is the reason why she sees the American revolution as properly political. Meanwhile, the French revolution was plagued by the social objective, i.e., with its goal of ameliorating the conditions of private life. But the social question in revolution was not only manifest in the French demand to alleviate poverty. I think that the social question was also manifest in the American effort to protect wealth and property. This is seen in the demand "no taxation without representation," against the limiting of American trade and exorbitant taxation by the English monarchy. This is also seen in the delimitation of the privilege to represent and in the bestowing of suffrage only to men of property. The American revolution did not, in reality, demonstrate a clear distinction between public and private, as Arendt claims. Instead, like the state, the revolution also conflates the public and the private. The real problem for the multiple in society is when the revolution or the state that the revolution founds, decides to be the determinant agency of this conflation.

The more obvious and relevant problem is the tendency of revolution to marginalize or eliminate alternative visions of political order and organization from its ranks. This disposition is reminiscent of the state. The victims of this are the "alternatives," the "others" that at earlier moments were indispensable parts of the revolution. I see two overarching stages in revolutions that explain this. The first stage requires the revolution to be as inclusive as possible. Thus, all alternative visions of social and political order in society are resources to the revolutionary goal of building a broad-based resistance to the state. But not all of these alternatives will constitute the new state. When revolution reorganizes from broad-based resistance to a defined

organization, a counter-state, and then a state, it undergoes a purification that recalls the homogenizing strategies and techniques of the state. These transformations constitute the second stage.

These two stages can be argued to roughly correspond to the positive and negative practice of power. The goal of the first stage is to produce revolutionaries—the more of them the better. The second stage proscribes the nonstandard (and deviating) from the true revolutionary (which it also prescribes). These stages are not hard and fast, and not associated rigidly to specific moments in revolution. A revolution may not win. Also, it may face a counter-revolution that is not necessarily sponsored by the state. Thus, the need for revolution to cohere itself in an exclusionary manner is not necessarily driven by its desire to be a state, but may also be motivated by the desire to differentiate itself from what it perceives as rivals.

The "treasures" of the revolution consist of the multiplicity that is found in its early stage. This multiplicity is not only limited to the varied conceptions of political order, as Arendt is apt to favour, but also includes the multiple conceptions and practices of social and economic life. What revolution does is to transform this multiplicity into a contentiousness directed at the state. This is the revolutionary moment that I privilege as exemplar for the contemporary political struggle against the state (as both government and order/sovereign and commonwealth). Also, in its direct confrontation with the state, spaces for the practice of life outside both state and revolution become possible. This is because the challenging of the state weakens its powers, opening societal spaces to the multiplicity of alternative orders.

CONTENTIOUS MULTIPLICITY AS PRACTICE OF FREEDOM

The connection between revolution and freedom raised by Arendt is important and interposes a nuance between the concepts of liberty and freedom. Her assertion is that the revolution itself is an exercise in liberation, the unshackling of the fetters that impede individual liberties. The liberties won back in revolution then become instruments that build and constitute spaces for freedom—"the practice of participating in governance... self-government" (Arendt 1963, 21-28). Freedom is action, and it is political. For Arendt, it is also public.

But the advent of the modern state signalled the end of the public/private dichotomy in political practice. In this regard, revolution is no different from the state. Societal practice will also, I think, disclose an interconnection between the supposedly separate realms that trump the artificial bifurcation. What I mean is that the conflated public/private is not inherently bad (or good). It is, however, dangerous. The danger to society, as already asserted, is when the conflation is determined and managed by the state. The counter-danger to the state is when the multiplicity in the conflation—the variations of political, social, and economic life—becomes contentious, challenges the state, and becomes self-determined.

I hold to the notion of freedom that is a danger to the state. I extend Arendt's conception of freedom and argue that it is also practised in the waging of revolution. The contentiousness of the multiplicity in revolution is a practice of freedom. I argue that the contentiousness of the multiple can create spaces in which life can be lived

beyond the determination of both the state and the revolution. These spaces multiply within society, and within the revolution itself, as the state becomes weakened by the struggle. These spaces multiply, as there are multiple versions of living life politically, economically, and socially.

The theoretical discussions, thus far, have only hinted at the concept of multiplicity without fully clarifying it. Rawls's reasonable pluralism defines the concept of multiplicity negatively, but multiplicity is not limited to the reasonable. Arendt laments the lost treasures of a revolution. These "others" and "alternatives" eventually were excluded, captured, or repressed because they posed a challenge to the power of the revolution in its second stage, and so they were calamitous. Arendt's idea of the calamitous plurality partially clarifies what I mean with the term multiplicity. But she limits this to the narrow human activity of action (as it is authentically political) and denies it to work and labour. Genuine Multiplicity, however, includes the many variations of labouring and working. Hobbes's view of the multitude of wills and judgements that fires up the war of all against all, also, adds to what I mean. Here, Hobbes's conception is wider than that of Arendt, as willing and judging is applied to all aspects of life, and as he argues that these can be multiple as there is a multiplicity of individuals in the state of nature. The capacities to will and to judge create the unique individual life. But life is not limited to the individual living of it. Life can refer to the lives lived together in a family, a community, in societies. It is at these levels of being among others that the individual life *really* thrives. This is because wills and judgements are in themselves dependent on other wills and judgements. They thrive on the busy interaction of individuals, groups, communities. Even the one and universal will and judgement of the Sovereign in Hobbes's commonwealth is parasitic on the wills and judgements that constitute it and that it suppresses. Thus, like Rawls's liberal democratic state, the Sovereign must make the multiple reasonable. Agamben shows that the state of exception affirms the state power. And the bare life that dwells in this threshold validates it as well. But what the *homo sacer* does not realize yet is that s/he is political again. Not only because of the Sovereign that recognizes her/him (because s/he appears, in Arendt's sense) but also because s/he is no longer subject to the law, to the order, or to the social contract. The homo sacer is political because s/he can will and judge once more and s/he can endanger the state through contentiousness—by declaring the state as enemy and fighting it.

Multiplicity is all the possible configuration of living life as individuals and as communities. Multiplicity, as such, is also a resource for living the individual and community life. Life is not fixed, not being something but becoming. We can stop and freeze a moment in life's becoming to think about life so far. In such reflective instances, we realize that life is dependent on other lives, as models, as resources, as other lives from which one's life can be differentiated and reflected on.

Contentious multiplicity is the revolt of life. Oriented towards the state, it is a revolt of life against the state: against the practice of power that limits and proscribes the possibilities of life and prescribes certain kinds of life, which we then accept as our own to the detriment of our free becoming.

Contentiousness puts fangs into multiplicity and transforms it into a weapon against the state. Here, I do not limit the term to its meaning in revolution. Contentiousness does not consist in violence alone, but also in other forms of violent or nonviolent resistance practised by people throughout history: teach-ins, boycotts, pickets, strikes, mobilizations,

civil disobedience, sabotage, etc. Contentiousness makes multiplicity into a weapon to combat the state in two ways. First, contentiousness confronts the negative power of the state and wrestles liberties to constitute spaces of freedom that are beyond the powers of the state (or of revolution). I go beyond Arendt and argue that true freedom is practised only in spaces that are beyond the state's control. Second, contentiousness creates spaces for the living of multiple lives beyond the determination of the state, which in turn erode the state practice of positive power. Earlier, it was asserted that the positive practice of state power multiplies. There is a profound difference here: the state multiplies identities as authorized social roles and in terms of defined categories in which it can box its citizens and, as such, transform them into objects and subjects of specific state apparatuses (for example: prisons, mental institutions, juvenile disciplinary houses, homes, the census office, and health agencies). On the other hand, contentiousness makes possible a multiplicity that expresses the possibilities of life.

The practice of contentious multiplicity erodes the positive and negative practices of state power. This is shown by an analysis of state power that reveals practices of limiting or determining multiplicity and making it uncontentious and reasonable. A contentious multiplicity says that the state (as government, institutions, and overarching order) is not needed and that it is willing to fight to prove its point.

I also argue that contentious multiplicity possesses transformative capacities that can restructure the diffused practices of power in society. This is because the point of contentious multiplicity itself is to make multiplicity thrive beyond the state. But the transformation of diffused powers does not happen automatically in the fight between contentious multiplicity and the state. Multiplicity and contentiousness must be privileged in an ethos—an attitude towards the world and the living of life among others in the world. This resembles the ethos towards modernity that Foucault (1984b, 32-50) proposes in the essay, "What is enlightenment?" Foucault's is a philosophical attitude described as a "permanent critique of our historical era." He characterizes this ethos as a rejection of the blackmail of the Enlightenment (whether one is for the Enlightenment and, thus, reason or is against it), as a permanent critique of the self that avoids the traps of humanism (ultimately an appeal to a conception of human, which is easily given content by varied ideologies), as a critique located at the frontiers wherein limits are discarded in favour of transgression (and as such requiring the methods of archaeology and genealogy), as experimental (by being available to the test of reality, in pursuit of possible changes and the form these take); and, as possessing stakes, homogeneity (of the attitude that everything is changeable), systematicity, and generality. The ethos of contentious multiplicity only makes the amendment that such ethos must be directed against the state primarily, that it must privilege multiplicity and an attitude of contentiousness.

CONCLUSION: METAMORPHOSES AND LIFE

Contentious multiplicity—as practice of freedom, and as an individual stance or ethos—rests on a hope: that in its practice, individuals and communities will learn to not need an authority of any sort to live life. How life itself should appear in the future is not its concern. In fact, contentious multiplicity affirms that the living of life is a concern best addressed through the particular living of lives.

Perhaps, what I mean can be illustrated by the metaphor of metamorphoses in Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus spoke Zarathustra*. Nietzsche (1998, 25-28) speaks of the three metamorphoses of the spirit: first as camel, the beast of burden that bears much and reveres; second as lion, the fierce beast possessing the capability of "creation of freedom for oneself for new creation" and that fights the dragon of "all values of all things." The lion rejects the dragon as "lord and god" that says "thou shalt" with the roar of its "I will"; and, third as child, who creates new values for itself and who says a sacred "Yes" to the game of creation.

Contentious multiplicity is the camel metamorphosed from its burden of being subjects/citizens that bear and revere the knowledge of all things represented by the state. Contentious multiplicity is the lion saying "I will" to reject the "Thou shalt" of the dragon, which is the state. Nietzsche's metaphor is here applied as metamorphoses of life.

But what of the child? The child represents the hope for the lion—that, perhaps, the lion will learn in its continuous willing to stop transforming itself back into a camel that bears and reveres another authority over its life after its victories (or to make itself into a new authority, the new dragon), to let go and become a child. This is also the hope that I hold for contentious multiplicity. Conceivably, this hope may never come to be. But the continuous assertion of "I will" through a contentious multiplicity, at least, makes the practice of freedom a part of life.

Contentious multiplicity—as lives being lived and as an ethos—teaches us to not seek authorities, certainties, and permanence in life. It teaches us to "be at home in the maelstrom" (Berman 1988) that is life.

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SEXUALIZED BODIES OF THE FILIPINO: PLEASURE AND DESIRE AS EVERYDAY TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE

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This paper will show that attempts to control the body in late capitalism is replete with symbolic violence, but Filipinos have not succeeded in confining the body, thereby validating Foucault's (1980) critique of the repressive hypothesis. Ordinary narratives about the body in the Philippines exist not in the context of a settled template of silenced debates and repressed desires, but in the explosion of discourse and contestations, and of an intricate articulation between popular knowledge and truth, on one hand, and the ordinary and everyday experience of pleasure and desire, on the other.

TRANSGRESSING THE REPRESSIVE HYPOTHESIS: SEX AS ORDINARY TALK IN MODERNITY

It is easy to paint the narrative of sex as one of prohibition and repression, in which sex is a taboo that is banished to the realm of the unsaid and unseen. Apart from being seen as a forbidden realm, the logic behind the prohibition of sex has roots also in bourgeois political economy, in which engaging in sex was considered to be an unproductive endeavor that panders only to pleasure and not to serve the purpose of accumulating capital. Michel Foucault, in his significant work on the *History of sexuality* (1980, I), offers a powerful critique against the argument that sex has been repressed by power, and its implication that the only way to achieve liberation is to talk about and engage in sex freely and in an unfettered manner. Foucault's critique emanates from his belief that power in society is not just in the form of repression manifested as a law-like force whose function is only to control and prohibit. On the contrary, he argues for the productive role of power vis-à-vis sex as it is expressed not only from structures of authority such as the state, but also from a multiplicity of origins as it engenders the production and circulation of knowledge, discourses, and narratives that influence the formation of concepts and identities.

For Foucault, discourse refers to the manner by which we ordinarily talk about something beyond the subject matter and the words used, but also includes the sources, the context, and the reactions to such manner of talking and speaking. Thus, the interplay between discourse, power, and knowledge becomes centrally located, in which what is said

is as important as who decides what should be said, and how it is done and in what contexts. Those who control the production of social meaning through their ability to restrain or allow talk on a particular subject have the power to determine knowledge, even as those who control knowledge also control the thinking processes of human subjects and the production of their identities. It is through this interplay that efforts to control knowledge about sex proliferated during the seventeenth century through institutions that are supportive of the bourgeoisie as an attempt to confine sex in safe places where it could not impede the capitalist agenda. It is here that sexuality became a socially-constructed narrative that offered the human body to be subjected to political control. Ironically, attempts to control talk about sex have only led to the intensification of the discourse about it. The desire to control human sexuality has made people realize the depths by which sexuality is embedded within people's identities and in all aspects of their everyday lives. In this context, sex broke free from the confines of the silences to which it was designed to be banished, as sinful, deviant, and as forms of transgression of the normal, which even bordered on the criminal, to become the object for the institutionalization of sexual knowledge. Sex was supposed to be something that people were required to confess for not only to a priest but also to psychiatrists, the police, and other experts. But these confessions become inputs to the furtherance of more "talk" about sex. Thus, far from being a private matter, sex proliferated in the public sphere and became a matter for public interest, to be studied, controlled, rationally analyzed, put into taxonomic classification, and be understood. It became a valuable social commodity.

Key to Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis is his rejection of a juridico-discursive form of power that restricts, is law-like and uniformly manifested, and simply says "no" to sex. He gave more weight to the productive functions of power as it enables the fostering and preservation of life, which is captured in a form which he referred to as "bio-power." Foucault believed that power has many faces and is always present, even as it does not only repress, but also enables and takes on productive roles. In this view, he recognized sexuality not as an object which power needs to control, but instead as a venue by which power could enable knowledge and within which it could circulate. In modern society, the development of knowledge about sexuality has been especially focused on women, children, married couples, and the sexually deviant, thereby allowing power to take root not only in the private lives of people as families living in their homes, but in the public spaces by which power/knowledge on sex and sexuality are institutionalized such as the women's clinic, the school, the police station, and the prison, among others. These spaces for the development of knowledge about sex and their institutionalization are enabled by the appearance of the female body as an object of interest and control, it being the center for human reproduction; by children's sexuality being endangered and considered as a threatened space and, therefore, has to be cautiously controlled and studied; by the belief that labor power rests on human reproduction that necessarily is enabled by regularly functioning couples that effectively use sex for procreation; and, by sexual deviance threatening not only the moral fiber but, even more important to capitalism, also the normal reproduction of labor power.

In this complex terrain for the development of knowledge, power for Foucault is manifested no longer as an external resource that one can possess and others do not, and which comes from the top. He upheld a structuralist bias by recognizing the absence of direct authorship of the strategies through which power circulates in society, even as he

located the dynamics of power in the context of social relationships, as the productive force which engenders the emergence of a discourse around these relationships. For Foucault, resistance and repression both flow through these complex relationships, the dynamics of which leads to their unpredictable occurrences. It is the multiple discourses on sexuality that influence the patterns of thinking about it in society. Thus, the analytical goal is to inquire into the structured power relations that enable the production of these discourses in order for us to understand the reasons for the manner by which we talk and think about sexuality in a particular way.

The emergence of bio-power in modern societies, for Foucault, is the principal driver for the development of capitalism. In contrast to the absolutist and precapitalist era, where the power of the state is expressed as a right of the sovereign over life and death, modern power is now invested in more productive functions. For example, in the past, capital punishment was seen as an act of vengeance of the King on the body of its transgressor-subjects. In modern capitalist systems, capital punishment has been replaced by a more economical and productive penology system whose focus is on reform, and where capital punishment still exists, it is now considered not an act of vengeance but a protective mechanism of a society to eliminate a threat. Thus, in capitalism, and as enabled by bio-power, the human body became an object of productive political control, and the manner human beings live their lives was transformed into a domain for the articulation of truth/knowledge to facilitate understanding and regulation. Law and politics relocated their focus away from prohibition and punishment into normalization and optimization of citizens not only as labor force but also as subjects capable of sexual desire.

For purposes of this paper, one can argue that the many forms which bio-power takes go beyond the state and ultimately seep into the domains of everyday life. The first, which is focused on disciplining the human body as an economic resource, is now residing in spaces in which the individual citizen is subjected to some form of discipline, such as the school, the workplace, and the other venues for values formation. The second, which is focused on regulating the population, is aimed at controlling the reproductive capacities of citizens and would now exist in both private and public spaces by which human subjects experience pleasure and desire. It is in this context that sex, the one that is supposed to be banished and silenced, takes a firm grip of citizens as they live their everyday and ordinary lives. The demands of the modern capitalist economy have reinforced the forms by which bio-power now takes, albeit with sexuality as a dominant template for expression. Here, the sexualities and bodies of women, children, married couples. and the sexually perverse are crucial as they become objects of discipline and regulation to ensure not only a healthy population, but an economically productive and rational one, even as they also become templates for the emergence of narratives of resistance. In late capitalism, these domains further evolved to become infused with a plethora of images and representations, and the possibility for implosion between image and reality, which Foucault may have not fully addressed, but to which this paper will attempt to focus on.

Foucault's deployment of bio-power as a meaningful construct for which power is exercised in society undoubtedly politicizes the body not only for its natural physicality but also for its social constructedness. It also enabled a framework of analyzing power beyond the juridico-discursive domain of the state to accommodate everyday and ordinary domains of contestations. Foucault, however, is not alone in putting up the body to become a focus for social theory and practice. Chris Shilling (2000, 415-31) has identified major developments

that enabled the body to become an object of scholarly inquiries in contemporary societies. These inquiries focused on the body as a project, as a productive resource for the accumulation of capital, as a source of pleasure and object of desire, and as a subject of control. This paper will argue, however, that these different foci of inquiry served as templates from where one can produce narratives about the body that eventually went beyond scholarly theorizing, but now also governs the manner the body is deployed as part of the ordinary discourse of everyday life and in late capitalism is offered to the altars of simulation.

BODY POLITICS: CONTROLLING THE BODY AS SOURCE OF PLEASURE AND OBJECT OF DESIRE

The usual template from where we paint our images of objectified and commoditized bodies lies in the dominant narratives that look at bodies either in the form of labor power that is sold in the market as input to production, or when its image is sold as a template from which body projects can be launched. Also important to be cited is the objectification of the female body as a domain in which labor power is reproduced. The Marxist concept of alienation was defined as happening when the surplus that is produced by the body of labor is detached from it and appropriated by others. In late capitalism, another form of alienation exists not only when the surplus that is realized by using the image of the body of a particular person is appropriated by the culture industry that benefits from it and only pays the model a fee for such exposure. More importantly, and characteristic of a simulacra, alienation occurs when the image takes a life of its own, even as the models or actors lose control over the images of their likeness. In contemporary popular culture, this can take the form of sexual exploitation when the body as commodity is sexualized by turning it into an object for erotic titillation, as in the case of *FHM* and other sexy magazines.

A case that dramatizes the loss of control of human agents of their bodies, which in many instances are sexualized in its representation, is seen in reality TV programs such as *Survivor* and *Big Brother*. In shows like these, real people, and not paid actors, enter as participants in contrived but nevertheless realistic settings such as the big brother's house or the castaway island where their interactions, conversations, and physical activities are observed and recorded 24/7. As expected, throwing a group of strangers with interesting attitudes in contrived and conflict-prone environments could lead not only to interesting television, but could also provide an opportunity to expose the natural bodies of the contestants for viewing to a public turned on by a voyeuristic fetishism not only of interpersonal conflicts, backstabbing, and betrayal that could come naturally, but also of the possibility of sexual encounters and of sexy bodies being exposed. The case of *Survivor* provides a more natural setting for parading and eroticizing the bodies of its contestants, and its selection of participants considers their visual attractiveness as an important criterion. Every season of *Survivor*, which includes those produced by the Philippine franchise, always include a significant stable of young, attractive, and sexy men and women who later would be presented to the viewing public wearing revealing, if not skimpy clothes. But in the nature of reality game shows with no prior scripts, the images and narratives that the viewers see that feature the contestants are done after the fact, of which the latter do not have any prior idea of how they will be presented, and for which they do not have control. To make the matter worse, contestants are required to sign a contract in which they waive

rights over their "character" for a given period after the show has been aired. This is particularly significant, considering that that "character" to which they lose control is in fact their true selves, and not just a role to which they agreed to play, and of whose lines they will say and image they will project they have been informed prior to production. This is also different from posing naked in sexy magazines, considering that a model has prior idea on how her or his body will be shown to the public for viewing. As Deborah Halbert (2003, 37-38) asserted with regard to the American version of *Survivor*, but is also applicable to *Survivor*-Philippines:

> All people have publicity rights in their public personas and these rights allow them to control the manner in which others use their image. However, the contract signed by Survivor contestants gives CBS control over all rights to publicity for at least three years after the program is aired. While a television studio may own the publicity rights to a fictional character, the blurring of fact and fiction in reality programming makes the type of ownership CBS has asserted over its Survivor cast a bit disconcerting. After all, these people are "playing" themselves on television, not fictional characters.

One of the domains in which sexual bodies are offered for public viewing is in the sex video industry. There is no evidence that this kind of industry has taken root in the Philippines, even as we get occasional reports of mostly foreign sex filmmakers shooting their sex videos of local "talents," usually young children. While child pornography is criminalized globally, adult pornography of both straight and gay genres is a thriving industry in North America, Europe and Australia, and even Japan, which even popularized animated porn through its *hentai* tradition. In the Philippines, however, there is a growing perception that sexually explicit movies have began to colonize and implant themselves in the liberal spaces provided by independent films. It is noteworthy to mention that many gay-oriented movies emerged through these venues, thereby suggesting the resistive nature by which local independent filmmakers transgress the limits of allowable representations to push for their own artistic and personal advocacies. However, social control remains imposed to regulate, if not prevent, the public viewing of what can be construed as pornographic materials. The Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) has been particularly relentless in its regulation of what images can be commercially exhibited. Due to this strict regulatory environment, most of the pornographic videos that people get to purchase are in the forms of pirated materials originating from abroad and are sold in the black market.

Actors and models who appear in pornographic movies undeniably present their bodies for public viewing, but unlike participants in a reality game show, they have prior knowledge, though not necessarily with full and informed consent, of such form of representation. Even if they have prior knowledge and consent, nevertheless, it is easy to paint these as disempowering and objectifying forms of choices. However, one can also argue that there are porn stars that have made pornography their career and in the United States, the porn industry is subjected to regulation and even has its own self-regulatory processes and award-giving bodies. There, regular bureaucratic mechanisms are deployed to control the industry, including strict laws on who can legally produce, act in, distribute, sell, and purchase pornographic movies and videos.

However, a different matter arises in the case of cyber-pornography, with its proclivity to democratize access not only to the anonymous production but also to the anonymous distribution of sex videos. In this space, the culpability of authorship escapes interrogation even by the power of the state, considering that just anyone hiding in the anonymity of a user name can upload sexually explicit materials in http://www.youtube.com, or in its adult counterpart, http://www.xtube.com. As free sites, anyone could also view the uploaded materials, thereby heightening the intensity and depth by which these sites could have the power to offer sexualized bodies for public viewing, with or without their owners' consent. These x-rated sites are different from pay-per-view internet channels in which one has to subscribe and purchase airtime to be able to access video-streaming materials of what can be considered as "legitimate" and commercially available pornography. Both free and pay-per-view sites are just examples of the different modalities by which the internet has become a highway for the proliferation of sexual images.

In addition to porn sites, there are also those that come in the form of social networking sites which are focused on what has been termed as "alternative" lifestyles for people looking for friends or long-term relationships. These sites usually feature members, again taking up anonymous user names, who post messages, pictures, and videos, which may also be sexually explicit. However, most sites require payment in order to access explicit materials posted by members, and some would even require permission from them. While these sites enable some to find their future partners, thereby totally altering the term "mail-order brides" into "cyber-brides," when they become the platforms to launch virtual interactions through chat rooms in which people looking for cyber-partners can link up, and even arrange an "eye ball," or an actual meeting, they could also enable a more sexual interaction and where people seeking sex with others of their choice could arrange for casual sex. However, even without physical encounter, the cyberspace could also enable image-based virtual sex, through a web camera hook-up of both parties as they perform sexually explicit acts for their mutual visual enjoyment. This mechanism has also enabled cyber-prostitution in which virtual customers purchase air-time to be able to link up with a cyber-prostitute, many of whom are young women and men from impoverished countries, and engage in virtual sex.

In late capitalism, the cyberspace and mobile technologies become fertile avenues for the proliferation of sexual simulacra, in which reality and images implode and lose distinction. The case of Katrina Halili and Hayden Kho in 2009, is a perfect example of the implosion of sexual image and reality. Katrina is an actress that plays sexy and seductive roles while Hayden also entered showbiz through his playing of a gigolo. Thus, both were presented as objects of sexual desire. Both Hayden and Katrina were also associated with the Belo Medical Clinic, a leading body-sculpting and -improving service provider in the Philippines, with Hayden being one of the attending doctors there and is the former lover of its owner, Vicky Belo, and Katrina as one of its celebrity endorsers. When Hayden recorded his graphic sexual trysts with Katrina, allegedly without her knowledge and consent, it was meant to be a private form of perversion which, to be fair, is also committed by others as part of their sexual fantasies. However, it became simulacra when copies of the tape leaked in cyberspace, and was posted in many sites, and further reproduced and circulated not only on CDs but also through mobile devices. Their appearance on the sex videos was both reality and imagery, and the videos were consumed as sexual artifacts in cyberspace. While watching one particular video, one could not help but view it both as porn movie featuring

two sexy celebrities and as a perverse act of two real people caught on tape. The televised hearings in the Senate further heightened the simulacra, with Hayden and Katrina, and other real personalities turning into some kind of actors in the unfolding of a soap-operatic sexual reality drama. This was achieved through the manner by which the hearing was presented to the public, through skillful videography which was almost movie-like with Katrina, Hayden, the lawyers, and Senators as actors if not only for its being actually a real event featuring real people. The sexualized bodies of Katrina and Hayden became the foundation from where these forms of implosion took shape. While their bodies may not have been initially and directly commoditized, they eventually were when copies of their tapes were turned into CDs sold in the black market, or when the high ratings of the newscasts and programs, or high internet traffic in sites, which featured the controversy were translated into advertisement revenues earned by TV networks, website hosts, and internet service providers.

Another form of sexualized commoditization, albeit more insidious, is when the real physical body itself, and not just its image on print, film, or in cyberspace, becomes the commodity that is sold and consumed. This is true for sexual labor done by prostituted people, both women and men. This is the kind of sexual labor that many people, from the conservative right that includes pro-life advocates to the extremely liberal left and the radical feminist pro-choice activists, see as objectionable and problematic. While referred to in popular culture as the "world's oldest profession," prostitution has been painted as dehumanizing and objectifying even to a point that, sensing much abhorrence of the term and for the sake of political correctness, it has been changed to "commercial sex work" to provide those who are part of the industry a neutral and more dignified label. This discursive shift offered to at least symbolically rescue the human agents from a kind of work that has been theorized to be something that one is forced or conscripted into due to poverty or lack of employment opportunities. The dominant narrative for prostitution is one that evokes a sense of disgust, a kind of rejection, and an air of moral turpitude that is warranting societal control at best, and abhorrence at worst. To be called a "prostitute" is considered the worst form of insult.

Sometime in 2004, a politically-charged incident occurred when General Victor Corpus called Senator Loren Legarda, who was then running for Vice-President, a "political prostitute." Legarda was furious and so were others, who demanded an apology from Corpus. However, this incident made me reflect on how easily we can mix our metaphors, and how easily we can confuse an unprincipled political act to be similar to what prostituted women and men have to endure. We ordinarily use prostitution to refer to the act engaged by women and men who sell their bodies for money. Thus, it is easy to associate it with acts of desperation, of people willing to sell their principles and dignity in exchange for some material benefits. However, one has to really think hard if it is appropriate to associate the word "prostitute" with desperate acts driven by greed and ambition, which Corpus was charging Legarda of committing when he accused her of allegedly sleeping with both the political left and right just to advance her political agenda. While this may be a form of "political promiscuity" on the part of Legarda, there is still some sense of discomfort in assuming that it is similar to what drives those involved in commercialized sexual labor. While one can liberally construe that prostituted persons sell their bodies for personal gain, it is not authentic to associate this with acts driven by greed and ambition.

My field study with commercial sex workers in Calamba City in Laguna gave me the opportunity to examine the narratives of women who are involved in this profession. What

I learned and observed made me doubt the accuracy of using the word "prostitute" to describe a desperate act motivated by lust for greed and naked ambition, or of selling bodies for personal gain, or of desperate acts driven by lust, or by promiscuity. Indeed, while all of the women who were interviewed tell their stories of desperation, what I saw are personal narratives of bravery and strong convictions in willing to make sacrifices, even to a point of selling their bodies, just to feed their families, send their kids to school, and earn some money for their future. These are acts very much unlike what Corpus now suggests to be associated with naked ambition that politicians have. While it may be possible, I have not seen a "prostitute" in our field study who sold her body for plain and unadulterated greed and lust for power, nor to satisfy her sexual appetite. Most of them do so because they just want to survive.

To be called a "prostitute" is indeed an insult. However, the women and men who are involved in the commercial sex industry, who we call "prostitutes," could easily be seen, even as they also easily see themselves, as victims of their own circumstances. This is why some feminists call them as "prostituted," to illustrate the fact that they are victims. Yet, most of them are also survivors and heroes in their own rights. They do not sell their bodies to enrich themselves, but simply to get by in difficult circumstances. They do not go to bed with anyone simply for personal gain. More often than not, they do so for the gain of others whom they care for so much—such as for an ailing mother's medicine, a sibling's education, or a love child's nourishment. But nevertheless, society continues to deploy a lowly image of prostitution. There is much "abjectification" and "objectification" in the categories and labels that we use to refer to those who are involved in sexual labor. To my mind, these are forms of social control, of efforts to inflict a negative image on sexual forms of work as a way to prohibit its proliferation.

One of the most poignant moments that I ever encountered in my career in field-based social science research is that single meeting with one of my respondents in the field study I conducted on commercial sex workers in Calamba City which I referred to above, who shall remain anonymous not only to protect her identity, but also to dramatize the point that her narrative may not necessarily be hers alone, but may be found in others as well. Its poignancy was derived from how the experience did not simply provide data for my research on the everyday lives of prostituted women, but more importantly, it confronted and interrogated my worldview about the process of victimization, and about the political functions of ordinary lives. I always had the impression that women who sell their bodies as commodity are disempowered and objectified. The images that I have of them are cemented by the empty and sad, if not tragic, faces I have seen in my immersion in another place where sex, pleasure, and desire are also sold. I refer to the faces of those naked women I saw dancing in Silom in Bangkok, gyrating to the tune of modern disco music, with colored lights playing on the surfaces of their skins and the shadows that they create not only on the walls, ceiling, and floors, but on the faces and bodies of the customers eagerly ogling at such contrast—of sadness dancing soullessly through empty bodies moving in the colored shadows and upbeat music of a place filled with old, sex-starved, lust-filled men, or of men like me who justified my presence there with the convenient excuse of doing it in aid of research. I was nevertheless truthful, considering that my self-reflections made me realize that there is nothing erotic about watching women being objectified right in front of my very eyes. That single moment became living proof to what my feminist friends have always said, of how dehumanizing commercial sex work is, whether it is of Thai women or of Filipino women.

This is the dominant narrative that I had with me, now re-presented as a hypothesis that I wanted to prove as I engaged the sex worker in Calamba. I wanted her to validate her oppression and exploitation with her responses to my queries. She did not.

One of her answers that really made me reflect on the validity of our social science templates and baggage was when she refused to be labeled as a "victim," considering that she felt it was her choice to be working in that place. She proudly said that she has more choices than regular housewives, who have to perform sexual labor to their husbands even if they are not in the mood, or when their husbands are demanding it at times when they are tired from doing household chores, and when the latter are drunk, stink, and are simply in a state which is not conducive to an erotic encounter. She admitted being forced to have sex with men she did not like, even if she could refuse, but at least she was getting paid for this, unlike the poor housewives who were not. Her other response which literally floored me was to the question of whether she thought she was a good citizen. To this, she answered by looking me straight in the eye and without hesitation averred in the affirmative, and supported this by her innovative way of linking her sexual labor to the performance of male public servants. She said that she is performing her civic duties every time she makes a mayor, policeman, and any other public official happy.

As I reflected on her responses, I told myself that maybe she was just providing excuses. Maybe, hers was a case of false consciousness, or of being desensitized by the dehumanization she had to endure everyday. I even tried to use as an explanation that phenomenon about kidnap victims or hostages gradually learning to have positive feelings towards the kidnappers. I worked hard to dig deep in the many socio-psychological theories to provide an explanation to what I felt was an anomaly. But in the end, I was working hard to debunk the logic of her responses to reinforce my academic security zone and the theories that I, until then, subscribed to. It is too easy to depict women as sex objects. But in the end, it is not only patriarchy that is guilty of this objectification. It also lies deep in the theories that we have built that makes it convenient for us to label their everyday lives as a sad case of oppression and victimization. My encounter with my female respondent in Calamba became a compelling critique of how our academic disciplines have contributed to the proliferation of a regime of truth and knowledge that turns our research subjects into objects whose behaviors have to be characterized, controlled, and predicted. They now become merely cases, variables, and that X in our equation. Whenever they behave differently from what theory is saying, our usual response is to treat these as anomalies and outliers. Thus, our academic truth and knowledge, through their power to determine our inquiries, are also forms of control as they limit our lenses, even as they also define the boundaries within which we can only make sense of the data we gather.

Beyond academic forms of control, the explosion of venues and mechanisms by which the body can be sexualized, from print to video to cyberspace, required the deployment of other control mechanisms to restrain the body and prevent it from being an object of pleasure and desire. One of the mechanisms by which the body can be controlled is by regulating behavior that may have sexual implications or consequences. This was first expressed in the imposition of strict control over the female body, as perceived to be a source of sin, even as public interest on it was being simultaneously expressed through the enormous amounts of knowledge and truth produced to regulate its fertility, to a point that these discourses have effectively denied women control of their own bodies. One of the strategies deployed to achieve this is through the imposition of norms for acceptable

embodiments, such as the adoption of dress codes. This is premised on a logic that is consistent with a "blame the victim" attitude that was the dominant characteristic of societies confronted with the proliferation of sexual violence particularly targeting women. This is found in the belief, albeit flawed, that women who are sexually assaulted are asking for it whenever they wear revealing and sexy dresses, in that these seduce and induce men to treat them as sexual objects. The roots of these could even be biblical, in that the original sin was supposed to have been induced by Eve when she seduced Adam to bite the forbidden fruit. There is reason to believe that this was a metaphor for the first sex act, which in fact inspired one motel chain in Manila to use an apple with bite-marks to suggest what many of its customers can expect to happen inside its facilities. Sex was considered a dirty act in most religious narratives, and women's bodies were banished in the private sphere to merely become vessels for reproduction and private desires. A bare woman's body was associated with seductive temptation, and therefore had to be covered and clothed in public. In Islamic societies, this imposition of strict dress codes for women is seen in the mandatory wearing of burkhas and veils. In modern Christian societies, and even in secular ones, this could now take the form of stricter dress codes for women compared to men. There are also instances when the imposition of dress codes is not limited to religious reasons only, and has taken forms that apply even to men. It is interesting to note that there are government offices that bar people wearing shorts to enter their premises. In Metro Manila, there are areas in which men who are not wearing shirts were apprehended for allegedly committing acts of obscenity in public.

It is significant to cite as an example the experience of one Catholic university in Manila that has a dress code policy among its students. There was an earlier attempt to liberalize the policy, which before was punitive in that violations of it were considered as an offense warranting disciplinary action. With the cooperation of more liberal administrators, students were able to negotiate for a less punitive mechanism in which they would be allowed to self-regulate themselves by employing a more developmental approach, in which inappropriate dressing is considered not as a disciplinary case that needs punishment, but a behavioral problem which warranted counseling. In this mechanism, students who are inappropriately dressed are tagged, and when such reaches a limit, they will be required to see a counselor. This liberal and developmentalist policy was, however, undermined by many forces, foremost of which were the many cases of students who abused their new found freedom, and were bolder in transgressing established norms for appropriate campus wear. More influential than this, however, was the preponderance of protests and complaints coming from adult employees and faculty who feared the rise of promiscuous liberalism that threatens the Christian ethos of the school. Many faculty members wanted a return to the old dress code policy to create a stricter environment so that they can be spared from being distracted by the provocative outfits of usually their female students. Hence, for these faculty members the bodies of students, as expressed through their clothing, have to be controlled less for the reason to train the students to be morally prudish but more to spare the moral fiber of the institution and its adult members, specifically by protecting the adult male from temptation. Eventually, the liberal developmentalist policy was junked in favor of a return to the old dress code "regime" in which inappropriate dressing was considered once again as an offense that warranted disciplinary action.

A related mechanism to control the sexualized body is through the normalization of sexual behavior. This is achieved through the institutionalization of acceptable codes of

sexual conduct, such as prohibition against sex outside marriage and public display of intimacy, and through censorship such as banning pornography, sensual art, and other forms of sexual expression. The move to ban certain songs from being aired, and the restrictions imposed on films and other visual materials for them to be acceptable for public exhibition, are only some of the mechanisms which institutions in modern society, from the church to the state, can deploy. There is also an attempt to regulate private lives and choices of citizens through law-like prohibitions, or what Foucault (1980) termed as the "deployment of the juridico-discursive power of the state." This comes in the form of banning same sex marriages, sodomy, and even artificial contraception. The reproductive health debate captures the dynamics in which conservative forces in society, particularly spurred by the power and influence of religious conviction, attempt to stake their claims over the body of citizens and, in turn, restrict their right to make choices.

However, despite attempts to control the body through the deployment of narratives that demonize sexuality, the logic and dynamics of institutionalization is never complete and undoubtedly enables the proliferation of cracks that can easily be filled by counter-narratives. The body in this context becomes a domain for political contestations through the deployment of resistance from those who refuse to be captured in the "box" of dominant sexualities and the theories that tend to explain them. Here, I am referring to the renegades and the challengers. There is a powerful template for sexual resistance that springs from the marginalized and repressed sexualities in the context of a dominant politics of the body that rests on prohibition and control. I am again offering the case of prostituted women and men who are usually treated as victims, even as their identities are demeaned and are subjected to marginalization. As my conversation with one sex worker in Calamba suggests, while it is easy to fall into the trap of looking at sexual labor as a form of objectification, it is also possible that there are prostituted persons that view their profession in the light of a transactional logic, albeit empowering since they are in control of their pleasures, unlike housewives and others whose sexual pleasures are repressed and dependent on the permission of others.

The case of gays, lesbians, and transgendered persons would be another fertile domain from where one can derive powerful symbols of sexual contestations. Being gay is another identity position which is usually considered as repressed. However, there is growing evidence that gays are beginning to assert themselves through rites that, in the mold of Mikhail Bakhtin's (1984, 6-13) carnival, make fun and turn straight culture into a parody. I remember two incidents when I was in college that symbolized what to me had become images that foretold gay politics in late capitalism. One incident was when an obviously gay colleague in my college military training platoon, who was constantly subjected to verbal abuse by my homophobic platoon leader, was physically assaulted by the latter who on purpose pushed and caused him to fall on the ground. I fully remember the gay student cadet in tears, composed himself, and like a fallen actress rose, and with conviction shouted in full force for everyone to hear: "*Pangit ka! Kahit ikaw ang pinakahuling lalake sa mundo, hindi kita papatulan. Pangit!*" ["You ugly beast! I swear that even if you are the last man standing in this world, I will never fall for you! You ugly beast!"], and in typical dramatic flair, threw his wooden rifle at the direction of the stunned platoon leader, and strode head up high and walked out. Such image was so poignant for its sheer parody, and raw truthfulness that bore deep into the egoistic machismo of the abusive homophobe, who indeed was really not attractive. In a masculine-dominated world with gays being pictured to be man-starved, to be denied and rejected by a gay person for being ugly is pure poetic

justice and unadulterated humor. Another occasion I witnessed was a case embodied in discursive reversal. This occurred when a gay student walking on campus was being taunted by a group of bullies who repeatedly shouted in a derisive manner "*Bakla!*" ["Faggot!"] at him. Appearing unperturbed and even somewhat comical, the gay student turned around and with ferocity shouted back repeatedly and derisively at them "*Lalake!*" ["Men!"] in a way which only he could muster, but the message was obviously to put the bullies in their place by equally demeaning their position of being men in the same manner that they have demeaned his being gay.

The above forms of gay resistance, while discursive in character, help elevate the gay body to a level of legitimacy as a canvass against which alternative identities and sexualities can be mapped. Also in this category, and still in the same mold as Bakhtin's framing of ordinary resistance, is the development of "gayspeak," in which the gay sub-culture is able to construct a new vocabulary and an associated lingo, albeit full of humor and satire, that serves as an exclusive code which become signifiers of their identity, even as it also provides a protective shell from where only those like them can access the meaning. In addition, and more directly aimed at embodiments and how gays present themselves, is the successful attempts of the gay sub-culture to parody straight culture through their own beauty pageants, and in the case of the Philippines and to the consternation of Church authorities, even their own versions of a religious event such as the Santacruzan. These are just some of the ways by which this marginalized group challenges existing practices, in addition to those which celebrate their own spaces by which they use their bodies to become bases from where they can construct their own counter narratives. The example of Bebe Gandanghari, formerly Rustom Padilla, is a case in point that speaks loudly of this kind of politics. Still, another example of this is the case of Justine Ferrer, a transsexual who became one of the contestants in the second season of *Survivor* Philippines, which was aired on GMA 7 in the latter half of 2009. First to be voted out due to her identity, Justine nevertheless was able to redeem herself by winning over other players with whom she competed later, who were eliminated after her, to earn a right to remain in the island up to the point where she rejoined the game and ended up as one of the final three contestants, and eventually losing by just one vote during the finals. Her iconic presence has forced the prevailing biases against gays and transsexuals to yield to a counter-narrative that has been mediated by a media representation that effectively undermined the dominant constructs. Justine's fairy-tale story of beginning at the bottom as the first contestant to be voted out, but ending with a spot at the top three, besting not only the "normal" female contestants, but even the most "macho" male contestants, became an embodiment of a powerful politics of redemption, in which marginalized bodies are able to assert their own power despite the predominance of discriminatory narratives.

NORMALIZING SEXUALITY: SPACES AND NARRATIVES OF POPULAR TRUTH/KNOWLEDGE AND ORDINARY AND EVERYDAY PLEASURE/DESIRE

The ease by which sexuality is normalized in the everyday fabric of Philippine society, despite the strong push to control it, is just a logical outcome of the deeply embedded discourse of sex in the Filipino habitus. One can observe how sexualized ordinary "Pinoy" (the ordinary and everyday reference to the Filipino) talk is by listening to conversations

between people in their everyday lives. Ordinary people refer to sex not as exogenous and malicious, but in the spirit of youthful playfulness. One can hear people refer to "*puke*" and "*titi*" ordinarily without a tint of willful malice on the part of the speaker, and these words only take on noxious meanings when it is said in the formal context and vis-à-vis the prudish and moralistic air of an elitist social discourse. Nudity, particularly in the rural countryside and among the urban poor, may not be as offensive, considering that the spaces within which residents there ordinarily commune are designed in such a way that privacy becomes an alien concept. It is normal to see people taking a bath almost half naked, or of men wearing only their underwear in public artesian wells, or along rivers and irrigation canals; or of women doing their laundry in "wet look" where they wear only the "*tapis*," "*malong*," or "*duster*." Living places of many Filipinos are small to a point that these become spaces which deny them the privacy that people normally living in big houses can afford. In this architecture of the ordinary abode, the display of bodies by family members is taken in the context of rituals of familiarity. Thus, one can observe that ordinary peoples are not as hesitant to strip naked with friends as they take a bath in a common shower, or in a river, as compared to those who are reared in houses with private bathrooms and bedrooms. An ordinary woman nursing her child may even not be shy to expose portions of her breast in public, in street corners as she engages in idle talk with others, or even when riding in jeepneys. Men are not as restrained in relieving themselves in public to a point that even attempts to regulate this, as seen in the public open urinals in Metro Manila, have acquired a design that partly accommodates this personal ritual, albeit now using a not-so-private facility along main streets in the metropolis.

This lack of hesitation to display the body is not to be interpreted as being "*walang hiya*," or "shameless," but more as expressions of "*walang malisya*," or "without malice," and therefore innocent. Hence, in the habitus of the ordinary Pinoy, shame, which is a Victorian construct that was foisted on Filipinos to prohibit the public display of their bodies, is replaced by innocence. It is this template that produces ordinary narratives about human bodies and sexuality that do not see sex as taboo, and instead have a healthy attitude towards it. In fact, one can even conclude that viewing sex as taboo is mainly a construct among the educated and the urbanized elites, as they operate in spaces in which the division between public and private is defined. In the ordinary and everyday lives of the Pinoy, the divide between public and private, and the demands to respect rights to privacy, are not as important an issue. This is reflected in how ordinary Pinoys usually value more kinship and camaraderie over rights to privacy, and consider meddling into the affairs of family members, friends and even neighbors as not as problematic as compared to Western societies, and even those in the Philippines who have now been influenced by the latter's worldviews, or those who are in the affluent crowd and the urban elites.

The other dynamic that drives the institutionalization of this kind of narrative about the human body and sexuality lies in the Filipinos' enormous capacity for humor and fun. This is manifested, for example, in how they can easily turn a serious event into a material that can be given a comic spin, either through text jokes or in gigs of stand-up comedians. Parody and satire are ordinarily deployed not only as forms of entertainment, but as coping mechanisms to deal with stressful events. It is here that they turn the dangers of sexuality on its head and recast it as a resource that they can spin around to take on an element of fun and pleasure not in an erotic sense, but as an antidote to the seriousness of life. "Green jokes" proliferate in the ordinary setting, some of which may be offensive to the sensibilities

of some people, while others may see in them the redeeming function of providing a venue by which people can detoxify their discourse of the serious challenges that they face. In fact, when one takes offense with a seemingly innocent "green joke," peers may respond by reminding the one who took offense not to take life seriously, even as others may even chastise the latter for being the one with a malicious mind, thereby shifting the burden of malice to those who interpret the joke as offensive.

The preponderance of "green jokes" and what may appear as sexually nuanced narratives also derives its potency from the nature of ordinary language. Tagalog, as spoken in the ordinary, like any other language when taken in the informal context, is structured in a way that it is easy to have double meaning that appears sexually suggestive but can be turned around to mean otherwise. You can hear many of these on the morning radio programs, such as the one that is aired in *Love Radio* featuring the duo of Cris Tsuper and Nicole Hyala, which takes the name of "T*ambalan ng Balasubas at Balahura*" ("The duo of the boorish man and the loose woman). Let us consider the following example from among their repertoire: "*Ang hanapin mo ay isang lalakeng may malaking T....as in, may malaking talento.*"

Some may find this sexually nuanced, as it may appear to be an advice to look for a well endowed man ("*malaking T*" can be interpreted by some as a code for "*malaking titi*" or "big penis"), even as the DJ quickly adds that the "T" in fact refers to "*talento*" or talent; hence, the advise is in fact to look for a talented man. Another example is the following: "*Pahimas naman ng ibon mong mabalahibo.*"

This statement can be taken in an even more sexual way, to imply that a request to stroke a heavily-feathered "bird" actually suggests a sexually graphic plea to stroke a hairy male organ, with "*ibon*" now being interpreted as a code for penis. The DJ can, of course, argue that the statement is an innocent request to indeed stroke someone's pet bird, and that "*balahibo*" actually refers to bird feathers, and not to its other meaning which is body hairs. This relative fluidity of Tagalog and the ease by which it can be used to create double meanings thus enable ordinary discourse to become a slippery domain for moralizing agents to condemn and definitively be held accountable as purveyors of malice. In fact, the politics of reversing the culpability, as seen in shifting the burden of malice to those who take offense at the seemingly innocent play of words, is a very effective mechanism to resist control of this particular discourse.

A similar thing happened, but this time, to a fruit. Many prudish people associate the banana with something they think as "dirty" like sex, like other phallic-shaped fruits and vegetables, such as the eggplant. In the middle of 2009, this versatile fruit has again taken the center-stage in a sex-related controversy when the Catholic Bishop's Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) moved collectively to pressure radio stations and record bars to stop playing/selling discs of a song about the banana performed by the group *Blank Tape*. Here are the lyrics of the song (I have supplied at right the English translations, whenever needed).

Kung ayaw mong nabibitin sa taste	If you don't want to be shortchanged in taste
I-try mo to banana ko babe	Please try my banana, babe
I'm selling today.	I'm selling today.
Ito ay long, di ka magsisisi sa size	It is long, you won't regret its size

Masarap, matamis at mahaba at panalo pa ang price.	It's delicious, sweet, and long, and reasonably priced.
Refrain	*Refrain*
Sige i-try mo Aking banana Pag natikman mo to Di magsasawa Dahil masustansya ang aking banana. At ubod pa ng sarap aking banana.	Please try My banana If you ever get to taste it You will not get tired of it Because my banana is nutritious. And it is delicious.
Kaya i-try mo Aking banana.	So please try My banana.

However, a careful and objective examination of the lyrics of the song *Banana* contrast both with being "*payat*" or thin. Furthermore, the word "*matipuno*" is rarely used in everyday discourse, as it is considered to be too formal. The word "*matikas,*" on the other hand, is used to refer to being smart in external appearance, and does not refer to internal well-being and health. Thus, indeed, an ordinary person would almost always consider someone who gained muscle as someone who is "*tumaba.*" This is because in ordinary and everyday discourse, "*taba*" is not necessarily "fat" but could in fact mean "healthy," two constructs that are considered to be oppositions in their ordinary use in English. In the ordinary Tagalog, a fertile soil is referred to as "*matabang lupa*" and fertilizers are referred to as "*pampataba ng lupa.*" And when someone tells you that "*mataba ang iyong puso,*" it is a commendation of your noble trait of being generous and kind-hearted, signs of inner psychological health, and not as a health warning about you having a fatty heart. The relevance of this to body politics is that it enables a resistive template where our language, which is a bearer of our social meanings, have subverted the Western model of embodiment and physicality, as it deploys a narrative in which the states of being fat and healthy are not antithetical categories, but could in fact refer to a same state of well-being.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Attempts to control the body in late capitalism is replete with symbolic violence, but we have not succeeded in confining the body to merely become a canvass for the articulation of the dominant narratives that govern it as a usual project to be produced or a resource to be consumed. Validating Foucault's (1980) critique of the repressive hypothesis, we have institutionalized the body narratives in the Philippines not as a settled template of silenced debates and repressed desires, but in the explosion of discourse and contestations, and of an intricate articulation between popular knowledge and truth, on one hand, and the ordinary and everyday experience of pleasure and desire, on the other. While some institutions deploy control mechanisms, others are able to offer venues by which individuals and collectives express their own sexualities and body narratives by using ordinary discourses through the language games in which they are expressed. Thus, in the heat of attempting to banish and silence talk about sex in Filipino normal lives, they have ended up not only

sexualizing the normal, but even normalizing sexuality to a point that the Filipino body is now told about in narratives as no longer as alienated, conservative, and repressed as Filipinos have been made to believe.

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BOOK REVIEW

Jonathan I. Israel: *Democratic enlightenment: Philosophy, revolution, and human rights 1750-1790*

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 1066 pp.

Democratic enlightenment: Philosophy, revolution, and human rights 1750-1790 is the capstone of Jonathan Israel's trilogy—the third part—that argues in painstaking detail for a thorough reconsideration of Baruch Spinoza's contribution to modern ideas. The vast work *in toto* comprises almost 3,000 pages. Each volume presents precise and eloquent dissections of every aspect of the growth and dispersion of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries thought called "the new philosophy." In each part the author makes a controversial and persuasive case for a profound reevaluation of the entire modern period in light of recent archival enrichment of how much more we have come to understand about the principal actors of the period. Israel's project is to demonstrate how Spinoza's radical ideas had a singularly important, though hitherto unappreciated, influence on the shaping of modern thought. *Radical enlightenment: Philosophy and the making of modernity 1650-1750*, the first part of the trilogy, presents a fascinating account of Spinoza's life, work, and influence first in the Netherlands and then—as his work so daringly challenged accepted religious and political beliefs—throughout Europe. His ideas offended many people because of his substance monism (essentially a deterministic materialism), which is an advocacy of democratic government and a rejection of revelation. But for those few who understood their implications, he presented the most coherent account of a mechanistic universe explicable in purely material terms. The book serves up a fascinating detailed account of how the new ideas (under the generic name of *Cartesianism*) spread to every corner of Europe via the "republic of letters" transforming the way people viewed themselves and nature. Revolutionary, they stirred up such intellectual and political discontent within society-at-large that by the end of the eighteenth century they inspired and justified a collection of political revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic. That, the actual revolutions and what inspired them, is the thrilling story told in *Democratic enlightenment*, part three.

Israel's *modus operandi* (skilful forensic bibliography), brilliantly illustrates how old libraries can reveal new clues for understanding their possessors' intellectual growth and change. Intense inspection of the interconnections between the notable thinkers of the period through careful examination of their libraries' contents (and annotations in personal editions), their correspondence with one another and their own contemporary works give us a much clearer and nuanced picture of how they actually thought. In the case of Spinoza, Israel presents a richly etched picture of how his ideas grew to fruition amidst a group of Cartesian freethinkers that brought him modest fame (even the offer of a chair of philosophy in Germany) and simultaneous furious condemnation—all within the short frame of forty-five years.

In the second volume, *Enlightenment contested: Philosophy, modernity and the emancipation of man 1670-1752*, the reader learns in fine detail how the new and growing network of philosophical interconnections was beset by word wars between those who generally agreed about the new ways to conceive of the natural world but differed controversially about the many particular implications this had for traditional beliefs and practices, especially in the realms of religion and politics. Israel's project makes necessary the delineation of two competing strands in the new philosophy which he labels "moderate" and "radical." In this part the focus turns to France where, after the death of Louis XIV in 1715, the new ideas ignited the sort of effervescent enthusiasm that led Montesquieu and Voltaire, along with countless others, to embark on the vast project of public education the enlightenment represents in the history of Western thought. The moderate party (Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Hume, among many others) represented those who espoused the new way of looking at the natural world (essentially Lockean and Newtonian) but attempted to reconcile them with traditional beliefs as much as possible. They were religiously deists, mostly, with differing beliefs about how to account for divine providence. They waffled this way and that on the question how to reconcile materialism with traditional beliefs, and how to account for providence in a world where it could coherently be dispensed with.

This is where the radicals come in. They reject the very idea of providence to explain reality. As Israel (*Contested enlightenment*, 11-12) puts it:

> [T]he radical wing which scorned all such dualistic systems and attempts at adjustment, may have been a tiny fringe in terms of numbers, status and approval ratings, among both elites and in popular culture, but they proved impossible to dislodge or overwhelm intellectually. Those who reduced the worldly and spiritual to a single set of rules governing the whole of reality, beginning in a sense with Hobbes but especially with Spinoza, were everywhere denounced, banned and reviled. Yet the universal opposition of churches, governments, universities, and leading publicists, as well as the great bulk of the common people, could not alter the fact that it was precisely these philosophical radicals extending the Galilean-Cartesian conception of rationality and criterion of what is "true," across the board, pushing it as far as it would go, and allowing no exemptions whatsoever, who often seemed to evince the greatest intellectual consistency and coherence.

A key portion of the second volume deals with the *Encyclopedie*—the defining expositor of new ideas—first in France, and soon afterwards all over Europe. Its publication was simultaneously transforming and threatening to an extent we find hard to comprehend today. Deliberately provocative, it propagated "new" ways to look at everything, prompting endless controversy which of course resulted in its popularity and infamy.

The third volume, *Democratic enlightenment*, charts the pathway from revolutionary ideas to democratic revolutions. Throughout the whole of this period a growing recognition of the implications of human equality shapes all political and social thinking. The idea of equality was richly explored in *Enlightenment contested*. This volume which follows, tells the epic story of how radical ideas led to popular revolutions in different parts of Europe and on both sides of the Atlantic towards the end of the eighteenth century.

The reviewer's problem is size. The book captivatingly explains so many intellectual events that a short review cannot begin to do it justice. The menu is vast, full to overflowing with interesting accounts showing first how revolution was in the air, then on the ground, in many different parts of the world, after the middle of the eighteenth century. The most important part explains how a single publication made radical political and social ideas popular in many places after the middle of the century. Before that, it treats in sharp detail the monumental battle in France over publication of the *Encyclopedie*; Rousseau's falling out with the *philosophes* over religion and about the force and popularity of his ideas; Voltaire's and Diderot's engagements with enlightenment despots (Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great); Hume's political ideas; the Scottish enlightenment; German metaphysics and the pantheism crisis; and the fate of modern ideas in Catholic regions of Europe and the Americas. To give a little idea of how rich the book is, I will mention two of the many cases discussed. The first has to do with how mid-eighteenth century "natural" catastrophes led to a notorious religious controversy that clearly depicts how divided people were in their fundamental conceptions of reality. The second has to do with how a massive, revolutionary, worldwide bestseller, published in 1770, compelled readers (all over the world) to think in revolutionary terms. Simply put, its ideas sparked the revolutions that popped up in Europe and in the Americas. Here Israel introduces the reader to a book, deeply inspired and partly written by Diderot, that radically transformed the popular thought of its age. However, I venture to say that few readers of this review have ever heard of it.

On All Saints Day 1755 a massive earthquake devastated Lisbon and a large portion of southern Portugal and Spain. News of it, along with the inevitable perplexity about why, spread all around the world. Debate about how to account for such ghastly destruction led to a fierce war between proponents of religion and philosophy (natural science). This is the stage upon which Israel opens *Democratic enlightenment*. The event and ensuing dispute were defining in the sense that the contradictory explanations for the disaster perfectly illustrate what the enlightenment was all about. For ordinary people and ecclesiastics it was divine punishment for sin. For "modern" thinkers it was explicable in purely mechanical terms; geology was already becoming a science. A famous debate between Rousseau and Voltaire drew enormous public attention to the question. Was it God or physics? The *philosophes* were divided amongst themselves. Most of the Deists found it impossible to square what happened with divine providence but could not at the same time accept purely natural causation. Others struggled to reconcile the ideas. The account of the debate gives a clear picture of complicated theological issues that in the end seemed to satisfy none. This is where the radicals had the edge—purely materialist explanations were offensive for ignoring providence, but they worked. They stood clearly and controversially in favour of natural causation alone. The contrast was dramatic: either God was punishing humanity or God had nothing to do with it. Nature alone accounts for nature. It is happily coincidental that this issue was in the air just as the *Encyclopedie*, hot off the press, was providing naturalistic accounts for every way to look at the world. War over its publication brought issues to a head and caused what Israel calls a "revolution of the mind."

The second event has to do with publication in 1770 of *Histoire philosphique des deux Indes*. For Israel, the book's radically destabilizing influence is indispensable for understanding the period. "If in the 1750s and 1760s, the *Encyclopedie* effected the first

great injection of radical thought into mainstream European intellectual and cultural life, and d'Holbach's mature works, commencing with the *Systeme de la nature* (1770), formed a second engine propelling the democratic Enlightenment's advance, the culminating impulse from 1770 in terms of impact and general ramifications was the spectacular diffusion of the "*Histoire* and its brood of daughter texts" (*Democratic enlightenment,* 413). The text itself, largely inspired by Diderot was reprinted and translated in numerous editions, spawned imitations, and encouraged a certain new genre of writing. The title page itself eventually bore the name "Raynal" (for Guillaume Thomas Raynal) but it was, like the *Encyclopedie*, the work of many hands and very significantly bore the hallmark of Diderot's eloquent defense of human rights.

> Like the Enclopedie, the *Histoire philosphique* was the fruit of arduous research, teamwork, and complex editing, a compilation expressing the collective vision of the inner core of encyclopedistes, especially Diderot who devoted much time to the project from 1766 onwards. Like d'Holbach's culminating works, this compendium is remarkable, indeed path breaking, for collating and integrating the Radical Enlightenment's critique of the existing order into a single, highly integrated, but comprehensive set of libertarian principles, recapitulating and consolidating as a tightly knit revolutionary core the entire tradition of radical thought, reconfiguring its complex legacy into a remarkably effective ideological machine de guerre. (*Democratic enlightenment,* 414)

The *Histoire* (actually six volumes) is ostensibly about European expansion and colonial trade. It boldly reflects the scathingly negative opinion of its authors about how European discovery of new worlds led to the brutal exploitation of people and their lands everywhere. It harshly criticizes colonial practices and is fiercely anti-slavery. It was based on a revolutionary ideology integrating history and anthropology that was developed in several editions and inspired imitators. "By pivoting its entire analysis of global misery and exploitation on the manifest defects of colonial systems, the *Histoire* perfected a strategy that fully exploited the circumstance that the moderate mainstream shared parts of this critique and could only agree that much had gone woefully wrong in the Indies" (*Democratic enlightement,* 417). Yet, it simultaneously embodied the optimism of the age, very much based on belief in equality, that "this same global process that forged such an unequal hierarchy of power and wealth also constructed a single world arena, or what the Histoire terms 'la societe universelle,' turning mankind into a single spectacle and inversely demonstrating the true universal morality founded on equality and common identity of all men's aspirations, needs and illusions" (*Democrtic enlightenment*, 415).

The work was not an overnight bestseller, but it gradually attracted a huge following in virtually all the European languages.

> The rapid diffusion of the *Histoire* and polemics surrounding it marked a new stage also in that for the first time a key European Enlightenment debate was swiftly extended to North America where the English translation figured among the few continental European works to find a wide readership before 1789, and the Caribbean, New Spain, and Central and South America. It had a noticeable effect also in the now substantial resident European communities in India and

> Indonesia. In short, the *Histoire philosphique* was a key component of the pre-1798 Western "revolution of the mind." (*Democratic enlightenment*, 415)

Throughout the 1770s, one edition followed another, each an improvement on the last. The work consumed Diderot for whom it was

> ...his last throw, a final denunciation of political oppression, obscurantism and ecclesiastical authority everywhere, putting the finishing touches to an ideology summoning the world's people against what he and d'Holbach deemed the general system of world oppression. Indicting all the churches and governments of the globe, he devoted his last energies to the project, but again, clandestinely, his role remaining as unnoticed by the outside world as with the previous two editions. Most readers had no inkling until reports of it began circulating during the revolution. (*Democratic enlightenment,* 429)

The impact of the *Histoire* on the diffusion of Enlightenment ideas throughout the world was unequaled and surely the most important conveyor of controversial ideas, even greater than that of the *Encyclopedie*. After introducing the path breaking book, Israel devotes the next 220 pages to showing literally how worldwide its impact was. In one country after another the reader thrills at how ideas changed peoples' behavior. Then, as if on a sort of diversion, the author takes up the complicated "Spinoza's controversy" in Germany and provides a stunningly interesting account of how German philosophy was profoundly caught up in dealing with issues raised by the philosophy of Spinoza. The account of how this influenced Kant ought to be read by anyone with an interest in the period.

And finally, to wrap things up, we are given the revolutions themselves. This part of the book presents in shocking detail the story of how one popular revolution after another broke out all over Europe as well as in the new world. For anyone interested in how radical ideas can lead to revolutions, this is a must read. The discussion of the French revolution dissects in great detail just how and why certain ideas shaped the events so well known from history. Of the three volumes, this is the most interesting because of its account of how popular unrest grew and reinforced radical ideas as it did so. The debate about what makes a good and just society was profoundly enriched by new ways of looking at everything.

Democratic enlightenment is a simply fascinating account of the most important change in human thought and behavior in history. What Israel called a revolution of the mind. Perhaps it is fair to conclude with the note that a concise, brilliant summing up of the whole of Israel's work (based on lectures at Oxford in 2008, in memory of Isaiah Berlin) can be found in his book, *A revolution of the mind: Radical enlightenment and the intellectual origins of modern democracy.*

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BOOK NOTE

Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp. *The predicament of belief: Science, philosophy, faith*

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2013, 208 pp.

The relation between religious belief and modern science has always been an uneasy one. Deeply rooted in the conviction that direct observation and autonomous reasoning can offer a more accurate and truthful picture of the surrounding nature, modern science treats religion in the best case as a naïve and superfluous remnant of the past, in the worst case as an annoying critic and stumbling block, that hampers its expansive ambitions, and therefore only deserves inclement criticism in return. In spite of the fact that even some distinguished scientists have been showing little tolerance or appreciation for religion recently, alternative ways of interaction between religious belief and modern science are possible. It is precisely these possibilities which the authors want to explore, particularly the position which takes religious truth claims seriously, while also going along with recent scientific discoveries; a preparedness to question one's own beliefs in the light of new discoveries, while not automatically forsaking them.

The investigative project unfolds over eight chapters. Starting from an overview of the difficulties which every traditional theist is doomed to face in defending her faith, the authors proceed to a critical assessment of the very notion of the "Ultimate." They successively proceed to an appraisal of the so-called "argument from neglect," the plurality of religions—and especially the confusion and contradictions to which this leads—the so-called "scandal of particularity," focusing on the personal dimension of God in Jesus Christ and His resurrection, spread over two chapters, and the dialectic tension between doubt and belief. The book closes with a digression on the Church or the community of the faithful and the question whether beliefs need or tolerate revision. All through the book, the authors emphasize that they remain committed to the ancient Christian beliefs, while they are also impressed by the arguments and experimental evidence presented in the name of rational thought and modern science. Declaring doubt "legitimate" and refusing to give in to the temptation of "immunizing" Christian claims from non-Christian criticism, they rather go for what they call "Christian minimalism," or a very basic, step-by-step assertion of the truth claims of faith, as far as these are compatible with Reason.

There are plenty of reasons why a pious believer could get entangled in doubts about the truth of assertions made in the name of his faith. The reasons that are enumerated by the authors re-emerge at regular intervals throughout the discussion, especially in the first chapters. There is the obvious problem caused by the widespread success of science in explaining and solving the many problems and questions caused by our imperfect

environment. Further, the simultaneous existence of various religions, each of which claims to have received its major beliefs through divine Revelation, discourages many objective truth-seekers from trusting the intentions behind religious claims and practices. Concerning the Judeo-Christian Bible, it cannot be denied that there are many obvious contradictions between its different parts, even within the New Testament alone. Of course, a lot of Jews and Christians do not even live up to their faith and its principles.

The "argument from neglect"—a term borrowed from Wesley Wildman—focuses on the very notion of God Himself. If God exists as a person-like being, that is powerful and benevolent, why then, does He not perform as we would expect him to, and why does He not try to minimize the widespread sufferings in this finite world? God is often called "father," but hardly seems to pass the "parental responsibility" test. The arguments brought in by the authors are not that new after all. It is being argued once more that God had the intention to create a world that works according to its own rules and laws, and that the development of human autonomous rationality presupposes stability of natural laws and processes, rather than their occasional suspension for God to perform a "miracle." Since God perceives absolutely all cases of suffering, it would be disastrous for science, if God would systematically—or even selectively—suspend natural rules to prevent accidents from happening. Two areas of divine impact may be exempted from bias, however, as natural laws do not seem to regulate the mental and spiritual orders. Thoughts and mental processes may partly depend on biological functions, but their own action is not biological in nature; likewise, spiritual or religious convictions may interfere with someone's behavior. This is possible if the assumption of Causal Closure of the Physical world (CCP) is given up. So, there is some space left for God's active influence in the world through people's thoughts and values. Drawing on panentheism and emergence theory, the authors describe God's interaction with humans in terms of "gentle guidance," "growing illumination," and "persistent attraction"; it is a "participatory" interaction. God is aware of human action and experience—including innocent suffering—"in ways that infinitely exceed our comprehension" (65).

The position defended in the first four chapters is defined by the authors as "minimally personalistic theism" (MPT). The tone and scope of the enquiry is predominantly philosophical and universal. This changes profoundly in chapter 5, when the focus is shifted towards concrete religions, in particular to Christianity. Particular religions include references to historical events and to well-defined doctrinal and moral beliefs, that escape the "neutral" philosophical point of view. While the authors have admitted their interest in Christian religion from the start, their philosophical perspective compels them—in principle—to consider all religions, in order to identify which among these complies best with universal principles. In today's globalized world and culture, it seems impossible to point at any religion as the obviously most rational. The question arises, therefore, how significant the differences among religious claims are. Could this mean, then, that all religions are equally true? The authors illustrate how minimal personalistic theism may be "underdetermined," but that this should not be a basis for declaring that "anything goes."

Focusing on Christianity, the authors attempt to define the very core of the Christian religious belief. It states that the Ultimate Reality has manifested its infinite grace and compassion in Jesus Christ. This will be called the "Christian proposition" throughout the rest of the book. The many concrete historical details presented by the gospels on the person of Jesus should be understood in function of this proposition. In the end, the

religious significance of Jesus seems to depend especially on the truth of the resurrection from the dead and of the *post-mortem* appearances to his disciples. Here the authors are coming up with a triple interpretation of his resurrection, which involves a denial of the literal, physical option, as this would imply an inconsistency with their earlier rejection of direct divine intervention in (and against) natural laws. The bodily appearances of Jesus immediately after his death could be interpreted in the light of the witnesses' familiarity with Jewish apocalyptic belief in the physical resurrection of the just, or simply as an effect of the grieving experience. The description of the resurrection as the recognition that Jesus' teaching was exceptionally true, or that he is a true model of self-giving love, is rejected as theologically irrelevant, as these options are foregoing any action by God and, therefore, are losing touch with the essence of religion. Heavily drawing on Paul's letter to the Romans, the authors formulate the "participatory" hypothesis instead, according to which Jesus' so-called righteousness—another term for "obedience"—made him participate in God's own life, as God drew others to Himself in him, through the power of His Spirit. Likewise, humans who believe in him in word and deed may reach the same state of participation in relating to the Ultimate Reality. Another version is the "pneumatological" one, which goes a bit further, as it considers Jesus as the exclusive form taken by the Spirit. This interpretation already announces the third, most classical version, that fully accounts for the triune nature of God, as posited by religious dogma, and emphasizes the "personal presence" of Jesus (140-41).

The seventh chapter could, perhaps, have figured at the very start of the book as it investigates the nature and dynamics of doubt and belief. Actually, it discontinues the "concrete" religious orientation of the preceding two chapters, as the perspective and the terminology used turn abstract again, at least in the first paragraphs. Repeating the very intention of the book, which is to come up with a rational foundation of one's religious beliefs, the authors recognize how impossible a task it is to try to justify all personal beliefs and assumptions against a standard of rationality, or to define in what this standard exactly consists. Any attempt in this direction would find itself inevitably relying on other, more fundamental beliefs again. Eventually, good reasons to hold a certain belief are those that are endorsed by a Relevant Community of Experts (RCE), provided that these "experts" are correctly and completely informed on the matter. Sometimes, indeed, one may consider a belief as rational, in spite of the "experts" defending a different or even contrary one. In other cases, the belief in an actual truth may be weakened into the hope that this truth will become reality sometime in the future. There are, hence, various degrees in the rational justification of beliefs, the authors identifying six of them. Each of these degrees can be applied to a specific belief of scientific or religious nature, including the belief in the resurrection, that could be explained as the Holy Spirit sustaining Jesus' subjective existence after the death of his physical body.

In chapter 8, the authors again refer to their "Christian minimalism," which also implies the openness to "revision" of religious truth claims, as occurs in, for instance, the reinterpretation of miracles in a more spiritual sense. The authors recognize that "revisions" are not without risk, as they may fail to produce a satisfactory reformulation of the content of faith, and lead to a loss of interest in the faith or simply to a loss of faith as such. The authors also use the decline in church attendance in nearly all Western countries as an argument for churches to be open and "invite the participation of all who find themselves attracted to the teachings, actions, or personality of Jesus..." while "membership will not

require or be defined by a literal adherence to any particular interpretation of the ultimate reality, or of Jesus' relation to that reality" (145).

The authors acknowledged in the beginning of chapter 5 that some readers would probably regret the loss of universality in the discussion that had dominated chapters 1-4 and may have appealed also to a nonreligious and even anti-religious audience. However, universal claims in religion are deemed to be "thin," and ask for completion by concrete religions, the most visible and embodied face of religious belief. As an effect of their ambition to match the universal with the particular, the focus and method of the book acquire a hybrid identity, as is revealed in the alternation of abstract or analytical stretches, that prevent the reader from skipping pages or paragraphs, and patches of confessional language and biblical text fragments that illustrate the more "theological" passages.

In combining the philosophical and theological points of view, the authors have rejected the option of a "cheap" or one-sided and superficial approach. They may have stirred rather than appeased the debate, as they acknowledge themselves that the academy and public opinion are divided in two camps on whether to choose a more universal than a more concrete and strict interpretation of the meaning of religion (95). The book may, therefore, appeal to holders of a wide range of confessional positions, but in this also consists its vulnerability, as some fervent religious believers may find that it is too prudent, or even ends up denying essential elements of Christian faith, like the physical dimension of the resurrection, while more skeptic minds will find it too inclined to serve the established beliefs of Christians. Claiming that the so-called "participatory interpretation" of the resurrection—deemed "the easiest to explain and defend"—would enable its adherents to "participate in God through Jesus' self-surrendering love" and that "it offers a mode of existence in which human self-transcendence meets, and even shares in, the compassion and freedom of the divine reality itself" (140) reflects to our impression a (too?) optimistic interpretation of the effects of elementary Christian belief. Likewise, non-Christian religions are underrepresented in the discussion of concrete religions, even as any effort to comprehensiveness would inevitably have led to a superficial analysis. At any rate, through its varied approaches and the rigor of its philosophical reasoning, the book is a "must" for all who are involved in the study of philosophy and epistemology of religion and of fundamental theology.

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Φιλοσοφια
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BOOK NOTICES

Shane Weller. 2011. **Modernism and nihilism.** ***Basingstoke-New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 182 pp.***

Modernity is a concept that figures among the most used in philosophy nowadays. However, it is also hard to define in univocal terms, as it may be used in a wide variety of contexts, and seems to have evolved since its first appearance in the eighteenth century until the present. While it was initially advocating progress, science, and social revolution, it came to be gradually associated (especially after 1848) with disenchantment, desacralization, and instrumentalizing humanity, tragically culminating in Nazism and Auschwitz. Nietzsche recommended art as the "only superior counterforce" against modern nihilism. This explains, perhaps, why modernity has been abundantly discussed in aesthetics, while its philosophical and political implications deserve more attention. Nihilism is another multi-faceted term, which is often used to characterize modernity, as it radically rejects old certainties, while taking shape along the return from reason to myth, sometimes with disastrous consequences. Shane Weller presents a critical history of the concept of "nihilism" and its intrinsic link with "modernism," first focusing on the fields of philosophy and politics, and on aesthetics thereafter. Before the end, an assessment is made of the link between postmodernism and nihilism. Through her multi-disciplinary approach, the author shows how "nihilism" has migrated to different countries, every time enriching its meaning. That this meaning is, indeed, very comprehensive, and may shift, is expressed by the fact that "nihilism" finds itself opposed to countless philosophical systems, as well as to the opposites of each, such as Christianity and atheism, socialism and fascism, etc. This handy and easy-to-read book will impress many scholars of modern and contemporary culture, and deserves a place on the bookshelf of all students in modern philosophy. (W. V.)

Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr. 2013. **Mind, science and computation.** ***Quezon City: Vee Press and De La Salle University.***

The book examines the various philosophical issues arising from the project to naturalize the mind (or to assimilate the mind into the scientific worldview) especially those relating to the computational framework for carrying out the said project. The first half of the book is a lucid and well-organized presentation of the fundamental issues and competing views in the philosophy of mind. The second half, on the other hand, is an in-depth and a critical examination of the central theses of the computational theory of mind: The Non-Materialist views (Idealism and Dualism, Substance and Property Dualism) and the Materialist views (Non-Realist Physicalism, which includes behaviorism, identity theory, eliminative materialism, and instrumentalism, and Realist Physicalism, which includes functionalism, computalism, biological naturalism, and Quantum view of consciousness). As the book traces the development of this theory in the areas of philosophy, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science and explicates the grounds on which its central theses are formulated, the

book also raises important questions on the feasibility of this theory as a framework for naturalizing the mind.

Stephen Asma. 2012.* Against fairness. *Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 224 pp. $22.50.

Among the characteristics of contemporary, democratic Western culture, "fairness" or "equality" definitely figures at the top. This quality is contradicted by "bias" or "favoritism," that are deemed to be products of a pre-civilized past, or of some alien culture. Stephen Asma profoundly challenges this view in a book that excels in readability and vividness of style, as well as in the richness of its documentation. Indeed, Asma uses many registers to defend his case. Drawing on examples from contemporary American culture and politics, and blending them with experiences of oriental cultures and philosophies, he manages to show how un-natural "egalitarianism" is, and how it differs from "morality." Using also discoveries by neuroscience in support of the "natural" disposition of mammals to mother-child bonding, and of the "hierarchical" programming of the emotional part of the human brain, the author identifies "egalitarianism" as a product of modern culture. Standardization in modern group painting, as well as increased wealth and tolerance, form the background of the enlightened emphasis on rationality and universality that culminates in Kant's categorical imperative and in Bentham's (and Singer's) utilitarianism. The latter requires, indeed, a sort of mathematical operation to identify the greatest good for the greatest number, and to make a proper moral choice. Through his challenging and captivating approach, Asma tries to reclaim "tribe," "nepotism," and "preferentialism" from moral suspicion and give them a new and respectful place within modern, liberal culture. (W. V.)

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6. 7 December (Saturday)	Dr. Napoleon Mabaquiao Chair, Department of Philosophy De La Salle University, Manila "On a master argument against the phenomenal concept strategy"

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