

PHILOSOPHY OF WILLAM T. HARRIS IN THE ANNUAL REPORTS

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The three intertwining careers of William Torrey Harris [1835-1909] in philosophy, philosophy of education, and educational administration converge in twelve of the Annual Reports of the board of directors of the St. Louis public schools, most of the essential features of which he formulated as the superintendent of schools from 1867-79. These twelve reports, comprising philosophical and educational principles, have been acclaimed nationally and internationally to be among the most valuable official publications in American educational literature.

The major purpose of this paper is to clarify the nature and scope of the philosophical principles of Harris expressed in his Annual Reports. The areas of philosophy represented are metaphysics, anthropology, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion. While the motivation and context of these philosophical principles are pedagogical in orientation, it is evident that Harris produced here a philosophical synthesis worthy of consideration in a formal survey of the history of American philosophy.

I. BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE TOPIC

A. HARRIS AND THE ANNUAL REPORTS

The three intertwining careers of William Torrey Harris [1835-1909]—in philosophy, philosophy of education, and educational administration—converge in twelve of the Annual Reports of the board of directors of the St. Louis Public Schools, most of the essential features of which he formulated as the superintendent of schools from 1867 to 1879 (Leidecker 1946, 183).¹ His philosophical career is associated primarily with the St. Louis Movement, particularly the efforts of the St. Louis Philosophical Society (which he founded in 1866), the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (which he founded and edited from 1967 to 1993), and the Concord School of Philosophy (where he lectured during summers from 1880 to 1889). His educational career, as such, is linked most prominently with his work as superintendent of the St. Louis Public Schools [1867-1880] (Leidecker 1946, 428-30)² and as United States commissioner of education in Washington, D.C. [1889-1906].

While Harris's historical importance and fame are attested in numerous volumes,³ the following comment also signals the fact of his three integrated careers:

His contributions to philosophy and to the theory and practice of education were not only numerous, but of commanding importance.... The history of American education and of our American contributions to philosophical thought cannot be understood or estimated without knowledge of the life work of Dr. William Torrey Harris.⁴ (Butler 1946, v)

Furthermore, he has been referred to as "America's first great educational philosopher"⁵ (Monroe 1900-13, III, 220).⁵ While this assertion raises some questions, perhaps a modified version of it could be justified. Kilpatrick (1929, 61) offers a more moderate comment in this regard: "It seems rather probable that the translation of Rosenkranz made under Dr. Harris's direction gave the term 'philosophy of education' its first strong hold in America."⁶

The Annual Reports of the board of directors of the St. Louis Public Schools for which Harris was responsible are not always viewed as treatises in philosophy of education in the sense of embodying explicated philosophical principles applied to educational problems. However, one can locate in the portions of these Annual Reports distinctly philosophical principles, expressly educational principles, and explicit as well as implicit relationships between the two categories. Evidence for the fact that this kind of report was not intended originally (or, at least, officially) by Harris is found in his citation of his predecessor (Divoll) concerning the purpose of these annual publications. As Harris (1869, 89) says:

I am called upon, not to discuss new theories and principles, not to write elaborate essays on the subjects of education, but to make such a *statement of facts* as will enable your constituents, the citizens of St. Louis, who bear the expense and enjoy the benefits of the Public Schools, to judge correctly of their management, their present position, their progress, and their future prospects.⁷ [Emphasis added.]

Harris's inclination to produce the kind of school reports which he did seems to stem (at least practically) from his own philosophical abilities and interest, and the practical orientation of the St. Louis Philosophical Society, of which he was a leader. According to one commentator (Witter 1938, 404), "They [the members of the Philosophical Society] felt that philosophy had a public service to perform.... Its function [was] to make clear the great thoughts that help us to live." Furthermore, education was a prime area of concern for the practical application of philosophy in this group: "The dominant and rather astonishing characteristics of this St. Louis movement of thought was that it centered around the public schools. The St. Louis group was mostly teachers in the city schools." Therefore, it appears that one might be successful in defending the contention that these Annual Reports (that is, Harris's lengthy contributions to them) are documents integral to the St. Louis Philosophical Movement and strongly indicative of its tenor.⁸

The major purpose of this paper is to ascertain the nature and scope of Harris's philosophical principles in his Annual Reports. However, before adverting directly to

these Annual Reports in attempting to discern his philosophical principles, attention is turned to selected comments of various observers concerning the Reports. The main purpose of this next section is to supply some general information concerning the nature and context of the Annual Reports as further basis for appreciating the expression of his philosophy.

B. THE ANNUAL REPORTS: COMMENTARIES FROM SELECTED SECONDARY SOURCES

The remarks of these commentators will be considered under three topics: introduction to the Annual Reports of the board of directors of the St. Louis public schools, their influence or importance, and conclusion. Among the introductory items is one concerning the initiation of Harris's (1867) efforts in formulating the basic features of the Annual Reports. As indicated above, although Assistant Superintendent Harris had labored intensely on the Thirteenth Annual Report, it appeared over the superintendent's (Divoll's) signature.⁹ However, Harris did assume full responsibility for the Fourteenth Annual Report for the year ending 1 August 1869, the year following the academic year which it referred, establishing a precedent for dating the Annual Reports (Leidecker 1946, 183).

Moreover, the introduction to the Annual Reports through these selected secondary sources concerns the purpose of these and some effects, their general tenor, and their timeliness. Kohlbrenner (1950, 60) notes three purposes of the Annual Reports: (1) to familiarize the members of the School Boards and the St. Louis citizens with the condition of the schools, (2) to educate this audience in the principles and practices of education, and (3) to popularize the efforts and achievements of the local schools beyond the immediate community. A similar consideration from another source, although viewed in terms of accomplished fact, yields three distinct effects of Harris's Annual Reports: they (a) provided an account of school activities and cost, (b) promoted the taxpayers to take pride in their schools as partners in establishing "the finest Public School system," and (c) inculcated in the citizens of St. Louis an awareness that they were contributing to the development of American democracy and humanity by supporting the schools (Leidecker 1946, 56-57).

As indicated above, Harris's Annual Reports were comprised not merely of statistical data and other facts, but also of theoretical discussions of prominent educational questions. They were "a distinct departure from the run of dry compilations of mummified pedagogues," according to Harris's main biographer, Leidecker (1946, 256). The substance of these reports was not dictated by the rules of the school board (Kohlbrenner 1950, 6), which suggest the possibility of a great deal of freedom and initiative on the part of Harris in their formulation. The numerous topics he included were chosen on the basis of one or more of several criteria (not all mutually exclusive): the form and arrangement of these reports developed by his predecessors, state law, information required by the nature of the circumstances, typical content of such documents, his own special interest, general interest within and beyond the boundaries of the city, local and general controversy, and local and general demand for new development (Kohlbrenner 1950, 61-62).

The second of the three topics, focusing upon background from the secondary sources, concerns the influence or importance of the Annual Reports. One noted

American educator (in 1900) ranked them among the most valuable official publications in American educational literature (along with the school reports of Horace Mann as secretary of the State Board of Education of Massachusetts [1838-49], and the annual reports of Charles W. Eliot as president of Harvard University [1871-99] (Butler 1900, xvii). These Annual Reports, for which Harris was largely responsible, have been touted virtually as educational classics (Leidecker 1946, 257, 373, 376-77; Kohlbrenner 1950, 61-62).¹⁰ According to Leidecker (1946, 183), even Harris's philosophical-pedagogical contributions to the Thirteenth Annual Report (published under Divoli's name) received complimentary remarks from all the reviewers.

The scope of the influence achieved through these annual publications during the Harris superintendency appears to be extraordinary. In what must be the most personal published account of the St. Louis Movement, Snider recollects that "by his annual reports as well as by his addresses, he [Harris] made an epoch in education, not only locally but throughout the nation" (Snider 1920, 96). His Annual Reports became models for other superintendents in the United States, and "... they were read and quoted nationally and internationally" (*Studies in honor of William Torrey Harris* 1935, 208). Kohlbrenner (1950, 62) asserts that by means of the Annual Reports "national and even international recognition was given to him [Harris] personally and to the St. Louis schools. He then specifies several instances of national recognition between 1873 and 1875." Leidecker (1946, 257) refers to the uncommonly abundant correspondence of Harris brought about by discussions evoked by the reports throughout this country and in Europe, especially in Germany.

Further evidence of the international fame of Harris and the St. Louis public schools lies in their association with the Vienna Expositions of 1873 and the Paris Universal Exposition of 1878. Both Harris and St. Louis were awarded honors through the latter, and the Annual Reports were subsequently placed in the Pedagogical Library being organized in the Palais Bourbon (Leidecker 1946, 373, 376).¹¹ Reasons mentioned for such widespread attention to the Annual Reports, in addition to the quality of the education which they described, are Harris's appealing literary style (*Studies in honor of William Torrey Harris* 1935, 248), the timeliness of the topics, and the "thorough and decisive manner in which Harris stated his views" (Kohlbrenner 1950, 62-63). While at least two commentators emphasize the existence of philosophy of education in the Annual Reports (Kohlbrenner 1950, 64 and John 1937, 14), apparently no one has distilled from them the principles which illustrate Harris's philosophical posture, as such. Most of the remainder of this paper is devoted to that end.

II. PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES IN THE ANNUAL REPORTS

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

The uniqueness of the Annual Reports of the board of directors of the St. Louis Public Schools under the superintendency of William Torrey Harris is an unhidden fact in the history of American education. A feature of those reports, which probably best exemplifies that uniqueness, is the scope and depth of Harris's attention to philosophy, as such. Although the philosophical considerations are intended to explain and to

justify the educational recommendations and practices (in the context of a philosophy of education), the former also constitutes (it is contended here) a rather well developed philosophy of life, which can be interpreted somewhat independently of the educational applications.

The strictly philosophical topics explored by Harris in his Annual Reports include the following: reality in general, nature, nature of the human person, freedom, truth (and universals), knowledge, morality, wisdom, and religion.¹² It is somewhat evident even from this list of topics that the philosophy of Harris in these Reports refers to carefully reflected and systematically detailed thought identifiable with the kind of content assigned typically and formally to the history of philosophy. Further judgments on the kind of philosophy he proposed can be based upon the following analyses of these topics, undertaken insofar as is possible in the spirit of the designated Annual Reports. The order of the topics to follow will be that given above; their interrelatedness and overlapping are readily observable.¹³

A. REALITY IN GENERAL

The choice of this topic as a starting point stems obviously from its breadth and from the fact that the principles here undergird in some manner all of what follows. One of the most fundamental philosophical principles of Harris in his Annual Reports is his insistence upon the distinction between matter and spirit. For example, in describing the Philadelphia exposition (of 1876), celebrating the centennial anniversary of American independence, he (1877, 174) distinguishes between the representative collection of industrial products displayed and its symbolic value, the latter being associated with “the transcendent magnitude of what was there, [which] elevated the thoughts toward the not visible sources that lay beyond.” Again employing the notion of symbol, this time in reference to a theory of knowledge (linked with Friedrich Froebel here, but apparently his own), Harris (1880, 205) claims that “... in [material] nature everything corresponds to spirit, and hence each lower, material object is in some sense a key to unlock the perception of a higher, more subtle object....”

In a discussion of the nature of the person (to be investigated further below), he (1877, 139-40) elaborates the difference between “things of the mind” or spiritual things—also called potencies, powers, and substance—and the external, material world. The former are visible only to the “eye of reason,” are more real to man than physical beings, are “the ‘things’ that he has to deal with first and last in this world”; and “their difference from material things is a discrete degree.” Harris (1870, 112) carries this dualism a step beyond itself by introducing number as “standing midway between sensuous concrete things and pure thoughts.” In his theory of knowledge, number is the most immediate means of the human intelligence in transcending nature (the material). The fact that its “course of training” entails abstraction is indicative of its spiritual character.

A third principle of reality in general centers upon the notions of history, evolution, and teleology. Although the foundation of this observation appears to be scientific (in the sense of natural science), it has obvious philosophical overtones. Harris maintains that, according to the best evidence, “the forces of matter are all correlated and are in a process of continual evanescence, the one into another....”

Furthermore, “their tendency is *to* correlate gravity—the tendency of all matter to a center—with light (or heat) the tendency of all matter *from* center.” This much appears to be scientific; however, it also is claimed that “all History is a process of realization of some final end or cause,” and within history “each institution of man has likewise some final purpose or ideal which it perpetually seeks” (Harris 1873, 141). Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn about this aspect of the nature of reality must be focused upon a process of material evolution keyed to an epicenter and a process of historical evolution which is teleological in the sense of being destined for a final or absolute purpose, end, ideal, or cause.

In summary of these views of reality in general, it should be noted that Harris’s notions of material and historical evolution toward a point (final end in the case of the latter) exemplify his insistence upon the duality of matter and spirit with the spiritual representing the higher form of reality. However, in this explanation of change, there is no formal reference to number, which, though spiritual, is somehow “between” matter and spirit.¹⁴

B. NATURE

The general signification attributed to “nature” must be appreciated in the context of the dualistic frame of reference, which (along with his view of change) founds Harris’s philosophical principles. This topic, in fact, is essentially an elaboration of the first with a focus here upon one dimension of reality. Recognizing the confusion in the uses of the term “nature,” which had led (in Harris’s view) to the promulgation of disastrous educational heresies, he unambiguously identifies the term with the external world of unconscious growth, that is a dependent, conditioned, fated world.¹⁵

Nature is governed by laws without consciousness of its obeisance. It is ruled by external ends (“purposes, designs or objects which are not consciously formed in thought—not selfproposed by the being whose end and aim they express” (Harris 1874, 74). The term “nature” also can be applied to the human person, signifying, however, not humanness, as such, but the unregenerated animality and savageness (or “externality”) of the person—in contrast to the rational, or the truly human (Harris 1880, 153, 215).¹⁶

The central message of Superintendent Harris relative to his comments on nature (a message echoed throughout his philosophical meditations) rest in the prioritizing of the Spirit. Against materialism, he (1874,110;1869,93) says that

...one does need to be reminded that human history is a record of deeds done in the cause of spiritual ideals, and that these ideals are the bases of all our institutions of civilization. The deeds of history, moreover, that are considered worth recording are most strangely subversive of physiological and hygienic laws....

These views identifying nature with the external world and the (irrational, unconscious) animality of the human being, along with the mandate to cultivate the spiritual in order to develop the person and to humanize the world, sets the stage for a somewhat detailed analysis of the “human person” expressed in Harris’s Annual Reports.

C. NATURE OF THE HUMAN PERSON

The subtopics pertaining to the nature of the human person can be distinguished from one another, but not in a manner which avoids the overlapping and intertwining aspects among them. The categories concerning the person, and the order in which they will be considered, are as follows: (1) human nature in general, (2) human faculties and feelings, (3) socialization, (4) work and play, and (5) the person as a moral being. Brief remarks concerning four specific matters conclude this topic, which seems to have attracted more attention than any of Harris's other philosophical inquiries in these Reports.

1. Human nature in general

Prefatory to a consideration of the dualistic nature of the person are Harris's observations on the fact of human nature.¹⁷ He (1877, 119, 139) asserts that "There is human nature in general and the law of its unfolding—common to all civilized nations." This law of abiding human nature, to be distinguished from specific human beings, is an end unto itself and is destined to be served by nature.

The simple fact that the person is a dualistic being, according to Harris (1873, 105), is evident from his reference to the need for the "correlation of man's *spiritual* well-being with the supply of his *physical* wants and necessities" (italics mine). Therefore, the fundamental distinction between matter and spirit characterizing reality, in general, is manifested in the human being. More precisely, "human matter" is represented by the senses and "human spirit" by the soul or mind. At least some evidence for this is located in the process of cognition: the obvious role of the senses in the awareness of physical objects is the basis for the "profound reflection of the soul into itself" as a means of knowing God, freedom, and immortality. Without the immaterial operation of a spiritual dimension of being, there is no adequate explanation of what the human being actually achieves in cognition (Harris 1869, 90-91).

Also, in the context of human experience, the distinction between facts and ideas (the latter "standing for" particular facts) suggests to Harris (1880, 149) the differentiation of the use of the senses from the activity of reflection, sensible awareness from a process of abstraction. Furthermore, the spiritual aspect of the person is evident from the fact of human ability to comprehend one's own final cause and the final cause of a natural or unconscious being (Harris 1874, 74).¹⁸

Human life also is dualistic in a manner quite different from that just described; it is manifested in males and in females. While the distinction between masculinity and femininity was not discovered originally by Harris, he may have been ahead of his time in some views on the roles and relationships of men and women in society. He (1874, 118) observes that, in contrast to animals, for which sex is the most important fact of existence, the person is elevated above the sphere of sex by the fact of consciousness and becomes an immortalized individual. The rational soul (signifying intellect, will, and affections) is common to both male and female.¹⁹ Ideas and "directive power" (self-determination) are neither male nor female, but universal. While sexuality is a characteristic differentiating two groups of human beings, its sphere is narrow and "scarcely traceable" in science, religion, and art (Harris 1874, 108, 117-18).

The changing status of the social relationships of the sexes is summarized in terms of three epochs: (a) the savage state, when women are responsible for all facets of family nurture and men largely for defense; (b) the development of civil society, when women remained within the family and men settled into productive industry outside the home; and (c) advanced mechanized industrialization, when women and men must be prepared intellectually to become “supervisors” (Harris 1874, 118-20). The equality of men and women is emphasized by Harris relative to his own time: “Mere brute force being in abeyance, it is noticeable that woman becomes more equal to man in the third epoch of industry, and a sharer with him in all forms of labor” (Harris 1877, 178). Therefore, the person is a material-spiritual being with capabilities common to both male and female. A more detailed consideration of human faculties and feelings will clarify further the meaning of “humanity.”

2. Faculties and feelings

The following analysis of Harris’s views on human potentiality will be divided according to the physical, emotional, and spiritual aspects of the person. While he does not dwell upon the physical capacities of the person in these Annual Reports, Harris is not unaware of the importance of the well-being of the body. In one place he (1880, 134-35) especially emphasizes the exercise of muscles, which then tend to demand and to get continued exercise, allowing for physical aptitudes for skill in any direction. Physical exercise is associated with freedom of the body (called “gracefulness”), which rests upon the use of a great variety of body muscles. Also important to Harris (1880, 131; 1877, 192) in regard to physical cultivation is the use of the hand and the eye, the former for dexterity of function and the latter for “a habit of accurate measurement.”

Of significance to Harris (1880, 211), but afforded only slight attention in this context, are human “feeling,” “emotion,” and “sensibility.” These are “names of activities of the soul which become thoughts and ideas by the simple addition of *consciousness* to them, i. e., the addition of *reflection*.” Instinct in relationship to clear rational purpose is likened to smoke in relationship to the flame. Feelings and impulses, which are particular or special (having only specific application), preexist thoughts or ideas, which are general or universal and are seen as “principles, regulative of all similar exigencies.” At least two specific examples of feelings are provided. The person, according to Harris (1877, 173; 1879, 201), possesses natural desires or inclinations. One direction of these desires he terms “caprice,” a synonym for pleasure or enjoyment. The aesthetic feeling also is mentioned; its activation demands the sensation of some object (as a starry night in the Himalayas) in a manner which suggests the “whole,” meaning the indefinite or immeasurable, if not the infinite.²⁰

Of the three dimensions of the person considered here (the physical, the emotional, and the spiritual), the last is by far the most significant to the superintendent, at least in terms of the amount of attention paid to it in the Annual Reports. A part of the apparent basis for the spiritual life of the person is a physical organism, the brain. Nevertheless, it appears to be the “mind” that the author is really intending when he asserts that “It is as normal for man to exercise his brain as for animals to exercise their limbs; it is the supreme function belonging to human nature, and it would be strange indeed were this unhealthy” (Harris 1871, 22). At any rate, it is clear that thinking is a natural activity for

the person, and it is a spiritual function. The basis of this activity of thought is “analytic power,” the kind of power exemplified by detecting the sounds of a word and finding letters to represent them (Harris 1878, 227). However, Harris (1870, 98, 109; 1877, 207) also refers to analysis and synthesis as “complementary processes of the thinking activity” and to the intellectual tools of classification and analysis entailed in gaining mastery over material objects in the empirical sciences.

The spiritual faculties rendering thought possible are intellect and will (Harris 1872, 21, 201; 1873, 16-17, 26-27, 76; 1877, 183, 191; 1878, 212). The latter is the human faculty necessary for all vigorous action (mental and physical), and it is directly associated with the formation of habit. The will enjoys a twofold priority over the intellect: (i) temporal priority relative to the desired chronological development and (ii) functional priority in that it (the will) pertains to practices of the civilized person, while the intellect refers to ideas—the intellect remaining inoperative without a stimulus from the will. In fact, the development of the will, insofar as it is synonymous with moral education, is acclaimed as the basis for the “whole fabric of society,” that which makes spiritual life possible.

The natural activity of the intellect is toward immateriality (Harris 1880, 13-32). It is associated with the notion of “directive intelligence” when united with the natural activity of the will; in fact, “directive intelligence” is seen as equivalent to “self-controlled will,” which is intended to develop from impulse and or inclination or “undisciplined will” (Harris 1875, 135). This is related to attention: “With the power of attention, moral and intellectual forces unite. Attention is intellect acted upon directly by the will, and without such combination with the will, there is no such thing as higher insight or thinking” (Harris 1877, 83).

Other human faculties in this realm are imagination and memory. “Imagination” refers to the power of a human being to invent forms and ideas (Harris 1877, 112); its cultivation is extremely important in counterbalancing training in the exact and quantitative (Harris 1874, fn. 19). However, excessive stimulation, accompanied by deceit, is injurious to the child’s faith and reverence, which are necessary for the long-term effort to attain wisdom (Harris 1880, 213). Memory is a human faculty apparently distinct from the intellect and will, as such, but it is aided in its operation by reflection. For example, the spelling of a word will be revealed more readily if the letters comprising it are considered in their various aspects (Harris 1870, 97).

Critical appreciation of the spiritual faculty known as the intellect is an awareness of the natural process of abstracting on the basis of sensations. This process will be considered below in the summary and conclusion of this section, focusing on development. Before that, however, the notions of creativity, self-activity, and habit will be analyzed briefly in light of their intimate connections with human spiritual faculties. First, Harris (1877, 112) seems to attribute the ability to “invent” forms and ideas to the imagination, as indicated above. Creative ability is associated with play (to be considered in more detail below); it involves cutting “loose entirely from prescribed tasks, and giving scope to...fancy.” Through experimentation, the processes of destruction and construction, the child “gratifies his instinct to subdue natural things” (Harris 1877, 92; 1880, 131-32).

Secondly, the notion of self-activity appears to be one of the focal points of Harris’s (1877, 181, 95, 137, 192; 1880, 213-14) philosophy. Only the self-active person

can become truly human. Although the development of self-activity is essential, it is not reserved for adults; its basis is the spontaneous play of children. Furthermore, while the cultivation of self-activity can be excessive, self-activity itself appears to be a necessary characteristic of the child who should enter the primary school from the kindergarten “with a reasoning, inquiring habit of mind.” This kind of self-activity could and should be enhanced through reading, which the youth is able “to make himself the possessor of the contents of the printed page by his unaided effort, thereby rendering his whole subsequent life “a perpetual self-education.” Combined with a “reverent spirit,” self-activity is a key to acquiring and mastering the wisdom of the race.

Habit, the third of the three corollaries of human spiritual faculties, is formed through training of the will (Harris 1874, 18-19).²¹ It was implicit in the remarks above concerning “directive intelligence” and “attention.” In addition to intellectual habits (as exemplified in doing geometry and arithmetic), there are also moral habits (as regularity, punctuality, industry, cleanliness, self-control, and politeness), and other habits gained through the discipline of phantasy and imagination. The immediate means of “reducing” a new activity to a habit is continuous repetition, a (literally) deadening process in which the activity is removed from a state of conscious spontaneity to a level of unconscious, involuntary deed. Despite its negative aspect, the process of converting spontaneous acts into habits is necessary to the development of spiritual life in that it is a “process of freeing the will and the intellect from its concentration on a lower activity, in order that it may energize anew upon a larger synthesis (Harris 1877, 209). The expediency of the formation of habits is seen in an ethical system where habits and observances allow for the possibility of social combination or community (Harris 1872, 21; 1879, 23) which, in turn, is the basis of industrial success in the world.

In this section, human potential is considered in its physical, emotional, and spiritual manifestations. The last receives the most extensive treatment by Harris, being focused upon the human faculties of intellect and will, and involving creativity, self-activity, and habit. A few remarks upon the subsequent nature of human development will conclude this section. It is evident to Harris (18809, 215) that “the humblest child—nay, the most depraved child—has within him the possibility of the highest angelic being.” The authentic human order of development is indicated by a basic notion of “angelic being,” namely, pure spirit. The priority of spirit is evident in the *ascent* of the person out of the “savagery and imbecility of childhood” by means of “thought and insight into the essence of things.” The process is toward an awareness of “laws as the truth of things” (Harris 1877, 40). This human passage from nature to reason is called “self-estrangement” (Harris 1874, 63-64).

Akin to this notion of self-estrangement is that of the evolution of the faculties of the mind (Harris 1877,96);²² the first faculty to develop is that of recognizing symbols, the “root of intellectual generalization as well as of art and religion” (Harris 1877, 97). Intellectual activity is founded upon the sensible: the learner “ascends from concrete, particular, tangible objects to abstract general truths and archetypal forms” (Harris 1880, 131-32). The transition from an awareness of physical objects to the exercise of pure thought rests upon a familiarity with numerical quantity by means of attention and abstraction, “the two processes which lie at the basis of all intellectual culture” (Harris 1870, 112).²³ Moral development also is integral to the spiritualization of the person. Morality is initiated through choices by the will which lead to habits of regularity,

punctuality, neatness, silence, observance of forms, self-restraint, and the preference of the “good or general” over the “selfish or particular” (Harris 1877, 192).²⁴ These kinds of habits are instrumental, of course, in intellectual development.

The process of human spiritual generation is characterized by “a struggle on the part of the individual to ascend into conscious participation with the race as a whole.” Engagement in this struggle requires aspiration, of course, an agency of which is unhappiness as well as happiness (Harris 1878, 195).²⁵ Beyond this struggle toward human socialization is a (desired) “theoretical and practical adjustment (i.e., through intellect and will) of the particular individual (you or me) to the general or universal intellect and will—to the Absolute Reason” (Harris 1880, 148-49).

There are, at least, two very general descriptions of human development in Harris’s Annual Reports, one focusing upon the psychological dimension, the other upon the (so-called) ontological foundation. The former consists of three epochs corresponding to the stages of education:

(1) Childhood (Birth—7 years of age)	Symbolical stage of education
(2) Boyhood and girlhood (7—13/14)	Conventional stage of theoretical education
(3) Youth (13/14—?)	Generalizing stage of education (Harris 1878, 221-22; also 1880, 192-94)
(4) Manhood and womanhood	

The ontological dimension of human development is explained in a “theory of the person” in three phases.

(1) The person as a practical being	A will power, a moral being functioning socially and politically	A “history maker”
(2) The person as a theoretical being	A thinking power, a rational being giving an account to oneself of the world and the self	A “science-maker”
(3) The person as an artist	A being that portrays oneself, embodies one’s ideal in real forms, and renders visible the world into one’s own image	A producer of art literature (Harris 1874, 74-75)

3. Socialization

The socialization of the person is one of the most important of all philosophical topics to Harris.²⁶ He (1870, 110; 1874, 152-53; also 1877, 193-94; 1879, 23, 201; 1880, 110,

149, 193-94, 217) says that “The essential in human life consists in the *participation* by the individual in the life of the whole.” “Participation designates not merely laboring to supply needed goods for humanity, but also partaking in ‘the fruition of the whole’.”²⁷ This process involves productive industry and perishable goods, but more significantly, rational intelligence and imperishable ideas and aspirations. Participation in the realm of ideas does not diminish the ideas, but renders them more potent. It is the use of reason exercised in this context which makes “a puny individual...potentially all mankind.” (Perhaps, this distinction between perishable goods and ideas can be aligned, on the one hand, with habits of industry, regularity, punctuality, and self-control as means of combining with others in civil society and the state; and, on the other hand, with instrumentalities enabling the person to participate in the intellectual or theoretical acquisition of the race).

Another expression of this principle focuses upon social institutions: “... human nature is revealed in and by means of institutions alone...” (Harris 1877, 141). These institutions are human organizations united through direction toward an ideal. They include the family, civil society (with its arts, trades, professions, schools, etc.), the state, and the church, all of which “exist solely as means whereby the individual may develop his ideal” (Harris 1880, 218, 227; also 1879, 201). Such combinations of persons require language, itself an institution, which is the “primary condition—the spiritual protoplasm as it were—out of which institutions develop” (Harris 1873, 141; also 1879, 201). The particular word is “an immediate thing of nature” (Harris 1877, 141), which can become universal by signifying an idea. Furthermore, the sharing of ideas is instrumental in the sharing of human experience, which renders life meaningful (Harris 1877, 141-42; also 1880, 149). This leads to the conclusion that “The race transcends the individual almost in an infinite potency”; only participation in the common experience of the race can prevent merely erratic and negative human performances (Harris 1877, 187). The modern phenomena of industrialization and urbanization have complicated social relationships and have enhanced the responsibility of the individual to society, as such (Harris 1875, 78-80).

Reference was made earlier to Harris’s (1878, 195; 1874, 18-19; 1880, 136; 1872, 21) view that “it is everywhere a struggle on the part of the individual to ascend into conscious participation with the race as a whole.” In light of the fact that sociality and desire for companionship develop in the child at about age three, it can be presumed that efforts toward social relationships should be promoted in children from that age. This appears to involve inculcating an ethical system, the “network of habits and observances which makes social combination possible, which enables men to live together as a community.”²⁸

In concluding these remarks on interpreting Harris (1870, 110) is that his principles of human socialization, the tremendous importance he attaches to the participation of the individual in the life of society is to be noted. The interchange among human beings, entailing both the material and spiritual facets of the world, is referred to as the “cornerstone of civilization.” In support of this, Harris (1878, 190) asserts that the “greatest art of life” is “the ability to combine with one’s fellow-men to produce a rational result.” He (1877, 197-98, 182) says, further, that “The great lesson of civilization is to learn how to combine with one’s fellow-men. This is the logical condition of society and of culture.”

Social combination is linked to human progress in history in at least two passages. According to Harris (1877, 182), “The primary fact of human nature is the participation

of each in the life of all—upon this depends all progress from barbarism toward civilizations.” On the same theme, he (1872, 76; 1874, 54) says, “Progress, in a historical sense, means nothing more nor less than the realization in the individual of the unity which combination produces in the community. It is the interpenetration of each with the general form of the whole; the rationality of all made possible for each.”

4. Work and Play

The activities of play and work represent aspects of the development of human socialization.²⁹ As Harris (1879, 202; 1880, 219; 1877, 94-95; 1872, 38; 1873, 18) says, the former is the “pure experience of caprice and particular will.” It is the realization of the child’s spontaneity in its “irrational form of arbitrariness and caprice.” It prescribes for itself. In its positive phase, the child produces whatever is dictated by fancy; in its negative phase, the child destroys. This will power is the basis of personality and the source of freedom. In play the child realizes immediately independence and selfhood; this activity does not occur through or for another. Play is educative in that it is a necessary foundation for the development of self-activity and strong character. According to Harris, “Without play he [the child] is learning to have no will of his own and no personal interest in anything—he will become a slavish drudge.” Through play the child (after age three) also “meets” children from other families in “street associations.”

Work is the opposite of play: rather than the exercise of caprice and particular will, it is obedience to what is prescribed (Harris 1879, 201-202; also 1880, 219); instead of entailing acts directly for the self, it involves suppressions of subjective inclinations for the sake of producing what is useful to others (Harris 1872, 38). Work dominates “practical life” (the life of the individual in society); each person “works out, or elaborates, some general product, not for his own exclusive, direct use, but for society,” a process requiring self-sacrifice by means of discipline (Harris 1877, 93, 95).

An obvious requirement for human maturity in light of this view of play and work is the transition from a life centered upon the former into one focused upon the latter (for example, Harris 1873, 18). Failure to realize this transformation leaves a person in the state of “arrested character development” (Harris 1880, 219). “Without work the child learns to know only his caprice, his arbitrary likes and dislikes, and he is training himself for a tyrant” (Harris 1872, 38). The problem of human development in this context obviously is one of socialization, and it necessitates attention to a “balance” or “due proportion” of play and work in this process of maturation. Bringing the child from an exercise of caprice to obedience, from acting directly for the self to acting on behalf of others, from nature to reason, must be accomplished by means of gentle restraints, leaving room for the spontaneity of play (Harris 1877, 96; 1879, 202). The specific educational means to this end is the “preservation of the *form* of play, and at the same time the induction of the *substance* of prescription” (Harris 1880, 219).³⁰ Play and work not only should be preserved in due proportion, but an awareness of their distinction should be borne in mind (Harris 1872, 38).

In conclusion, it has become evident, according to Harris, that the development of a mature human being, one who is aware of and contributes to the fulfillment of the needs of others, occurs through “living out” a meaningful relationship between play

(spontaneity and self-interest) and work (obedience and other-centeredness) in a process which subordinates play to work and, yet, accords a due proportion to each.

5. The person as a moral being

Despite the importance of this topic to Harris, it will be discussed only briefly here due to the inclusion of a separate section on morality below.³¹ Firstly, the fundamentally moral feature of the person is evident in Harris's (1879, 139; 1880, 151, 192) assertion that "Human nature is an end unto itself and its destiny is to make nature exist solely for human ends and uses." Secondly, in a related explanation, he equates the "things of the mind"—the results of acts of the human will and intellect—with "the ethical ideas which support like timber work the gigantic structure of civilization." Thirdly, morality is associated with the "whole picture" of the deed and its consequences; therefore, human life seen in terms of deeds and consequences assumes a moral dimension.³² Finally, the human person is referred to as "a being that constantly develops—for good or evil."

Morality is considered as a basis for general health in the context of education. Harris contends that the main cause of the better health of those who study rest upon the development of habits of self-control engendered by such activity. Apparently, (at least part of) the claim is that through study the will is exercised in suppressing natural appetites and inclinations, allowing for enhanced intellectual enlightenment and, therefore, greater wisdom in choosing a course of action conducive to health. Although temperance is the subordination of the appetites to reason (and is the virtue which affects health the most),³³ the other cardinal virtues (prudence, fortitude, and justice) also involve self-control. The student (and, presumably, any person) forms a personal moral basis in proportion to self-denial, sacrificing immediate pleasure for reasonable ends (Harris 1871, 22-23).³⁴ The habits of industry, regularity, punctuality, and self-control apparently are all vital to the development of character and morality in the young person, and are mentioned prominently by Harris in his educational theory. However, it is clear that self-control is the key.

6. Summary and conclusion (Nature of the human person)

There is a reality known as "human nature," according to Harris, and it is explained partially in terms of a dualism of matter and spirit, body and soul. Human faculties, in keeping with this dualistic nature, i.e., physical and spiritual, also entail a capacity for feeling or emotion. The individual person becomes truly human only in association with other human beings, and the activities of play and work are instrumental in this process. The human person possesses an integral moral dimension. While nothing has been said relative to natural human freedom, that will be the next topic, following this conclusion on the nature of the person.

The maturation of the person appears to hinge upon the internal dualism of matter and spirit in conjunction with the duality of individual and social being. The following passage of Harris (1873, 105-106) illuminates his position:

Out of natural, gregarious combinations arises conscious thought, through the necessary expression of wants and feelings and the consequent

discovery of common ground of assent and dissent. In order to combine with his fellow-men the individual must sink his most peculiar preferences and inclinations and plant himself on a deeper idea or sentiment, one which he holds in common with the rest. This process of elimination of what is merely peculiar or negative, and of retaining the positive general result, is the activity of thought. Thus even in the activity of gratifying his personal wants and necessities, man is forced to combine; and in order to do this he is obliged to eliminate what is merely animal from his character, and to square his character by what is universal, i.e., regulations of justice and prescriptions of morality. The human thus ascends above his mere natural condition to a spiritual or rational existence.

The *substance* of the character of the person who has transcended his natural state to a rational existence is comprised of national memories and aspirations, family traditions, customs, habits, and moral religious observances. Removal or alteration of these factors weakens the personality disastrously (Harris 1876, 113). An essential ingredient in the process of human maturation is aspiration to undertake the struggle demanded by such development. Unhappiness as well as happiness appear to be instrumental to the estrangement of the person from his naturalness and the return to it in a manner in which it can be grasped consciously and rationally (Harris 1878, 195; 1874, 63; 1870, 113).

D. FREEDOM

Although this topic is integral to the nature of the person, it is presented discretely due to the length of both topics. The relationship of freedom to human nature is noted by Harris when he (1880, 216, 219; 1874, 68) says that “the nature of man—human nature—must be freedom, and not fate.” The source of this freedom is will power, which also is the root of one’s personality. Freedom is described in the exercise of directive intelligence, knowledge itself, in modifying the effects of its presuppositions upon itself, and the act of the will in determining itself in accord with its “pure ideal.” Both intellect and will are necessary for the realization of human freedom. “The first requisite for directive power is knowledge.” Presumably, the will is involved in gaining knowledge, which renders the possibility of awareness of the “pure ideal,” which further attracts the will, bringing about overt action.

The exercise of freedom lies at the heart of human living; in a sense, the problem of freedom is the problem of life. “For when one sets out to determine what objects are important for man to examine and select in preference to all others, he has got the whole problem of life before him...”(Harris 1869, 92). This problem is bounded by two extremes, a clue to which is found in the following excerpt: “The right of private judgment is sacred and to be respected; the right or license to *act* as one pleases can never be granted with impunity by society. Action can never be free unless it is moulded in the forms of justice and right.” This last sentence tends to indicate that, according to Harris (1871, 177-78) both thought and action are impinged upon by reality. Is one free to think and do whatever is desired, or is there a norm or criterion to be sought and “obeyed”?

The answer to this question requires a consideration of the two “sides” of freedom—absolute toleration and subordination to law. The former “permits and encourages difference of opinion, and trusts that the freest exercise of thought is the healthiest, and will lead in the surest way to the absolute truth wherein all convictions shall be united in one.” The latter requires that “each man squares his *deeds* by the universal rules laid down in the statute books, and prescribed by the judicial function of the government—wherein each man not only squares his own deeds by the universal norm, but at the same time insists that each and every other man shall square his deed by the same norm” (Harris 1871, 178).³⁵ However, a recognition of these two sides of freedom merely explains the problem. The resolution of it (which is a continuous process) is marked by the interpenetration of the two “provinces”: “free thought taking up and comprehending the prescriptions embodied in the institutions of civilization.” Toleration loses its capriciousness when the essential character of institutions is recognized and affirmed with complete conviction. On the other hand, a mandate sheds its externality, and its mechanical and tyrannical features, when its necessity is comprehended. At the “highest point,” spontaneity and prescription have coincided in content, and the person finds them making the same demand. “When the individual has reached this insight into the nature and necessity of institutions and comprehends the working of their organic forms, he is a free man” (Harris 1871, 79 and 174).³⁶

As indicated above, the intellect and will are the primary human faculties engaged in the actualization of personal freedom. Harris (1869, 92; 1874, 68, 70; 1876, 112, 193-94; 1879, 117-18) intends to combat the identification of freedom with spontaneity when he says that “the yokelessness of caprice and arbitrariness is the illusive semblance of freedom.” A freedom from subordination to reason is no freedom at all. Among the more specific means to the attainment of freedom are reading and writing, artistic skill, history and philosophy. In regard to history and freedom, Harris contends that we know an object as a whole only in the perspective of its history due to the fact that it is part of a process. Concerning the history of oneself and personal freedom, he says that we exist for ourselves, possess ourselves, make our existence our own—or become free—when we learn to know our entire being. However, since awareness of our entire being requires a knowledge of the historical dimensions of the self and its civilization, historical appreciation is instrumental in the development of individual freedom.

The man who does not know his history nor the history of his civilization, does not consciously possess himself.... From the modern scientific idea of method—even that called Darwinism—we see the absolute necessity of mastering our history in order to know ourselves. We must take up into our consciousness our presupposition before we can be in a condition to achieve practical freedom. (Harris 1874, 68 and 70)

Philosophical awareness also is vital in a special way to the realization of freedom by human beings. In fact, a system of philosophy is an essential means to the continual process of the resolution of the problem of freedom because it enables one to arrive at a comprehensive view of reality, which is needed for classification

and for arriving at a fixed object (or “pure ideal” as referred to above), free of contradiction (Harris 1869, 92).³⁷ The practical means to freedom is, of course, the process of socialization, or combination with other human beings. “Through participation with his fellow-men united into institutions—those infinite, rational organisms, the product of the intellect and will of the race conspiring through the ages of human history and inspired by the Divine purpose which rules all as Providence—through participation in institutions, man is enabled to attain freedom, to complement his defects as individual by the deeds of the race. . . .” (Harris 1880, 270). It should be noted that, in Harris’s view, the humanizing institutions are inspired by Divine Providence, obviously a situation radically different from one in which the person is supreme.³⁸

We have seen that Harris’s notion of freedom entails knowing and willing, as well as spontaneity and prescription, in manners involving history and philosophy. All human emancipation is promoted by and leads to social relationships. On the negative side, the newborn is to be freed from his naturalness, animality, and subordination to appetite, or the external laws by subordination to human laws and customs. On the positive side, he is to be freed spiritually by gaining scientific, aesthetic, and religious insights. “The enlightened individual conforms to the conventional usages of society . . . because he sees their necessity to the realization of spiritual life, and not from mere habit or blind custom” (Harris 1877, 116). This is the free person. The remaining topics (truth, knowledge, and wisdom, morality, and religion) serve to ground and explain this notion of freedom.

E. TRUTH

The question of the meaning of truth suggests to Harris (1869, 92; 1872, 140) the distinction between a changing particular object of the senses, and an abiding kind of species or genus, a class of objects, comprehended by reason. Underlying physical objects there are “pre-supposed layer after layer of mental things, or ideas moral and intellectual—a thick deposit of spiritual growth.” Separating the permanent from the variable enables one to know laws as “the true things.”

Truth, in the fullest sense, signifies “intuitive truths” or “intuitive ideas,” which are universal and necessary (Harris 1874, 186-88). In conjunction with this notion, Harris (1869, 91; 1880, 148-49, 198-99) refers to the “Eternal Verities” (God, Freedom, and Immortality), which can be known only through the reflection of the soul into itself. For such activity the mind must transcend the senses and externality in order to promote the radiance of the “inward light.” By means of insight, the faculty of knowing the highest principles, one gains philosophical awareness of the universality and necessity of these principles. In a related context, the general or universal intellect and will are identified with Absolute Reason, to which the intellect and will of the particular individual must be adjusted theoretically and practically.³⁹

While the notion of truth, as such, is given scant attention in Harris’s Annual Reports, it is clear that, in its most exalted form, truth is spiritual, universal and necessary. The impact of this will be seen in his view of human knowledge (and wisdom), which is depicted in somewhat greater detail (primarily for pedagogical purposes) in the Reports.

F. KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM

To become “more rational,” according to Harris (1874, 186-88; 1880, 132), means to ascend from awareness of concrete, particular, tangible objects to awareness of abstract, general truths and archetypal forms. Intellectual activity involves three faculties: perception, understanding, and reason. Their corresponding objects are isolated properties, abstractions and relations, and totalities or wholes. Such activity is initiated by attention, which is “intellect acted upon directly by the will.” Harris (1879, 183) says that “without such combination with the will, there is no such thing as higher insight or thinking.” In this joining of will and intellect, the mind

...exercises its first self-determination.... The infinitely manifold objects always present before the senses vanish, and one object engrosses the mind. This is the *sine qua non* of intellectual culture. All the grades of intellectual power that follow are successive stages of strength to concentrate the mind, and exclude extraneous objects. (Harris 1874, 186)

The function of “attending to” an isolated sensible property pertains to the faculty of perception in the process of knowing. In the development of thinking, this is followed by reflection and analysis in which the isolated object is seen as “a bundle of relations to the rest of the world”; this involves abstraction and pertains to the faculty called understanding. Thirdly and finally, the ascent reaches classification and comprehension of the totality or the whole, which pertains to the faculty of reason. Harris (1874, 86-88) summarizes this process of intellection as follows:

There is the sensuous object (a) abstracted and isolated by the first phase of self-activity; (b) synthetically reunited with its necessary relations by the second phase of self-activity; (c) and the universality and necessity perceived by the third phase of self-activity, which contemplates its entire scope, and thus takes in at a glance all of its possibilities.

Whereas the lower activities never include the higher, the latter, in a certain manner, do encompass (and transform) the former.

Although the nature of this intellectual activity is not explicated in detail in Harris’s (1870, 109) Annual Reports (that is, by clear definitions and exemplifications of key terms), some further information is provided. The empirical sciences, focusing on physical objects, are investigated by the intellectual tools of classification and analysis, and “furnish a field of mental activity so elementary that all may enter it successfully. Arithmetic concerns numerical quantity; and number “standing between sensuous concrete things and pure thought is the first instrument which intelligence uses to gain its victory over nature.” Cultivation of the mind relative to this first elevation over the material involves attention and abstraction, “the two processes which lie as the basis of all intellectual culture” (Harris 1870, 112). Referring to Froebel, Harris (1880, 213-14) apparently associates antithesis of the doctrine of opposites (as mind and nature, light and darkness, sweet and sour, good and bad) with this level of the process of knowing, which is a necessary stage beyond sense perception, and, yet, very crude compared to the activity of the comprehending reason.

In another place, there is a reference to analysis and synthesis as complementary processes of thinking, which “are reached at the beginning” and serve as a basis for a kind of “transfer of training” (Harris 1870, 98).⁴⁰ Some miscellaneous comments pertain to the necessity of history in knowing a particular object scientifically, to the fact that memory is aided by reflection, and to the practical effects of ideas (Harris 1870, 97; 1874, 68; 1877, 174-75).⁴¹ Finally, there is some “advice” offered to enhance one’s intellectual alertness: one assertion should be compared with another; one person’s view should be compared with that of another; various authorities should be consulted; the sources of information on a given subject should be exhausted; and original investigation should tend to follow rather than precede a mastery of what has been achieved previously concerning the subject (Harris 1871, 176).⁴²

The following schema will serve to summarize the nature of the process of knowing proposed by Harris (1874, 186-88), particularly in the Nineteenth Annual Report.

<i>Faculty</i>	<i>Process or function</i>	<i>Object</i>
Perception	Attention	Isolated properties
Understanding	Reflection Analysis	Abstractions and relations (Relativity)
Reason	Classification Comprehension Synthesis	Totalities or wholes

Closely aligned with Harris’s (1869, 96; 1873, 154; 1877, 86; 1880, 213) philosophy of knowledge is his view of wisdom which is, however, treated somewhat incidentally in these Annual Reports. The concept of wisdom is associated directly with the “intellectual patrimony,” (the best of) what has been thought, observed, and done by human beings throughout history. The purposes of assimilating this accumulation of facts, principles, and values are to avoid the repetition of discovery, to “reinforce...[one’s] little life, bounded by a few years of time and a few miles of personal inspection—with the experience of all mankind in all ages,” and to become wise.⁴³ The means of acquiring this heritage is through the use of the mind undertaken in a “reverent spirit.”⁴⁴ Educationally, wisdom results from the interrelating of various kinds of knowledge in order to attain a “vision of the whole.”⁴⁵

G. MORALITY

A persistent corollary to knowledge in Harris’s (1872, 21, 28-29, 35) philosophy in the Annual Reports is morality.⁴⁶ With pedagogical purposes as a backdrop, morality, along with knowledge, is portrayed as a cornerstone of human development and happiness. Knowledge results from the cultivation of the intellect, and morality from the formation of the will. An “ethical system” is linked intimately to the process of socialization; it is defined as the “network of habits and observances which makes social combination possible, which enables men to live together as a community.” Its “fundamental

predisposition” is human responsibility, and the feeling of responsibility is the “essence of virtue.” Fundamental to the notion of virtue is that of obligation. Harris distinguishes between *legal* obligations and *moral* obligations. The former are “those which have an external necessity in the laws of the State” and are merely prohibitory. The latter are those obligations which “depend upon the subjective will of the individual, and concern more directly his intentions,” and which ordain positive acts.

Moral duties are divided into two classes: duties of the individual to the self and duties toward others. The duties to *self* include the general realization in oneself of the “ideal of humanity,” the use of one’s being as a means, not an end. These duties entail fostering and preserving the physical organism, pursuing a rational end, confirming gratification of natural wants and sacrificing them for “higher duties,” and striving for self-culture through sacrificing one’s natural being for spiritual being. The importance of moral duties toward *others* lies in the fact that “The individual is not able to achieve his highest end and aim directly through himself but only through combination with his fellow-men—with the human race.” There are four categories of duties toward others. Firstly, each person has duties to his family; the reciprocal duties of parents and children, brothers and sisters, husband and wife constitute a special code distinguished by its close association with the natural impulses of affection and reverence. Secondly, duties in “polite society” (a “transition from the family to civil society”) which consist especially of “persistently treating the special individual with whom one has relations, as an ideal being.” Polite conduct requires regulating one’s behavior toward the ideal humanity which each person potentially possesses; this means ignoring personal defects, and exhibiting unselfish and refined manners. The limits of polite society, however, “serve only as polish to human actions which penetrate deeper the essence of personality.” The third classification of moral duties to others are those in civil society, where a key factor is combination through a division of labor and commerce. The end sought for oneself is mediated and its quality changed insofar as it is achieved by means of devotion to the gratification of some need of a fellow human being. Others are treated (ideally) as abstract legal persons in a business transaction. Finally, there are moral duties to others in the state, where the principles pertaining to the family, polite society, and civil society are subordinated to the actual ideal of justice. “Man is here complemented so that whatever he does returns through the state to himself and he becomes actually free and self-determined” (Harris 1872, 21, 28-29, 35).

These ethical spheres presuppose, of course, the distinction between the person as a natural being (animal) and the person as human (elevated into his ideal by means of culture). The basis of ethical principles, fundamental to enculturation, is self-sacrifice, “employing as its conviction *responsibility*, i.e., the insight into the necessity of its own agency in attaining its true self by the suppression of its natural appetites” (Harris 1872, 29-30, 81-84; 1876, 184; 1871, 22-23).⁴⁷ (Various species classed immediately under this category are self-control, self-denial, temperance, neatness, cleanliness, and self-respect).⁴⁸

There are two sides or conditions of self-sacrifice: obedience and kindness. The former, which is the general mode of conformity of the individual to general rules, laws, and prescribed forms of activity, consists of seven phases: (1) punctuality - “conformity to the external requirements of time and place,” (2) order and regularity - “conformity to the rhythm that governs external things,” (3) perseverance - “conformity to purpose”;

(4) earnestness - “conformity of outward endeavor to inward resolution,” (5) justice - “conformity to the universal (self-measured) standard of action,” (6) truthfulness - “conformity of activity to the channels prescribed by society so that what one does is directly for others, indirectly for one’s self (Harris 1871, 30; 1879, 201).

In the context of school education, Harris discusses several of these seven phases, plus kindness or love of mankind. He (1872, 31-32; 1879, 23; 1877, 97-98, 183-84, 192; 1880, 192-94) refers to *regularity* as “punctuality reduced to a system” and claims that the habits of punctuality and regularity “are the basis of moral education and alike the basis of industrial success in the world, because they render possible all combination of man with man and also are the conditions of self-control and all rational effort.” They are called the most elementary virtues,⁴⁹ of the moral code—“its alphabet.”⁵⁰

The duties of punctuality and regularity not only are indispensable to basic morality; they are “the ground and means of higher duties,” rendering possible the development of higher spiritual culture” (Harris 1872, 32). One element of this higher culture (which is a phase of obedience to be inculcated through the school) is truthfulness (defined as “conformity of utterance...to reality”). The relationship of truth to social combination is a matter of grave concern to Harris (1872, 34), as the following passage indicates.

Truth is the basis of the duties of a man toward others. Truth makes free, says the old proverb. No positive relation with our fellow men is possible except through truth. Untruth is the essence of discord. Earnestness and sincerity, honesty and reliability are the virtues that rest directly on truthfulness. The vices founded on neglect of this duty are lying, deceit, hypocrisy, cheating and all manner of fraud; its effects on society are to produce suspicion and distrust among men and to stifle all spiritual relationships. It is a subtle poison that destroys the positive benefits that may be derived from the institutions of society; and the individual who practices it will soon find himself in the condition of a wild beast, as regards social life.⁵¹

Ordinary means to truthfulness are careful attention to the meaning and implications of one statement and the cultivation of self-discipline (Harris 1872, 34).⁵²

The second side or condition of self-sacrifice, kindness, or love of human beings, is a corollary of obedience (the first side or condition). The species of kindness are sympathy, forbearance, considerateness, mercy, benevolence, charity, and philanthropy. Its exercise requires a community, a group of persons of all classes and conditions who are experiencing similar trials and seeking levels of success together. Its basis is a “feeling of justice fostered by a constant opportunity to see through the old adventitious wrappings of social rank and condition and observe the real substance of the character.” Called by Harris (1872, 30-31, 35) the “highest virtue in our list,” kindness or love “affirms the ideal to be the true final aim and destiny of the individual, to whom it offers aid and comfort.” In kindness or love, the intent is to draw the particular person up to the universal (ideal) by removing imperfections and limitations of humanity without harming the individual. According to Harris (1872, 36), a Christian civilization finds its necessary presupposition in kindness, which is “the moral duty that approaches nearest to Religion and forms the connecting link with it.”

A consideration of the question of the relationship between morality and religion, suggested in the last citation, concludes the major portion of this section on Harris's (1872, 24, 30-31, 35-36) moral philosophy as found in his Annual Reports. These remarks also will serve as an introduction to his philosophy of religion, discussed in the last section of this paper. A key distinction at the heart of this topic is that between the religious and the secular, which Harris sees as having evolved in paradoxical directions: toward greater explicitness and independence from each other, on the one hand; and toward enhanced harmony in what they embody, on the other hand. The *religious* realm is "the temple of the Divine, wherein the truth and freedom in God are presented to the human spirit as doctrines by which the deepest aspirations of the heart are to be moulded and directed"; while the *secular* order comprises the state and civil society, which exist "for the establishment of justice and moral rectitude—the realization of that spiritual freedom which constitutes the fundamental principle of religion." The general orientation of these two spheres of human living can be described as the "separation of the secular and the religious." The following citation provides the framework for Harris's view of the relationship between morality and religion:

The secular becomes independent of the religious, not in the sense that it alone is all sufficient for man, but only in the sense that it is capable of directing its own sphere in harmony with religion, and consequently does not need interference or guidance from it. Into the realms of the secular has been transferred and recognized the religious principle of human responsibility." (Harris 1872, 25)

Morality comes explicitly into focus with the distinction between a *crime* and a *sin*. The former breaks the laws of right and is under the jurisdiction of the state, which adverts only to the actual deed and its intent; each deed is measured by itself and not by the absolute ideal. The latter breaks the mandate of religion, which focuses upon the innermost personality of man. In light of the essential inadequacy of the person relative to the ideal type of spirit, religion "pronounces the sinner a lost being and deserving of infinite punishment"; however, it also "proffers reconciliation upon the complete self-surrender of the culprit and meets infinite forfeiture with infinite mercy" (Harris 1872, 25; 1873, 16-17).

Two points, then, need to be borne in mind: morality or ethics relies upon religion as the ultimate ground of obligation; nevertheless, morality is independent insofar as it is capable of self-direction within its own sphere and in harmony with religion. Concerning the second point, it is evident to Harris that morality, as such, does not require the support of ecclesiastical authority. An application to moral education exemplifies the principle that religion will gain from the independent practice of morality because the inculcation of habits of obedience to duty (apart from appeals to self-interest and the ultimate grounds of religious obligation) is conducive to the development of self-control, self-denial, or preference of what is right over animalistic inclination. This foundation in character is the presupposition of religion. In other words, the soil has been prepared for the introduction of religion when organized justice reigns naturally or habitually.

Finally, Harris emphasizes that desirable moral development under the auspices of the state independent of religion is not a substitute for religion. "The State must

exist; Religion must exist and complement the structure of human culture begun in moral education.” While religion finds its presuppositions in a secularized morality, in another sense, “the secular elements of our civilization are derived from Religion and presuppose it.” The church, having been absolved by secular society from sponsoring certain kinds of efforts, “justly claims the prerogative of enlightening man on the highest of all themes,” the conscious relation of the human to the Divine (Harris 1872, 25, 27-28, 36-37).

In summarizing and concluding Harris’s (1871, 23) philosophy of morality, his emphasis on self-sacrifice should be noted especially. This factor (referred to as self-control) is the basis of the four “cardinals virtues” (prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude), while the seven “deadly sins” represent various species of excess realized by yielding to the appetites and passions. Harris (1871, 23) asserts:

In proportion as the pupil learns the lesson of self-denial and has acquired that energy of character which enables him to sacrifice the ease and pleasure of the moment in order to gain reasonable ends, he has formed a moral basis for himself.

Furthermore, self-sacrifice is a means to socialization. Achieving any degree of civilization without community life is impossible. In fact, human history is the record of the answer to the question, “What are the necessary conditions under which the community may exist?” Finally, the significance of the topic of morality to Harris (1872, 76) becomes clear from his observation on moral education:

It is evident . . . that ethical education is a far more immediate agency in the direct preservation of man than any science whatever. The initiation of the child into manners and customs, into the general forms of right doing—the conventionalities of civilization—this in its broad sense is ethical education, and it is the first necessity of the child when he grows up to the capacity of self-activity.

H. RELIGION

With the exception of the discussion of religion insofar as it is related to morality, all of the topics discussed have been directed to the domain of the natural and the human. According to Harris (1872, 22, 24-25, 76; 1873, 16-17; 1874, 75), religion pertains to the Divine. In fact, it is called the “Temple of the Divine,” “the source of truth and freedom in God.” Another aspect of religious concern is “the innermost personality of man”; and religion itself is “a realm wherein man strives to elevate himself above all visible forms to the Absolute Ideal through devotion and worship.” Through religion a human being is able to ascertain “the ultimate and supreme ground of all obligation” and violation of this obligation is called sin, an infinite transgression, deserving infinite punishment, but “forgiven” through infinite mercy following the “complete self-surrender of the culprit.”

The relationship of religion to human civilization, as such, is a vital aspect of Harris’s (1872, 22-26, 36-37; 1877, 177) philosophy of religion. First, the separation of

the secular from the religious must be re-emphasized. This disjunction will be beneficial to both sides since the state is capable of the independent pursuit of justice and moral rectitude, and realization of spiritual freedom which underlie religion: these, in turn, lead persons to the consciousness of the Divine. Yet, there is an intimate bond between the secular and the religious. In one place, Divine Providence seems to be equated with the “genius of humanity.” Secondly, religion is seen as complementing the structure of human culture (initiated in moral education independently of religion). Thirdly, religion is said to be the force of the secular elements of civilization.⁵³ Fourthly, the form of government or constitution of civil society, as well as moral and intellectual education, rests directly upon the idea of the final destiny of the person, which is defined by religion.⁵⁴ Finally, moral law is referred to as the foundation of civilization; however, moral law also is said to be “next akin to religion,” which is the ultimate base of all obligation. Therefore, it would appear that, in some sense, religion is the foundation of civilization.

Christianity is brought into this intellectual panorama explicitly. Harris (1872, 24, 26, 27-28) claims that “Only where the state is founded fully on the Christian idea, can religion and the state be sundered as existing institutions” and sundered they must be in order “to secure the highest perfection of each.” It appears that the key to appreciating Harris’s philosophy of religion in these Annual Reports lies in recognizing a somewhat generalized ambiguity about the nature of religion (which concerns the relationship of the human being to the Divine) and the manner in which religion is separated from, and yet a fundamental source of, civilization.

III. SUMMARY, RELATED QUESTIONS, AND FINAL REMARKS

A. SUMMARY

The Annual Reports of the board of directors of the St. Louis public schools apparently were intended to be and generally are considered to be educational documents. These include, of course, those particular Reports compiled under the superintendency of William Torrey Harris from 1867 to 1879. While no one could claim reasonably that Harris’s Reports are not educational documents, it appears that they are much more than that. Some evidence for this assertion lies in the fact that Harris produced in his Annual Reports a network of philosophical principles worthy of consideration in a formal survey of the history of philosophy. These principles can be classified as aspects of metaphysics, philosophy of the person, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion. An example of each follows.

A metaphysical principle of Harris in his Annual Reports is his insistence upon a dualistic interpretation of reality: the world is comprised of matter and spirit. His philosophy of the person is exemplified in his explanation of the human being as body and soul with corresponding physical and spiritual capacities, and the need to commune with other humans. In epistemology, Harris claims, for example, that there are “intuitive truths,” which are universal and necessary; by means of the faculty of insight, a person can gain awareness of the universality and necessity of these principles. This is accomplished by learning how to scale the height of truth gradually, progressing from a

perception of particular, tangible objects to a reasoned appreciation of abstract, general truths and archetypal forms.

Harris's ethics or moral philosophy as expressed in his Annual Reports is a corollary of his theories of truth and knowledge. As an example, he asserts that the human will is employed directly in a person's assuming responsibility for the self and for others. The feeling of responsibility is called the essence of virtue, a statement akin to the assertion that self-sacrifice is the basis of ethical principles. Responsibility and self-sacrifice are fundamental to enculturation. Morality is independent of, yet closely related to, religion. The latter focuses upon the conscious relation of the human to the Divine, and embodies the ultimate and supreme ground of all human obligation. These examples of the philosophy of Harris in the Annual Reports justifies the contention that these documents have a genuinely philosophical dimension.

B. RELATED QUESTIONS

Several features of Harris's philosophy lie outside the scope of this study. For example, in light of the present state of pertinent research, one still can wonder legitimately about the stage of development or relative completeness of Harris's philosophy in his Annual Reports in relationship to his other writings.⁵⁵ While many presume that Harris is a strict follower of Hegel, not all commentators concur in that opinion. Along the same line is the opposition between those who claim that Harris is an absolute idealist and others who contend that he is a personal idealist.⁵⁶ Intimately related to these two issues is the question of his originality as a philosopher. The common view seems to be that, although he was not particularly original in his philosophizing, he rendered a major contribution to American philosophy, especially in founding and editing the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, the first American journal devoted exclusively to philosophy.⁵⁷

Harris also published extensively in philosophy. Taking "originality" in its ordinary sense of "saying things which were never previously said," no philosopher can be considered totally original, and relatively few in the history of ideas could be called thoroughly original. On the other hand, countless philosophers might be referred to as "independent thinkers." Even one who is associated directly with a philosophical tradition can be and usually is, if the person is a philosopher at all—an independent thinker in that

...he accepts certain ideas of the past and restates them in terms of the significance that he ascribes to them. In interpreting his masters and predecessors he translates their doctrines into new language, reconstructing them according to his own views, altering them in more-or-less numerous details, now omitting, now adding certain essential elements. (Kristeller 1943, 4-5)

In this manner, it appears that Harris contributed to the development of an American idealist tradition in philosophy. In this kind of tradition "basic ideas are not merely repeated and passed along; they are continually adapted to the changing intellectual problems and needs of successive periods and thinkers" (Kristeller 1943, 4-5).

A large area for fresh inquiry is suggested by this reference to Harris's (Butler 1946; Curti 1966, 310; Monroe 1900-13, III, 220; Kilpatrick 1929, 61) major contributions

to American philosophy. What was his role and place in American philosophy? He is said to have wielded an extraordinary influence (in philosophy and in education) during his lifetime, but why did that influence diminish so abruptly? What caused his sudden demise in American intellectual circles (Kilpatrick 1929)? These questions touch especially upon the relationship of Harris's philosophy to the cultural revolution occurring in the United States between approximately 1880 and 1920. The "watershed" of the 1890's was followed by the twentieth-century reaction of the pragmatist, realist, and naturalist to the various forms of idealism (Commager 1956). These three movements have tended to be "replaced" in later twentieth-century American philosophy by various analytic philosophies, some effects of which have been to narrow the scope of philosophy; to divorce philosophy from theology; and to diminish widespread communication among philosophers, and between philosophers and non-philosophers.⁵⁸ These recent and contemporary trends raise a question of the pertinence and importance of Harris for the twenty-first century. What role(s) did he have in promoting changes in the philosophical environment which have occurred since his time? Is he worthy of our attention in attempting to clarify philosophical problems and answers today?

C. FINAL REMARKS: SIGNIFICANCE AND CONCLUSION

Is William Torrey Harris worthy of our attention in attempting to clarify philosophical problems and responses today? In view of the necessity of appreciating the American philosophical (and cultural) revolution between 1880 and 1920 or even beginning to understand twentieth and early twenty-first century philosophical shifts in the United States, the answer is clearly positive. Firstly, Harris was an important and representative figure in late nineteenth-century philosophy and its demise during the revolution which produced the philosophy of pragmatism. Secondly, while he was aware of the need for the clarity of language and a critique of rationality, the object of his investigations was never language, as such, and he did not for a moment abandon the highest appreciation of the need for genuine reasoning. Thus, one can claim significance for "Harris the philosopher" today in view of the manner in which he approached reality in confronting real issues of real persons in real situations. He sought the ultimate meaning of human life.

In any case, we undoubtedly do find in the Annual Reports of the board of directors of the St. Louis public schools which were formulated by William Torrey Harris from 1867 to 1893 philosophical reflections constituting topics typically addressed in formal treatments of the history of philosophy. This is the case despite the unusualness of these kinds of considerations in such documents—and (ironically) Harris's own stated intention to avoid (in the documents) the kind of speculation required in his formulation of them.

NOTES

1. The Annual Reports referred to include the fourteenth (published in 1869) through the twenty-fifth (published in 1880). Although Harris, as assistant superintendent, "had worked vigorously" on the Thirteenth Annual Report, it appeared over the signature of Superintendent Ira Divoll. The Fourteenth Annual Report (for the

year ending 1 August 1868) was the first one for which Harris assumed complete responsibility.

2. Harris also was superintendent of the Concord (Massachusetts) public schools from 1882 to 1885, although that fact seems to have escaped notice in practically all of the pertinent secondary sources. Leidecker (1946, 429) refers to Harris's service in this capacity as "completely forgotten."

3. Investigations related to this study have turned up many secondary sources iterating the prominence or influence of one or more aspects of Harris's undertakings. Perhaps his founding of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* in 1869 (the first philosophical journal in the United States), and the founding of the kindergarten under his leadership in the St. Louis public schools in 1873 (the first kindergarten in the United States under public schools auspices) are the most frequently mentioned of his contributions in philosophy and in education, respectively. As examples of commentaries in historical importance and influence, see *Studies in honor of William Torrey Harris* (1935), published as a number of the *International Education Review* and *William Torrey Harris: The commemoration of the one hundred anniversary of his birth (1835-1935)* (John 1937, 143).

4. Another passage which seems to connote a similar notion is the first paragraph of Merle Curti's "William T. Harris, The conservator," in his book, *The social ideas of American educators* (1966, 310). However, while Curti's work has been held in high esteem, it might be contended that his theme in this article (which is expressed in the passage referred to) appears to be seriously shortsighted from a theological-philosophical-educational perspective: while Harris's efforts might have had the appearance of "conservation" for a very limited time, his philosophy of religion seems to have opened the floodgates in the "watershed" of American intellectual history, including especially its philosophical and educational dimensions. For the use and meaning of "watershed" in this context, see Commager (1956, 41-54).

5. This phrase is cited by William H. Kilpatrick (1929, 61).

6. The "translation of Rosenkranz ..." refers to Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz (1886), *The philosophy of education*, International Education Series. Harris edited many volumes in Appleton's International Education Series, the first of which was this book by the Hegelian Rosenkranz.

7. Kohlbrenner (1950) notices this point in his studies of Harris and observes that while the Superintendent did provide the required statistical data, he went beyond. His Annual Reports became a series on the theory (philosophy) of some of the most prominent pedagogical topics of the day.

8. The practice-oriented philosophical interests of the St. Louis philosophers of this era also are pointed out in other secondary sources.

9. In addition to whatever unofficially recognized contributions Harris made to this volume, he also provided the "Report of the assistant superintendent" (1867, 56-73).

10. For notices of other commendations of these reports the reader can consult *William Torrey Harris: The commemoration of the one hundred anniversary of his birth, 1835-1935* (John 1937, 14) and Ernest Sutherland Bates (1932, 328-30).

11. For Harris's honors in France see also "Harris, William Torrey," *Encyclopedia of the History of Missouri* III (Conrad 1901, 190-91).

12. "Religion" in this context denotes primarily "philosophy of religion," which was a significant area of philosophy for Harris.

13. It should be noted that the classification of topics followed is not found, as such, in these Annual Reports; rather, it represents an interpretation not intended to be taken in an ironclad fashion, but to be utilized for purposes of clarifying the philosophical content.

14. Although Harris's dualistic conception of the real is compromised somewhat with the introduction of number, it is not eliminated due to the fact that number is a spiritual entity.

15. For example, one can consult pertinent educational fallacies in John Locke, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (Harris 1880, 215-16). Obviously against Rousseau, he (1880, 217; see Ulich 1965, ch. 5) claims that "this belief in the perfection of nature is the arch-heresy of education."

16. An explicit distinction is made between man as natural being (animal) and man as human (elevated into the ideal via culture) in Harris (1872, 29-30). Another distinction, between the "realms" of nature and of mind, is suggested in the context of development of human mastery as an educational purpose (Harris 1870, 110). The desired direction of change, away from naturalness (in a process called "self-estrangement") is described in Harris (1874, 63-65).

17. Although this point may seem inconsequential, it represents an attitude toward reality and the human being, more specifically, which is not shared by all philosophers and, in fact, was attacked directly in subsequent developments in American philosophy.

18. The purposive human being is contrasted with nature, which is determined by external ends.

19. The actual statement here refers to education; the culture of the rational soul of all human beings is not merely a privilege, but also a duty. Other references to "equal education" of the sexes are found in Harris (1874, 117-20 and in 1871, 22).

20. As the assistant superintendent of St. Louis public schools (writing in a document not under formal consideration here), Harris (1867, 57-58) adverted to the importance of aspiration, calling it "the mother of all noble endeavor."

21. "Habit" here signifies "good" or "correct" behavior which is practiced repetitively with relative ease.

22. This concept is attributed by Harris to Froebel, apparently with his (the former's) assent.

23. More will be said about this later in conjunction with Harris's theory of knowledge.

24. The human will is not mentioned by Harris in this immediate context.

25. More will be said later in this regard in connection with the topic of human socialization.

26. The obvious significance of this topic for education helps to explain its centrality in this (or any other) Harris treatise concerning philosophy of education.

27. The "partaking" referred to here prevents one's labor from becoming slavery.

28. The topic of morality will be discussed below; that of moral education—and education, generally—belongs to another study.

29. In light of this observation, it is evident that this topic tends to synthesize and conclude parts of the last two (concerning human development and socialization). Harris apparently gives more attention to play than to work in his direct discussion of the two, partially because of his concern for the education of young children.

30. The details of this process pertain to Harris's theory of kindergarten education.

31. This state of affairs exemplifies the interlocking character of these philosophical topics.

32. In this context, the “partial and untrue” are identified with the immoral.

33. The text says, “...the virtue that mostly affects health.” However, the interpretation rendered appears to be what is intended.

34. This matter is obviously of extraordinary importance to Harris’s theory of education.

35. One is reminded here of the parallel between toleration and prescription, on one hand, and play and work, on the other.

36. The reconciliation of spontaneity and prescription is seen also by Harris as a fundamental problem of education.

37. This “fixed object” is relative to questions of truth and knowledge.

38. Harris’s philosophy of religion is one of the major topics below.

39. There also is a reference to an Absolute Person (see Harris 1880, 148); however, that is associated with religion.

40. The notion of “transfer of training” (a phrase not used in this context in the Report) is based upon the comment that “the child engaged in this activity has gained a quickened intelligence [which] has been disciplined to seize subjects in a correct manner.”

41. In this regard, he says that “From enlarged conception, issues forth new and more potent directive power.”

42. The context for these suggestions is directly educational: a formal teacher-student relationship.

43. Avoidance of mistakes might have been added as a purpose.

44. A preliminary essential means to the attainment of wisdom is the use of language (reading, writing, grammar, etc.), according to Harris (1873, 154). Wisdom is said to be proportioned (in choosing a course of action) to intellectual enlightenment, “more” of the latter signifying “more” of the former (Harris 1871, 22).

45. In Harris’s complaint about students’ inability to combine “the knowledge of several quarters together,” the term “wisdom” is not used, although it presumably could have been employed. (It should be noted that, in order to promote students to “combine knowledge,” different *kinds* of subject matter must comprise the curriculum; an immediate concern in this context is the potential overemphasis upon the natural sciences.)

46. Although they may not be perfect synonyms for “morality,” the terms “ethics” and “ethical system(s)” are used interchangeably with it.

47. According to Harris (1877, 184), “Self-sacrifice for a rational end is the root of the moral tree.”

48. For Harris (1871, 22), temperance (or “the subordination of the appetites to reason”) is the virtue which has the greatest effect on health.

49. Harris (1875, 144) says, “a feeling of responsibility and the necessity of making persistent and regular exertions” are associated with the development of “that valuable discipline of the will.”

50. According to Harris (1876, 95), the virtues of priority for the indigent are cleanliness, manual skill, taste in ornament and design, and politeness and courtesy.

51. For a similar concern from a different perspective, one can consult the views of Martin Buber as explained in Aubrey Hodes (1971).

52. In Harris's Twenty-fifth Annual Report (1880, 251), the moral and the true are linked relative to the "spectacle of the world."

53. This is so, Harris says, according to "the profoundest thinkers of our time."

54. The reference here (to the source of the final destiny of the person) is to the "national religion."

55. An important primary source to be utilized in this regard is Harris's only full-length book on philosophy of education, *Psychologic foundations of education: An attempt to show the genesis of the higher faculties of the mind*, published in 1898.

56. Two sources of discussions of absolute and personal idealism, in general, are in Macquarrie (1963, Chaps. II and III) and in Creighton (1925, Chap. XIV).

57. Leidecker (1946, 316, 324-27) characterizes *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* as "America's first serial publication of a professional philosophic nature." (Its contributors include William James, Josiah Royce, Charles Peirce, John Dewey, Thomas Davidson, G. Stanley Hall, G. H. Howison, and Nicholas Murray Butler.) *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1867-1893* has been re-published in 22 volumes and is reviewed by John J. Stuhr (2003, Vol. 17, No. 3, 237-40). Stuhr notes that Harris's *JSP* "was the first scholarly journal in the English language without a specific theological agenda." Along with the *JSP*, the St. Louis Philosophical Society was "instrumental in bringing about one of the most significant movements in the history of American philosophy, the St. Louis Movement in Philosophy.

58. What Myron C. Atkin (1980), then dean of the School of Education at Stanford University, said publicly about philosophy of education in 1980 also characterizes the situation in American philosophy in recent years. A portion of a letter which he sent to the author is as follows:

(a) It is not clear that philosophers of education are addressing some of the major moral and social issues in education (such as the growth of private schools or the practice of using children as primary agents in addressing some of the nation's most vexing social problems).

(b) Much of the writing by educational philosophers seems directed toward other educational philosophers. As in much humanistically-oriented scholarship these days, expository styles tend to be opaque. Educational philosophers would do well to cultivate literary approaches that are at once valued by academic scholars and also by those who have most to gain by a greater understanding of the philosophical basis for education policy.

(c) Some education philosophers use their scholarship primarily to advance their own political preference. While there is no particular objection to this development, most people who have responsibilities for teaching or school administration would just as soon trust their own political judgment as someone else's. If education philosophy is seen as partisan in a narrowing sense, it is taken less seriously.

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