

THEOLOGY-PHILOSOPHY OF CATHOLIC EDUCATION: AN EXAMPLE FROM THE “DUTCH CATECHISM”

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*The most prevalent modes of philosophy, educational theory, and philosophy of education currently extant in the United States represent a pronounced departure from the fundamental patterns of the Greek-Jewish-Christian tradition. Among the noteworthy characteristics of the more popular trends is a tendency toward the denial of, or an indifference regarding, the existence of a Transcendent Being. This feature alone has effected a radical departure from the scholarly traditions which are characterized by investigations into the relationships between theology and philosophy. This factor, in turn, bears potentially strong influence upon the theory and practice of education. Partially in order to promote the revivification of a heritage not unrelated to that of many early American intellectual leaders, the main purpose of this paper is to exemplify the structure and an aspect of the substance of a theology-philosophy of Catholic education in accord with a selected passage from *A New Catechism: Catholic Faith for Adults* (known as the “Dutch Catechism”). The theological-philosophical dimension of this structure is represented by a developmental process entailing three stages of progression: from human love through an awareness of the “God of the philosophers” to belief in Christ. It is shown how theological and philosophical elements of this process bear upon the importance of early childhood religious education as well as of Catholic education somewhat more broadly conceived. It is noted that, although the theological-philosophical foundations allow for numerous options in education, there are bounds within which the direction of this education must be retained.*

The current importance of this kind of investigation lies in 1) the fundamentally empiricist approaches in philosophy of education so prominent today, 2) the inability of empiricist philosophies to confront prescriptive values in an authentically rational fashion, and 3) the necessity of a theological-philosophical approach for the Christian who wishes to

think rationally about prescriptive values, and to formulate the kinds of educational plans which will prove to be effective in promoting authentic human happiness. Brief references to the practical (including educational) efficacy of theoretical (including theological and philosophical) conceptions, and to teacher education, conclude the paper.

INTRODUCTION

The most prevalent modes of philosophy, educational theory, and philosophy of education currently extant in the United States represent a pronounced departure from the fundamental patterns of the Greek-Jewish-Christian tradition. Among the noteworthy characteristics of the more popular trends is a tendency toward the denial of, or an indifference regarding, the existence of a Transcendent Being. This feature alone has effected a radical departure from the scholarly traditions which are characterized by investigations into the relationships between theology and philosophy. This factor, in turn, bears potentially strong influence upon the theory and practice of education.

The following remarks are intended to exemplify the structure and some features of the substance of a theology-philosophy of Catholic education. More specifically, they are directed to an analysis and interpretation of a relatively brief passage of *A New Catechism: Catholic Faith for Adults* (1965, 235-41)¹ within the framework of theology-philosophy of education. A short outline of this passage will be followed by the commentary.

DUTCH CATECHISM

The topics of the *New Catechism* which are under scrutiny here appear in the text in the following order.

- 1) Introduction: Faith, hearing, “conversion” (p. 236)
- 2) Philosophical analysis of the foundation of the “philosophy of the good life” (pp.236-37)
- 3) Beyond the limits of the person to the Transcendent (pp. 237-38)
- 4) Beyond the “God of the philosophers” to belief in Christ (and the Triune God) (p. 238)
- 5) The pedagogical process by means of which belief in Christ is addressed (pp. 239-41)

The first and fourth topics are theologically-oriented, whereas the second and third are philosophical, and the last one focuses upon education. (It is interesting to note that neither the term “education” nor the term “pedagogy,” nor any term derived directly from either, is used in the passage in question.) In accord with the purposes of this paper, as stated above, the interfacing of the theological and philosophical considerations (with priority afforded the former) provides a basis for predicating,

explaining, and justifying the educational enterprise proposed.

The Introduction to the selected passage in the *New Catechism* focuses, in a preliminary manner, upon the process of “coming to a belief” in Christ.² According to the text, there is “no doubt” that we are created ““for Christ:”” the whole of reality, including individual selves, is oriented to Him and in contact with Him. However, despite the fact that a human being’s spontaneous instincts, sound reasoning, talent for love, and human progress contain “something of Christ,” one cannot rely entirely upon personal powers for achieving faith in Christ.

Faith is not something discovered by the self through, for example, analyzing the nature of the person. Rather, “Faith comes by hearing” (the opening sentence of this passage). No human being accepts what he has not heard and does not know; however, God has revealed Himself and established His Church. The person who hears the Word of God, and allows the Gospel message to revise his thinking and to mold his life in accord with it is thereby “converted.” But, how does this occur? The *New Catechism* refers to “difficult steps” needed to arrive at faith and to develop in the faith. What are the difficulties? Answering this question leads us to the philosophical analysis of the foundation of the “philosophy of the good life” (the second topic).

While recognizing the relative uniqueness of each human being, it is noted that “the difficulties are ultimately rooted in factors which are common to all men” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 236). The first difficulty is identified as the desire to master all things, to subject everything – including the self – to one’s own will. This entails, according to the *New Catechism*, an elimination of admiration and reverence from one’s attitude toward the environment, and the preclusion of an awareness of the mystery of things: the “wonder”³ of the world has vanished. Another name for the attitude portrayed here is “self-centeredness,” a primary concern for external reality in terms of its personal utility (*New Catechism*, 1965, 236-37).

The second difficulty noted is simply a specification of the first with regard to the human being. Again, this refers to a certain blindness to the appreciation of the uniqueness, mysteriousness, and irreplaceability of other human beings as centers of love and freedom. A dominant characteristic of this problem is the manipulation of other persons for one’s own enhancement. While modern technology is noted as promoting an inclination toward such an approach, the root of the problem, which is covetousness (often mixed with pride), is found within all persons to some extent.⁴ Does this mean that the problem cannot be overcome? It appears to mean that it cannot be overcome once and for all by an individual, which is not to say that it cannot be counteracted in any manner.

What must be done to combat covetousness as a means to authentic human happiness? The answer of the *New Catechism* to this question is *love*. When one “crosses the threshold” by means of “really loving,” fellow human beings cease to be objectified as sources of pleasure or some other form of utility; and each person becomes “a person like ourselves and other than ourselves, with his own depths and unexpectedness” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 237). An effort is made in this new life to see the other in a relationship which develops by letting oneself be won over, by giving

oneself, and by trusting and believing.

The notion of faith is strongly emphasized here: “Without belief there is no love. This belief in the other is not a lower form of knowledge but a higher. It is the one way of knowing the greatest thing on earth: another person. . . . It (‘I believe in you’) means grasping and knowing in the finest way of knowing which exists on earth: knowing another in his unique selfhood” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 237).⁵ A truly loving relationship, involving admiration and reverence, does not make a person blind, but clear-sighted, according to this passage in the *New Catechism*.⁶ The conclusion reached at this point in the selected passage from the *New Catechism* is that the “good life,” the life conducive to authentic human happiness, is one which is characterized by self-transcendence, by a “going-out” of oneself toward other human beings in gestures of love. It is further observed that those persons engaged in genuine love relationships “sometimes come to summits where they feel that ‘the best is yet to be’” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 237). They also feel as if they somehow have been given to one another.

At this juncture, some fundamental questions may arise. How or through whom has all this occurred? Whence the persistently unfulfilled desire for more? What lies beyond our love? Is that something greater than anything we know? One may refuse to entertain these questions, choosing to close oneself to anything distinct from that which is experienced empirically. On the other hand, one can “try to listen,” and the resulting search can carry the person “beyond” – to an idea of the Other, the Transcendent, the “God of the philosophers” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 237-38). Although this stage (referred to above as the third topic) is treated very sketchily in the *New Catechism*, the mode of expression is noteworthy: “Questioning, searching, groping, the human mind forms an idea of what the Other, the Transcendent should be” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 238). Attention should be focused upon the fact that, at this stage, the instrument of one’s effort is the human mind. This is significant in at least two respects: the person who has achieved this vision has transcended the use of the senses and an empiricist approach to reality, and the process is a natural one frequently called “abstraction.”⁷ The result of this use of the human mind is the formation of an *idea* of the Transcendent. This idea is the basis for the above reference to the Transcendent as the “God of the philosophers.”

The natural use of reason to achieve awareness of the idea of a Transcendent Being lies in the realm of the philosophical. The result is knowledge of an abstraction, or an Ultimate Principle.⁸ While formal philosophical reflection can be an important and vital stage in religious conversion, no amount or quality of philosophical reasoning, of itself, will enable one to meet the God of Christianity in a personal relationship. That fact takes us to the next stage, which goes beyond the “God of the philosophers” to belief in Christ and the Triune God of Christianity (the fourth topic in this plan).

Apparently in accord with the spirit of this selected passage in the *New Catechism*, it can be asserted that the person who has ascended to an awareness of the “God of the philosophers” has a certain kind of preparation appropriate for meeting Christ. However (and, somewhat paradoxically, as will be seen), this stage of faith in the Person of Christ is achieved only when one is “ready to stoop” to accommodate oneself to the “lowness

of the lintel.” This “stooping” occurs “when we do not shrink from the fact that God’s speech is so ordinary.” God has spoken in Christ in a very human manner; furthermore, He continues to do this in such “humanly external things” as the Sacraments, the Word, and the fellowship of the Church. Meeting the Lord today is neither a purely invisible nor an individual matter: “It is only in the fellowship which is the body of Christ that man really perceives God as the Other...” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 238).

An important feature of this matter of Christian faith, according to this section of the *New Catechism*, is the potential reluctance of the person to accept the message of Christ. Perhaps, in noting the “stooping” and “lowness of the lintel” relative to doing so, the author(s) is (are) pointing to the paradox stemming from the exalted use of reason in achieving a philosophical conception of a Transcendent Being, and faith in a somewhat ordinary and yet mysterious Divine Person. Overcoming some apparent incompatibilities between faith and reason, and certain feelings of humiliation, in order to believe in Christ as God in union with the Father and the Holy Spirit are essential to conversion.

Again, the stumbling block noted in crossing from knowing the philosophical “One” to believing in Christ may be witnessed, to some extent, in terms of the contrast between the depths of abstraction in this kind of philosophy, and the concreteness and straightforwardness of the Gospels. Whereas learnedness is adequate for the former, only the highest wisdom is suitable in reference to the latter. The crossing entails abandoning the utterance of “I know” in favor of assuming the kind of effort intended by St. Augustine when he said, “I believe in order that I might understand.” The former requires character, of course, but the latter demands a new dimension of being.

The conclusion to this section in the *New Catechism* refers to the external, “the unfolding of Christ’s message,” and the internal, “the peace that the world cannot give.” These two signposts, it is noted, “point to the door, which is there for those who are ready to bow their heads. The house to which it leads is then seen to be wonderfully high” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 238).

This concludes the theological-philosophical side of this example of theology-philosophy of Christian education. In summary, it can be recalled that the process of conversion entails crossing three thresholds: 1) choosing to trust, which effects a loving relationship with another human being; 2) transcending the senses by means of the human mind in becoming aware of a Supreme Reality, recognized as a source of one’s love and of the fulfillment of personal desires; and 3) passing beyond an awareness of the “God of the philosophers” to belief in Christ in His relationship to the Father and the Holy Spirit.

PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Before elaborating various essential features of a kind of education which will foster the described meaning of conversion, some external circumstances of the learner must be considered. The first application of the above topics in the selected passage of the *New Catechism* does not pertain to the adult catechumenate, even though that

might be expected in light of the type of analysis offered above. It is pointed out that even though many persons throughout the world come to faith as adults, in the United States the first preaching is usually accomplished through parents' examples of living their faith in the view of their young child (*New Catechism*, 1965, 239-40).

The first question raised is whether this practice (of raising children from birth to be religious) is right or wrong. Should children be brought up without any religion so that they later will be able to choose their religion more satisfactorily? This is a crucial pedagogical issue, and the answer provided is unequivocal: children should be brought up to be religious, *and* they should be allowed to make their own religious choices as adults. Three arguments are provided to explain and justify the first part of this thesis, regarding early religious education. In a somewhat preliminary manner, it is noted that the necessity of regarding a personal religious choice as an adult does not "prove" that parents ought not to attempt to educate their children in religion. (This assertion is followed by an appeal to the "general consensus:" "All who genuinely believe will spontaneously agree") (*New Catechism*, 1965, 239). The first major positive argument is offered by means of a question and a Gospel citation. The question is, "can one imagine Christ refusing to speak to children of their heavenly Father?" Furthermore, Christ referred to "these little ones who believe in me."

Secondly, the nature of the person as an "animal educandum," that is, a creature who must develop through a process of education, is offered as a foundation of the need for the religious formation of the child. It is pointed out that babies raised without contact with adults would develop inhumanly, namely, without language, thought, and morals. Furthermore, it is suggested that there is empirical evidence⁹ that the child becomes humanized or civilized through persons who affect his life, especially, of course, his parents. In addition, it is natural for parents to "give the best they have in every human sphere" (meaning their culture and convictions) to their offspring. As result of this desire, "parents transmit to the child the best of their human qualities." Within the substance of the heritage to be passed on by a Christian, then, is religious faith: "Those who gratefully acknowledge the faith as their greatest possession, the deepest truth they know, cannot but wish to pass it on" (*New Catechism*, 1965, 239).

Two other approaches to the need for early religious education are expressed. In the first one a parallel case is argued: no one claims that children should be removed from the influence of language and general culture until the age twenty-one, at which time they will select their own language and life style. (It is observed that St. Thomas Aquinas emphasized this point in defending the rights of Jewish parents and guardians to raise their children as Jews). The second approach refers to the practice of parents bringing their children into contact with esteemed persons such as grandparents and good friends. The conclusion is obvious: "If they love Our Lord, if he is really important in their lives, someone whom they prize above all, they cannot but teach their children to speak to him" (*New Catechism*, 1965, 239-240).

The third argument¹⁰ advanced in defense of the religious education of children rests on the assertion of a natural human tendency to imitate. Christian belief is not a purely interior matter, and children will "automatically join in" the practice of this belief

with their parents. Noteworthy here is the inevitability of a parent choosing to be for or against God (indifferences being categorized with the latter),¹¹ and (granting an inevitable inclination of children to copy their parents), thereby, an inevitable influence upon a child to develop toward or away from God.¹² The contention that “There is, in fact, nothing more effective than example” obviously bears serious implications for the role of a teacher in a Catholic school.¹³

In this section on pedagogical implications, attention thus far has been focused upon the education of young children. At this point in the selected passage of the *New Catechism*, adult “conversion” of persons raised as Catholics is considered.¹⁴ The “conversion” desired in this circumstance consists of the adult’s choosing whether or not to accept the religious heritage within which he has been educated throughout his life. Despite the religion of his parents and his own upbringing, there exists “a personal threshold which he must cross” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 240). Here, again, an argument for early religious education is made: despite possible difficulty, the person who has been raised a Catholic will be in a better position to “cross the threshold” than one who has not been so raised. Some of the reasons offered include the fact that he will not suffer from certain prejudices,¹⁵ he will have “tasted peace,” and he will have “spoken to God.” These effects are likened to the loving affection of which the young adult is capable due to earlier parental love in the home.

A central argument for early religious education employed here, in connection with the effects and analogy just mentioned, focuses upon the social dimension of the Christian faith: “Faith, like every other human thing, is something of a social act, something done together. . . . The Church believes together” (*New Catechism*, 1965, 240). Although one’s faith is personal, it is affected (and apparently, effected, to some extent) by parents and other members of the community.

Some space is devoted near the end of the selected passage from the *New Catechism* to reasons for giving up the faith of one’s parents and one’s own upbringing, and an appropriate reaction of the parents to that situation. Three circumstances surrounding loss of the faith are mentioned: 1) faults and hardening of the heart, 2) the obscuring of personally meaningful evidence of the faith (which could promote spiritual progress), and 3) a combination of these two factors. Two principles are urged upon parents reacting to loss of faith for these reasons. First, while faith can be promoted in another, it cannot be imposed. Secondly, a directly educational matter, parents must grant the child gradually enhanced freedom as he matures, respecting increasingly what the son or daughter believes, even though they (the parents) judge it to be wrong. Finally, in this regard, it is noted that the loss of faith of one of their offspring can be an occasion for a religious renewal on the part of the parents (*New Catechism*, 1965, 241).

Although the following is not the last paragraph of the pedagogical remarks from the selected passage of the *New Catechism*, it can serve to conclude this section.

To the question, therefore, of whether the parents determine the faith of the children the answer is yes and no. No, because once he has come to adulthood, the child must determine his own attitude in face of Christ. One

does not automatically become a fully mature believer, without the definite intervention of a free act. But it remains true that the parents' choice has influenced the children. This is inevitable and good and willed by God. It is in the nature of faith to be given to men in common (*New Catechism*, 1965, 241).

CONCLUSION

A brief summary and conclusion will close these remarks, which are intended to provide a limited example of theology-philosophy of Catholic education. In the first section of the selected passage from the *New Catechism*, concerning the theological-philosophical dimension of the example, a process of conversion is delineated in terms of three thresholds: 1) choosing to trust, which effects a loving relationship with another human being; 2) transcending the senses by means of the human mind in becoming aware of a Supreme Reality, recognized as a source of one's love and of the fulfilment of personal desires; and 3) passing beyond an awareness of the "God of the philosophers" to belief in Christ in His relationship to the Father and the Holy Spirit.

The first crossing occurs at a very basic human level, although philosophical reflection might accompany it. The second crossing exhibits explicit philosophical content, while the third one is based upon Divine Faith, the rational appreciation of which entails theological investigation. "Philosophy," in this context, can be taken to mean "the science which by the natural light of reason studies the first causes or highest principles of all things..." (Jacques Maritain, 1937, 108). "Theology" can be viewed as the rational investigation of truths revealed by God (as known in Christianity) and set forth by the Catholic Church. It can be seen readily that the two are intimately linked in the process of conversion described above. In a sense, philosophical awareness prepares one for religious faith; the Supreme Reality or First Principle becomes "transformed" into a Personal being, whom one "meets" and in whom one trusts.¹⁶ Philosophy and theology are explicitly involved and closely related in this process.

In the second section of this paper (the fifth topic in the preview) are some pedagogical implications of the meaning of "being a Catholic." The focus is on early religious education with some attention to adult "conversion" (for one who had received a religious upbringing) and suitable reactions by parents to loss of faith by a son or daughter. As indicated earlier, the term "education" (or some derivative thereof) is not used in these five-plus pages of the *New Catechism*;¹⁷ as a result, there are no explicit references to educational purposes, the curriculum, and teaching methods, as such. However, the part of the text in question (pp. 239-41) directly involves the process of Catholic education.

A fundamental educational purpose implicit here is to bring into existence a mature Catholic person, one who gradually develops suitable intellectual awareness and exemplifies Christian virtues in a manner appropriate to each stage of life, including the adult "conversion" described above. Although the substance of this kind of education is not adverted to in terms of a curriculum, elements of the curriculum could be inferred

and obviously would include Holy Scripture. Again, methods of teaching, while not considered, as such, are brought into the picture through an emphasis on the importance of parental example (as indicated above). Other methods obviously need to be employed in bringing about a familiarity with the Bible, more specifically, with the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Christ.

Presumably, it is clear that the specific combination of theological and philosophical principles expressed in the selected passage of the *New Catechism* tends to suggest, or even prescribe, a relatively clear pattern of education along the lines discussed. While this theology and philosophy allows for numerous options, there are bounds within which the direction of this education must be retained. For example, the formation of atheists cannot be a purpose of education, given the theological principles discussed.¹⁸

The above remarks constitute a very limited exemplification of the structure of theology-philosophy of Catholic education. This framework obviously could be filled in (on both sides) with an indefinite number of volumes. Although many libraries of books and articles have been written on the various topics discussed above, it does not appear that the structure as such is widely considered. But, what is the loss in that?

According to one commentator, “What seems to matter most is not whether the school is voluntary or maintained, single sex or mixed, large or small but the process, the life and values of the school” (Mervyn Davies, 1979, 3).¹⁹

Two points stand out in regard to this citation (given an authentically Christian frame of reference and meaning of “value”). Initially, the “world” of education in the United States, particularly educational research, is thoroughly permeated not merely with empirical approaches, but, largely, with an exclusively empirical attitude. Secondly, the only apparent means of an authentically rational investigation of values at the level of prescription are found in theology and non-empiricist philosophy. These two points suggest fundamental needs: for the general citizenry, the development of non-empiricist philosophies of education; and for the Catholic, the development of theology-philosophy of education in the direction indicated above. Some fulfillment of these needs is necessary in order to find appropriate meaning in the realm of education, and in order to formulate the kinds of educational plans which will prove to be effective in promoting authentic human happiness.

Whether or not the reader is sympathetic to the suggestions just offered, it must be admitted that there is clear historical evidence to support the fact that differences in theoretical (including theological and philosophical) conceptions of reality have contributed fundamentally to differences in actual cultural patterns, including educational theory and practice. Not the least important of the implications of this observation is the demand for serious attention to the education of the (prospective) teacher of youth and adults, with a special focus upon the necessity of considering theology-philosophy of Catholic education, both in planning teacher education and as a dimension of its curriculum.²⁰

NOTES

1. Hereafter, this volume will be referred to as *New Catechism*. It also is called the “Dutch Catechism.”

2. The immediate concern of these two paragraphs is not Divine Grace, as such, but the natural elements which are involved, and which are based upon the notions of God the Creator and God the Revealer of the Word.

3. The sense of “wonder” here seems akin to that which Aristotle identifies with a metaphysical approach to reality (see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book I).

4. These two difficulties, which, in fact, constitute a single problematic from this philosophical perspective, may remind the reader of Martin Buber’s distinction between I-Thou and I-It. Portrayed here is, of course, a typical I-It relationship from Buber’s point of view: a relationship in which one (empirically) knows and uses the other for the sake of oneself, without allowing the full impact of that other (see Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, Second edition, 1958). Some applications of these principles made by Buber himself can be found in Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (1965). For a commentary on Buber’s principles, see Maurice Friedman, *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue* (1960).

5. This attitude seems to have some correspondence to what Buber calls the I-Thou approach to existence. This refers to becoming aware of the other for the sake of the other, with an intent to promote the real well-being of the other (which is not necessarily to be identified with what the other consciously says, does, or desires) (see Buber, *I and Thou*, Second edition, 1958; Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 1965; and Friedman, *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*, 1960).

6. The references to belief and trust here suggest attention to the extraordinarily extensive role of natural faith in human living. For example, note the pervasiveness of belief in what we commonly refer to as knowledge (as in one’s knowledge that Russia exists without having been to Russia); note, also, the faith which is operative in the first principles or points of initiation in all philosophical systems. Perhaps relative to both of these examples, although more obviously pertinent to the first, is the following comment of John Henry Cardinal Newman: “Life is not long enough for proving everything; we are obliged to take a great many things upon the credit of others.” John Henry Newman, *Lecture on the Present Position of Catholics in England* (1925, 38-39).

7. This is not intended to diminish the importance of the senses and empirical investigation of the world; rather, the point is that one uses the senses to go beyond the empirical to a cultivation of reason, an immaterial human faculty which renders the possibility of comprehending the *idea* of a Transcendent Being. A well-known example of religious conversion in which this stage is elucidated is found in the life of St. Augustine (see St. Augustine, *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, 1960).

8. An example is Aristotle’s Prime Mover, also known as First Cause or First Act.

9. The phrase used is “Scientists are more and more convinced...” (see *New Catechism*, 1965, 239).

10. In the text of the *New Catechism*, this is designated as the second argument, since the first two in this interpretation are lumped into one. (The distinction between

the first two here is made on the basis of a Biblical approach in the first instance, and a scientific and analytic attitude in the second.)

11. A pertinent reference here is to William James' notion of a "forced option," which, in fact, he applies to religion (see William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902).

12. The *New Catechism* does not elaborate explicitly the full argument given here. However, the argument has a serious bearing upon the *idea* of a school and educational planning in regard to conscious and unconscious effects of teaching or not teaching religion, teaching this or that religion, and the exercise of values throughout the curriculum and total educational process.

13. Support of the early religious education of children is expressed clearly by Pope John Paul I in his "letter" to Bishop Dupanloup (see Albino Luciani, *Illustrimi: Letters from Pope John Paul I*, 1978, 220-26).

14. It may be of some interest to note that this is the first reference to Catholicism in the selected passage of the *New Catechism*. (This reference is on p. 240, and the selected passage begins on p. 236.)

15. Perhaps, the reader might find this point illuminated in Newman's *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England*, (1925, 233-50).

16. One can be reminded here of the kind of process engaged in by St. Thomas Aquinas in adapting the philosophy of Aristotle to a Christian context.

17. Despite this omission here, the phrase "Christian education" appears twice on p. 250 of the *New Catechism* in connection with infant baptism.

18. A similar notion regarding psychology of education is suggested by William James in *Talks to Teachers on Psychology; and to Students on some of Life's Ideals* (1958).

19. This point is made from a radically different perspective in Denis P. Doyle, 16-19.

20. The term "Catholic" rather than "Christian" is employed consistently in this paper because the *New Catechism* is a document prepared by Catholics, and the references to Catholicism within the selected passage (on p. 240) obviously indicate the intended orientation. This does not mean, however, that non-Catholic Christians and others would find the selected passage and the above remarks outside their own interests.

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